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Preface - Psychiatry and Cosmological Speculation 
After high school, when I told my aunt that I wanted to study philosophy at the 
university,  she looked at  me very empathically and said:  “have you considered to 
consult a psychiatrist? they can be very helpful, you know.” I was shocked. What had 
the philosophical pursuit to understand humanity and the cosmos to do with psychic 
health? Maybe she confused philosophy and psychology. Or maybe she thought that 
studying philosophy leads nowhere socially or professionally and that I was simply 
experiencing a temporary existential crisis. Seeing a psychiatrist would put me back 
on the right social track. 
But  maybe  she  was  right  after  all.  Maybe  asking  fundamental  and 
philosophical questions is an illness. In that case I am proud to be ill. Even more, my 
hope is that it is highly contagious, and that you, my reader, will want to pursue even 
further the intellectual journey I will now share with you. But first, a word of caution.
I  would  like  to  warn  my  readers  that  this  work  contains  cosmological 
speculations1. The speculations I discuss are cosmological because they stretch over 
billions of years and billions of light years. How can we legitimate such speculations? 
Part  I  constitutes  one  third  of  this  work  and  is  dedicated  to  a  study  of  the 
philosophical method at large. I argue that a major aim of philosophy is to construct 
comprehensive and  coherent worldviews. To construct such worldviews demands to 
answer big questions like “where do we come from?”, “where are we going?” or “are 
we alone in  the universe?” Motivated by our  existential  need to  answer such big 
questions,  we  naturally  tend  to  speculate.  Isn't  such  an  endeavor  in  striking 
contradiction with the rigor of the scientific enterprise? Is it just fantasy?
Certainly not! Speculating does not mean being unscientific. On the contrary, 
it  means  identifying  and  relying  on  the  most  fundamental  scientific  theories  and 
principles, and then extrapolate them. In my speculations, mostly contained in Part III, 
I have done my best to focus on the most robust and general scientific theories such as 
principles  of  relativity  theories,  thermodynamics,  systems  theory,  evolution, 
theoretical computer science or logic.
Of course, many speculations turn out to be wrong. As the multiple failures in 
the history of science show us, the risk for a speculative theory to become refuted is 
real.  Indeed,  cosmological  speculations  rely  on  and  extrapolate  from our  current 
theories. Cosmological models in the next decades might refute speculations of our 
time,  or  lead  to  very  different  kinds  of  speculations.  Speculating  also  means 
extrapolating the physical laws we can experiment with on Earth, to extreme regimes 
of large energies, high densities, as well as huge space and time scales. We need to be 
aware that such extrapolations are subject to strong uncertainties, for example because 
we do not have yet an established theory of quantum gravity.
Historian of cosmology Helge Kragh (2011, 2) wrote in the introduction of his 
book  Higher Speculations: Grand Theories and Failed Revolutions in Physics and 
Cosmology :
Speculations  have  always  been  an  integrated  part  of  the  physical  sciences, 
sometimes  hidden  under  the  more  palatable  term  'hypotheses'.  Indeed, 
fundamental physics without some element of speculation is hardly conceivable. 
1 To make this warning explicit, my PhD at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel was defended with the 
subtitle “Cosmological Speculation and the Meaning of Life”, instead of “The Meaning of Life in a 
Cosmological Perspective”. 
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All scientists agree that speculations have a legitimate place in the construction of 
scientific theories, but there is no agreement as to how speculative a theory may 
be and still be counted as scientific.
To  evaluate  how speculative  a  theory  may  be,  we  need  to  be  clear  on  why we 
speculate.  What  is  our  aim  when  we  speculate?  I  distinguish  three  kinds  of 
speculations to navigate into their variety (Vidal 2012a):
1. Scientific: a speculation is scientific if we have strong reasons to think that 
future observations or experimentations will corroborate or refute it.
2. Philosophical: a speculation is philosophical if it extrapolates from scientific 
knowledge  and  philosophical  principles  to  answer  some  fundamental 
philosophical problems.
3. Fictional:  a  speculation  is  fictional  if  it  extends  beyond  scientific  and 
philosophical speculations.
Fictional speculations are found in counterfactual  history or science fiction books. 
Their main goal is entertain a reader, but their value for history as a discipline or the 
scientific enterprise is limited. 
Scientific  or  philosophical  speculations  stem  from  our  urge  to  complete 
logically  our  knowledge  in  areas  where  it  has  not  yet  been  probed.  Importantly, 
scientific and philosophical speculations have a clear aim, namely to solve scientific 
or philosophical problems.
Of  course,  the  status  of  a  speculation  can  change through time,  and even 
become  normal  science.  For  example,  Giordano  Bruno  made  the  philosophical 
speculation that there were other solar systems in the universe. It was philosophical 
and not scientific because it was not clear at his time if we would ever be able to have 
telescopes  and  observational  methods  to  discover  exoplanets.  With  technological 
progress,  the speculation becomes scientific,  because observational  techniques can 
empirically check such a claim. Finally, the status of speculation disappears altogether 
as we found the first  exoplanets  (Wolszczan and Frail  1992).  Today,  hunting and 
finding  exoplanets  is  no  speculation  anymore,  but  part  of  normal  astrobiological 
science. However, Bruno also believed in the common speculation that the universe is 
filled with a substance called “aether”, a theory which is now considered obsolete.
So any speculation has to be taken with a grain of salt. To this end, I tried to 
review many different speculations, and not to overstate the conclusions. I made clear 
the hypotheses on which some of my core reasonings hinge in Appendix II. This is 
presented as argumentative maps, and I hope they will facilitate rational and critical 
debate. 
For readers familiar with my previous work, let me quickly outline how it 
connects with this thesis. Part I presents philosophical reflections on what philosophy 
is,  and its  method. It  is  a  synthesis and expansion of several  papers  (Vidal 2007; 
2008a; 2012b).  Part  II  analyzes the origin of the universe,  of which Chapter  5 is 
mainly  based  on  (Vidal  2010a;  2012a);  and  section  6.3  The  Cosmic  Evolution
Equation on  (Vidal  2013).  Part  III  is  based  on  reflections  about  future  cosmic 
evolution, Chapter  7 on  (Vidal 2008b), Chapter  8 on  (Vidal 2010a; 2012c; 2012a; 
2012d) and Chapter 9 on (Vidal 2011). Good news, the rest is new. 
Brussels, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, December 2012.
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Abstract
Where does it all come from? Where are we going? Are we alone in the universe?  
What is good and what is evil? The scientific narrative of cosmic evolution demands that we  
tackle  such  big  questions  with  a  cosmological  perspective.  I  tackle  the  first  question  in  
Chapters 4, 5 and 6; the second in Chapters 7 and 8; the third in Chapter 9 and the fourth in  
Chapter 10. However, where do we start to answer such questions wisely? Doing so requires a  
methodological discipline mixing philosophical and scientific approaches.
In Chapter 1, I elaborate the concept of worldview, which is defined by our answers to 
the big questions.  I argue that we should aim at constructing  comprehensive and  coherent 
worldviews. In Chapter 2, I develop  criteria and  tests to assess the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different worldviews. In Chapter 3, I apply those methodological insights to  
religious, scientific and philosophical worldviews.
In Chapter 4, I identify seven fundamental challenges to any ultimate explanation of  
the origin of the universe:  epistemological, metaphysical, thermodynamical, causal, infinity,  
free parameters and fine-tuning.  I then analyze the question of the origin of the universe  
upside down and ask: what are the origins of our cognitive need to find an explanation of this  
origin? I conclude that our explanations tend to fall in two cognitive attractors, the point and  
the cycle.  In  Chapter 5,  I  focus on the free parameters issue,  namely that  there are  free  
parameters in the standard model of particle physics and in cosmological models, which in  
principle can be filled in with any number. I analyze the issue with in physical, mathematical, 
computational and biological frameworks.
Chapter 6 is an in depth analysis of the fine-tuning issue, the claim that those free  
parameters are further fine-tuned for the emergence of complexity.  I debunk common and 
uncommon physical, probabilistic and logical fallacies associated with this issue. I distinguish  
it  from the  closely  related  issues  o f  free  parameters,  parameter  sensitivity,  metaphysical  
issues, anthropic principles, observational selection effects, teleology and God's existence.  I 
conclude that fine-tuning is a conjecture, and that to make progress we need to study how  
common our universe is compared to other possible universes. This study opens a research  
endeavor that I call  artificial cosmogenesis. Inspired by Drake's equation in the Search for  
Extraterrestrial Intelligence, I extend this equation to the Cosmic Evolution Equation, in order 
to study the robustness of the emergence of complexity in our universe, and whether or to  
what  extent  it  is  fine-tuned.  I  then  review  eight  classical  explanations  of  fine-tuning  
(skepticism,  necessity,  fecundity,  god-of-the-gaps,  chance-of-the-gaps,  weak-anthropic-
principle-of-the-gaps, multiverse and design) and show their shortcomings.
In Chapter 7, I show the importance of artificial cosmogenesis from extrapolating the  
future of scientific simulations. I analyze two other evolutionary explanations of fine-tuning  
in Chapter 8. More precisely, I show the limitations of  Cosmological Natural Selection to 
motivate the broader scenario of Cosmological Artificial Selection.
In Chapter 9, I set up a new research field to search for advanced extraterrestrials,  
high  energy  astrobiology.  After  developing  criteria  to  distinguish  natural  from  artificial  
systems, I show that the nature of some peculiar binary star systems needs to be reassessed  
because  of  thermodynamical,  energetic  and  civilizational  development  arguments  which  
converge towards them being advanced extraterrestrials. Since those putative beings actively  
feed on stars, I call them  starivores. The question of their artificiality remains open, but I  
propose concrete research proposals and a prize to further continue and motivate the scientific  
assessment of this hypothesis.
In  Chapter  10,  I  explore  foundations  to  build  a  cosmological  ethics.  I  build  on 
insights from thermodynamics, evolution, and developmental theories. Finally, I examine the  
idea of immortality with a cosmological perspective and conclude that  the ultimate good is  
the infinite continuation of the evolutionary process . Appendix I is a summary of my position,  
and Appendix II provides argumentative maps of the entire thesis.
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Introduction
The great philosophers have always been able 
to clear away the complexities and see simple  
distinctions  –simple  once  they  are  stated, 
vastly difficult before. If we are to follow them 
we  too  must  be  childishly  simple  in  our 
questions –and maturely wise in our replies. 
(Adler and Doren 1972, 271)
Where does it all come from? It takes nothing less than a synthesis of modern 
science to answer this childish question. In a nutshell, modern science gives us the 
following story of our past. Everything started with a Big Bang, about 13.7 billion 
years ago. As the universe expanded and cooled down, atoms formed, stars structured 
in galaxies and clusters of galaxies. On a tiny solid planet, around an average star, 
some special conditions allowed the self-organization of molecules, and the first cell 
was born. Life started. Later, vegetation used the radiation of the Sun and contributed 
to  the  creation  of  an  atmosphere.  Gradually,  more  and  more  complex  organisms 
emerged,  competed  and  cooperated.  Nowadays,  human  cities,  societies  and 
technologies are growing rapidly.
That's for our past. What about our future? Where are we going? Of course, 
we have –by definition– no data about the future.  However,  we do have physical 
scientific theories, which are temporally symmetrical and it is thus legitimate to apply 
them in the past as well as in the future. 
Astrophysicists teach us that in about 5 billion years, our solar system will 
end, with our Sun turning into a red giant star, making Earth's surface much too hot 
for  the continuation of  life as we know it.  The solution then appears to  be easy: 
migration. However, even if life would colonize other solar systems, there will be a 
progressive end of all stars in galaxies. Once stars have converted the available supply 
of hydrogen into heavier elements, new star formation will come to an end. In fact, 
the problem is even worse. It  is estimated that even very massive objects such as 
black holes will evaporate (see e.g. F. C. Adams and Laughlin 1997). The second law 
of thermodynamics, one of the most robust laws of physics, states that disorder or 
entropy of an isolated system can only increase. Eddington  (1928) applied it to the 
universe as a whole and concluded that our universe is doomed to perish in a  heat  
death. Modern cosmology confirms that in the long-term future we will need to deal 
with a cosmic doom scenario, heat death or other. Now, what do those insights about 
our past  and future imply for the meaning of life, intelligence and humans in the 
universe? Most people I talk to, both colleagues and friends, think it is too early to 
think about such a long-term issue as cosmic doom. I strongly disagree. For, when are 
we to start worrying about the far-future, then? When will be a good time to take 
responsibility? 
Humans are insignificant regarding the space they occupy in the universe. The 
Earth is ridiculously small compared to the universe. It  is a tiny planet orbiting a 
common star,  in  a  galaxy  composed  of  billion  of  stars.  And  there  are  billion  of 
galaxies. Humans are also insignificant in terms of universal time. This is illustrated 
by Carl Sagan's (1977) cosmic calendar, in which the ~15 billion year lifespan of the 
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universe is compressed into one year. One second in that cosmic calendar corresponds 
to  475  years  in  our  Western  calendar.  Then,  the  first  humans  would  appear  on 
December 31, the very last day of the cosmic calendar, very late, at  ~10.30pm. Our 
spatial occupation and duration of existence are thus ridiculously small seen from a 
cosmological perspective. To sum up, the fact that in a single, tiny cosmic pocket, life 
and intelligence very recently appeared seems an accident without any significance, 
anyway doomed to be wiped out.
Is this murky story true? Is it correct in all its aspects? Is it possible that it 
misses some important aspects of cosmic evolution? My aim is to show you that this 
story is wrong. Not so much in its scientific content, but in its conclusions and limited 
perspective. In this thesis, I will tell you a very different story, where intelligence and 
complexity are the keys to unlock the universe's mysteries.
The questions of  the beginning and the end of  the universe are  extremely 
difficult, because they require the utmost extrapolation of scientific models, whose 
results then become highly uncertain. Additionally, scientific models cannot directly 
answer metaphysical questions like “why is there something rather than nothing?”; 
“was there a beginning of the universe?”; “is our universe fine-tuned for life?” or 
“what is the meaning and future of life in a cosmological perspective?” 
When dealing with such difficult questions, we have to acknowledge the limit 
of  the  scientific  enterprise.  For  example,  regarding  the  ultimate  origin,  there  are 
observational limits to the early universe, i.e. data we will never get. Neither science 
nor philosophy will  bring us certain answers and this is  an invitation to humility, 
honesty,  and carefulness when approaching those ultimate questions in cosmology 
(see  e.g.  Ellis  2007a,  1259;  Vaas  2003,  sec.  section  7).  This  does not  mean that 
science won't provide us an answer later. Scientific progress often surprised us in the 
past, and there is no reason it won't continue to do so. 
Compared  to  the  early  universe,  there  are  surprisingly  few  works  on  the 
ultimate  future of  the  universe.  However,  mysteries  about  our  far-future  are  as 
important and fascinating to explore as the ones of our past. Classical cosmic doom 
scenarios presuppose that intelligence is and will remain insignificant. But this is in 
contradiction with past cosmic evolution, which shows a complexity increase, from 
galaxies, solar systems, life, mind, intelligence, society, science and technology. What 
if  intelligence  could  have  a  major  impact  on  cosmic  evolution?  If  we  do  not 
underestimate that complexity increase, the matter of cosmic doom becomes much 
more exciting because it remains unsettled.
The human world may be small in comparison to cosmic space and time, but 
what about the increasing complexity? Mind, intelligence, science, technology and 
culture  are highly significant  from a  complexity point  of  view.  There  is  even an 
acceleration in this rise of complexity  (see e.g. Coren 1998; Livio 2000; Chaisson 
2001). Could it be that mind, culture, science and technology are not accidents in the 
universe? Could they have a profound and important cosmological meaning? 
Moreover,  our  day-to-day  lives  seem  very  much  disconnected  from 
astrophysical  or  cosmological  events.  Yet  we  are  in  the  cosmos.  And  future 
generations  ultimately  depend  on  the  future  of  our  universe.  How  will  this 
acceleration and increasing complexity evolve in the far future? Where will it end? 
Will the universe end in a cosmic doom? Or will it be our aspirations that will win out 
in  the  long term?  Is  it  possible  for  life  and  intelligence  to  survive  forever?  Can 
searching  –and  maybe  spotting–  advanced  extraterrestrials  bring  us  a  better 
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understanding of the increasing complexity in our universe? What is goodness in a 
cosmological perspective? Could an evolutionary ethic inspired by cosmic evolution 
help us in guiding our actions? 
How can we hope to answer such difficult questions? If they cannot be fully 
answered  in  a  scientific  framework,  should  we  switch  to  a  religious  approach? 
Religions indeed offer creation myths and value systems, and thereby give practically 
and socially very valuable answers to those questions. However, they often lack a 
self-critical  and  scientific  basis.  Could  a  philosophical  approach  answer  those 
questions, with open, non-dogmatic, rational and cautious answers? If so, how are we 
to answer them in a philosophical and not theological way? Is there a philosophical 
method to do so?
I always was fascinated by the beauty of the starry sky and images of nebula, galaxies 
and other astrophysical objects that modern telescopes bring us. But how do we fit 
into this scheme? In high school, my curiosity led me to buy a French translation of 
Paul Davies'  (1991) The Mind of  God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World, 
which I found most fascinating even though I couldn't understand most of it. Yet,  I 
loved Davies' profound and sincere quest for understanding, combined with up-to-
date cosmological and scientific theories. I was especially fascinated by two ideas: the 
theoretical possibility of baby universes, and Davies' intuition that mind, intelligence 
and consciousness might not be mere cosmic accidents. I  started to speculate that 
those very two ideas might well be connected. But this was just a vague intuition, and 
I do not trust  or value intuitions as such. They are good starting points, but need 
further elaboration, clarification and argumentation. This thesis is my attempt to lift 
this intuition as precisely as possible to a carefully crafted argument and worldview. 
Story 1: Minding rationality and the Mind of God. 
 I  argue  in  this  thesis  that  intelligence  and  complexity  are  essential 
components  of  our  universe.  My  philosophical  position  is  to  remain  rational,  in 
agreement with science, yet attempting to go one step further than scientific inquiry, 
motivated by our childish curiosity and need to answer the big questions.
I  will  not  attempt  to  write  another  comprehensive  story  of  the  universe.  I 
assume that my reader is aware of and familiar with cosmic evolution (if not, see e.g. 
Sagan 1985;  Jantsch  1980;  Turchin  1977;  Christian  2004;  Laszlo  1987;  Chaisson 
2001; 2006; Dick 2009a; 2012).
What  follows  is  instead  an  exploration  and  analysis  of  three  extreme and 
ultimate points of this story: the beginning, the end, and the meaning of increasing 
complexity. If on large scales all our sciences are reduced to cosmology, and if on 
small scales all our sciences can be reduced to particle physics, then how do we link 
the two? The sciences of evolution and complexity have the potential to bridge the 
gap between these two reductions to cosmology and particle physics. They are anti-
reductionist  by  nature  and  try  to  understand  the  emergence  of  new  laws,  of 
complexity transitions.
Inspired by Adler's and Van Doren's quotation above, my ideal is to answer 
childishly simple questions, in a maturely wise manner. These questions concern the 
ultimate origin, future and values from a cosmological perspective. To answer them in 
a wise manner, we will inquire into many intricate theories and discussions, but their 
point  will  always  be  to  answer  those  simple  questions.  I  will  also  balance  this 
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apparently overzealous ambition with an appeal to considered conclusions through an 
extensive study of the philosophical method in Part I.  
The organization of this thesis is simple.  Part I deals with the philosophical  
method, Part II with the beginning of the universe and Part III with intelligence in the 
far-future universe. By weaving insights in these three parts, we can find and refine a 
meaning of life in a cosmological perspective. Both the beginning and the end are 
extreme extrapolations, and it makes sense to treat  them together, as we will  face 
similar problems and solutions in exploring them.
What is philosophy? This work is of synthetical and speculative nature. It is 
an attempt to answer some of the deepest philosophical questions, by constructing a 
coherent and comprehensive worldview. In Part I, we inquire about the philosophical 
method, and show that  there is  an existential  need to answer those big questions. 
Answering them might involve some speculations. Yet, speculating does not mean 
being unscientific.  On the  contrary,  it  means relying on and identifying  the  most 
fundamental  scientific  theories  and  principles,  and  then  extrapolate  them.  In  my 
speculations, I have done my best to focus on the most robust and general scientific 
theories  such as  principles  of  relativity  theories,  thermodynamics,  systems theory, 
evolution,  theoretical  computer  science  or  logic.  The  first  step  to  discuss 
philosophical  questions  in  a  way  that  is  compatible  with  scientific  results  is  to 
reformulate those childish questions in a maturely wise scientific and philosophical 
manner. 
Where does it  all  come from?  In  Part  II,  we examine  in  three  steps the 
problem of the ultimate origin of the cosmos. Firstly, in Chapter 4 we deal with our 
cognitive needs for origins. We ask, what is a cognitively satisfying answer to the 
question of the origin of the universe? In Chapter 5 we then focus on the existence of 
free  parameters  in  physical  and  cosmological  models.  The  problem is  that  those 
parameters are not specified by our theories, yet all particle physics and cosmological 
models have such free parameters. We explore them with a variety of approaches: 
physical, mathematical, computational and biological. Those free parameters need to 
be filled-in in our models. But filling-in doesn't necessarily imply fine-tuning. We thus 
discuss  in  Chapter  6 whether  or  not  those  free  parameters  are  fine-tuned.  More 
precisely, the fine-tuning of the universe is a highly confusing and controversial issue 
at the intersection of physics, philosophy and theology. It is infused with physical and 
probabilistic fallacies; mixed up with other issues (e.g. free parameters, parameter 
sensitivity,  metaphysical  issues,  observation  selection  effects,  anthropic  principles, 
teleology and God's existence); and it is most often ill defined. To clarify the debate, 
we  first  debunk  common  and  uncommon  fine-tuning  fallacies.  We  then  ask  the 
question “fine-tuning for what?” to generate different definitions of fine-tuning. For 
this,  we  introduce  a  Drake-like  “Cosmic  Evolution  Equation”,  defining  different 
cosmic outcomes we want to focus on. We then review classical  and evolutionary 
explanations  in  light  of  our  new  framework.  We  conclude  that  to  scientifically 
progress on the issue we need to explore the space of possible universes with the help 
of computer simulations. This includes not only simulating our universe but also other 
possible universes, with the nascent field of Artificial Cosmogenesis.
Where are  we going? In  Chapter  7 of  Part  III,  we  explore  the  future  of 
scientific  simulations,  and  further  substantiate  the  need  to  pursue  Artificial 
Cosmogenesis. We discuss in Chapter 8 cosmological selections and develop in detail 
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Cosmological  Artificial  Selection (CAS, Chapter  8),  a  wide  ranging philosophical 
scenario covering the origin and future of the universe with a role for intelligence. 
Surprisingly,  CAS leads to the idea that  it  is by better understanding our ultimate 
future that we will progress to understand our ultimate origin. The two may well be 
deeply intertwined. 
There is a great uncertainty regarding two main trends in cosmic evolution. 
The  one  trend  goes  towards  more  disorder  or  entropy,  the  other  towards  more 
complexity. Which one will prevail in the long term? If the first prevails, it will be our 
end  in the universe.  But if  the second trend prevails,  there  is  hope to construct  a 
meaning of life in harmony with the complexity increase in cosmic evolution.
Are we alone in the universe? Predicting the long-term future of humanity, I 
mean its  fate  in  thousands,  millions or  billions of  years,  is  a  notoriously difficult 
attempt, often deemed impossible. But there is a workaround. The idea is to look at 
how  other  civilizations might  have developed their  complexity in the universe.  In 
Chapter  9 we thus look for very advanced civilizations in the universe, and, to my 
great surprise and awe, my theoretical reasonings led me to the conclusion that we 
might already have spotted very advanced extraterrestrials!
What is good and what is evil? What are the ultimate values for intelligent 
life? By ultimate I mean, values both valid at all times, past and future, as well as 
valid in all places in the universe. In Chapter 10 we enquiry about values derived from 
a  cosmological  perspective.  We  develop  a  cosmological  ethics  and  apply  the 
framework to the idea of immortality, which is a constant longing in human cultures. 
We survey five kinds of immortalities and how they relate to the definition of the self. 
We  argue  that  the  ultimate  good  is  the  infinite  continuation  of  the  evolutionary 
process.  We  then  discuss the  possibility  or  impossibility  of  such  a  cosmological 
immortality.
To  facilitate  the  navigation  in  this  work,  on  the  one  hand  I  provide  in 
Appendix  I  a  straightforward  summary  of  the  worldview developed,  in  terms  of 
positions, not arguments. In many ways, it spoils the content of this thesis, so I leave 
the responsibility to the reader at which point he wants to read it. On the other hand, 
Appendix  II  provides  two  argumentative  maps.  The  first  map  describes  the  core 
problems we tackle; the second map summarizes our proposed solution. These two 
appendices will mostly benefit to professional academics familiar with the issues I 
tackle, but also to other readers when they need to take a bird's-eye view. In a less 
formal  way,  I  also took the freedom to write  ten short  stories,  which I  hope will 
entertain some of my readers and show some psychological  and social  aspects of 
doing research. Academics who disdain such a practice can easily skip such stories 
already  well  contained  in  grey  boxes.  Importantly,  they  do  not  contribute  to  the 
general argumentation of the thesis.
Academic research is always work in progress. So, at the end of each Part or 
important Chapter, I point to the most important and challenging  open questions I 
came up with. I hope researchers will pursue them –with or without my collaboration.
In this thesis, I put together pieces of a cosmic puzzle which form a worldview 
that I find magnificent. My objective now is to share it with you. I hope to establish a 
deep, enduring and yet evolving connection between intelligent life and the cosmos, 
which will provide people a meaning of life, in harmony with cosmic evolution.
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Part I - Overview of Worldviews
In december 2005, I moved to Brussels to start a PhD in philosophy with Francis 
Heylighen. A PhD is a long and difficult project. I had the ambition to inquiry about 
big  philosophical  questions  like  “where  does  it  all  come from?”  or  “what  is  the 
ultimate future of intelligence in the universe?” Before entering into these waters, I 
wanted to be clear on  how to philosophize.  Despite  years of university studies in 
philosophy, I figured out I didn't know precisely what the philosophical method was. 
What a shame! The best answer I quickly found was that each philosopher has his 
own method (Passmore 1967). It made sense, but I was disappointed. Isn't it a pity if 
each philosopher needs to redefine the philosophical method even before starting to 
philosophize? Isn't it a waste of intellectual resources? Imagine if empirical scientists 
needed  to  reinvent  the  experimental  methodology  each  time  they  started  a  new 
experiment. They wouldn't have any time to actually start their experiment! I was 
committed to find a better answer, and this Part I is my small contribution to this 
issue.
The dictionary tells us that a method is a set of procedures for accomplishing 
an aim. Consequently, to find the philosophical method(s), I needed to find what the 
aim of philosophy was. However, defining what the aim of philosophy is comes down 
to answering the most debated philosophical question: What is philosophy? I started 
to research this question and was astonished by its difficulty. I thought it would keep 
me busy for a few months, but it kept me busy until now. I find it the most difficult 
issue I've inquired so far; maybe as difficult as my attempt to prove or disprove the 
existence of advanced extraterrestrial intelligence! (See Chapter 9).
Story 2: An ignorant young philosopher. 
Since the development of modern science, science has been taking over more 
and  more  issues  from  philosophy.  For  example,  classical  philosophical  problems 
about the mind, time, space, or the cosmos are now investigated by scientific means. 
How can philosophers react to this? Either they can feel invaded by an intruder, and 
will take refuge in issues science will never touch; or they can be delighted. Indeed, 
scientific  progress  on  philosophical  issues  means  that  we  are  getting  new ideas, 
arguments and insights in our common quest for understanding the world. 
Philosophy thus often needs to redefine its scope and also its relationship to 
science. Philosophy can also take the opportunity to embrace all this new knowledge. 
However, partly because of this takeover, today's philosophy collapsed in two main 
traditions,  analytic and  continental,  with different  drawbacks that  we will  quickly 
examine. 
Thirty years ago, Paul Ricoeur (1979) directed a survey of the main trends of 
philosophy. He distinguished three main trends: 
(1) Philosophy as a Weltanschauung (worldview) 
(2) English and American analytic philosophy 
(3) Subjectivity and beyond. 
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In trend (3),  philosophy explores  other  forms of  experience than objective 
knowledge  (e.g.  the  young  Hegel,  Kierkegaard,  young  Marx,  and  certain 
developments of phenomenology.) This trend corresponds to continental philosophy. 
It is a stimulating intellectual approach, but it faces harsh critiques, notably its lack of 
methodology (see e.g. Shackel 2005). 
 On the other hand, even if analytical philosophy (2) brings precise methods of 
analysis and critic into philosophy, it still lacks a general guideline, a unifying agenda. 
And the use of logical methods is insufficient to constitute such an agenda. Analytic 
philosophy  really  needs  something  more  than  pure  analysis;  it  also  needs  to  be 
completed with a synthetic dimension. Synthetic worldview construction, as we shall 
see, can fill this gap. Our own philosophical position will thus tend towards the trend 
(1).
Still, distinguishing those three trends does not answer our question: What is  
philosophy? A fuzzy answer is that it  is a quest  to understand humankind and its 
world.  However,  for  the  most  important  questions,  this  enterprise  overlaps  with 
science  and  religion.  Philosophy,  science  and  religion  share  this  quest  of 
understanding, and they can build more or less strong relationships to pursue it  (see 
e.g. R. J. Russell, Stoeger, and Coyne 1988). The result is that starting either from 
science, religion or philosophy, we end up with different worldviews. 
We will  argue that  having a coherent and comprehensive worldview is the 
central aim of philosophy. But, what is more precisely a worldview? How can we 
compare  very  different  worldviews?  Specifically,  what  are  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of scientific, religious and philosophical worldviews?
To  better  grasp  what  philosophy  is  and  to navigate  its  rich  and  complex 
landscape, I first introduce in Chapter 1 six philosophical dimensions along with the 
worldview agenda. This agenda invites us to tackle big questions, and our answers to 
them define what our worldview is. Furthermore, to meaningfully and critically tackle 
the big questions, we must be able to compare different worldviews. For this we need 
a set of criteria and a battery of tests. We introduce such criteria and tests in Chapter 
2, which facilitate the difficult endeavor of worldview comparison. We conclude our 
analysis of worldviews and criteria by showing that science and religion both have 
complementary strengths and weaknesses (Chapter 3). By synthesizing them, we aim 
at coherent and comprehensive philosophical or theological worldviews.
This Part I provides an ambitious yet considered philosophical framework as 
an indispensable prelude to conduct our journey into the big cosmological issues: the 
beginning and the end, and the meaning of life.
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CHAPTER 1 -  The Six Dimensions of Philosophy
Abstract: We introduce six dimensions of philosophy, whose first three deal with 
first-order  knowledge  about  reality  (descriptive,  normative and  practical);  the 
next  two  deal  with  second-order  knowledge  about  knowledge  (critical, 
dialectical), while the sixth dimension (synthetical) attempts the integration of the 
other  five  dimensions.  We  describe  and  illustrate  the  dimensions  with  Leo 
Apostel's worldview program. Then we argue that we all need a worldview to 
interact with our world and to give a meaning to our lives. Such a worldview can 
be more or less explicit, and we argue that for rational discourse it is essential to 
make it as explicit as possible. With a cybernetic diagram, we then illustrate how 
the different worldview components dynamically interrelate. 
While defining what a worldview is, it is useful to distinguish six dimensions 
in philosophy, as depicted in figure 1. We distinguish between first- and second-order 
knowledge  (Adler  1993,  13–16).  First-order  knowledge is  about  “reality”,  and 
second-order knowledge is about knowledge itself. We add a third-order  synthetical 
dimension  (6),  which  is  the  integration  of  first-  and  second-order  dimensions  of 
philosophizing.  The  descriptive dimension  (1)  and  the  normative dimension  (2) 
correspond  to  Adler's  (1993)  metaphysical and  moral dimensions.  The  critical 
dimension  (4)  and  the  dialectical dimension  (5)  partially  overlap  with  Adler's 
objective and categorial dimensions. Dimensions (4), (5) and (6) are also inspired by 
Broad  (1947; 1958) who calls them analysis,  synopsis and  synthesis. Let us further 
dive into these dimensions.
1.1  First-Order Questions
A philosophical  agenda defines  the  range  of  problems and  issues  that  are 
addressed by a philosophy. What are the most profound questions of existence? Those 
questions,  not  their  answers,  are  surprisingly  enduring  throughout  the  history  of 
philosophy (see e.g. Passmore 1961, 39; Rescher 2006, 91). The worldview approach 
21
Figure 1: The Six Dimensions of Philosophy. 
developed by Leo Apostel elegantly makes the questions explicit  (Apostel and Van 
der Veken 1991; trans. in Aerts et al. 1994); we can summarize them as: 
(a) What is? Ontology (model of being);
(b) Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past);
(c) Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future);
(d) What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values);
(e) How should we act? Praxeology (theory of actions).
These  questions  correspond  to  the  “big”,  “eternal”,  or  “age-old”  philosophical 
questions.  Each question corresponds to  a  first-order  knowledge branch,  in  italics 
above.  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  starting  with  this  agenda  is  already  a 
philosophical choice. We will discuss the agenda more in depth when describing the 
scope in agenda criterion (section 2.2.3, Scope p36). Although the six dimensions of 
philosophy are  more general than this worldview agenda, I introduce it  because it 
makes our philosophical framework more concrete.
Apostel's definition of a “worldview” is broader than just a representation of 
the world because it also includes theories of values and actions (questions (d)-(e)). 
An  answer  to  a  worldview  question  forms  a  worldview components.  Articulated 
together, the components form a worldview that we define as a coherent collection of 
concepts “allowing us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to 
understand as many elements of our experience as possible.” (Aerts et al. 1994, 17).
Let  us  now  clarify  how  this  worldview  agenda  typifies  three  of  the  six 
philosophical  dimensions.  The  descriptive dimension  (1)  attempts  to  describe  the 
world  as  it  is  and thus corresponds to  worldview questions  (a),  (b)  and (c).  The 
normative dimension  (2)  corresponds  to  worldview  question  (d),  whereas  the 
practical dimension (3) matches with worldview question (e), or praxeology. 
The  descriptive  dimension  (1)  concerns  “is-questions”.  Tackling  this 
dimension is the task of an ontology, explanation and futurology.  The first question 
(a)  is  the  question  of  ontology,  or  a  model  of  being.  It  can  be  typified  with  the 
question “What is?”.  The second question (b) explains the first component. Why is 
the world the way it is, and not different? What kind of global explanatory principles 
can we put forward? How did the Universe originate? Where does it all come from? 
The kind of explanation sought here is one in terms of antecedents. Answers to these 
questions explain how and why such or such phenomena arose. The third question (c) 
is complementary to the second one. Instead of focusing on the past, it focuses on the 
future. Where are we going? What will be the fate of life in the Universe? Answering 
these questions give us possible and probable futures. But there are many possible 
futures and their probability is most often hard if not impossible to assess. We need to 
cope with uncertainties,  and this  leaves us  with choices  to  make.  Which possible 
alternative should we promote and which one should we avoid? To answer this, we 
need values and thus the normative dimension (2).
Importantly,  describing or  modeling the world is  an enterprise  overlapping 
with science. The precise formulation of these first three worldview questions will 
thus vary from epoch to epoch. For example, current problems related to the ultimate 
constituents of matter (question (a)) highly depend on available scientific theories. It 
is thus mandatory to reformulate and define precisely those “big” questions in the 
context  of  a  certain  epoch.  Such  purely  philosophical  questions  become  mixed 
questions in the sense that they require scientific knowledge to formulate and to solve 
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them  (Adler 1993, 67; C. I.  Lewis 1929, 4–8).  Such mixed questions invite us to 
conduct “philosophy with” other disciplines, rather than the more common second-
order “philosophies of” other disciplines (Hansson 2008). Anticipating what follows, 
considering  mixed-questions  is  already  part  of  the  synthetical  dimension  (6)  of 
philosophy.
The  normative  dimension  (2)  tackles  “ought-questions”,  typified  with  the 
fourth worldview question: what is good and what is evil?. How to live a good life? 
How to organize a good society? How do we evaluate global reality? What should we 
strive  for?  What  is  the  meaning  of  life  in  a  cosmological  perspective?  Axiology 
traditionally  deals  with  those  questions,  including morality,  ethics,  and aesthetics. 
Also in the normative dimension, the questions are mixed. For example, the question 
of how to live a good life is mixed with the psychology of well-being; the question of 
how to organize a good society is mixed with political philosophy, sociology, etc. This 
worldview component gives us preferences, direction, purpose, a set of goals to guide 
our actions. Yet, it is not always clear how to connect values with actions. 
The practical dimension (3) addresses “act-questions”. Given our model of the 
world  and  our  axiology,  how  should  we  act?   What  are  the  general  principles 
according  to  which  we  should  organize  our  actions?  We need  such  principles  to 
implement  plans  of  action  according  to  our  values,  in  order  to  solve  practical 
problems. Importantly, such practical insights will remain implicit for most us, in the 
sense that we act without having a theory of how we act. Theorizing about action is 
the  domain  of  praxeology,  which  is  mixed  with  fields  like  operational  research, 
problem-solving methods, management sciences, etc. Adler (1993) did not explicitly 
include  this  important  dimension.  It  is  however  a  notable  kind of  philosophizing, 
namely, philosophy as a way of life. 
Most of today's philosophers would disagree that philosophy's task is still in 
dimensions  (1)  or  (3).  This  is  mainly  because  those  questions  which  were  once 
philosophy's territory gave birth to various modern sciences (James 1987, 993). For 
example,  William  James  himself  is  one  of  the  founding  fathers  of  scientific 
psychology;  Frege  and  Russell  founded  mathematical  logic  and  Auguste  Comte 
coined the the term “sociology”.
Those descriptive  and practical  philosophical  dimensions were once at  the 
core of the philosophical enterprise, and the fact that they are not anymore today is 
arguably only a historical accident (see Adler 1965, 1993). Let us now turn to second-
order philosophizing.
1.2  Second-Order Questions
Apostel added two other questions:
(f) What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge);
(g) Where do we start to answer those questions? 
They invite us to become aware of our current worldview, and to also ponder where 
our knowledge comes from. Yet these questions are of a different nature than the five 
others.  
The  five  first  worldview  questions  are  first-order  in  the  sense  that  they 
question directly our world and how to interact with it.  By contrast,  the sixth and 
seventh questions are about the origin of our answers to those first-order questions; 
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they  are  thus of  a  second-order  nature.  Let  us  now characterize  the  second-order 
dimensions more precisely. 
The second-order critical dimension (4) is like an intellectual acid, which can 
attack anything. It has two traditions, continental and analytical. The two are critical 
approaches  to  philosophizing,  yet  in  two  very  different  ways.  Continental 
philosophizing includes movements such as phenomenology, existentialism, critical 
theory,  hermeneutics,  structuralism,  deconstruction,  and  postmodernism.  First  and 
foremost, it  takes  subjective and  intersubjective perspectives as starting points. By 
contrast, analytical philosophy is mainly focused on objective aspects and emphasizes 
the  use  of  precise  definitions,  sound arguments  wrapped up in  a  rigorous  logical 
analysis.
A third aspect of critical philosophizing is “philosophies of X”, where X can 
be almost any discipline. Those efforts which exploded in recent years are of a critical 
and second-order nature, contrasting with “philosophies with”, which are synthetical 
or first-order. Epistemology, typified with worldview question (f), is also a second-
order inquiry, which is critical. Second-order philosophizing mobilizes a critical and 
reflexive attitude, typical  to the philosopher.  This Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 are of 
second-order nature, about the “philosophy of philosophy”.
Yet, even second-order questions are not disconnected from first-order ones. 
Answers to first-order questions, whether implicit or explicit, determine second-order 
analysis  (Adler 1965, 45).  For example,  reflections in philosophy of mathematics, 
investigating what mathematical objects are, have implications in our epistemology 
(question (f)) and therefore on how to model and predict the world (questions (a)-(c)). 
Most lively debates are likely to be motivated by first-order questions. Platonists or 
constructivists disagree on the ontological  nature of mathematical  objects,  and are 
thus ultimately busy with question (a).  With this worldview agenda,  we insist  on 
reconnecting with first-order questions,  whose corresponding dimensions are  often 
neglected in contemporary philosophy (Adler 1965, 42–48).
The  dialectical  dimension  (5)  in  second-order  philosophizing  describes 
different and sometimes contradictory positions on issues.  Worldview question (g) 
requires that this dialectical dimension is properly answered. The concept of dialectic 
has a rich history in philosophy, but here, its etymological meaning will suffice: “the 
art of debate”. I do not use it in a Hegelian sense, nor in the derogatory sense of 
rhetoric or sophistry. The goal of dialectical philosophizing is to remain “point-of-
viewless”. This philosophical activity consists in stating or reconstructing issues and a 
variety of positions towards them. Here, dialectical is opposed to doctrinal.
This can be illustrated by three great examples in the history of philosophy. In 
Antiquity,  Aristotle  in  the  first  book  of  his  Metaphysics describes  in  detail  the 
positions of his opponents before developing his own. In the middle ages, Thomas 
Aquinas in his  Summa Theologica (1265-1274) also represented other positions as 
objections.  In modern times,  with the two index volumes of “The Great  Ideas:  A 
Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World” Adler and his team  (1952, xxx) 
also had this ideal to remain position-neutral. They provided outlines and indexes of 
positions related to 102 great ideas in 443 books. Such a gargantuan work could be 
called a “Summa Dialectica” of the twentieth century (Adler 1952, xxxi). 
As useful as it is, dialectical philosophizing alone still remains categorization, 
an exercise just slightly more difficult than philately. As Rescher  (1985) argued, the 
temptation  of  syncretism,  namely  to  accept  all  positions  distinguished,  is  an 
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insufficient philosophical accomplishment, since a mere conjunction of contradictory 
positions is of course self-contradictory. Syncretism stems from a confusion between 
first and second-order philosophizing.
A final dimension of philosophizing is needed to fully exploit this dialectical 
effort  in  a  doctrinal  way.  As  Broad  (1947) noticed,  philosophers  doing  such  a 
dialectical  investigation,  what  Broad  calls  synopsis,  are  most  often  motivated  by 
synthesis.  Assuredly,  Aristotle,  Thomas  Aquinas  or  Adler  are  great  synthetical 
philosophers.  
The synthetical  dimension (6)  is  the climax of  philosophizing,  but  also its 
most  arduous  dimension.  To be  successfully  conducted,  it  requires  mastering  and 
juggling with all other five dimensions. The great philosophers' feat is in providing a 
comprehensive and coherent  synthesis of  their  time.  It  is  so challenging that  it  is 
rarely attempted (Broad 1947). When we speak about “worldview synthesis”, we refer 
to this dimension of philosophy.
This chapter and the next fall within the critical dimension (4), concerned with 
“the philosophy of philosophy”. Nevertheless, my motivation in proposing evaluation 
standards  and  tests  (in  Chapter  2)  is  to  help  answer  first-order  questions  and  to 
encourage  synthetical  philosophizing.  Faithful  to  the  spirit  of  this  synthetical 
dimension,  there  is  a  clear  connection  between  my  first  and  second  order 
philosophizing.  This  is  why at  heart  my analysis cannot  be neutral,  it  can not  be 
separated from my first-order philosophical position outlined in Appendix I, p315.
Even  if  synthesis  remains  an  ideal,  it  is  very  important  to  note  that  each 
dimension  of  philosophizing  can  be  pursued  relatively  independently.  What  is 
dangerous and ridiculous is when a philosopher claims that one of the dimensions is 
the  only  “real”  or  “true”  way  of  philosophizing.  For  example,  an  historian  of 
philosophy  does  very  valuable  work  in  dimension  (5)  when  he  clarifies,  puts  in 
perspective or corrects some misinterpretations of a great philosopher. The position of 
that philosopher is then faithfully represented. But this effort, however useful, remains 
at best one sixth of philosophizing. In section (2.3 Assessment Tests, p45) we will 
examine the interactions of the six dimensions,  by proposing tests across each of 
them. 
1.3  Necessity to Have a Worldview
In the section “The need for philosophy: humans as homo quaerens” Rescher 
(2001, 6–10) argued from an evolutionary point of view that humans' strength is in 
their capacity to acquire and use knowledge of the world:
We are neither numerous and prolific (like the ant and the termite), nor tough and 
aggressive (like the shark). Weak and vulnerable creatures, we are constrained to 
make our evolutionary way in the world by the use of brainpower.
This leads to the practical need to acquire more knowledge, to be able to understand 
and  thus  predict  features  of  our  world.  There  is  accordingly  a  need  to  have  a 
worldview to describe the world and to act in it. What about the normative dimension 
of worldviews?
There are also psychological and sociological needs for a worldview giving 
values. Sociological research indicates that the feelings of insecurity and distrust are 
stronger among the people who least profess belief in a religious or philosophical 
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worldview  (e.g.  Elchardus  1998).  Psychologists  researching  life  satisfaction  have 
found  that  having  such beliefs  increases  well-being,  by  providing  a  sense  of  life 
meaning, feelings of hope and trust,  a long-term perspective on life's woes, and a 
sense of belonging to a larger whole  (Myers 1993). If philosophy does not answer 
those questions, other realms of our culture will take advantage of the situation, and 
provide answers. These are principally religions, or, much more dangerously, cults, 
sects,  extremist  secular  ideologies  or  fundamentalist  interpretations  of  religion 
spreading irrational beliefs. 
We all  need a  certain  worldview,  even if  it  is  not  made  fully  explicit,  to 
interact with our world and give a meaning to our lives. There is a practical need to 
have at least an implicit, pre-ontological and for that reason “naive” answer to each of 
the worldview questions.
1.4  Implicit and Explicit Worldviews
Most  people  adopt  and  follow a  worldview without  much  thinking.  Their 
worldview  remains  implicit.  They  intuitively  have  a  representation  of  the  world 
(components (a)-(c)), know what is good and what is bad (component (d)) and have 
learned how to act in the world (component (e)). And this is enough to get by.
But some curious, reflexive, critical, thinking or philosophical minds wake up, 
and start to question their worldviews. They aspire to make it explicit. Articulating 
explicitly  one's  worldview  is  an  extremely  difficult  task.  It  is  so  difficult  that 
philosophical schools have tried to escape it, remaining in the comfortable armchair 
of second-order philosophizing. Two extreme positions are then possible; either to 
accept no philosophical doctrine at all (skepticism) or to accept them all (syncretism). 
Such positions are not tenable if we commit to answering first-order philosophical 
questions  (Rescher  1985).  At  best,  skepticism  or  syncretism  can  be  useful 
philosophical critiques or dialectical descriptions.
Having a clear agenda is still not enough. What about the answers? Answering 
first-order philosophical questions explicitly is an enterprise which was traditionally 
philosophy's  task.  This  took  the  form of  comprehensive  and  coherent  systematic 
philosophical treatises. Regrettably, this trend seems to have fallen out of fashion, 
since most  of  today's philosophy addresses second-order problems  (see e.g.  Adler 
1965; Ricoeur 1979).
Before  agreeing  or  disagreeing  with  someone,  we  need  to  explicitly 
understand  our  respective  positions.  Making  explicit  one's  first-order  position is 
extremely  valuable  to  present  one's  philosophy  immediately  and  truthfully. 
Unfortunately, this practice is not common amongst philosophers. But I choose and 
invite you to go against this trend. For intellectual transparency and honesty, I make 
explicit my current first-order position in the Appendix I, which is also a summary of 
my positions in this thesis.  So,  don't  read it  if  you like suspense! Having a  clear 
position on basic philosophical issues is the philosopher's identity card. Every thinker 
should have one, and be able to show it when entering the Agora of philosophical 
dispute.
In Appendix I, I have chosen only to state my positions, not to give arguments. 
Instead, I give main references to the works which most influenced me, where the 
curious reader will  be able to find many detailed arguments.  I  also make explicit 
which  criteria  I  value  most  to  work  out  my  position.  Certainly  this  is  not  as 
satisfactory as a fully developed philosophical system (see e.g. the impressive work of 
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Bunge 1974; or Rescher 1992). Yet, I am confident this effort will facilitate debate 
and critique of the positions and arguments presented here.
1.5  A Cybernetic Model of a Worldview 
I reproduced in Fig.2 above the “Worldview of an individual in a cybernetic 
system” diagram of  Heylighen  (2000a). This  cybernetic  approach shows how the 
different worldview components dynamically interrelate. 
When we look carefully at the diagram, we are struck by the centrality of the 
value component. The information we seek and the actions we do ultimately depend 
on our values. Murphy and Ellis (1996) also saw the importance of values and ethics 
when they argued that ethics is a science at the top of the hierarchy of social sciences. 
Likewise, our Chapter  10 which deals with cosmological ethics is a cornerstone of 
this work. 
Let us also note that the seventh component does not appear here, since it is a 
second-order  component.  Also,  the  components  need  not  to  be  explicit  in  each 
individual. I can act consistently according to some values, yet never think about a 
theory of values.
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Figure 2: Worldview of an individual in a cybernetic system. Heylighen (2000a):
“The apparently disconnected components of a worldview can in fact be understood as part of an 
encompassing scheme describing the interaction between a system or self and the world or 
environment. In cybernetics an autonomous system or agent is conceptualized as a control system, 
which tries to achieve its goals or values by initiating the right actions that compensate for the 
disturbances produced by the environment. For that, it needs to perceive or get information about 
the effects of its actions and the effects of the events happening in the world. More specifically, it 
needs to understand how particular events (past) cause other events (future), that is to say it needs to 
have a model that allows it to explain and anticipate events. The first six components of a 
worldview cover all the fundamental aspects of this control scheme, as illustrated in the following 
figure. Worldview components (in [large font]) are written above the corresponding control scheme 
components.” Reproduced with the permission of Francis Heylighen. 
To  illustrate  this,  we  can  take  the  far-fetched  example  of  a  bacterium's 
worldview. How can we interpret its worldview components? Its ontology is what it 
senses at present, its explanation is a kind of memory which can be its biochemical 
state,  its  prediction is  a  genetically-based feedback system, its  axiology is  mainly 
genetically determined: to find food, reproduce, move, eat and digest. Its perceptions 
are chemical gradients. Stuart Kauffman  (2007, 909) also argued that “a bacterium 
swimming up a glucose gradient and performing work cycles is an agent, and glucose 
has value and meaning for the bacterium without assuming consciousness. Of course 
it is natural selection that has achieved this coupling. But teleological language has to 
start somewhere, and I am willing to place it at the start of life”. 
This  approach  in  terms  of  worldviews  thus  intricately  links  abstracts 
philosophical questions with an agent's personal experience. We do not just seek the 
most  perfect  model  of  the  world;  we  also  want  it  related  to  and  embodied  in 
individuals, thus providing rules to live and act meaningfully. 
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CHAPTER 2 -  Criteria for Worldview Comparison
Abstract: Philosophy lacks criteria to evaluate its philosophical theories. To fill 
this gap, this Chapter introduces nine criteria to compare worldviews, classified in 
three  broad  categories:  objective  criteria  (objective  consistency,  scientificity, 
scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency,  personal utility,  emotionality), 
and  intersubjective  criteria  (intersubjective  consistency,  collective  utility, 
narrativity). The Chapter first exposes the heuristic used in the quest for criteria. 
After describing each criterion individually, it shows what happens when each of 
them is violated.  From the criteria  it  derives  assessment tests  to compare and 
improve  different  worldviews,  which  operate  across  the  six  dimensions  of 
philosophy. These include the is-ought,  ought-act, and is-act first-order tests; the 
critical and  dialectical second-order tests; the  mixed-questions and  first-second-
order third-order  tests.  The  we-I,  we-it,  and  it-I tests  operate  across objective, 
subjective and intersubjective worlds. 
If philosophical theories are all irrefutable, how can we ever distinguish 
between true and false philosophical theories?
(Popper 1958)
Philosophers  disagree.  As  the  saying  goes,  philosophy  is  the  field  of 
unresolved  controversies.  There  is  no  progress  in  philosophy  comparable  with 
progress in science. Philosophical disagreements are not replaced with agreements. 
Indeed, given the wide diversity of philosophical schools and traditions, it is difficult 
to point out even why or how two philosophers disagree.
Broadly speaking, philosophers have tried to understand the relation between 
humanity and the cosmos. But this enterprise is not philosophy's sole prerogative, it 
overlaps with science and religion. For this reason, the situation is even worse. Not 
only do philosophers disagree among themselves,  but their answers to the biggest 
questions compete with answers provided by science and religion. The result is that 
humans use philosophical, scientific or religious insights  –or a combination of them– 
to handle this quest for understanding, leading to very different kinds of worldviews. 
Instead of tackling the difficult task of synthesis, there is a trend of overspecialization 
which  leads  to  a  fragmentation  of  knowledge.  The  communication  between 
worldviews becomes at best delicate and knotty and at worst,  impossible. Can we 
compare  and  assess  such  different  worldviews?  How  can  we  test  their  relative 
strengths and weaknesses? What criteria and tests can we use for arguing that such 
and such worldview is “better” than another? Furthermore, can we use those criteria 
and tests to construct synthetical worldviews?
The solution of synthesis can not come from science, which is empirical; nor 
from  religion,  which  often  relies  on  traditional  dogmas.  It  must  come  from 
philosophy,  whose  very  nature  is  reflexive.  Indeed,  this  understanding  of  the 
relationships between different domains of knowledge is itself a (meta)philosophical 
dimension.  There  has  been previous  work  in  philosophy  of  science  to  assess  the 
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quality of scientific theories. Even this effort of finding clear criteria in science is not 
as easy as it seems (see e.g. T. S. Kuhn 1977; McMullin 2008). Surprisingly very few 
similar attempts have been made in philosophy. Indeed, finding criteria for a “good” 
philosophy or worldview seems even more difficult than in science. Why is this so? 
As Popper noticed in the quote above, criteria in science won't apply to philosophy 
because all philosophical theories are irrefutable. Even more than in science, there are 
in  philosophy  radically  different  aims,  methods,  schools  and  dimensions.  This 
contributes to the richness of philosophy, but also to its confusion.
More specifically, philosophers disagree on the agenda and thus can not even 
agree on philosophy's task (Rescher 2001, chap. 3). In that sense, rather than saying 
that  philosophers  disagree,  it  is  more  accurate  to  say  that  philosophers  rarely  
disagree. For they are beginning from different starting points and thus are simply 
talking past each other (Adler 1965, 165). This is a unique situation in the landscape 
of knowledge domains. To progress, one thus needs to propose a direction in the form 
of a philosophical agenda. Constructing a coherent and comprehensive worldview is 
such an agenda.
2.1  A Quest for Criteria  
2.1.1  The Philosophy of “Meta-” 
“Meta-”  disciplines  push  reflection  to  another  level.  In  mathematics  for 
example, this gave rise to metamathematics and completely new kinds of insights. 
Indeed, proof theory which was initially called metamathematics, uses mathematical 
methods  to  study  mathematical  proofs.  This  leads  to  qualitatively  new  kinds  of 
results, for example that a mathematical proposition  is  not  provable in a particular 
axiomatic  system.  Such  a  proof  is  qualitatively  distinct  from  the  traditional 
mathematical  activity  consisting  in  proving  statements.  Another  example  can  be 
found  in  historiography,  which  is  the  history  of  history.  It  asks  “how is  history 
written?” and leads to a new kind of reflection about history as a discipline.
In  philosophy,  this  “philosophy  of  philosophy”  endeavor  is  since  a  few 
decades explicitly studied  (see e.g.  Adler 1965; 1993; Rescher 1985;  2001;  2006; 
2010 and the Journal  Metaphilosophy). This questioning concerns the nature, scope, 
mission of the philosophical enterprise, and its relation to other knowledge domains. 
Our aim in this chapter is descriptive, to find and define criteria as much as possible 
independent of philosophical positions. This is why it is a work of metaphilosophical 
nature.  This is  of course an ideal,  since no metaphilosophical  approach is  free of 
philosophical assumptions (c.f. Pepper 1945; Rescher 1985, chap. 8.1).
Our main philosophical assumption behind the criteria and tests we are about 
to propose is the endeavor of synthetical philosophizing (dimension 6). That is,  to 
construct  coherent  and  comprehensive  worldviews,  answering  the  philosophical 
agenda constituted by the five worldview questions. We call such a worldview which 
is both coherent and comprehensive, synthetical.
2.1.2  The Big Three
There are three perspectives we take into account to structure our criteria. We 
call them objective, subjective and intersubjective. In broad terms, they correspond to 
three aspects that many philosophers have distinguished. Let us take a bird's-eye view.
The term “worldview” itself comes in three different flavors and emphases:
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(1) a world conception, systemic or objective;
(2) a life world, experienced or subjective;
(3) a world view, social or intersubjective.
In flavor (1) we find the rational scientific endeavor to construct a “world conception” 
(Weltauffasung), as did the logical empiricists of the Vienna Circle  (Carnap, Hahn, 
and Neurath 1929).  Another comparable concept  is  the “world picture” (Weltbild) 
which insists on remaining consistent with scientific results. For example, Dilthey 
(1957,  25–27) speaks  about  an  objective  Weltbild.  By  contrast,  a  worldview 
(Weltanschauung)  is  based  on this  Weltbild to  form values,  ideals  and norms for 
action, for individuals and society (i.e. subjective and intersubjective aspects).  More 
on the definition and need of a worldview in this flavor can be found in (Aerts et al. 
1994) and (Vidal 2008a).
Flavor  (2)  explores  the  “lifeworld”  (Lebenswelt)  with  existential-
phenomenological  philosophies,  which  emphasize  subjective  experiences.  The 
lifeworld stresses the personal aspect of a worldview. The inquiry is centered at the 
individual  level,  like  in  the  existentialist  philosophies  of  Kierkegaard,  Heidegger, 
Jaspers, Sartre, or Merleau-Ponty. The drawback is that it does not emphasize higher 
levels of organizations (e.g. family, society, planet, universe). This is why it is crucial 
to go beyond the individual level, and answer those worldview questions with a wide 
scope, a criterion we will detail later.
In  flavor (3) “world view” is  used in  a  social  and cultural  sense,  often in 
anthropology or social sciences (see e.g. Kearney 1975 for a review). The term then 
parallels  “ideology”,  “symbolic  order”,  “cultural  code”,  etc.  “Worldview”  is  also 
widely used in christian theology, generally between flavor (2) and (3). For a more 
thorough history and study of the concept, see  (Naugle 2002; Koltko-Rivera 2004).
Speaking  about  “worldviews”  can  thus  have  at  least  these  three  possible 
nuances, depending on our emphasis in either objective, subjective or intersubjective 
aspects. This will become clearer and more detailed soon (in section 2.2 Criteria for
Worldview Comparison, p34). My avowed bias goes towards flavor (1), but I will try 
to do justice to the two other flavors as well.
Turning  to  Kant's  three  critiques,  we  find  them  highly  reflexive, 
epistemological  and therefore second-order in approach. Yet,  their themes concern 
three  different  philosophical  realms.  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason concerns  the 
possibility  of  objective  judgments,  the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason deals  with 
intersubjective  morality,  and  the  Critique  of  Judgment  is  partly  concerned  with 
subjective aesthetic experiences.
In  an  attempt  to  go  beyond  monism or  dualist  philosophies,  Karl  Popper 
(1979) also proposed a three worlds pluralism. World 1 is “the world that consists of 
physical bodies”; world 2 is “the world of mental or psychological states or processes, 
or of subjective experiences” and world 3 is “the world of the products of the human 
mind”. This world 3 is a wide category, including languages, myths, scientific theories 
and works of art such as songs, paintings and sculptures. He saw worlds 2 and 3 as 
successive evolutionary products  of  world 1.  But  he emphasized the difficulty  of 
understanding  interactions  between  the  three  worlds,  because  of  the  feedback 
processes going on between them (for a modern approach on the three worlds, see e.g. 
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Hall  2003).  For  a  critical  discussion  and  the  limitations  of  this  ontology  from a 
sociological point of view, see (Habermas 1981, Vol. 1., 76–84).
Max Weber saw the birth of modernity with the distinction between several 
cultural  spheres  of  value:  science  and  technology  (objective),  law  and  morality 
(intersubjective), as well as art and criticism (subjective). As Habermas (1981, Vol.1, 
340) describes,  this  leads  to  cognitive,  normative  and  aesthetic  validity  claims.  
In  his  influential  theory  of  communicative  action,  Habermas  (1981) took 
inspiration  from Popper's  three  worlds  and  Weber's  cultural  spheres  of  values  to 
define three validity claims. Actors evaluate their speech acts against three worlds 
(Habermas 1981, Vol. 1, 100):
1. The objective world (as the totality of all entities about which true statements are possible);
2.  The  social  world  (as  the  totality  of  all  legitimately  regulated  interpersonal  relations);
3. The subjective world (as the totality of the experiences of the speaker to which he has 
privileged access).
Those  three  worlds  correspond  to  what  we  called  objective,  intersubjective  and 
subjective  worlds.  Interestingly,  this  framework  also  inspired  multimethodology 
research methods in information systems (Mingers 2001; 2003).
Ken Wilber (1995) made this tripartition popular,  expressing it  neatly with 
grammatical pronouns. The objective world corresponds to the “it”, the subjective to 
the “I”  and the intersubjective to  the “we”.  He stressed the  importance of  taking 
perspectives from inside these worlds and not only describing them in an objective 
manner.  It  means,  for  example,  that  instead of  striving  to  describe  the  subjective 
experience in a detached universal way, we can also experience it deeply from the 
inside. This makes a connection with meditative traditions which seek to explore the 
nature of  inner experiences,  as  science tries to  understand the nature of  the outer 
world.  Ken Wilber  (1995, 211 and 538–539) also argued that  integrating the “big 
three” is the central problem of postmodernity.
In cultural evolution studies, objective, subjective and intersubjective criteria 
to fit knowledge are also distinguished  (Heylighen 1997a; Heylighen and Chielens 
2008).  Further  developing  the  insights  of  Donald  T.  Campbell,  these  two  papers 
distinguish  three  main  classes  of  criteria  to  select  “fit”  knowledge.  The  selection 
concerns:
(1) Objective criteria – the object that knowledge refers to
(2) Subjective criteria – the subject who assimilates and remembers it
(3) Intersubjective criteria – the communication process used to transmit the 
knowledge between subjects.
2.1.3  Bootstrapping the Criteria
Are  the  criteria  descriptive  or  prescriptive?  The  best  way  to  answer  this 
questions  is  to  apply  the  “Meta-”  philosophy  to  the  criteria  themselves.  In  other 
words, to bootstrap the criteria. This leads us to three principal applications of the 
criteria.
First, 'objectively', the criteria can help the dialectical dimension of philosophy 
(5), by describing characteristics of different philosophical approaches and positions. 
This is partly the mission of the comparative history of philosophy, when it aims at 
what Rescher (1985) calls descriptive metaphilosophizing.
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Second, 'subjectively', the criteria can be used to develop a clear substantive 
position. It is very insightful to recognize one's own cognitive values, and thereby 
giving weights to the criteria. In this section, I have tried to restrict my use of criteria 
in an 'objective' and dialectical manner. However, I do take a first-order position in 
Appendix I, (p 315), where I give weight to the criteria. The criteria can also be used 
as a self-critical checklist, to improve one's worldview, when one tries to maximize a 
number of criteria. 
Importantly,  when  a  philosopher  says  “philosophy  should  value  only  this 
criterion and not that one”, he is just expressing his philosophical position. There is no 
absolute metaphilosophical  position from which he could justify such a statement. 
Prescriptive  metaphilosophizing is  simply philosophizing (see Rescher  1985,  chap 
14).
Finally,  the criteria  can be used 'intersubjectively',  to  compare worldviews, 
conduct  debates  and  clarify  disagreements.  We emphasize  this  application  in  this 
Chapter  and  the  next  one.  Importantly,  even  two  thinkers  adhering  to  the  same 
descriptive metaphilosophical criteria list will certainly reach different conclusions. 
Indeed, they will most likely give different 'subjective' weight to different criteria.
To summarize, the criteria can be seen as tools for philosophers to describe the 
history  of  philosophy,  to  work  out  their  own philosophical  position,  or  to  clarify 
disagreements.
2.1.4  Relativity, not Relativism
Of course it  is possible to critique this tripartition. As Popper pointed out, 
there are many feedback loops between those three worlds. Yet, distinguishing the 
three  worlds  helps  us  to  understand  the  different  natures  of  various  knowledge 
domains and traditions.
Taking into consideration the history of ideas as well as cognitive, social and 
communicative mechanisms, it  is clear that  knowledge and representations evolve. 
There is thus no “true” worldview, and it is fundamental to constantly criticize and 
improve our worldviews. There is therefore a fundamental relativity in our approach, 
in the sense that  we can only compare one worldview with one other. To compare 
means exploring and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different worldviews. 
There are thus no absolute criteria, nor any intrinsic “goodness” or “truthfulness” of a 
worldview, as there is no “sound” or “true” language. The French language may have 
some qualities to express emotions and convey poetry,  but a formal  mathematical 
language  is  indispensable  to  solve  complicated  financial  problems.  It  would  be 
vacuous  to  argue  whether  French  or  mathematics  is  the  “better”  language.  A 
worldview pluralism is imperative. 
This  relativity does  not  imply  relativism however.  From a  dialectical  and 
second-order  perspective,  a  philosopher  can explore and understand a  plurality  of 
worldviews.  But  as  she elaborates  her  first-order  philosophical  position,  the same 
philosopher will still consider some worldviews to be better objectively, subjectively, 
or socially than others. The problem is to define what lies behind the word “better”. 
When  we  use  it,  we  implicitly  use  cognitive  values.  The  role  of  our  criteria  is 
precisely to make them explicit.
For  example,  a  scientist  might  argue  that  objective criteria  are  far  more 
important than subjective and intersubjective ones, whereas a theologian would argue 
the opposite. This simple remark will lead us to suggest two directions in which the 
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science-and-religion  dialog  can  be  enriched  (see  section  3.3.1 The  Way  to
Philosophical Worldviews, p60).
How can we start to formulate criteria for “good” worldviews? A typical set of 
criteria would be to recommend good features for each of the worldview components. 
For example, we can ask: what is a true model of the world? what are the features of a 
good axiology or praxeology? These questions test worldview components and are 
certainly necessary to build a well-thought worldview (see section  2.3.1 Testing the
Components, p46). However, this would not guarantee that the resulting worldview 
would make sense as a whole. For example, what if our representation of the world is 
in contradiction with one's values? We will discuss this is-ought assessment problem 
and other tests (in section 2.3 Assessment Tests, p45).
In  formulating  the  criteria,  we  focused  on  transversal ones,  as  much  as 
possible applicable to different worldview components. Which concrete criteria can 
we use to compare worldviews?
2.2  Criteria for Worldview Comparison
Nicholas  Rescher  (2001,  31) proposed  an  appealing  list  of  evaluation 
standards  for  philosophical  theories.  Inspired  by  this  list  and  the  “big  three” 
distinction, I propose in Table 1 below a list of criteria. I further explain and illustrate 
them in the following way. After a short description, for each of them, I attempt to 
answer: “what if this criterion is violated?”. I then point out abuses and limits of each 
criterion; and, where possible, suggest contrasting criteria. This balanced questioning 
will help us to better delineate both the importance and limitations of each criterion. 
When I refer to a criterion in the ensuing discussion, I italicize it.
Objective criteria
Objective consistency – The worldview exhibits internal and systemic consistency.
Scientificity - The worldview is compatible with science.
Scope -  The worldview addresses a broad range of issues and levels, in breadth and in 
depth.
Subjective criteria
Subjective consistency - The worldview fits knowledge and experiences individuals 
already have.
Personal utility - The worldview promotes a personally rewarding life-outlook.
Emotionality - The worldview evokes emotions, so that it is more likely to be assimilated 
and applied.
Intersubjective criteria
Intersubjective consistency - The worldview reduces conflicts between individuals.
Collective utility - The worldview encourages a life-outlook and mobilizes individuals 
for what is socially beneficial.
Narrativity - The worldview presents its messages in the form of stories.
Table 1: Criteria for worldview comparison.
One worldview is “better” than another, when, other things being equal, it better fulfills objective, 
subjective and intersubjective criteria.  
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2.2.1  Objective Consistency
Objective consistency requires us to hold a consistent worldview with the use 
of logic and rationality as a general way to understand, value and act in the world. 
This includes theorizing, a problem-solving attitude and use of arguments devoid of 
anomalies and contradictions. Applied to a worldview, this criterion makes us realize 
that answers to the different questions are interdependent, and must not contradict 
each other.
Argumentation theory helps in classifying and assessing arguments  (see e.g. 
Weston 2000). Reading and producing complex arguments can greatly benefit from 
argumentation mapping techniques, which present an argumentation in a clear and 
accessible  visual  format,  instead of  a  sometimes confusing lump of  text  (see e.g. 
Scheinkopf 1999; Twardy 2004; and Appendix II of this work). 
If  this  objective  consistency is  violated,  the  result  is  an  invalid  or  self-
contradicting  worldview,  which  is  unacceptable.  Adler  (1965,  158-160)  gave 
examples of self-contradictory theories in Lucretius, Descartes, Berkeley and Hume. 
In pure logic, the ex falso quod libet rule allows one to derive any proposition from a 
contradiction. But even that rule has two sides. First, it shows that the theory at hand 
is trivial, since it can derive anything and this is why logicians abhor contradictions. 
On the other hand, resolving a contradiction, precisely because it allows anything to 
happen  next,  can  be  seen  as  a  great  opportunity  to  question  deeply  rooted 
assumptions, and to try out radically new hypotheses or theories.
Yet, even if the worldview is perfectly self-consistent, one also needs to start 
with solid premises. The soundness of premises is as important as the validity of the 
reasoning itself.  When consistency is  taken too far,  for example if  we follow too 
closely the mathematical ideal, creative problem solving in broader contexts may be 
frozen by the requirement to comply with the formalism. To avoid this we need to 
maintain a wide scope (see 2.2.3 Scope, p36). Abusing objective consistency, we are 
naturally drawn into more formal thinking, and therefore into narrowing our creative 
potential. It seems that more supple tools for thinking are needed as this point (see e.g. 
the Dialectical Thought Form Manual by Laske 2008, 443–655).
2.2.2  Scientificity
Taking  into  account  the  advances  of  science  is  mandatory  nowadays.  A 
modern  worldview  is  therefore  expected  to  be  compatible  with  all  the  natural 
sciences. The modeling of our world (questions (a) to (c)) is now mostly a scientific 
matter. A worldview with respect to the  scientificity criterion constantly needs to be 
updated according to scientific progress. This criterion can also be seen as an external 
consistency criterion, whereas objective consistency was only an internal consistency 
criterion. By internal we mean a logical and systemic consistency, and by external we 
mean accuracy with regard to the external world.
Ignoring  this  scientific  criterion  leads  to  unscientific  worldviews.  This 
happens when we can study a subject scientifically but nonetheless ignore scientific 
methods  and  results.  Importantly,  Broad  (1958,  103) distinguished   between 
nonscientific and unscientific. Philosophy is certainly nonscientific, but this does not 
imply  that  it  is  unscientific.  Indeed,  philosophy,  in  contrast  to  science,  is  not  an 
investigative  enterprise;  it  does  not  question  the  world  with  observational  or 
experimental  methods.  It  is  therefore  nonscientific.  However,  it  is  possible  and 
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appropriate  to  conduct  the  philosophical  endeavor  in  harmony  with  scientific 
progress, and thus avoid the unscientific pitfall.
What happens when scientificity  is abused? Most likely, we fail to make the 
distinction between unscientific and nonscientific, dismissing both unscientific and 
nonscientific areas of knowledge. Such a worldview falls into scientism, as it displays 
an excessive trust in the power of scientific knowledge and techniques, applied to all 
areas of study. 
Three general scientific approaches are key for building synthetical scientific 
worldviews (see section 3.2 Scientific Worldviews, p57). These are systems theory for 
an  attempt  toward  a  universal  language  for  science;  a  general  problem-solving 
perspective  on  scientific  issues  and  evolution,  broadly  construed.  To  contrast  and 
properly extend a scientific worldview, one needs to take into account the normative 
dimension of philosophizing in the agenda (e.g. worldview question (d)) as well as 
considering and integrating subjective and intersubjective criteria.
2.2.3  Scope
The  scope criterion is  particularly rich and vital.  We can subdivide  it  into 
three: scope in agenda; scope in level breadth and scope in level depth. 
Scope in agenda.  Other criteria being equal, one worldview is “better” than 
another when it has a larger  scope in its agenda, tackling a wider array of issues. I 
have already mentioned that the philosophical agenda is a topic of critical importance 
and so of huge dispute. This dispute often remains implicit and therefore confusing. 
The worldview agenda covers the most important first-order questions. Here we have 
used five worldview questions as a prototypical first-order starting point, but more 
related  philosophical questions might be added. To this end, it would be worth doing 
a history of philosophy based on a comparative analysis of philosophical agendas.
If the scope in agenda is violated, specific and narrow issues are considered, 
which leads to sectarianism and overspecialization  (Bahm 1953, 423).  What often 
happens  in  philosophy is  that  an  intellectual  conceptual  world  is  built,  criticized, 
refined, discussed again, and so on. With time, more and more complex distinctions 
emerge  and  the  initial  motivation  for  those  distinctions  is  forgotten,  as  is  the 
connection with first-order philosophical issues. This is precisely what has happened 
in modern philosophy in its insistence on second-order questions and knowledge. For 
example, American analytical philosophy after World War II tends to have a good 
internal consistency and a scientific aspect, but a very narrow scope in its agenda 
(Rescher 2001, 38). The scope in agenda is narrowed-down to second order problems 
(Adler 1965). It is remarkable that, according to Adler (1965), the commitment to 
first-order  philosophizing  is  the  only  condition  that  is  missing  from  analytical 
philosophy for it to become a respectable way of philosophizing.
Of course, the wider the agenda, the more difficult the synthetical integration. 
Such an integration has always been the achievement of a single philosopher. Those 
philosophical systems turn into unrevisable, untouchable personal constructions. At 
that  point,  there  are  no  more  common standards  of  truth  that  are  applicable,  and 
philosophizing becomes a personal enterprise, instead of a public one (Adler 1965, 
55-56). Adler (1993, xx) describes this mode of validation as  poesis.  The mode of 
validation  is  non-exclusionary,  where  two  philosophical  systems  are  not  more 
comparable  than  two poems.  This  contrasts  with  a  logical  and rational  approach, 
which  uses  an  exclusionary mode  of  validation,  in  which  two  contradictory 
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propositions cannot be true at the same time. Ironically, this grand rational entreprise 
of philosophical systems then becomes like poesis, because philosophical systems are 
not comparable anymore. We thus need to build revisable philosophical systems, open 
to  comparison  and  criticism.  To  progress  in  that  direction,  metaphilosophical 
agreement is required in the form of sharing a common agenda and list of criteria.
An  analogy  with  thermodynamics  is  interesting  here.  We  can  distinguish 
between closed and open philosophical systems. If the philosophical system is closed, 
there  is  no  communication  with  other  philosophies,  and  philosophizing  becomes 
dogmatic.  Such  system building  (e.g.  Descartes,  Leibniz,  Spinoza)  is  a  dogmatic 
approach in the sense that it is like an artistic whole: one accepts it or not (Adler 1993, 
244).  Systems  have  a  monolithic  and  deductive  structure,  rising  from  a  firm 
foundation in unchangeable premises.  Such closed systems, if  we assume there is 
something like the second law of thermodynamics for ideas, are condemned to die 
out.
We thus need to  build  open philosophical  systems,  revisable,  open to  new 
ideas, comparison and criticism. Here, open means that new inputs are welcomed (e.g. 
data  from  science  or  from  competing  positions  known  from  the  practice  of  the 
dialectical dimension of philosophizing), as well as waste production (e.g. rejections 
of some old theses because they conflict with new scientific knowledge or thanks to 
the  practice  of  the  critical  dimension  of  philosophizing).  These  inputs  and  waste 
production are necessary to maintain the system working. But there is a problem: 
what do we deem worth of including or rejecting? Having a list of criteria or explicit 
cognitive values is a key ingredient to take such a decision.
But even a wide scope in agenda is not enough. For example, Carnap (1928) 
initially had a very wide scope in his agenda. But it was reduced and translated in a 
very narrow way. It looked at every philosophical question solely from logical and 
empirical viewpoints. To avoid such reductionism, we also need to consider the scope 
in levels.
Scope in level breadth. A worldview with a wide scope extends across many if 
not all domains of human experience. This synoptical dimension is fundamental to the 
philosophical enterprise (Broad 1947). Philosophical principles then apply to a wide 
variety of scales and aspects. Such philosophizing aims at unifying otherwise separate 
phenomena. 
When the scope in level breadth is violated, philosophizing is restricted to one 
aspect.  Such reductionism starts  from a universal  intuition such as  “Everything is 
composed of atoms”; or “Everything can be analyzed logically”; or “All our thinking 
is embedded in language”, and so forth. When such and such insight is pushed in only 
one particular direction, thinking becomes reductionistic. The history of philosophy is 
full of such cases. For example, materialism assumes that everything is composed of 
elementary particles,  which leads to  difficulties.  For example,  how can we define 
what is beautiful  or what is a morally good action if everything is determined by 
interactions between atoms? In the case of language, even if every expressible thought 
and idea must be expressed through language, does that  mean that  we can reduce 
every problem to a problem of language? 
There is, however, an equally important danger in  abusing a broad  scope in 
level breadth. The worldview risks becoming too holistic, and might fall into vague 
New Age intuitions like “Everything is one field” or theories that are too abstract and 
useless.  Accordingly,  a  delicate  balance  has  to  be  found  between  objective 
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consistency and the scope in level breadth. The broader our scope is, the harder it is to 
make it consistent. For example, Hume's work can be seen as mainly analytical, with 
scientificity and  objective  consistency as  his  main  criteria,  while  Hegel's  work  is 
mainly synoptical,  aiming at the widest  possible scope  (Broad 1947). Yet, Hegel's 
scope has a tendency to be too large. Some utility and pragmatic criteria can balance 
the holistic aspect (compare for example the subjective and intersubjective criteria). 
Let me now mention one antidote to reductionism, Dooyeweerd's aspectual 
framework.  In  his  unique  philosophical  approach,  Herman  Dooyeweerd  (1953) 
introduces fifteen aspects through which we can make sense of the world. The aspects 
are quantitative, spatial, kinematic, physical, organic, psychic, analytical, formative, 
lingual,  social,  economic,  aesthetic,  juridical,  ethical  and  “pistic”;  pistic  means  a 
deep-seated faith, a kind of ultimate vision. This framework is very promising, and 
has  already  lead  to  applications  in  information  science  (see  e.g.  Winfield  2000; 
Basden  2007). If  we  systematically  consider  such  different  aspects,  it  is  indeed 
difficult to fall into any kind of reductionism.
Scope in levels' depth. A worldview with a wide scope extends across not only 
a wide diversity of levels, but also the extreme possibilities of each level. This is to be 
found in the idea that  great  philosophers go to the extremes by seeking the most 
universal issues, principles, theories and answers (Jaspers 1957, 1:intro). 
If we maintain a worldview taking into account many different levels, it might 
still be reductionistic if all these levels are not pushed to their extremes. Let us take 
two examples violating the scope in levels' depth. If the spatial scope is violated in its 
depth, the worldview applies only to a very limited geographical area. How seriously 
can we take a philosophy that is based only on the life of a small village but claims to 
be universal? Similarly, when the  time scope is violated in its depth, the worldview 
applies  only  to  a  very  particular  era.  How  seriously  can  we  take  a  philosophy 
considering only what has happened in the past ten years of human history? 
We need to consider the trade-off between depth-first or breadth-first in the 
scope in levels. Either we go in depth into a subject, with a particular methodology 
and aim, or we explore a wide variety of levels, aspects, and perspectives. 
Even  assuming  we  reach  the  broadest  range  of  levels,  and  their  deepest 
capacity, a fundamental issue remains, namely the scalability of the worldview, or its 
logical  and  scientific  consistency  across  different  levels.  Scalability  requires  a 
dynamical hierarchical understanding of the world. We need to switch from static to 
dynamical hierarchical levels. Although Dooyeweerd proposes aspects that should be 
distinguished and taken into account, he doesn't convincingly explain their origin or 
their complex evolution and interrelations.
The dynamical  and hierarchical  understanding of  different  levels  is  key  to 
understanding complex systems (see e.g. Salthe 1985). It is the ability both to analyze 
issues  closely,  and  to  have  a  broad  perspective  analyzing  microscopic  and 
macroscopic  issues.  In  fact,  even  the  micro-  macro-  terminology  is  misleading 
because we do not want to restrict the analysis to two levels only. We need to look at 
n relevant levels. If we seriously consider the relativity of scales, all scales might be 
equally  important.  Understanding  the  transitions  between  different  levels  of 
complexity arguably generates the hardest challenges in contemporary science. For 
example, how did space-time emerge in the Big Bang era? How did life, language, 
consciousness, society, and the rest emerge?
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2.2.4  Subjective Consistency
Subjective consistency requires the worldview to fit the broader knowledge, or 
common experience individuals already have. It is an important theme in philosophy 
which  is  called  with  some  variance  “common  sense”  (Descartes),  “immediate 
experience”  (Whitehead),  “macroscopic  experience”  (Dewey),  “public  experience” 
(Santayana), or “common experience” (Adler). 
If an idea does not connect to existing knowledge, it simply cannot be learned. 
If  subjective  consistency is  violated,  knowledge  becomes  esoteric.  Whatever  its 
manifold  benefits,  if  a  simple  and  transmissible  version  of  a  worldview  is  not 
available, its qualities will not benefit large numbers of people. 
There is a continuum between our day-to-day common experience and  special 
experiences undertaken by empirical sciences. The scope in level breadth of common 
experience is much wider than the scope of the tightly controlled special experiences 
performed in science. So, even if one takes the position that common experience is 
not reliable for philosophical and scientific knowledge, we can't ignore it and need to 
interpret it somehow.
As  with  objective  contradictions,  subjective  contradictions  can  generate  a 
cognitive dissonance at the heart of a growth process. Radically new problems, ideas 
or theories hurt our basic expectations. For example, quantum mechanics is at odds 
with many of our intuitive ideas such as objectivity or causality, and many scientists 
work hard to interpret this theory consistently with our macro-world intuitions. If my 
worldview is not challenged by any experience, theory or person I encounter, I have 
no reason to change it. A contradiction with common-experience stimulates a quest 
for knowledge.
The subjective consistency criterion on its own has some limits. What might 
be obvious and consistent for a particular subject might not be so for another. This 
limits theorizing to particular events and subjects, not general theories and objects. 
Not surprisingly, it is in contrast with objective criteria.
2.2.5  Personal Utility
A worldview satisfying personal utility provides goals, values, or at least some 
preferences  heuristic  to  choose  between  alternatives.  It  requires  having  a  well 
functioning implicit or explicit theory of values (question (d)), which connects with 
ways to act (question (e)). 
Life  satisfaction  research  has  shown that  having clear  goals  or  a  personal 
vision is one of the key factors of happiness  (e.g. Emmons 1986; Csikszentmihalyi 
1990). In our time of information overload, we can easily get overwhelmed by a flow 
of possibilities. To navigate in this flow, many self-help books encourage one to make 
one's “vision” explicit  (e.g. Nanus 1992; Covey 1999). In fact, even when a clear 
vision is found it requires a lot of courage and discipline to be faithful to it. Without a 
vision, one tends to be reactive instead of proactive. As Covey  (1999, 72) puts it, 
reactive people “are  driven by feelings,  by circumstances,  by conditions,  by their 
environment. Proactive people are driven by values –carefully thought about, selected 
and internalized values”.
A vision in isolation remains idealistic and sterile if it does not help with day-
to-day functioning. The challenge is thus to have practical  means for coordinating 
one’s personal actions in harmony with one’s vision. Concretely, this can be achieved 
if the vision mobilizes one for action. In terms of real-world actions, what we need is 
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a good method of managing action, answering question (e). Problem-solving methods, 
insights into operational research, management, logical-decision trees, criteria lists, 
and so forth, are all well-known tools to help us in complex decision making. The 
“getting things done” method proposed by David Allen (2001) is also a key building 
block for a praxeology. It  is now widely used among knowledge workers, and its 
principles are supported by insights in cybernetics and cognitive sciences (Heylighen 
and Vidal 2008).
The doctrine of utilitarism centrally meets the criterion of personal utility –and 
its companion, collective utility. An action is right insofar as it promotes happiness. So 
personal utility could also be called “personal satisfaction” or simply “happiness”. 
Yet, it is well known that you can be very happy but be stupid. In Bentham's (1789, 
chap  iv) felicitous  calculus,  the  purity  of  pleasure is  essential  to  ensure  further 
pleasures, and not to have a pleasure that could lead to a pain. This encourages us to 
build a good model of the world, using objective criteria to anticipate future pleasures 
or pains, within a wide time scope.
Abuse of this criterion leads to individualism. Everything becomes centered 
on the individual's gain in pleasures and decrease in pains. We want the pleasures to 
be not only personal, but also scalable to other individuals and larger systems. That is 
why we also need to take into account a larger scope, at least with an intersubjective 
or social perspective, as we will see later with regard to collective utility. 
2.2.6  Emotionality
The  rational  attitude  is  unemotional  (Bahm  1953,  14).  It  might  then  be 
surprising to include emotionality as a criterion for a good worldview. The trouble is 
that  emotions  often  remain  poorly  recognized  and  discussed  in  many  human 
interactions, even if their influence can be immense. Merely suppressing or leaving 
emotions  unacknowledged  is  letting  them  intervene  in  more  subversive  and 
unconscious manners  (e.g. Freud 1899). It would be foolish to dismiss their power 
over and impact on every aspect of our lives and worldviews. We definitely need a 
framework and tools to deal with them.
Emotional states of mind can be triggered by the environment or by interacting 
with  others.  It  is  therefore  a  criterion  better  categorized  as  both  subjective and 
intersubjective.  The  interplay of  emotions and higher  cognitive functions,  culture, 
education and personality is complex and intricate. It is the object of affective science 
to study motives, attitudes, moods,  and emotions, and their effect  in personal and 
collective behavior. 
Emotions are basic cognitive mechanisms inherited through evolution. They 
can be viewed as basic survival “values” passed on  genetically and  not culturally. 
They have been successful over millions of years of evolution in achieving survival 
and reproduction (e.g. Darwin 1872; Ledoux 1996).
For example, they are indispensable to maintaining basic bodily functions (see 
e.g. Denton 2005). Such homeostatic emotions are feelings triggered by internal body 
states. Thirst, hunger, or feeling hot are all feelings engaging us to restore balance in 
bodily  systems,  by  drinking,  eating  or  moving  into  the  shade.  They  can  be 
distinguished from classical emotions triggered by external stimuli. Lust, anger and 
fear  motivate  us  to  copulate,  fight  or  flee.  More  generally,  beyond  their  original 
survival  and  reproductive  merits,  emotions  are  etymologically  what  moves  us. 
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Emotions direct our attention and motivate our behavior, resulting in mobilizing us for 
action. 
Finding a good emotional balance is fundamental for someone to be in good 
health  and  to  be  socially  integrated.  If  not,  he  will  experience  emotional  and 
behavioral  disorders.  Having  too  few emotions,  like  a  psychopath;  or  having too 
many, as with some forms of neurosis, are both pathologies. Modern medicine and 
psychotherapies can help in dealing with such situations.
If  emotionality is violated, it means that few emotions are involved (or only 
negative  and  low-energy  emotions  such  as  depression).  Our  worldview  becomes 
bland and not engaging, whatever its other qualities may be. No motivation is found 
to accept or act according to a certain worldview rather than another. Not addressing 
emotions through psychological, social, educational and philosophical efforts leads to 
insufficient theories, missing a major aspect of our cognition. 
But  what  if  we  abuse  emotionality in  expressing  or  communicating  a 
worldview? To take an example in philosophy, Nietzsche's writing is at the border of 
philosophy and poetry. The result is a work of a great depth and beauty, which is very 
inspiring to many readers. His work is like a work of art,  open to many different 
interpretations  and ambiguities.  This  emotional  or  artistic  approach to  philosophy 
suffers from a downside –namely,  that  it  does not  use an argumentative approach 
(Rescher  2001,  chap.  6.3).  We  thus  need  to  balance  emotionality with  objective 
consistency, and also include a logical and argumentative attitude.
What are the limits of  emotionality? The main problem is that emotions can 
take  over  our  rational  thinking  mode  (however,  for  a  balanced  discussion  about 
cognitive and affective cognitive processes, see e.g. Damasio 2000; Davidson 2000). 
Reacting quickly, strongly and thoughtlessly was once an evolutionary advantage: you 
had better be scared and react  if  you see a hungry lion running after you. In our 
modern day-to-day life, this emotional reactivity is more and more a burden than an 
advantage. Uncontrolled strong negative emotions can have devastating effects in all 
kinds of social relationships, so that it seems worth learning how to tame them. On the 
other  hand,  positive  emotions  are  crucial  to  creativity,  which  requires  a  relaxed, 
tolerant and open-minded attitude (see e.g. Fredrickson 2004).
Emotions thus need to be integrated with higher cognitive functions, towards 
an intentional emotional control (Stewart 2007). Emotional control is a theme that we 
find already in the Ancient Greece, for example in Epictetus' philosophy. The first 
step to emotional control is to be able to acknowledge, label and communicate them. 
Rosenberg's  (2003) nonviolent  communication  method  promotes  this  because  it 
encourages listening and fully expressing universal  human emotions,  feelings,  and 
needs.  This  communication  method  is  also  fruitful  to  start  a  constructive  dialog 
between  people  holding  very  different  worldviews  (see  section  3.3.4  Nonviolent
Worldview Communication, p65).
Once  we  are  able  to  recognize  one's  and  other's  positive  and  negative 
emotions, we can start to manage them. A simple idea for emotional control is to have 
functionally useful emotional reactions. For most purposes, it is useful to cultivate 
positive ones and tame negative ones  (this is the theme of positive psychology, see 
e.g. Seligman 1998). Surely, it's easier said than done. Meditation teaches how to have 
emotions instead of emotions having you. Positive ones can be cultivated (e.g. love, 
joy, peace, compassion, etc.) but meditation can also help to deal with strong negative 
emotions (e.g. hatred, anger, fear, anxiety) by observing and releasing them. Such an 
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activity can be seen as intentional evolution, where humans choose instead of being 
subject of their emotions. 
In debates, emotional control leaves more space to an objective attitude by 
focusing on rational arguments instead of following instinctive impulses. The use of 
logical reasoning is what makes the rational inquiry a universal pursuit, beyond some 
subjective emotions which could hamper communication. Obviously, it doesn't imply 
that  researchers  shouldn't  or  do  not  experience  emotions.  The  point  is  that 
pragmatically,  positive  emotions  broaden  the  mindset,  which  will  lead  to  more 
creativity  than  having  negative  emotions,  which  narrow  the  mindset  (see  again 
Fredrickson 2004). 
From a collective perspective, a great issue in political theory involves the role 
of  emotionality  in  human association.  To promote  or  diffuse  a  worldview,  which 
emotions  should  be  initiated?  There  are  four  logically  possible  responses,  either 
harnessing positive emotions, negative emotions, both or none. 
First, we saw that relying only on rational arguments doesn't work for most 
people.  This is  a lesson of evolutionary psychology, which was since long before 
understood  by  rhetoric,  the  art  to  convince  and  persuade.  Aristotle's  Rhetoric 
famously divided it in three steps: ethos, pathos and logos (authority, motivation, and 
then only rational arguments). A politic using no emotions would most likely fail. It 
would not be engaging and it would not encourage mobilization. Mass media and 
politicians capitalize on this, applying many tricks to trigger and manipulate people's 
emotions.  The  abuse  of  rhetoric  leads  to  verbosity  and  empty  pomposity.  This 
negative aspect is now a common use of the word “rhetoric”, but it is worth noting 
that rhetoric had in the past a much more positive connotation. 
Second, using only positive emotions like love, generosity, compassion, etc. 
sounds like a good choice for a long-term engagement of humans. For example, an 
unprecedented  global  compassionate  humanitarian  response  occurred  after  the  26 
December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake. But to generalize a positive attitude to any 
situation leads to a naive and gullible attitude. Emotions, even positive ones, need to 
remain functional.
Third, using negative emotions such as fear, hatred, etc. can also be effective. 
The fear of burning to hell helped to control the behavior of the faithful. However, 
such a strategy might not work on the long-term and is questionable ethically. Indeed, 
it  is  worth  remembering  that  incitement  to  hatred  is  something  which  is  legally 
punished in many countries and that history has and is still showing us the worrying 
results of politics based on fear.
The  fourth  option  is  to  trigger  both  positive  and  negative  emotions  for 
different purposes. Even if it is probably the best option, it is important to note that 
the  interpretation  of  emotions  depends  on  the  cognitive  developmental  stage 
individuals are (see e.g. Graves 1974).
Yet,  harnessing  emotions  can  very  quickly  be  abused,  because  a  strong 
emotional  reaction  will  limit  rational  deliberation.  History  has  taught  us  that 
emotional control of masses can lead to atrocities. Because emotions are hard-wired 
in our brains, they easily take over the more rational way of thinking, and can push us 
in unconsidered actions.  Before moving masses we need to consider  utility applied 
with a wide scope along with a “good” axiology and political project.
It is worth balancing the striving of political leaders to harness emotions with 
individual emotional control. If citizens are educated in emotional control, it becomes 
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easier  to  engage  –also–   in  rational  argumentations,  debates  and  actions.  If  their 
education led them to cultivate emotional awareness, expressing negative and positive 
emotions,  they  can  more  easily  engage  in  informed  long-term mobilization  for  a 
greater good.
2.2.7  Intersubjective Consistency
Intersubjective  consistency  calls  for  the  reduction  of  conflict  between 
individuals. In other words, it  is an effort towards social peace. It requires human 
interactions  flowing  flawlessly.  Moral  philosophy,  economics,  ethics,  politics  and 
jurisprudence are mainly concerned with this criterion. 
When  intersubjective  consistency  is  violated,  conflicts  between individuals 
and states occur and interactions are difficult. Yet, moments of high frictions can also 
be occasions for in-depth reforms and social learning. For example, too much friction 
in a society often leads to revolutions, along with a whole new way of functioning. A 
form of social learning occurred after World War II when states learned from their 
failures and set up new agreements and social bonds. 
Abusing this criterion by avoiding conflict at all costs would only promote 
traditional  ways  of  thinking  and  acting.  This  would  hinder  creative  ways  of 
reorganizing societies, because new ways of thinking necessarily imply friction with 
older ways.  Fortunately,  conflicts need not to be physical.  As Karl  Popper  (1963, 
conclusion) eloquently wrote, “the role of thought is to carry out revolutions by means 
of critical debates rather than by means of violence and of warfare; (…) it is the great 
tradition  of  Western  rationalism  to  fight  our  battles  with  words  rather  than  with 
swords.” 
It is therefore important to balance intersubjective consistency with objective 
criteria,  conducting  conflicts  in  an  Agora  rather  than  on  a  battlefield.  If 
communication is difficult,  it  may also be time to seriously take  emotionality  into 
account  to  open  dialogue  (see  also  section  3.3.4  Nonviolent  Worldview
Communication,  p65).  Additionally,  it  is  fruitful  to  combine  intersubjective 
consistency with a wide scope, considering a variety of levels from the individual to 
the ecological.
2.2.8  Collective Utility
Collective utility is a natural extension of personal utility. It encourages a life-
outlook and mobilizes one for what is socially beneficial. We saw the importance of 
having a personal vision. Yet, if the vision is centered on the individual it runs the risk 
of being individualistic and opportunistic. Thus, the personal and collective visions 
should as much as possible be meaningfully integrated within a wide scope, leading to 
a  personal  life-outlook  that  is  also  beneficial  for  larger  organizations.  Those 
organizations range from the family, the social network, the country, to humanity as a 
whole,  the  planet  as  an  ecosystem,  or  even the  entire  universe.  It  is  of  course  a 
difficult challenge to integrate personal and collective utility. 
The concept of coordination is central in this discussion. It can be defined as 
the organization of actions so as to maximize synergy and to minimize friction. To 
work properly,  an organization needs individuals to coordinate  their  actions.  Such 
coordination mechanisms can emerge  more or  less  naturally,  for  example through 
cultural  norms, linguistic conventions, traffic rules, and so on. For more elaborate 
purposes, however, the coordinating endeavor is much more difficult to achieve. How 
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can  we  promote  order  and  mobilize  for  collective  actions,  so  that  they  are  done 
smoothly and cooperatively? A promising compromise between individual freedom 
and collective interest  is to design choice architectures that  nudge people towards 
desired  actions  (Thaler  and  Sunstein  2009).  In  addition,  information  and 
communication technologies make this collective coordination endeavor technically 
workable on large scales (see e.g. Watkins and Rodriguez 2008). A famous illustration 
of  collective  coordination  is  the  well-known  Wikipedia  encyclopedia,  which 
coordinates millions of users to collaboratively write the largest encyclopedia ever.
The  open-source  software  development  community  already  functions  with 
advanced collaborative coordination tools (Heylighen 2007). A central tool is the  job-
ticketing system, which stimulates the community to act. A user who finds a bug or a 
feature to implement leaves a message on a forum to which others have access. Other 
users can then work on this initial stimulus. Inspired by this success, and extending 
personal  utility,  personal  action  management  systems  could  be  extended  to  the 
collective,  hinting at  the  possibility  of  a  collaborative version of  “Getting Things 
Done” (Heylighen and Vidal 2008). Collective problem solving through collaborative 
argumentation mapping methods also promises to significantly promote large scale 
rational decision making (Baldwin and Price 2008; Iandoli, Klein, and Zollo 2007).
If  collective utility is violated, people strive to fulfill individualist values or 
basic needs.  Collective utility can be interpreted as a consistency criterion, not on a 
theoretical  level,  to  stay  contradiction-free,  but  on  a  practical  level,  to  achieve 
mutually beneficial actions. Idealized consistent systems are useless if they can not be 
applied in  the real  world.  Collective utility is  thus a  strong pragmatic  criterion to 
complement  theoretical  reasonings  and  constructions.  Nonetheless,  focusing  on 
personal utility or collective utility leaves normative problems open. We need to find, 
define  and  refine  what  we  deem is  the  most  useful,  personally  and  socially.  An 
axiology is needed. 
2.2.9  Narrativity
Narrativity calls for presenting the worldview's messages through stories. A 
story can be defined as a connected sequence of actions that follow from one to the 
next.  Stories are everywhere, in every culture. Religious texts, newspapers, gossip, 
literature,  movies  and  stage  plays  all  use  a  narrative  form to  tell  stories,  real  or 
imagined. Overall, stories constitute the vast majority of humanity's bookshelves.
Narrativity and  emotionality go hand in hand, because both have a  double 
subjective and intersubjective aspect. Subjectively,  narrativity is essential because it 
makes the worldview emotional, motivating and easy to assimilate  (see e.g. Oatley 
1999;  Heath  2007).  Intersubjectively,  it  is  also  crucial  for  relaying  messages 
effectively.  Love  stories  are  typically  much  easier  to  spread  than  mathematical 
theorems. 
Stories are very efficient for passing messages on because our very thinking 
process works with stories. We are constantly constructing stories where we are the 
hero... or the victim. Even analytical philosophy applies narrativity when it presents 
moral dilemmas in the form of short stories. This is partly why it is so exciting to try 
to solve them.
When  narrativity is  violated,  we  are  confronted  with  theoretical  material. 
Theories  are  not  only  insipid  emotionally,  they  are  also  hard  to  learn,  hard  to 
understand and hard to remember. Theories are disconnected from human concerns. 
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At the extreme of theorizing is mathematics, often painful to learn. A simple way to 
overcome  difficulties  in  learning  theoretical  disciplines  would  be  to  include  the 
history of  disciplines  in  curricula  more systematically.  This  would reestablish our 
natural tendency to be motivated and to learn better through stories. Philosophy and 
mathematics  are  not  popular  because  narrativity is  constantly  violated.  Notable 
popular  exceptions  such  as  Sophie's  World (Gaarder  1994) and Fermat's  Last  
Theorem (Singh 1998) both use a narrative form to make those disciplines widely 
accessible.
But  leaving aside  narrativity is  also  the  price  of  good  theorizing.  Indeed, 
telling  stories  is  antithetical  to  theorizing.  The  literary  and the  scientific  are  two 
different cultures, very hard to bridge (Snow 1959). Stories require a long message to 
convey a short  idea,  which may not be universally valid. Science and philosophy, 
because  of  their  theoretical  nature,  seek  generalities  and  intentionally  avoid 
narrativity. Science  aims  at  finding  universal  laws,  supposed  to  be  certain, 
independent  of  time,  contexts  or  individual  subjects;  whereas  stories  narrate  a 
sequence of actions at a particular time, in a particular context and with an uncertain 
outcome (Heylighen 2010a).
2.3  Assessment Tests
The simplest application of the criteria is to use them as a checklist to improve 
or to compare worldviews. Yet, such a worldview assessment is not to be understood 
as an issue-resolving algorithm. Rather, the criteria are cognitive values that influence 
the preferring of one worldview over another. As Kuhn (1977) and McMullin (2008) 
emphasied, the incentive behind such lists of criteria is to maximize each of them 
simultaneously. Rather than a mechanical process, constructing worldviews is an art 
that needs to balance contrasting and sometimes conflicting criteria.
Individually,  criteria  are  also  imprecise.  Individuals  may differ  about  their 
application in concrete cases  (T. S. Kuhn 1977, 322). For example, philosophers of 
science have shown that even if scientists are in principle driven by objective criteria, 
subjective  considerations  (Is  the  theory  simple  to  understand?)  or  intersubjective 
considerations (Do authorities believe in this theory?) play an equally important role 
in constructing and assessing scientific theories  (e.g. T. S. Kuhn 1970; Feyerabend 
1993).
Can we derive more criteria from the nine we proposed? Surely. For example, 
sustainability requires a wide time scale (scope in level depth) as well as  collective 
utility. Synthesis requires a wide scope in agenda and levels, coupled with the striving 
of objective consistency. And so on, and so on.
Let  us now turn from our criteria  to evaluation tests and recover some of 
Adler's  first  (1965;  1993,  31).  Adler  argued that  there are  three families of  tests: 
empirical,  pragmatic and  logical.  Empirical tests, such as Popper's falsificationism, 
are  clearly  included  in  scientificity.  Furthermore,  if  we  follow Adler's  distinction 
between special experience and common experience,  scientificity would be useful to 
assess the special  experience that  science involves, whereas  subjective consistency 
assesses the common experience that we undergo. Pragmatic tests are represented by 
subjective  and intersubjective  utility  criteria.  Logical  tests  are  included  in  our 
objective consistency criterion. 
Using each criterion individually is relatively easy, but the outcome of such a 
use is limited. How can we use several criteria at the same time? Combining more and 
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more criteria, we face a combinatory explosion, especially as we enlarge our  scope. 
Let us see why.
2.3.1  Testing the Components
A natural use of the criteria is to test the worldview components (ontology, 
explanation, prediction, axiology and praxeology). Let X be a worldview component 
and Cn, criterion n. The general question is then:
“What is a good X according to C1, C2 ,..., and C9 ?” 
For example, “What is a good explanation according to scientificity, scope, subjective 
consistency and collective utility?” Arguably, the most important combination to keep 
in mind is the scope in levels. As I argued when describing the scope criterion, its use 
is fundamental to grasp complex realities and to avoid reductionism.
So,  the  criteria  can  be  used  analytically,  to  improve  each  worldview's 
components.  But  the  comprehensiveness ideal  urges  us  to  think  about  several 
worldview questions and components  simultaneously. So, if  Xn is component  n, the 
problem becomes:
“What are good X1, X2 ,..., and X5 according to C1, C2 ,..., and C9 ?”
In other words,  “What are a  good ontology, explanation,  prediction,  axiology and 
praxeology according to every objective, subjective and intersubjective criteria?” Or 
more  simply,  “What  is  a  good worldview according to  all  criteria?” The  task is 
daunting. The purpose of the following assessment tests is to identify the most salient 
and  useful  tests  among  the  most  significant  combinations.  Some  tests  partially 
overlap, which is not ideal but can be a way to double-check one's worldview.
2.3.2  Testing the Dimensions
I will now describe  first-order (is-ought,  ought-act and is-act); second-order 
(critical,  dialectical)  and  synthetical  or  third-order  tests  (mixed  questions,  first-
second-order) operating across the six dimensions of philosophy.  When there is an 
effort to make descriptive and normative dimensions consistent, we are in the domain 
of  the  is-ought  test.  Similarly,  combining  normative  with  practical  dimensions  is 
covered by the ought-act test. Finally, coupling descriptive and practical dimensions 
leads to  the  is-act test.  Key questions summarizing the  tests are  given in  table  2 
below.
The  is-ought  problem  (Hume 1739) reminds us that philosophy is a unique 
discipline concerned with questions both about what is the case and about what ought 
to  be.  In  other  words,  it  is  busy  with  both  descriptive  and  normative  issues. 
Combining descriptive and normative theories leads to the is-ought  problem, “the 
central problem in moral philosophy” (Hudson 1969, 11). 
Let me illustrate the is-ought problem with the classical issue of determinism 
and  freedom.  If  we  assume  at  a  descriptive  level  that  everything  is  completely 
determined, can we then defend on a normative side the view there is such a thing as 
human  freedom?  This  is  a  typical  complication  of  the  philosophical  doctrine  of 
determinism.  Until  this  is-ought  problem  has  received  an  adequate  answer,  the 
doctrine is  not  satisfying (see also e.g.  Adler  1965, chap. 11;  and 1993 for more 
details on the is-ought test). 
Even if the worldview under consideration successfully passes the  is-ought  
test,  it  tells  us nothing about how to act  in concrete situations.  How well  are  the 
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normative and practical dimensions holding together? How are moral principles and 
ethical theories applied in practice, individually and collectively? 
The ought-act test concerns consistency between values (worldview question 
(d)) and actions (question (e)). Philosophy as a discipline is rarely considered to be 
occupied with this problem. In the ought-act test, efficiency in action is not primarily 
what matters. What matters is that individual or collective actions are in line with 
normative principles.  How can we apply normative theories  in  specific  cases  and 
contexts?  This  is  the  central  problem of  applied ethics.  For  example,  fields  like 
medicine,  business,  engineering  and  scientific  research  are  all  confronted  with 
difficult ethical choices to perform (see e.g. LaFollette 2007). To act meaningfully, a 
normative theory is largely insufficient. To act we also need practical realizable and 
concrete means consistent with normative rules. More realistically, to tackle complex 
moral decision making, applied ethics has developed sophisticated models such as 
case-based reasoning or Rawls's  (1971) reflective equilibrium. In such an endeavor, 
the philosophical  enterprise  is  mixed with the  moral  and political  one,  and needs 
insights from strategic action, management theories, and so forth, to conduct it. 
Let  us  illustrate  a  failure  of  the  ought-act test  with  Kant's  (1785,  4:421) 
categorical imperative, “Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same 
time will that it should become a universal law.” Beautiful. But how are we supposed 
to apply it in practice? This normative imperative doesn't take into account any real-
world complexity in decision making. It doesn't much help one to act. For example, it 
doesn't help a young doctor to decide if a fourteen-year-old pregnant girl should have 
an abortion or not. Another example is the value of achieving world peace. Almost 
everybody would see it as a valuable enterprise. But what are the most urgent and 
important actions to do now to accomplish it as soon as possible? To stop famine? To 
fight corruption? To provide all people in the world with energy by building more 
nuclear  power  plants?  And  so  on.  A lot  of  deliberation  will  be  needed  to  reach 
agreement on these matters. 
Often, philosophers are reluctant to embrace action, notably because they feel 
more  comfortable  with  second-order  philosophizing.  A notable  exception  is  Karl 
Marx  who  famously  wrote  to  Feuerbach  that  “philosophers  have  hitherto  only 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Engels and Marx 
1903). Mises (1949) also developed a theory of action, which is sometimes considered 
as the capitalist equivalent of Marx's Capital. The problem is that abuses of applying 
a philosophical theory in the moral or political sphere easily occur. Therefore, it is 
worth asking if the philosopher should not be more worried and present when this 
critical  transition  from value  to  action  occurs.  The  ought-act  test  aims to  cohere 
values with concrete actions and is as crucial to adress as the is-ought test.
Passing  the  is-act  test  successfully  is  essential  for  effective  and  efficient 
action. From a cybernetic viewpoint, this is obvious. The more accurate the model is, 
the more precise and effective will action and control be (Conant and Ashby 1970). 
This test entails an engineering attitude, and is of a technical utility. When the is-act 
test is neglected, action doesn't work. In fact, in science and engineering there is a 
constant feedback between modeling and experimenting (acting). An action that does 
not produce good results will not be selected. A good model of the world enables us to 
make predictions of our actions' outcomes.
However,  considered  alone,  the  is-act test  short-circuits  the  normative 
dimension. The only implicit value here is efficiency. We might call such a shortcut 
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the “normative fallacy,” where the normative dimension is simply dropped. This is 
very important to acknowledge, because if we want to bring in our values, we need 
other dimensions of philosophizing. The most obvious solution is to combine this test 
with the ought-act or is-ought test. 
Let us now turn to second-order tests. First,  with the  critical  test.  The key 
question is: “Did you critically analyze your worldview with objective, subjective and 
intersubjective  criteria?”  We can  use  both  analytical  and  continental  traditions  to 
perform these tests. The analytical tradition will foremost use  objective consistency 
and scientificity to perform its critique; while the continental tradition will focus on 
intersubjective (social) and subjective aspects of the worldview under consideration. 
Failing to pass this test, philosophizing is unreflective and possibly self-contradictory.
The  dialectical  test is  summarized  with  the question:  “Did  you review all 
major positions on this issue?”  All good academic research starts by reviewing as 
impartially as possible all positions and related issues on a certain topic or idea. The 
Syntopicon is a very advanced and useful example of such an effort. Once a wide 
review is made, it is possible to precisely define and join issues. When this dimension 
of philosophizing is skipped, we are likely to generate naïve theories, by reiterating 
mistakes made through the history of ideas. But this dialectical work ultimately helps 
philosophers occupied with first-order questions, to synthesize different conflicting 
positions, or to show why their position is “better” than others. 
Synthetical tests are crucial for anyone concerned about synthesis, or third-
order  philosophizing,  gluing  together  the  previous  five  dimensions.  In  synthetical 
philosophy, we can distinguish at least two tests: the mixed question test and the  first-
second-order test.
The mixed question test asks: “Is your worldview consistent with and working 
with  other  branches  of  knowledge?”  It  demands  for  coherence  between  different 
disciplines,  when  each  of  them can  make  a  contribution  to  the  issue  at  hand.  It 
requires an awareness of relationships between disciplines, their subject matter and 
their  limits.  For  example,  a  mixed  question test  involving  historical  or  scientific 
knowledge can discredit philosophical theories. Adler (1965, chap. 12) described the 
mixed question test in operation, by comparing our common experience of material 
objects with the scientific description of elementary particles. He concludes that one 
“measure of the soundness of a philosophical theory or doctrine is its ability to (…) 
reconcile  what  truth  there  is  in  a  scientific  theory  with  what  truth  there  is  in  a 
common-sense opinion and in the philosophical  elucidation of  that  opinion,  when 
these several truths appear to come into conflict.”
Today  all  first-order  philosophical  dimensions  are  mixed  with  other 
disciplines.  To conduct such an interdisciplinary effort, we need to pass the  mixed 
question test. We must know which disciplines we need to involve to solve which 
problem.  The  distinction  between  philosophical  dimensions  does  not  imply  their 
separation  (Bahm  1980,  4).  The  same  can  be  said  for  the  distinction  between 
philosophy and science.  We can distinguish them, but this does not imply that we 
should separate them. This point  is essential  to tackle complex problems, and this 
explains why the  scope  criteria are fundamental. Such synthetical philosophizing is 
more than the “philosophies of” typical of its critical dimension (4). As I noted earlier, 
this synthetical dimension connects to first-order dimensions, which are successfully 
conducted by doing “philosophy with”, side by side with other knowledge branches 
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(Hansson 2008). If the mixed question test is violated, it leads to monodisciplinarity, a 
naïve approach to complex problems or inconsistencies between disciplines.
The  first-second-order  test  asks:  “Is  your  second-order  philosophizing 
ultimately  working  for  first-order  philosophizing  or  synthesis?”  Critical 
philosophizing most often fails to connect with first-order issues, and thus leads to 
esoteric knowledge. For example, when studying epistemology, is our goal strongly 
committed to the effective production of knowledge, to explain, predict and control 
our world? Or are we engaged in a debate amongst second-order knowledge experts? 
It is easy to lose sight and sense of the traditional first-order philosophical enterprise. 
When this second-order philosophizing is unduly developed, several things happen. 
First,  the  scope in agenda is considerably narrowed down. Second, no connection 
with common sense is found –that is, it violates  subjective consistency. Third, only 
one philosophical dimension out of the six is performed. A similar reasoning holds for 
the dialectical dimension. It needs at some points to reconnect with first-order issues 
to be of any use. In summary, the second-order critical and dialectical dimensions of 
philosophy work in the final instance at operating a synthesis between descriptive, 
normative, and practical philosophy. 
Both  continental  and  analytic  philosophies  fail  this  test.  In  continental 
philosophy,  first-order  philosophizing  is  ignored  or  drawn  in  an  inaccessible 
conceptual vocabulary. Today's analytic and linguistic philosophies are focused on a 
technical  second-order  philosophizing  and  will  most  often  fail  to  connect  their 
analyses  to  first-order  dimensions.  In  both cases,  philosophy becomes  an  esoteric 
practice, reserved to a few intellectuals.
Test Question
Is-ought Is your description of the world consistent with your values?
Ought-act Do you connect your values with concrete decision making 
and action?
Is-act Is your model for action efficient?
Critical Do  you  critically  analyze  your  worldview  with  objective, 
subjective and intersubjective criteria?
Dialectical Do you join issues and review all major positions on ideas 
related to your worldview?
Mixed question Is your worldview consistent with and working with other 
branches of knowledge?
First-second-order Is your second-order philosophizing ultimately working for 
first-order philosophizing or synthesis?
Table 2: Summary of worldview assessment tests across the philosophical dimensions.
2.3.3  Testing the Big Three
Let us now turn our attention again to the three worlds. How do they interact? 
How  may  we  deal  with  this  tension  between  the  objective,  subjective  and 
intersubjective  –not  merely  as  independent  sets  of  criteria  but  in  their  systemic 
interaction? I will offer some tests to tackle this issue of integrating the three worlds 
(summarized in table 3 below).
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Let us take a bird's-eye view on our criteria. We humans are involved in three 
kinds  of  conflicts:  against  nature  (objective),  against  ourselves  (subjective)  and 
against others (intersubjective). We want to minimize those conflicts, or at least we 
want  tools  to  deal  with  them.  More  precisely,  objective  criteria require  that  the 
worldview not be in friction with the outside world; subjective criteria require that the 
worldview not be in friction with an individual's common knowledge and actions; and 
intersubjective  criteria require  that  the  worldview  minimizes  friction  between 
individuals, and maximizes their synergistic interactions. In comparative philosophy, 
Huston Smith  (1957, 8) recapitulated that, generally, the West has emphasized the 
natural problem (objective); India the psychological (subjective) and China the social 
(intersubjective).  This indicates that  comparative philosophy can be regarded as a 
pivotal starting point for satisfying criteria in the three worlds.
A worldview  that  fits  well  in  the  three  worlds  has  more  chances  to  be 
accepted, appealing, and useful. Ideally, it would give rise to the following benefits. A 
consistent  conception  of  the  world  (objective  benefit);  a  lifeworld  providing  a 
meaning of life, useful for living a good life (subjective benefit); and a world view 
whose  foundations  are  fit  for  a  well-organized  society,  where  few conflicts  arise 
(intersubjective benefit). Most importantly, those three worlds would be synthesized 
as much as  possible  in a coherent  and comprehensive framework,  thus forming a 
synthetical worldview.
If we sum up the use of the three-perspectives criteria, we come to the thesis 
of  minimizing  friction:  a  good  worldview  has  a  minimum of  friction  within  and  
between objective, subjective and intersubjective worlds. Can we specify more precise 
and concrete tests towards this ideal? Just as I did for the philosophical dimensions, I 
propose here tests across the three worlds. This leads to three main tests: we-I, I-it and 
we-it.
In the we-I test, we ask: “Is your worldview compatible with or in friction with 
the  interests  of  society?”  This  question  raises  a  classical  problem  in  political 
philosophy, namely, the conflicting interests of the individual and the collective. Ideal 
solutions of such conflicts do not reach compromise (a zero-sum game), but achieve 
cooperation  and  synergy  (non-zero-sum game).  To  achieve  cooperation,  we  often 
develop  empathy with our neighbor or our society. But applying the  scope in level  
breadth, we need not to stop at society. Larger systems can also be embraced, from 
the whole planet to the entire universe (see our exploration of a cosmological ethics in 
Chapter 10).
There are two common ways in which the  I-we test is violated. First, if the 
subjective world dominates, it leads to individualism and its downsides. Second, if the 
intersubjective  world  and  values  dominate,  there  are  risks  of  surrendering  to  a 
political system, such as communism. There is no obvious solution to this tension and 
a delicate balance between the two needs to be found. 
We can not build empathy for systems we are not even aware of. With the it-I  
test, we can assess the extent of this awareness: “Is your worldview compatible with 
or  in  friction  with  the  most  up-to-date  scientific  models?”  This  test  requires  the 
integration of subjective and objective worlds. 
When the  it-I test  fails,  we live in  an unscientific  illusion,  or with a  very 
limited objective view. Such a narrow awareness might work in the short-term of a 
single life-span, but is likely to fail on larger time scales. Interestingly, it might be 
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beneficial to work both on our inner subjective awareness –or involution– and on the 
outer objective evolution of systems (H. Smith 1976). 
With the we-it test we ask: “Is the society we are developing compatible with 
or in friction with the objective world?” Here, we combine objective criteria to serve 
collective utility. But, as the is-act test showed us, we need to be sure that our values 
are not short-circuited in such an endeavor.  If we emphasize intersubjective criteria 
too much, we might hamper the quality of our world models. On the other hand, 
relying  exclusively  on  objective  criteria to  take  decisions  leads  to  a  scientistic 
worldview,  ignoring  the  will  and  values  of  individuals,  societies  and  larger 
organizations. 
Test Question
We-I Is  your  worldview  compatible  with  or  in  friction  with  the 
interests of society? 
It-I Is your worldview compatible with or in friction with the most 
up-to-date scientific models?
We-it Is the society we are developing compatible with or in friction 
with the objective world?
Table 3:  Summary of worldview assessment tests on the big three
2.3.4  Summary
Without navigation tools, it is difficult to choose a philosophical direction or 
to compare the pros and cons of two opposite philosophical theories. To navigate the 
rich  and complex philosophical  landscape,  I  proposed four  key metaphilosophical 
concepts: a set of philosophical dimensions, a philosophical agenda, a list of criteria 
and a battery of tests.
I  first  distinguished six dimensions of philosophy, composed of three first-
order ones (descriptive,  normative,  practical);  two second-order ones (critical and 
dialectical) and one third-order (synthetical). I then introduced a clear, explicit and 
enduring philosophical agenda constituted by seven big questions, which define what 
a  worldview  is.  Next,  we  started  our  quest  for  criteria  from  previous  work  in 
philosophy, cognitive sciences and cultural evolution and ended it up with the finding 
of nine major criteria. We saw that the criteria can be used in three different manners. 
First, to describe the history of philosophy; second, to describe one's own position by 
giving  more  or  less  weights  to  the  criteria;  and  finally  to  clarify  disagreements 
between different worldviews. I then discussed the criteria one by one, pointing out 
both their strengths and weaknesses.
To facilitate  the  comparison of  different  worldviews,  I  identified  from the 
criteria and philosophical dimensions various assessment tests: the  is-ought,  ought-
act,  is-act first-order tests; the critical and dialectical second-order tests; the mixed-
questions and first-second-order third order tests; and the we-I, we-it and it-I tests.
Recognizing a set of philosophical dimensions, a common agenda, a shared 
criteria list and a battery of tests is essential to encourage communication and debate 
amongst  philosophical  schools  and  thus  make  philosophy  a  public  enterprise. 
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Specifically, I see the six dimensions, the worldview agenda, the criteria and tests as a 
metaphilosophical  apparatus  to  understand,  improve,  compare  and  constructively 
criticize different  worldviews. Such tools are  vital  for the demanding endeavor of 
constructing  together  comprehensive  and  coherent  worldviews,  in  the  spirit  of 
synthetical philosophizing.
Comparing in details two philosophical systems or worldviews is obviously 
outside the scope of this work.  For example,  comparing Whitehead and Spinoza's 
philosophies is a huge scholarly enterprise. Nevertheless, our criteria and tests should 
be useful to clarify concrete issues. This is why we now turn to applications, to further 
characterize religious, scientific and philosophical worldviews. 
52
CHAPTER 3 -  Religious, Scientific and Philosophical Worldviews
Abstract: This Chapter uses the philosophical dimensions, criteria and tests to 
better appreciate the respective strengths and weaknesses of religious, scientific 
and  philosophical  worldviews.  Religious  worldviews  are  illustrated  with  the 
conflict  between  Intelligent  Design  and  Flying  Spaghetti  Monsterism.  We 
recognize  psychological  and  societal  strengths  of  religions,  but  also  their 
limitations and failures. The strength of scientific worldviews is illustrated with 
systems  theory,  a  problem-solving  attitude  and  universal  darwinism,  while  its 
weaknesses stem from its focus on objectivity only and thus its neglect of values 
and  action,  essential  components  for  psychological  and  societal  functioning. 
Then,  I  present  philosophical  worldviews as  an attempt  to  build coherent  and 
comprehensive worldviews, in the spirit of synthetical philosophizing. I discuss 
the  pros  and  cons  of  promoting  uniformity  or  diversity  of  worldviews.  To 
understand  what  it  means  to  answer  worldview questions,  I  compare  them to 
axioms,  systems of  equations and  problems to solve.  I  argue  that  non-violent 
communication can be very useful when worldview conflicts become emotional. I 
end by introducing an extreme worldview agenda, which embraces a maximal 
space and time scope, thereby naturally introducing the cosmological perspective 
of Part II and Part III. 
3.1  Religious Worldviews
The science-and-religion debate  is arduous,  complex and multidimensional. 
There are many pitfalls to avoid in this debate (see e.g. Van Bendegem 2007). I do not 
aim here to go in the depth of the debate, but to show how our dimensions, criteria 
and tests can help to enlighten it.
3.1.1  Intelligent Design Versus Flying Spaghetti Monsterism
Let  us  examine the conflict  between Intelligent  Design (ID) and Flying Spaghetti 
Monsterism (FSMism).  In 2005, the Kansas State Board of Education required the 
teaching of ID as an alternative to biological evolution in public schools. Astonished 
by this decision, Bobby Henderson protested against it. He created a satirical deity, 
the Flying Spaghetti Monster (FSM), supposedly at the origin of our universe. In an 
open letter to the Kansas School Board, he then proposed that science classes should 
include: “One third time for Intelligent Design, one third time for Flying Spaghetti 
Monsterism,  and  one  third  time  for  logical  conjecture  based  on  overwhelming 
observable evidence” (B. Henderson 2005). The purpose of this action was to show 
that it does not make sense to teach ID in schools, at least no more sense than teaching 
FSMism.
With the help of our criteria, let us see whether we can confirm our intuitive 
idea that FSMism is still “less valid” than ID. Although the theories are not presented 
as worldviews, they underlie very different worldviews. Our criteria and tests can thus 
be applied if we look at FSMism and ID in such a broader context.
Testing the Components.  Regarding  objective consistency, ID and FSMism 
are  comparable:  they  postulate  a  designer-of-the-gaps  that  can  solve  any 
contradiction. Concerning the  scientificity criteria, ID and FSMism are equally bad: 
no scientific evidence supports either, which is the main point of this FSMism satire. 
Both are unscientific theories: biological evolution is most effectively researched with 
the available scientific evidence, theories, conjectures, methods, and the like. Still, ID 
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arguments  are  more  subtle  than  the  FSMism  ones  (e.g.  using  the  notion  of 
“irreducible complexity”,  instead of the FSM showed to be not very bright in his 
unintelligent design).
The  scope  in  agenda criterion  tests  the  breadth  of  worldview  questions 
tackled. FSMism tells us about how the world came about (question (b)), and perhaps 
where we are going (question (c)). However, the ramifications of ID are much richer. 
ID originated from creationism and thus has clear links with the God of monotheists. 
Therefore,  implicitly,  supporters  of  ID have  a  religious  agenda,  which  makes  the 
theory appealing. However imperfect and self-contradictory religions sometimes are, 
they are full  of recommendations and rituals concerning values (question (d)) and 
actions (question (e)). FSMism does not propose comparable values or ways of acting, 
gradually gathered by religious traditions over centuries. Both FSMism and ID are 
feeble in answering questions (a), (b) and (c), but FSMism has not much to say about 
questions (d) and (e). Therefore, ID has a greater scope in agenda.
In terms of subjective consistency, ID also scores much higher than FSMism. 
Indeed, in ID, the identity of the designer is not even systematically related to a God. 
The designer is thus a fuzzy concept open to many possible interpretations, and such 
vagueness  can  contribute  creating  a  mysterious  “guru  effect”  (Sperber  2010).  In 
contrast,  the  Flying Spaghetti  Monster  is  a  very  specific  entity,  with  “his  noodly 
appendage” and his meatballs, defying common sense. In this respect, ID is more 
subjectively  consistent  than  FSMism.  No  enriching  personal  utility is  offered  in 
FSMism, except perhaps to fulfill  a  need for humor. It would rather be scary and 
disgusting  to  think  that  the  world  really  originated  from  such  a  monster.  This 
disgusting aspect of FSMism triggers a negative emotion, and makes it score low on 
the  emotionality criterion. In contrast, ID points out that the scientific enterprise is 
limited. This is precisely the connotation behind terms such as “irreducible” which 
contributes  to  give  a  feeling of  mystery and awe.  Of course,  this applies  only to 
people not sensitive enough to objective criteria.
Regarding intersubjective consistency, it can be argued that FSMism is better 
than ID, because it has “never started a war and never killed others for their opposing 
beliefs”  (B. Henderson 2006, 65). Concerning collective utility, both are quite good, 
although  for  different  reasons.  ID,  because  of  its  links  with  religions,  which  can 
potentially  weave  a  social  web.  However,  even  if  FSMism  has  some  collective 
success because of its satirical, humorous and provocative aspects, its potential for 
collective utility is far behind ID.  Both ID and FSMism use stories and thus apply 
narrativity. Yet ID can rely on hundreds of well known biblical stories to convey its 
messages, whereas FSMism has just a few freshly elaborated stories.
Summing up,  both  score  equally  low on  objective  criteria (except  for  the 
scope, which is larger in ID). Otherwise, ID generally scores better on subjective and 
intersubjective  criteria.  Therefore,  from  this  analysis,  we  can  conclude  that  ID 
underlies a “better” worldview than FSMism. I have few doubts that Pastafarians, the 
devoted members of the FSM Church, will work hard to improve this situation. 
Testing the Dimensions and the Big Three. Both ID and FSMism score low 
on the  is-ought  test. FSMism because it is still in its infancy to provide values and 
moral  principles  to  guide  day-to-day  life.  ID  because  the  oughts derived  from 
creationism are often inconsistent and unscientific, violating two objective criteria, 
objective consistency and scientificity.
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The ought-act test succeeds better in the case of ID, because social structures 
have  already  been  in  place  since  more  than  two  thousands  years  with  churches, 
priests, rituals, and the rest, supporting its values with practices. By contrast, FSMism 
is only some half-dozen years old and needs more time to seriously compete with ID. 
Because they are not really occupied with  objective criteria, both ID and FSMism 
ignore the is-act test, which leads to inefficient acting.
ID and FSMism are likely to argue which of them is better when it comes to 
the we-I test. What is in the best interest of people and society? To believe in ID or in 
FSMism? Both fail the  it-I and the  we-it test, because they are not compatible with 
scientific theories, and will therefore maintain a naïve world conception. 
All second-order and synthetical tests fail –or are rather not even applicable, 
since both ID and FSMism have no ambition to be that thoughtful.
3.1.2  Psychological and Societal Strengths of Religions
This  brisk  comparison  between  ID  and  FSMism  shows  that  worldviews 
inspired by religions score high on many criteria at the same time, and this helps to 
explain their success. Why do so many people believe in religious worldviews? Let us 
now examine in more details the strengths of religions with our assessment tests. 
Testing the Components. Religions are  not afraid to  frontally tackle taboo 
subject-matters, such as the origin of our world or what happens after death. Religions 
give meaning by providing answers to such big questions.  Even if such answers are 
rarely up-to-date with recent scientific discoveries, at least, they do provide answers 
and do not evade, complicate or diffuse those questions as any well-trained second-
order  philosopher  would  do.  And,  as  we will  see  in  Part  II,  there  are  extremely 
difficult metaphysical issues regarding the origin, which can indeed be successfully 
tackled with an idea of God.
Religions excel  both in  personal  and collective  utility  by offering ways to 
resolve internal conflicts or to improve social bounds. Indeed, even if a contradiction 
arises in the life of a believer, religious personnel will be available to support him. It 
has also a  strong internal  logic.  As a  last  resort,  there  is  always the authority  of 
scripture or the will of a God-of-the-gaps. It will never end in uncertainty. The result 
is  that  religions  convey  a  strong  feeling  of  security,  essential  psychologically. 
Religions also bring a meaning of life, which is as important psychologically. They 
bring meaning to major events in human life, like birth with baptism, love relationship 
with marriage, death with funeral. 
Religions also have time-proven and socially accepted value systems –except 
in some of its fundamentalist interpretations. Religious values ensure social cohesion. 
For example, the fear of burning to hell could entail believers to act  according to 
religious values rather than others. This social role, although still important, is less 
and less central since the rise of secular governments.
The  emotionality criterion  is  central  in  religions,  with  major  concerns  for 
subjective  emotional  experiences  and  the  religious  experience.  Religions  take  the 
human dimension fully. Narrativity is also a key elements of all religions, since they 
all tell stories about heroes or martyrs to pass on messages. 
Testing the Dimensions and the Big Three. Let us now discuss religions 
with our worldview assessment  tests.  The  is-ought  test  rarely succeeds in popular 
religions,  because  they  prefer  tradition  to  novelty  and  adapt  very  slowly  to  new 
scientific discoveries. They maintain that they don't change essentially. They value 
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tradition and authority (intersubjectivity) or personal experiences (subjectivity) more 
than they value scientific progress (objectivity). 
The  ought-act test succeeds quite well when applied to religions, which are 
quite  focused on concrete  actions and practices.  At  the individual  level,  there  are 
rituals like prayer, meditation or confession that help one deal with difficult cognitive 
or emotional situations. At the social level, people go on pilgrimages or benefit from 
the wisdom of religious authorities to make sense of day-to-day life during Mass.
In a religious worldview, the most important of the big three tests will be the 
we-I test, because it is concerned with the cohesion of the individual with society and 
other human beings. It  will more rarely be concerned with the  we-it  and  it-I  tests, 
which involve objective knowledge.
It is reductionist to speak about “the religious worldview”, as if it were unique. 
Of  course,  different  world  religions  have  different  emphases,  especially  Western, 
Indian and Chinese religions (see e.g. H. Smith 1991). Within a same religion, there 
are also important inter-individual differences in belief systems. Psychologists have 
showed that  there are as many ways to believe in God as there are psychological 
developmental stages. Indeed, Fowler  (1981) has showed that  there are “stages of 
faith” which correspond to Kohlberg's (1981) stages of moral development and other 
developmental theories in psychology.
To  summarize,  a  religious  worldview gives  meaning,  provides  answers  to 
fundamental questions, has a pragmatic value both in terms of psychological benefits 
and social cohesion. So, we have to be religiously attached to objective values not to 
acknowledge those benefits!
3.1.3  Failures of Tradition
Of  course,  it  is  also  easy  and  healthy  to  criticize  religions.  The  religious 
worldview  has  few  rational  and  objective  mechanisms  to  resolve  issues  or 
disagreements. This may explain why it can easily lead to the most primitive way to 
solve  conflicts:  war  and  physical  violence.  A religious  worldview  proposes  few 
connections to new scientific developments, and is thus non-adaptive. It was not until 
1992 that Pope Jean-Paul II issued a declaration acknowledging the errors committed 
by the Catholic Church tribunal at Galileo's time. In our era of accelerating scientific 
and technological change, we must recognize and acknowledge our mistakes much 
more quickly. In cases of doubt, a religious person also runs to risk to fall back into 
fundamentalism, i.e. the literal interpretation of century-old scriptures. 
As we already saw, religions score very low on objective criteria.  Dawkins's 
(2008) recent book The God Delusion is a detailed and systematic illustration on how 
religions fail satisfying objective criteria. Religions also fail second-order tests, and 
such  a  failure  is  grave.  It  means  that  the  second-order  philosophical  mindset  is 
ignored.  There  is  no  critical  dimension,  no  dialectical  dimension.  Only  some 
professional theologians will attempt to remedy those limitations, generally with great 
difficulties. We will discuss such a more philosophically minded attempt towards a 
comprehensive theological worldview in section (3.3 Philosophical Worldviews, p60).
A religious worldview is often weak when attempting to describe the world 
(worldview questions (a)-(c)).  Furthermore,  it  will  often use the gaps in scientific 
knowledge to substantiate its position. The God explanation of the fine-tuning issue is 
such an example and is widely used by theologians to suggest or prove the existence 
of a creator (see Chapter 6 for an in depth and critical discussion). Since religions are 
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generally  more  concerned  with  questions  about  values  (question  (d))  and  actions 
(question  (e))  both  from a  subjective  and intersubjective  point  of  view,  objective 
criteria are much less central than the subjective and intersubjective ones. 
3.2  Scientific Worldviews
A scientific worldview is mainly concerned with modeling the world, that is 
answering questions (a), (b), and (c). Furthermore, two common requirements for a 
scientific  worldview  are  to  provide  explanatory  power  based  on  and  verified  by 
observations and experiments. The requirement of an explanatory power includes for 
example the ability to make predictions, but also the ability to connect consistently 
new scientific theories to the rest of science, as the scientific scope is enlarged. The 
empirical requisite furthermore demands that predictions can be tested, or falsified 
(Popper 1962).  Most scientists thus hold a critical realist worldview, and believe that 
“experimental and empirical activity can lead to truths about nature.”
In the last centuries there has been an explosion of the scientific activity. The 
total number of papers in scientific journals increases exponentially. Along with this 
tendency of information overload, new scientific disciplines spread out, leading to 
more  specialization.  The  scientific  landscape  thus  becomes  more  and  more 
fragmented. In this section I address the problem of bridging the different sciences, 
from a worldview construction perspective. What concepts should we emphasize to 
build a scientific worldview filling the gaps between different sciences? 
Although such a question would deserve much analysis and development, we 
argue here that three very general scientific approaches are keys for this endeavor, 
namely,  systems theory for an attempt towards a universal  language for science; a 
general  problem-solving perspective  and  evolution broadly  construed.  I  end  by 
pointing out limitations of scientific worldviews.
3.2.1  Systems Theory as a Universal Language for Science
Is it possible to find a universal language for science? Leibniz had a famous 
program  towards  a  universal  language  for  the  sciences  (scientia  universalis), 
composed of a universal notation (characteristica universalis) and a deductive system 
(calculus ratiocinator). However, despite that such a logical approach has the benefits 
of clarity and precision, it is unable to model complex evolving dynamical systems. 
Our world is embedded in time, a dimension not modelled by classical logic. But we 
need  to  understand  the  evolution  of  our  world  in  time.  Dynamical  mathematical 
models  have  been  and  are  still  widely  used  in  science,  but  they  often  prove 
insufficient when dealing with complex systems. 
General systems theory and cybernetics are a modern attempt to propose a 
universal dynamical language for science  (see e.g. von Bertalanffy 1968; Boulding 
1956). They provide general modelling tools (e.g. state-space approach) and concepts 
like system, control, feedback, black-box, etc. which can be applied equally well in 
physics,  chemistry,  biology, psychology, sociology...   Those concepts have proven 
their importance and fruitfulness in engineering.
Traditionally, mathematical models based on physical laws are used to predict 
the behavior of a system from a set of parameters, boundary conditions and initial 
conditions.  These  models  are  in  fact  reductionist  and  developed  with  analytical 
methods where the problem is split into easier subproblems. However, when systems 
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become more complex and the number of interactions increases, a simple analytic 
solution  of  the  mathematical  expressions  is  not  possible  anymore.  Computer 
simulations  can  then  be  used  to  predict  the  behavior  of  complex  systems.  These 
simulations are based on a discretisation of space (finite elements methods) and/or 
time (simulation methods). It is then possible to run a simulation many times, varying 
parameters and extract general statistical trends. Computer simulations are nowadays 
indispensable for the design of modern systems and structures. In Chapter 7, we will 
see that they hold great promises for the future of science.
Systems theoretic  models  and computer  simulations are  very successful  in 
engineering science. Nevertheless, they have limitations when dealing with non-linear 
and very complex systems. In case of chaotic systems for instance, the predictability 
of the behavior is in practice very limited. More generally, if mathematical models are 
not  available,  a  qualitative  approach  is  first  suitable.  A  general  problem-solving 
perspective allows to logically structure and clarify this qualitative approach. 
3.2.2  Problem-Solving Approach
In a system-theoretic and cybernetic perspective, a problem can be defined as a gap 
which is experienced by an agent from his current situation to the situation in which 
he would like to be. A problem is solved by a sequence of actions that reduce the 
difference between the initial situation and the goal.  Eliyahu Goldratt and Jeff Cox 
(1984) conceived the “Theory Of Constraints” (TOC) which provides organizations 
thinking tools to achieve their complex and fast changing goals. TOC  practitioners 
map the logical structure of problems, which considerably helps to make clear where 
inconsistencies  appear  (see  e.g.  Scheinkopf  1999). Because  it  is  a  very  general 
problem-solving approach, it can also be applied with great benefit to scientific and 
philosophical argumentation, as I did in Appendix II. 
Karl Popper (1958, 268–269) understood the importance of a problem-solving 
attitude in the rational enquiry when he wrote:
every rational theory, no matter whether scientific or philosophical, is rational in 
so  far  as  it  tries  to  solve  certain  problems.  A theory  is  comprehensible  and 
reasonable  only  in  its  relation  to  a  given  problem-situation,  and  it  can  be 
rationally discussed only by discussing this relation.
Most of our difficult problems involve many aspects of “reality”, or  scope in level  
breadth. For example, an ecological problem must often take into account knowledge 
about  chemistry  (e.g.  pesticides),  biology  (e.g.  genetics),  climatology,  without 
mentioning  political,  economical,  ethical  and  philosophical  aspects.  An 
interdisciplinary  approach  is  essential.  As  our  world  becomes  more  complex  and 
interconnected, it becomes very limiting if not impossible to restrict studies to only 
one discipline or one aspect of reality.
When  one  endorses  this  problem-solving  perspective,  borders  between 
different sciences fade out. If we have a complex problem to solve, we should use 
every possible resource at our disposal to tackle it. A major difficulty is then to be 
able to communicate with scientists of other disciplines. That is why the endeavor of a 
universal  scientific  language  we  outlined  above  is  so  important.  Even  a  minimal 
knowledge  in  systems  theory  would  already  help  scientists  from  very  different 
backgrounds to communicate. 
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Bridges  between  exact  and  human  sciences  can  be  constructed  from  the 
endeavor to solve problems. In this view, the scientific activity can be drew as a map 
of challenges, or problems (theoretical or practical) being solved or being tackled, 
instead of a traditional disciplinary map.
3.2.3  Universal Darwinism
The general idea of evolution, which Darwin expressed through the concept of 
natural selection (variation and selection), has infiltrated almost every scientific field. 
This general application of evolutionary principles is known as Universal Darwinism 
(e.g. Dawkins 1983; J. Campbell 2011) or Universal Selection Theory (Cziko 1995). 
This  spread  of  evolutionary  theories  can  be  illustrated  with  disciplines  like 
“evolutionary  psychology”  where  mental  and  psychological  traits  are  explained 
through  evolution  (e.g.  Wright  1994;  Barkow,  Cosmides,  and  Tooby  1992);   the 
closely related “evolutionary ethics” which focuses on the apparition of moral traits; 
“evolutionary economics”, which emphasizes complex interactions, competition, and 
resource constraints  (e.g. Boulding 1991); “evolutionary epistemology” arguing that 
knowledge can be seen as a result of a natural selection process (e.g. D. T. Campbell 
1974; Gontier 2010); “evolutionary computation” inspired by evolutionary processes 
to  design  new  kinds  of  algorithms  (e.g.  Fogel  1995);  “neural  Darwinism”  in 
neuroscience also has been proposed to explain the evolution of the brain (Edelman 
1987) and even in cosmology a theory of “cosmological natural selection” has been 
hypothesized (Smolin 1992) that we will discuss in detail in Chapter 8.
Evolution has thus largely crossed the border of biological evolution, and can 
be seen as a general theory of change. For example, complexity theorist Eric Chaisson 
wrote a history of our cosmos, based on scientific findings, where evolution is its core 
engine. He defines it  as “any process of formation, growth and change with time, 
including  an  accumulation  of  historical  information;  in  its  broadest  sense,  both 
developmental and generative change.” (Chaisson 2001, 232).
In  fact,  we  should  not  be  surprised  by  this  situation,  since  thinking  in 
evolutionary terms simply means thinking with time, and more precisely about how 
any kind of structure and function can emerge from interactions occurring in time. 
3.2.4  Limitations of Scientific Worldviews
What are  the limitations of  purely scientific  worldviews? We saw that  the 
mission of science is traditionally focused on modelling the world, i.e. on answering 
worldview questions (a), (b) and (c) in an objective manner. We saw that a religious 
worldview is weak in its answers to those three worldview questions because it  is 
generally more focused on the two other questions regarding actions and values. On 
the  other  side,  a  scientific  worldview  is  incomplete  in  the  sense  that  it  lacks 
integration of the model it constructs with the more philosophical problems involving 
the nature and meaning of values, actions and knowledge (respectively  questions (d), 
(e)  and  (f)).  Here  too  those  questions  are  not  exclusively  philosophical.  But 
disciplinary boundaries are less of an issue if we take a problem-solving perspective. 
Indeed,  we saw that  there  exists  a  field of  “evolutionary ethics”  (thus addressing 
question (d)), and “evolutionary epistemology” addressing question (f) and there is a 
lot of management literature addressing the question of how to act (question (e)).  
Testing  the  Components. The  scientist  has  a  mindset  focused  solely on 
objective criteria and scientific worldviews score the highest on objective criteria. If 
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we look at  subjective and  intersubjective criteria,  a  scientist  telling stories of  his 
personal  emotional  experiences  is,  fortunately,  not  taken  seriously.  This  is  an 
important limitation of purely scientific worldviews. 
Testing the Dimensions and the Big Three. Because science is not busy with 
ought  questions,  both  the  is-ought and  the  ought-act  tests  fail.  Some  normative 
principles need to be developed to complete a scientific worldview, if only to explicit 
its commitment to efficiency values only, that is to admit that it is only interested in 
the is-act test. An axiology, whether philosophical or theological, is an indispensable 
complement to a scientific worldview. 
Out of the big three tests, the  I-it  and we-it tests are directly applicable in a 
scientific worldview.  Since science and religion both focus on first-order questions, 
the critical, dialectical and synthetical tests will only be attempted by philosophically-
minded  scientists  or  professional  theologians.  Let  us  describe  philosophical 
worldviews in more details.
3.3  Philosophical Worldviews
3.3.1  The Way to Philosophical Worldviews
Given our short analysis, a fruitful open discussion between scientific and religious 
worldviews should ideally lead to either:
(1) A religious worldview more objective, consistent with scientific findings.
(2)  A scientific  worldview  completed  with  subjective  and  intersubjective 
perspectives,  with  a  larger  scope  in  agenda to  include  an  axiology  and  a 
praxeology and second-order dimensions.
The direction (1) is taken by theologians working towards integrating science and 
religion to build a comprehensive worldview. They invite to higher levels of spiritual 
intelligence. Notable examples of such developments are the religious philosophies of 
Teilhard de Chardin  (1959) or Whitehead  (1930). A similar modern attempt in this 
direction  was  proposed  by  Michael  Dowd  in  his  book  Thank  God  for  Evolution 
(Dowd 2007) where he proposes an accessible integration of science and Christianity. 
His directive line is to reinterpret Christianity in the light of evolutionary theory. The 
result is very inspiring, because it provides a synthesis of  objective, subjective and 
intersubjective  criteria.  The  same  interpretative  effort  to  integrate  modern 
evolutionary thinking would certainly greatly benefit other world religions. From a 
cosmological perspective, an effort towards constructing a comprehensive theological 
worldview can be found in Murphy and Ellis'  (1996) On the Moral Nature of the  
Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics.
What  about  the  other  option  (2)?  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  scientific 
popularization is part of the solution. Indeed, at best, it will make science meet some 
of the  subjective and  intersubjective criteria. Typically, science popularizers trigger 
emotions by telling fascinating stories around scientists, their lives and theories. But 
questions  of  values  and  actions  will  remain  unanswered.  How  can  we  build  a 
naturalistic worldview on rational grounds? This is normally the task of non-theist 
philosophical systems. One way is to start from a scientific worldview and extend it 
philosophically to integrate more philosophical propositions involving the nature and 
meaning of values and actions (respectively worldview questions (d) and (e)). For 
example, Laszlo (1972a, chap. 13) develops a framework for normative ethics, which 
fits in with scientific knowledge. In a similar manner, the praxeological component 
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could  certainly  be  enhanced  by  integrating  insights  from  problem-solving, 
management sciences, operational research, etc.
In  my  opinion,  it  is  urgent  that  efforts  are  coordinated  to  build  such 
philosophical worldviews, firmly based on objective criteria, and yet taking seriously 
into account  subjective and  intersubjective criteria.  Such a  philosophical  approach 
would  be  based  on  a  scientific  worldview,  but  completed  with  an  axiology  and 
praxeology,  that  time  successfully  passing  the  is-ought and  ought-act tests,  also 
helped  with  second-order  dimensions  of  philosophizing,  in  a  spirit  of  synthetical 
philosophy. 
Both  directions  (1)  and  (2)  aim  at  constructing  more  comprehensive  and 
coherent worldviews, which then become synthetical worldviews. More precisely, this 
leads to two kinds of worldviews, a “comprehensive theological worldview” and a 
“comprehensive  philosophical  worldview”  (Carvalho  IV 2006,  123).  Surprisingly, 
these two endeavors have a similar aim, they just use different starting points, means 
and criteria.
In Parts II and III, I will take the direction of a comprehensive philosophical 
worldview and not of a comprehensive theological worldview, which would require 
another PhD in theology. In the kind of philosophizing which follows, I use in priority 
objective  criteria (objective  consistency,  scientificity and  scope)  to  begin  the 
construction  of  a  coherent  and  comprehensive  worldview.  More  precisely,  the 
cosmological perspective requires that the scope in level depth is maximally wide in 
time and space, embracing the whole universe.
Afterwards,  when those objective criteria are maximally satisfied,  I turn to 
subjective and intersubjective criteria to make the worldview successfully applicable 
in the conduct of a good life and in the organization of a good society. The pursuit of a 
good life and a good society can then be harmonized with cosmic evolution. However 
in this work, those further themes won't be as central as the objective endeavor.
3.3.2  One or Several Worldviews?
Should we struggle for one single worldview or for several ones? The key to 
answer  this  question  is  in  our  distinction  between  first-order  philosophizing 
(descriptive,  normative and  practical dimensions) and the second-order  dialectical 
dimension. We saw that it is necessary to have implicit or explicit answers to first-
order  worldview questions  (sections  1.3 Necessity  to  Have  a  Worldview and  1.4 
Implicit and Explicit Worldviews, p25). But it is not necessary to have sophisticated 
second- or third- order philosophical insights to live. Most bacteria don't and most 
people don't. 
At first sight, one might be afraid of a single worldview. Why? We all know 
the dangers of powerful worldviews, underlying totalitarianism or fanaticism, such as 
the communist or the nazi ones. Of course, it is very important to analyze the complex 
reasons for the success of such worldviews at a particular time, but this is not the 
place to do that here.
Those worldviews bring simple, efficient and straightforward answers to first-
order dimensions. However, they won't welcome harsh criticism (critical dimension 
4) nor a dialectical comparison with alternatives viewpoints (dialectical dimension 5). 
Those  critical  and  dialectical  dimensions  are  precisely  the  philosopher's  main 
playground. A major role of the philosopher in society is thus to bring perspective, to 
make sure that worldviews remain open to criticism and comparison; the philosopher 
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does  his  best  to  secure,  maintain  and promote  the  fundamental  values  of  critical 
thinking and open discussion.
What if we all had the same worldview? We could fear that it would imply that 
we would all think the same. This would only be true only if we consider first-order 
knowledge of a worldview alone. However, as we encourage second- and third- order 
knowledge,  thinking  always  changes  and  improves.  Additionally,  values  in  a 
worldview are more like a guide, giving very general recommendations. There are 
always different roads for a same destination, thus leaving freedom for action. 
Furthermore,  for  the  time  being,  the  danger  is  rather  in  worldview 
fragmentation than in uniqueness. Archie Bahm (1979, 101) expressed it well: “the 
problems facing us today are more those of achieving greater unity, through a new 
complex organic synthesis, than of achieving more diversity”. This dilemma between 
uniformity and diversity is also well expressed in  (Aerts et al. 1994, 24) “we have 
learned to appreciate variety and multiformity as values, and hence we do not want to 
strive for one unique worldview. But neither do we want to resign ourselves to the 
present situation of fragmentation.” We can solve this dilemma by aiming for a unique 
worldview in first-order philosophizing, but continuously practice the dialectical and 
critical  dimensions of philosophizing, to constantly improve and integrate different 
worldviews.
On the other hand, what reasons can we find to argue for a unique worldview? 
First  of  all,  we could  say  that  if  reality  is  one,  and a  worldview is  an  objective 
description  of  reality,  then  there  can  be  only  one  sound  worldview.  We  can 
immediately object that a worldview as we have defined it also incorporates values, 
which are chosen, and thus not objective. Still, scientific progress and the scientificity 
criterion leave us less choices for components (a), (b) , (c). An other argument is that 
a homogeneous society has fewer conflicts  (Durkheim 1893). Thus, sharing values 
and aims will reduce conflicts, and enable to conduct more elaborated collaborative 
projects.  In  spite  of  post-modern  emphasis  on  cultural  relativity,  there  are  values 
common to all  civilizations.  As supported by empirical  research about  the factors 
determining what makes people happy (Heylighen and Bernheim 2000) murder, theft, 
rape,  lying,  etc...  are  negative  values  in  all  societies,  whereas  health,  wealth, 
friendship, honesty, safety, freedom or equality are positive ones. 
Generally, a homogeneous system is easier to control and has fewer conflicts, 
because the elements have the same goals. The word “control”, when used in a system 
theoretic  sense  has  no  negative  or  totalitarian  connotation.  Thus,  less  diversity  is 
easier to control. However, a consequence of Ashby's (1956) law of requisite variety 
is that more diversity allows more adaptability (see also Gershenson 2007). Therefore, 
it seems that a trade-off between diversity and uniformity has to be found.
3.3.3  Analogies for Philosophical Worldviews
How can we start building comprehensive philosophical worldviews? In this 
subsection  I  examine  three analogies  for  tackling the  worldview questions.  I  will 
analyze worldview questions as an axiomatic system, as a system of equations and as 
problems to solve. Importantly, analogies are only fruitful cognitive tools (see section 
5.1 Analogical Reasoning in Science, p87 for a discussion of analogies), I do not want 
to import the full formalism of mathematics or problem solving to the endeavor of 
worldview construction. 
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Worldview  questions  as  an  axiomatic  system. Here,  the  analogue  of  a 
worldview question is an axiom. A first consequence of this mathematical analogy is 
that  every  (hidden)  assumptions  has  to  be  made  clear  and  explicit.  We  can  do 
mathematics without axiomatization, but it will be much less precise, consistent and 
systematic. The same holds for philosophizing. We can philosophize vaguely about 
anything,  but  philosophizing  greatly  benefits  when problems are  clearly stated.  If 
worldview questions  are  axioms,  then  worldview answers  or  components  are  the 
analogue of a model of axioms, a structure satisfying a set of axioms. We use the term 
“model”  in  the  model  theoretic  sense,  i.e.  not  in  the  sense  of  a  simplified 
representation. As it is often possible for a set of axioms to have different models, the 
same  worldview  questions  lead  to  different  answers  translated  in  different 
worldviews. 
But if  we want to build synthetical  worldviews, we need to pass the  first-
second-order test. How can we make up our minds in the large landscape of possible 
worldviews? We already argued that we should only keep worldviews answering the 
seven  questions  in  a  coherent  and comprehensive manner.  In  our  analogy,  this 
corresponds  to  two  fundamental  properties  of  formal  theories:  coherence  and 
completeness.
A philosophical  worldview should  be  complete in  the  sense  that  it  should 
answer  all  the  seven  worldview  questions.  This  is  the  spirit  behind  synthetical 
philosophizing, or Rescher's (2001) comprehensiveness criteria, or the remark that 
philosophical systems should be evaluated “on their capacity for maximal integration 
of the [worldview] fragments.” (Aerts,  et al.  1994, 41).  I mean that  a “complete” 
worldview is suitable, in the sense of a worldview not excluding questions even if 
some answers are still problematic or ad hoc. 
Immanuel  Kant  took  into  account  this  requirement.  Indeed,  in  the  first 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1781) recognized that pure reason systematically fails 
to  answer  metaphysical  questions  and  ends  in  antinomies  impossible  to  solve 
rationally. He did not stop here, however. He still sought to answer those fundamental 
questions, but chose a more hypothetical approach, saying that freedom, immortality 
of  soul  and God's  existence  are  postulates.  This  is  fully  developed in  his  second 
Critique of Practical Reason where he introduces the “regulative principle of the pure 
reason” as a way to quench humanity's thirst to answer metaphysical questions.
Let us now remember that a system is coherent if it is not possible to derive a 
contradiction  from it.  This  of  course  echoes  the  consistency criterion.  In  the  real 
world, worldview contradictions are more or less ubiquitous. We should however be 
aware of the danger in emphasizing coherence too much. The ideal  is to build an 
abstract system of concepts, very coherent, but that would end up too far from reality. 
So, we should certainly add that coherence must not only be internal to the system, 
but also external, with “facts” or “reality”, a requirement we have characterized with 
the scientificity criterion.
An important question emerges. Assuming that it is very difficult to build a 
worldview  that  is  both  coherent  and  complete,  which  of  the  following  two 
possibilities should we prefer? 
(i) an incomplete but coherent worldview  
(ii) a complete but incoherent worldview 
The scientific worldview typifies situation (i). The answers it gives to a model of the 
world (a), an explanation (b) and predictions (c) are very coherent and with some 
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epistemological additions, it can handle the questions of the theory of knowledge (f). 
Note however that  coherence  between  different  sciences is  still  pretty  hard to see 
achieved, and that is why we proposed as a remedy systems theory,  problem solving 
and universal darwinism (see section 3.2 Scientific Worldviews, 57). But we saw that 
the scientific worldview is incomplete, in the sense that it does not answer problems 
of values (d) or actions (e). If we start with a very coherent scientific worldview we 
can then try to complete it with an axiology and praxeology. But how can concepts 
initially developed for components (a), (b) and (c) be extended or made compatible 
with attempts for answering the worldview questions (d) and (e)? This might well be 
very difficult to achieve.
On the contrary, religious worldviews tend to be complete but incoherent (ii). 
They  are  most  often  criticized  for  their  inconsistencies.  Indeed,  if  they  remain 
traditional, they are very poor at components (a), (b), (c) and (f). However, they focus 
on the practical  dimensions of life and thus do give values (d) and guidelines for 
action (e). Yet even such guidelines can be confusing. For example, if we follow a 
litteral reading of the Bible, we find both “An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth” 
(Matthew, 5:38) and “If someone strikes you on the cheek, offer the other cheek as 
well” (Luke, 6:29). We have to acknowledge that many theologians do great efforts to 
achieve coherence, by working hard on interpreting the texts, and by including the 
results of modern science. In this sense, this approach is much more appealing than a 
purely scientific worldview, which cruelly leaves fundamental worldview questions 
unanswered. Carvalho  (2006, 122) also argued that  comprehensiveness “cannot be 
achieved by a strictly scientific worldview”. One can work towards a complete and 
coherent  worldview  not  only  philosophically,  but  also  through  a  comprehensive 
theological worldview. 
To conclude, to focus on the big picture by valuing comprehensiveness makes 
much  more  sense  than  focusing  first  on  coherence.  If  we  have  a  comprehensive 
worldview,  we  can  start  solving  its  contradictions,  thus  going  towards  a 
comprehensive  and  coherent  worldview.  The  other  way  around  would  be  to  use 
concepts from a coherent worldview and extend them to make it more comprehensive. 
I insist again that this analysis is based on an analogy. Let us therefore point 
out some of its limitations. The analogue of axioms here are worldview questions, not 
propositions. The analogy thus does not imply a presupposition of foundationalism, in 
the sense that there would be propositions that we hold as dogmas. The foundational 
aspect  means  that  worldview  questions  are  fundamental,  but  there  are  no 
presuppositions regarding how to answer them. 
We can also object that the analogy breaks down because of the well-known 
limitation theorems, which state that  no formal system containing at  least  Peano's 
axioms  of  elementary  arithmetic  can  be  both  coherent  and complete.  We  do  not 
exclude that a trade-off may be needed to balance coherence and completeness. But 
we are looking for heuristics, and this analogy gives us some clues about what an 
ideal worldview should come close to. 
Worldview  questions  as  a  system  of  equations.  Another  interesting 
mathematical analogy is to compare worldview questions with a system of equations. 
Worldview questions are related, as are the equations in a system of equations. Hao 
Wang (1986, 210) explicated this analogy when he wrote that solving philosophical 
problems is
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comparable to solving an intricate set of simultaneous equations which may have 
no solution at all or only relative solutions in the sense that we have often to 
choose between giving more weight to satisfying (more adequately) one equation 
or another.
 This means that we might have to give more weight to one component or another 
when answering the questions. Ideally, the philosopher should limit this bias, or at 
least be aware of it. He might preferentially answer certain worldview questions, or 
more generally use a specific set of cognitive values, which can be translated in how 
he weights the nine criteria we examined. 
This analogy also implicitly assumes that there exists a common language to 
the different equations. Thus, for the worldview questions, this would imply having a 
same language for answering the different components. We saw that systems theory 
could  fulfill  this  role  for  bridging  sciences.  Its  concepts  can  also  be  used  in 
philosophy (see e.g. Laszlo 1972a; Heylighen 2000b). 
Worldview questions as problems to solve. This third analogy may be the 
most interesting and useful way to look at the worldview questions. Nicholas Rescher 
argued that the most valuable history of philosophy to write would be one explicating 
the dialectic of  problems (or questions) and answers  (Rescher 2001, chap. 2). If we 
assume that philosophy is problem-solving, then why not use its principles (see e.g. 
Newell  and  Simon  1972;  Polya  2004) to  formulate  and  tackle  philosophical 
problems? The classical literature on general problem solving methods considers that 
a problem is solved by following this sequence of steps: 
(1) Understand the problem 
(2) Conceive a plan 
(3) Execute the plan 
(4) Examine the solution 
In the case of building a worldview, the problem is a very difficult one, because it is in 
fact the set of problems given by the worldview questions. We saw with Popper the 
importance of this problem solving attitude (section 3.2.2 Problem-Solving Approach, 
p58). Not only do we need to examine the problem situation in its objective aspect, 
with a wide  scope, aiming at  consistency  and  scientificity; but we also must study 
problems from the  dialectical dimension, to see how the theory solves the problem 
compared to  alternatives.  We already introduced nine criteria to achieve just  that. 
However, the communication and comparison of competing solutions often becomes 
difficult because of very human reactions: emotions.    
3.3.4  Nonviolent Worldview Communication
More concretely and practically, how can we express aspects of our worldview and 
listen openly to different ones, especially when we feel involved emotionally? 
The  NonViolent  Communication  (NVC)  process  (Rosenberg  2003) is  very 
well suited for this. Let us see why. NVC is a foremost a communication approach 
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which insists on acknowledging the universality of human emotions, thus fulfilling 
the emotionality criterion. The four steps to speak in NVC are to: 
(i) Observe (without judging) what affects you
(ii) Express your feelings triggered by this observation
(iii) Express the needs, values, desires, etc. that create your feelings
(iv) Request your interlocutor concrete actions to enrich your life
It is remarkable that these steps correspond to worldview components, admittedly at a 
some level of abstraction. More precisely, what we observe (i) reflects how we model 
the world (questions (a), (b), (c)). Our feelings, needs, values, desires, (ii) and (iii), 
constitute our genetically and culturally inherited value system (question (d)).  The 
actions we do and request (iv) reveal our implicit or explicit praxeology (question 
(e)). The result is that when we use NVC to speak, we present others clearly an aspect 
of our worldview.
Similarly, when using nonviolent communication to listen, we try to decipher 
and understand the other's worldview, without judging it. The four steps are then to be 
attentive to: 
(i) What he observes 
(ii) What he feels
(iii) What his needs and values are
(iv) What actions he requests to fulfill his needs 
In NVC, there is also a general requirement to avoid easy judging dichotomies such as 
“true/false”,  “right/wrong”,  “good/bad”  etc.  This  induces  a  major  shift  in 
communication. Indeed, this forces us to explicitly justify our knowledge and beliefs 
in terms of needs or values. This communication process is utterly simple and very 
easy to understand. However, the real challenge is to apply it in practice, but can bring 
remarkable results. For example, let us imagine what a neuroscientist could say to a 
religious person: 
You are just plain wrong, there is no evidence whatsoever that God created human 
consciousness. Open your eyes to evolutionary theory: it's clear that a mechanistic 
scheme of explanation is under way.
In NVC, this can be reformulated in the following manner:
I see that we both wonder about the existence of consciousness. However, I feel 
puzzled because I'm not in agreement about the God explanation you propose. I 
need objective explanations to be convinced. I am therefore more inclined to think 
that  consciousness  gradually  appeared  through evolution.  Could  you  be  more 
explicit about why you need to introduce God in this context? Or is there a way to 
make  your  belief  in  God  compatible  with  my  need  to  fit  the  overwhelming 
evidence of evolutionary theory?
By using such language, one can truly say what is on our mind and heart, and also 
listen to other viewpoints to start a constructive dialog. Implicitly, we can start to ask 
questions  such  as:  “what  is  the  worldview  of  my  interlocutor?”;  “what  are  his 
observations, feelings, needs, and requests telling me about his worldview?”; “what 
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criteria  are  most  important  to  him?”;  “on  which  worldview  components  do  we 
disagree?”; “why and where do we disagree?”,  etc.
3.3.5  The Extreme Worldview Agenda
According to Karl Jaspers (1957), philosophers are concerned by problems of 
limits  and  look  for  extremes.  It  is  also  my concern  and  my directive  line  when 
pushing the worldview questions to their extremes.  In other words, I try to answer the 
worldview  questions  within  a  maximally  wide  scope in  time  and  in  space.  For 
example to the question “where does it all come from?”, I will not be satisfied with an 
answer of the kind: “from my mother's belly”. I mean, “where does our Universe 
comes from?” In the same way, I will seek in Chapter 10 ethical values with universal 
validity,  not  just  within  a  small  community  or  a  restricted  context.  Similar 
observations can be made about the other worldview questions. 
Those  extreme  questions  are  the  most  difficult  scientifically,  because  they 
require the utmost extrapolation of models, to conditions we can not experiment with 
on Earth. Yet, from a philosophical point of view, speculations are very much needed 
to answer  fully  and meaningfully  the  worldview questions.  Since  this  work  is  of 
philosophical  nature,  I  am  not  restricting  my quest  to  the  scientific  standards  of 
staying within empirically testable theories. 
I am fascinated by extreme sports like off-pist snowboarding or sea surfing. 
Ultimately, such sports harmonize two extreme phenomena, the maximal capacity of 
the human body with the vagaries of nature. For example, the extreme snowboarder 
will  attempt  to  ride the  steepest  slope,  even knowing a  high avalanche risks;  big 
waves surfers like Laird Hamilton seek the biggest waves, even knowing that a wipe 
out can mean minutes of apnea in highly turbulent waters.
I occasionally practice extreme sports (although the “extreme” here is very 
relative...) and I like to see my intellectual pursuit also as a quest to the extremes. The 
extreme  consequences  of  logical  reasoning  and  scientific  theories,  the  extreme 
potential of the quest for knowledge. Both physical and intellectual extreme sports are 
exciting. But they can also be dangerous and require a constant  ambition  balanced 
with caution.
Story 3:  Extreme Physical and Intellectual Sports
We saw in section (1.1 First-Order Questions, p21) that first-order worldview 
questions are mixed-questions, meaning that we need both philosophical and scientific 
expertise  to  tackle  them.  It  means  that  scientific  and  first-order  philosophical 
speculations very much depend on our current knowledge.
What  follows  in  Part  II  and  III  is  thus  potentially  vulnerable  to  new 
discoveries. Indeed, it may well be that in five years a revolutionary cosmological 
theory would dismiss much of what follows. In that case, the scaffolding presented in 
this Part I would prove very useful to understand why the worldview I present failed, 
to correct it, or to build a new one. This Part I was intended to help in adapting or 
updating  our  worldviews  in  a  lucid  way.  The  agenda,  criteria  and  tests  provide 
scaffolding for constructing and repairing philosophical worldviews. 
In  Part  II  and  III,  we  reformulate,  contextualize  and  focalize  those 
philosophical worldview questions into their version compatible with modern science. 
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The reader might wonder why I do not address directly the other worldview 
questions  about  ontology,  epistemology and  praxeology.  They  are  also  important, 
which is  why I  still  did  answer them by stating  my positions towards them (see 
Appendix I). But the questions of the beginning and the end requires to focus on the 
mixed questions to provide models of the ultimate past (explanation) and ultimate 
future (prediction), which can become meaningful with a theory of value (axiology).
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Open Questions
An architect does not leave his scaffolding after he has constructed a building. 
But here, the situation is different. Worldview construction resembles more a building 
site, in constant construction and reconstruction. Leaving some scaffolding is not the 
most aesthetic practice, but is very useful to ease and stimulate further improvements. 
The “Open Questions” sections at the end of each Part or important Chapter provide 
important questions to further research. Such open questions are even necessary if we 
take our analogy with thermodynamics and the idea of  open philosophical systems 
seriously (see section 2.2.3 Scope, p36). 
• Philosophical agendas. Studying philosophical agendas is key to understand 
different  philosophical  schools,  trends  and  traditions.  It  would  be  very 
valuable to do an history of philosophical agendas, to better understand their 
evolution. 
• More criteria. The criteria list we presented is a starting point, to be further 
refined and elaborated by other philosophers, possibly with different or more 
criteria.  The  criteria  may  also  be  refined  or  improved  with  studies  in  the 
history  of  philosophy.  Conversely,  the  criteria  can  help  to  describe  the 
complexity of the history of philosophy. 
• Worldviews and developmental psychology.  It  is  important to understand 
how the worldview of an individual changes through his life. We have not 
strongly connected developmental psychology with our worldview framework. 
It is something which remains to be done. Some useful starting points could be 
the works of Gebser  (1986), Kohlberg  (1981; 1984), Koltko-Rivera  (2004), 
Laske (2008), etc. It would thus be possible to tackle questions such as: How 
do you evolve and develop your own worldview? What will trigger a change 
in your worldview? How much are you attached to your worldview? How to 
change from one worldview to another? 
• Interdisciplinarity  and  cognitive  values.  We  focused  in  Chapter  2 on 
cognitive values in philosophy. However, the encyclopedist may be interested 
to define systematically cognitive values, criteria and agendas in all disciplines 
of knowledge, like mathematics, engineering, empirical sciences, history, art, 
religion,  etc.  Such  a  study  would  provide  a  different  outlook  on  different 
domains of knowledge, where distinctions between disciplines would become 
continuous instead of discrete. 
• In Chapter  2 we attempted to fulfill  one of Adler's (1965) condition which 
would  improve  philosophy  as  a  discipline,  by  proposing  nine  criteria  as 
standards  of  truth.  But  this  is  just  one  out  of  the  six  conditions  Adler 
identified. Two others are especially important to pursue.
◦ (1)  Philosophy as a public enterprise. Having criteria was a necessary 
step to encourage philosophy as a public entreprise. However, it is quite a 
challenge  for  the  synthetical dimension  of  philosophy,  which  requires 
systemic  consistency.  A  public  entreprise  supposes  that  questions  or 
problems  can  be  attacked  piece-meal,  one  by  one,  so  that  it  is  not 
necessary to answer all the questions involved in order to answer any one 
or some of them. 
However, it has at least been proven possible for its dialectical dimension, 
with  the  construction  of  the  Syntopicon  by  Adler,  Hutchins  and  their 
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editorial  team.  Thanks  to  modern  collaborative  web  technologies,  like 
editable  “wiki”  webpages,  it  is  possible  to  ease  and  scale  up  such  a 
collaborative effort.  The project  of a  “wikidialectica” would be a  great 
complementation of the encyclopedia Wikipedia. Indeed an encyclopedia 
traditionally presents facts, not arguments. It could be kick started based 
on the Great Books and the Syntopicon (1952) when its copyright will 
expire.
◦ (2)  Philosophy  as  a  first-order  inquiry. Philosophy  should  reconnect 
with first-order questions; i.e. about that which is and happens or about 
what  humans should  do and seek.  Part  II  and III  of  this  thesis  are  an 
example  of  such  an  attempt.  Indeed,  we  will  now  tackle  first-order 
questions  “where  does  it  all  come from”,  “where  are  we  going?”  and 
“what is good and what is evil?” as mixed questions, reformulated in our 
present scientific context. 
• The practical way to philosophical worldviews. An open question towards 
the  way  to  philosophical  worldviews  (3.3.1  )  is  to  further  develop  non-
religious practices, rites or prayers. Philosophers and thinkers did make such 
various proposals (see e.g. Comte 1890; Haeckel 1902; Sageret 1922; Huxley 
1957; Apostel 1998 up to today’s secular humanism). 
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Part II - The Beginning of the Universe
Modern  science  can  successfully  connect  physical  and  chemical  evolution 
with biological and cultural evolution (e.g. Chaisson 2001; De Duve 1995). Thus, it 
seems reasonable to assume that science is an effective method to understand cosmic 
evolution. The problem of harmony in the universe has thus shifted to its beginning: 
how did it all start? why did the universe start with these initial conditions, parameters 
and laws, and not others? Was the initial universe fine-tuned for the emergence of life 
and intelligence?
The belief in God allowed western thinkers to understand why the “Laws of 
Nature” are as they are and not otherwise. Scientific activity ultimately consisted of 
discovering the “Laws of Nature” set up by God. However, now that many scientists 
no longer believe in God, there is a lack of explanation in the origin of the “Laws of 
Nature” (Davies 1998).
Nicholas  Rescher  (1985,  230) summarized  alternatives  to  answer  “why  is 
nature's law system as it is?”: 
1. The question is illegitimate (rejectionism)
2.  The  question  is  legitimate,  but  inherently  unsolvable  (mystificationism)
3. The question is legitimate and solvable. But the resolution lies in the fact that 
there just  is  no explanation.  The  world's  law structure is  in  the  final  analysis 
reasonless. The laws just are as they are; that's all there is to it. And this brute fact 
eliminates any need for explanation (arationalism).
4. The question is legitimate and solvable, and a satisfactory explanation indeed 
exists. But it resides in an explanatory principle that is itself outside the range of 
(normal) laws - as it must be to avoid vitiating circularity (transcendentalism)
Rejectionism (1) will not make science and rationality progress. Although I am 
aware that it is a common philosophical position, I am committed to answer childishly 
simple  first-order  questions.  I  do  not  want  to  try  to  dismiss  too  quickly  those 
questions as meaningless. Mystificationism (2) does not make science and rationality 
progress  either.  Only if  it  could be  proven that  the question is  indeed unsolvable 
would it be an impressive result, similar to negative results in mathematical logic, like 
the proof of the impossibility to construct the quadrature of the circle.  Arationalism 
(3) is equivalent to saying that all explanations will fail. Without arguments to support 
this view, we can't  take it  seriously.  Transcendentalism (4) invites an external and 
most likely supernatural explanation, which is not something we presuppose in this 
thesis. Rescher mentions a fifth option, the position of  rationalism. It states that the 
question is legitimate and solvable, and the resolution lies in the fact that there is an 
explanation, yet to be defined and found.
Where does it all come from? Before attempting to answer this question, we 
ask in Chapter 4, where will a satisfying solution to “where does it all come from?” 
come from? The answer is ... from our brain! This is why I conduct a cognitive and 
philosophical study to understand our cognitive expectations to explain the origin of 
the  universe.  Of  course,  answers  to  the  origins  also  very  much  depend  on  our 
available  scientific  theories.  But  exploring  and  better  understanding  how  our 
cognition  functions  in  this  ultimate  quest  will  help  us  to  unveil  our  biases  and 
preferences in selecting explanatory models. Specifically, I argue in Chapter  4 that 
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there are two cognitive attractors that we use to explain the beginning of the universe, 
the  point and the  cycle. Building scientific models is a process which involves two 
equally important items, an external system to be understood, and an observer which 
constructs  a  model  of  that  system.  By  better  understanding  the  structure  and 
functioning of the observer-model relationship, we have more chances to avoid biases 
and confusions between reality and our models.
In Chapter  5, I focus on a common feature of all cosmological models: they 
bring in free parameters, not specified by the model. Can we reduce their numbers? 
How can we capture them? Which strategy should we use? I will examine physical, 
mathematical,  computational  and  biological  approaches,  bringing  different 
perspectives on this fundamental problem. This multiple analysis will prevent us to 
fall  into  any  reductionism.  Moreover,  an  understanding  of  free  parameters  is  a 
necessary step to make sense of the fine-tuning debate. 
In  Chapter  6,  we  will  see  that  some  free  parameters  also  have  puzzling 
properties. If we vary them even slightly, no complexity as we know it in our universe 
emerges. Our cosmological models display parameter sensitivity. This suggests that 
our universe is  somehow very special.  These arguments are  known as fine-tuning 
arguments and are widely debated in science, philosophy and theology. Unfortunately, 
they are most often confused with other related issues. Many researchers, including 
leading scientists, commit and repeat fine-tuning fallacies. I clarify and untangle those 
issues,  which  are  necessary  steps  for  the  new  research  discipline  of  Artificial 
Cosmogenesis, a scientifically promising and concrete way to study the emergence of 
complexity and the fine-tuning issue.
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CHAPTER 4 -  Origins of the Origin
Abstract:  This  Chapter  first  distinguishes  five  challenges  for  ultimate 
explanations:  epistemological,  metaphysical,  thermodynamical, causal,  and  the 
issue of  infinities.  In a  Kantian manner,  I  then turn the question of the origin 
upside down and ask: what do we cognitively expect to be a satisfying answer to 
the ultimate origin of the universe? I argue that our explanations fall into two 
kinds of cognitive attractors: the point-explanation (e.g. God or big bang) and the 
cycle-explanation  (e.g.  cyclical  cosmological  models).  Exploring  and  better 
understanding how our cognition functions in this ultimate quest will help us to 
unveil  our  biases  and  preferences in  selecting  explanatory  models.  I  critically 
discuss  objections  against  cycles,  such  as  infinite  regress  or  that  an  infinite 
universe  would  necessarily  imply  that  we  would  have  identical  copies  of 
ourselves somewhere or somewhen in this universe or another. I  conclude that 
cyclical explanations are more promising than point explanations, but also that 
less trivial cognitive attractors are logically possible.
When thus reflecting [of man as being the result of blind chance or 
necessity] I feel compelled to look to a First Cause having an intelligent 
mind in some degree analogous to that of man and I deserve to be called 
a Theist. But then arises the doubt, can the mind of man, which had, as I 
fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the 
lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions?
Charles Darwin (1887a, 282)
All  civilizations  have  developed  myths  explaining  the  origin  of  the  world.  They 
provide answers  to  the  fundamental  worldview question:  “where does it  all  come 
from?”  (b).  In  our  modern  societies  dominated  by  science,  myths  competition  is 
replaced by a competition of a wide variety of cosmological models. It is not our aim 
to review those modern cosmological models  (see e.g. Heller 2009 for a recent and 
excellent overview).
Tackling  the  question  of  our  ultimate  origins,  we  encounter  five  puzzling 
challenges, epistemological, metaphysical,  thermodynamical, causal, and the dealing 
with infinity in physics. They can be summarized with the following questions: what 
are the epistemological characteristics of an ultimate theory? why not nothing? where 
does  the  energy  of  the  universe  comes  from?  what  was  the  causal  origin  of  the 
universe? and Is the universe infinite?
Instead of tackling those questions frontally, our approach in this chapter is 
cognitive. As Darwin reminds us, our brain is a product of evolution. To what extent 
can we trust it to draw conclusions about the origin of the universe? What do we 
cognitively expect to be a satisfying answer to the ultimate origin?
I will here mainly focus on the causal problem. Was there a first cause? If so, 
is it a point-like explanation? If not, should we seek a cycle-like explanation? What 
are the limitations and biases of those two explanations?
I first outline the five major challenges ultimate explanations must face. I then 
show that there are two cognitive attractors on which ultimate explanations tend to 
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fall, the point and the cycle. They are similar to the fixed point and the limit-cycle in 
dynamical system theory. They can be described as cognitive attractors in the sense 
that our ultimate explanations tend to fall into them. 
4.1  Five Challenges for Ultimate Explanations
When no empirical data is available, we are left with theoretical reasoning. 
Furthermore, when it is doubtful to use physical theories, we are left only with logic 
and  metaphysics.  Before  the  rise  of  modern  cosmological  models  a  century  ago, 
talking about the origin of the universe was chiefly a metaphysical effort. It still is, 
but it is less recognized as such. The reason is that we also need to include major 
results of modern cosmology as we dive into metaphysical waters.
I  do  not  aim  to  solve  the  five  challenges  that  I  present  below.  They  are 
supremely difficult and each of them would deserve a PhD on its own. However, we 
will see them reappear later in Chapter  8, with some possible resolutions. My aim 
here is simply to formulate the challenges clearly, and to distinguish them from one 
another. This is in se a valuable step, because they are often confused.
Furthermore, there are two additional challenges to ultimate explanations that 
we will examine in greater detail, namely the unsatisfactory fact that cosmological 
models have free parameters (Chapter  5), and the open question whether those free 
parameters are fine-tuned or not (Chapter 6). 
4.1.1  Epistemological
When  we  adventure  into  the  idea  of  an  ultimate  theory,  some  basic 
explanatory principles can be shown to be mutually contradictory. Nicholas Rescher 
(2000) wrote a remarkable article entitled The Price of an Ultimate Theory, in which 
he  carefully  analyzed  the  logical  and  epistemological  foundations  of  an  ultimate 
theory, and concluded that it leads to an impasse. Let us summarize this argument5.
Rescher starts from Leibniz' Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) which states 
that every fact is capable to be explained. Formally, let the variables t, t', t'', etc. range 
over the set T of factual truth about the physical world. The abbreviation t'∑t means 
that “t' explains t”, and we have:
(PSR) t t'    t'∑t            ∀ ∃
Now, what are in particular the explanatory desiderata of an ultimate theory? 
Rescher identifies two such fundamental properties, explanatory Comprehensiveness 
(C) and  explanatory Finality  (F). The first states that whenever there is a fact, the 
ultimate  theory  affords  its  explanation.  This  can  be  formalized  in  the  following 
manner: 
(C) t' t   t'∑t∃ ∀
5 The reader who dislikes logical formula can easily ignore them, since they are also explained in the 
text. The courageous reader may like to note the notational conventions I use:
: existential quantifier. Read “there exists”∃
: universal quantifier. Read “for all”∀
&: logical symbol of conjunction (AND operator). 
 : logical symbol of negation.
: logical symbol of non deducibility. φ  ψ, reads “ψ is not deducible from φ”.⊬ ⊬
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It is striking that PSR and C only differ by an inversion of quantifiers. This difference 
between PSR and C is structurally similar to the difference between the potential and 
the  actual infinite (Vidal 2003). Indeed, the potential infinite can be expressed with 
the idea that for any given number x, it is possible to find a bigger one y. Formally:
(Potential Infinite) ∀x ∃y   x<y.
Whereas the actual infinite is a considerably stronger claim, positing the existence of 
an actual infinite number y, that Georg Cantor (1883) called . If = y, we have:
(Actual Infinite) ∃y ∀x   x<y.
Of course, one cannot derive the actual infinite from the potential infinite, as we can 
not  derive  explanatory  comprehensiveness  from the  principle  of  sufficient  reason. 
Formally, it means that:
Potential Infinite  Actual Infinite⊬
PSR   C⊬
There is thus a huge gap between the principle of sufficient reason and the ultimate 
theory, gap similar to the one between the potential and the actual infinite.
The  second  fundamental  property  expected  from an  ultimate  theory  is  its 
explanatory finality. Let us call the ultimate theory T*. The explanatory finality states 
that there is no further or deeper explanation than T* itself. Formally:
(F) t (t∑T* & t≠T*)∃
Now, there is a very basic principle that any explanation must respect, the explanatory 
noncircularity. It states that no explanation can invoke the fact that is to be explained. 
Formally:
(N) t (t∑t) ∃
The  problem  is  that  explanatory  comprehensiveness  (C)  entails  T*∑T*,  which 
contradicts (N). There is even another way to come to this contradiction:
1. t (t∑T*)∃ by PSR
2. T*∑T* from 1 by Finality (F).
This reasoning simply means that  if we apply the PSR to the ultimate theory, the 
ultimate theory must explain itself,  if  it  aims to be final (F). And a theory which 
explains itself is circular and thus in contradiction with explanatory noncircularity 
(N). 
We can conclude that a circular explanation or an infinite regress can not be 
avoided in the context of an ultimate theory. Rescher concludes that ultimate theorists 
must jettison explanatory noncircularity (N). Nevertheless, infinite regresses can but 
need not to be vicious (Gratton 1994). So, it is also logically possible to replace an 
75
ultimate theory by a non vicious infinite regress. For example, Quentin Smith (1987) 
has shown that an actual infinite past is logically possible.   
Rescher takes another road, and develops a solution where he considers not 
only inferential explanations, but adds a wider systemic explanatory mechanism. With 
this  added  explanatory  scheme,  he  avoids  a  vicious  circle  and  brings  instead  a 
virtuous circle of self-substantiation. 
4.1.2  Metaphysical
[Metaphysics] is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all the rest 
were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. 
(Kant 1781, B XIV)
“Why not  nothing?”  Those  three  words  compose  the  most  puzzling  metaphysical 
issue. They question the brute fact of existence. This formulation is a shorter version 
of  Leibniz's  (1714,  §7) “Why is  there  something rather  than  nothing?”.  The  best 
treatment I know of this question was provided by Leo Apostel  (1999) which he 
wrote before he passed away. The article is precisely entitled:  Why not Nothing?   I 
refer the reader to Apostel's paper for further reflections and to (R. L. Kuhn 2007) for 
a panorama of possible  answers to  this question.  As Kant  famously wrote  above, 
metaphysical questions are unavoidable. 
4.1.3  Thermodynamical
This pure metaphysical question of existence has its energetic counterpart. In 
physics, a class of fundamental laws are conservation laws. In particular, the first law 
of  thermodynamics states  that  energy  cannot  be  created  or  destroyed,  but  only 
transferred from one  system to another.  How can our  ultimate explanation of  the 
origin be compatible with this first law?
Recently, Krauss  (2012, 174) wrote that “The metaphysical “rule,” which is 
held  as  an  ironclad  conviction  by  those  with  whom I  have  debated  the  issue  of 
creation, namely that “out of nothing nothing comes,” has no foundation in science.” 
Too  bad  this  bold  claim  contradicts  the  first  law  of  thermodynamics,  indeed  a 
foundational law of science. 
Furthermore, how can an ultimate theory be compatible with the second law 
of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy or disorder in a closed system can 
only increase? Applied to universe as a whole, the second law famously led to the 
idea that our universe will ultimately end in a heat death. Is this application legitimate 
and the heat death conclusion inevitable? 
Another key thermodynamical issue regards the isolation or openness of the 
universe.  Is  the  universe  isolated  or  open thermodynamically?  The application  of 
thermodynamics to the universe will be very different depending on how we answer 
this question.
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4.1.4  Causal
What did cause the universe to be? Did the universe cause itself? Was there a 
first cause, a God or another first cause? If not, is there a cyclic process at play? Are 
we allowed to imagine an infinite causal chain? Wouldn't it be an infinite regression 
fallacy?
Is  the  concept  of  “cause”  itself  applicable?  Doesn't  it  presupposes  the 
existence of time or space-time? Our usual meaning of “cause” or “time” have good 
reasons to be challenged at densities and energies occurring at the big bang era, where 
the structure of space-time is altered. 
Following our philosophical criteria of scientificity, we must avoid unscientific 
theorizing. That is, when a subject matter can be treated with scientific means, we use 
those means. What is the scientific way to tackle the causal structure of the universe? 
It is found in cosmological models built with general relativity. It is thus fundamental 
to take relativity theories seriously, since they can violate our naive intuitions about 
space-time and causality. 
4.1.5  Infinity
Cosmologists see there is room for a lot of infinities in the Universe. 
Many are of the ‘potential’ variety— 
the Universe might be infinite in size, 
face an infinite future lifetime, 
or contain an infinite number of atoms or stars.
 (Barrow 2007a, 28)
The  metaphysical  challenge,  the  first-law  of  thermodynamics,  and  the  causal 
challenge all implicitly have to deal with the issue of infinity. Is the universe finite or 
infinite?  What  do  we  mean  with  this  innocent  question?  Do  we  mean  spatially 
infinite? Are we speaking about the global geometry of the universe? Do we ask 
whether the expansion of the universe will  be finite or infinite? Are we speaking 
about the quantity of matter-energy in the universe? Do we want to conceptualize a 
possible infinite number of causes, before the big bang, and in the far future? If so, do 
we represent an infinite causal chain with a line or with a cycle? 
Furthermore, in mathematics, infinities exist in several powers. Since physical 
models  heavily  use  mathematical  tools  to  model  our  world,  this  raises  profound 
questions. How should we interpret the fact that mathematical tools using infinities 
work  so  well  to  model  our  world?  Could  we  actually  do  the  same  with  finite 
mathematics?  What  can  we  do  if  infinities  appear  in  our  equations?  Should  we 
consider that something has gone wrong? Or should we simply avoid infinities given 
their impractical nature? We need to make clear our affinity for infinity, and these are 
arduous questions in philosophy of mathematics and physics.
4.2  The Point as a Cognitive Attractor
only an infinite sequence of finite causes
 may replace the notion of God.
77
(Heller 2009, 105)
4.2.1  Origin with Foundation
Michel Bitbol wrote a very valuable paper in (2004) about origin and creation. 
However, because it was published in French, I recapitulate its core message in what 
follows.  Bitbol  is  specialist  both in  quantum mechanics  and in  the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant. As a result of this rare double expertise, he is sometimes considered 
jokingly as a “Kantum mechanician”! In this paper, Bitbol distinguishes origin with or 
without foundation. The “first” origin needs a starting point, a cause which itself does 
not need another cause. This idea of a starting  point, which I call a point cognitive 
attractor, or simply the point, seems a satisfactory way to approach the question of the 
origins. Such a point takes shape with two successful ideas for the origins: God and 
the Big Bang.
4.2.2  Points in Everyday Life
The origin with a foundation has a causal and juridical meaning. The causal 
nuance demands a first or ultimate cause. Indeed, if the first cause is itself caused by 
something else, then of course it is no more a first cause. This is why this first cause 
must be causa sui, cause in itself. This is mandatory to avoid an infinite regress. This 
illustrates again the tension between the desire of a final and comprehensive ultimate 
theory and the desire to avoid a circular explanation. 
Importantly,  this  avoidance  of  infinite  regressions  was  Kant's  chief 
justification of his theses to solve the antinomies he describes in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
In  its  juridical meaning,  the  origin  is  a  creation point,  a  deliberate  act 
implying a responsibility. In legal reasoning, one attributes the responsibility of an act 
to  the  nearest  intentional  agent  which  provokes  a  particular  chain  of  causes  and 
effects. This is essential to stop somewhere the causal tree, which otherwise could be 
extended up to the origin of the universe. For example, in the Concorde's crash of July 
25th 2000, a tire exploded after running over a 40 centimeters metal strip that had 
fallen during the previous plane's takeoff. Who should be held responsible? The tire 
manufacturer?  The  pilot  who  didn't  see  the  metal  strip?  The  airport's  runway 
maintenance  service?  The  court  ruled  that  John  Taylor,  the  mechanic  who  had 
attached the metal strip which fell from the previous plane, was responsible. This act 
of Taylor who did not attach the metal strip tightly enough initiated a series of causes 
which led to the crash of the Concorde.
In such situations,  Bitbol  speaks of  heteronomy,  since  the  triggering cause 
stands out against the normal causal chain. As we will see with the cycle cognitive 
attractor, this is contrasted with autonomy, where all causes are internal. Heteronomy 
implies  an  asymmetry  in  the  causal  chain,  where  an  intentional  act  triggers  a 
discontinuity in the causal tree. Such a juridical reasoning stops the foundation series 
to a point. In the case of the Concorde's crash, the court decided it all started with 
John  Taylor.  What  about  the  universe?  How  did  it  all  started?  Two  possible 
foundational points are God and the Big Bang. 
78
4.2.3  God's Point
Judaism introduced God as a creator making the universe in the past,  as a 
definite event. Furthermore, for Judaism, Christianity and Islam, time is linear, not 
cyclic.  God's  creation  is  revealed  in  a  sequence  of  Creation,  fall,  incarnation, 
redemption and judgment. The creation story has thus a beginning, a middle and an 
end (Davies 2002, 42).
God has the power to put infinity in quarantine. Infinity is concealed in a three 
letters word: God. Furthermore, we can reassure ourselves if we can not fully grasp 
God's infinity,  because he is  of  a  supernatural  nature.  With our  finite  and limited 
mind, we can not really make sense of God's infinity. Such a line of thinking indeed 
successfully avoids an infinite regress, since infinity is condensed in a single concept, 
rather than in an unknown and hard to grasp infinite causal chain.
 The problem of the ultimate explanation has then shifted to a theological one. 
Indeed, the inquiring believer can still ask: where did God come from? What was God 
doing before he created the universe? etc. To make this logic watertight, theologians 
add that God is  causa sui, or self-caused. Furthermore, the thermodynamical issue 
remains.  How did the energy transfer from God to the universe occur? Is there a 
separation? Is God a being, or being itself? Is God the energy-matter of the universe 
itself, like in some pantheistic interpretations? Although theological reasonings could 
resolve  those  issues,  they  involve  a  supernatural  explanation,  which  a  non-theist 
philosopher by definition does not address. Is there an alternative? 
4.2.4  Big Bang's Point
The Big bang is often conceived as a space-time point or  singularity. Note 
however  that  this  interpretation  is  debatable,  since  depending  on  the  specific 
cosmological models, a singularity may or may not have occurred (Ellis 2007a, 1235). 
But could big bang models have the equivalent of God's  causa sui? Quentin Smith 
(1988) argued in a paper entitled The Uncaused Beginning of the Universe that one 
can solve the causal challenge without referring to a supernatural being. Continuing 
heated debates between atheists and theists, Smith  (1999) wrote another paper  The 
reason the Universe exists is that it caused itself to exist which presents three ways for 
the universe to cause itself to begin to exist.
A more precise cosmological model was developed by Richard Gott and Li-
Xin  Li  (1998),  which  uses  closed  time-like  curves  solutions  of  general  relativity, 
making the question of an earliest point in time meaningless. They write: “asking 
what was the earliest point might be like asking what is the easternmost point on the 
Earth. You can keep going east around and around the Earth — there is no eastern-
most point.”
So it may be possible to quarantine or avoid an infinite set of causes at the 
beginning of the universe, as an alternative to Heller's proposal in the above quote that 
“only an infinite sequence of finite causes may replace the notion of God.”
4.3  The Cycle as a Cognitive Attractor
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4.3.1  Origin without Foundation
Cycles have remarkable properties. They are without bounds, without author, 
are  self-sustaining  and  autonomous.  Let  me  illustrate  the  importance  of  cyclical 
thinking in different disciplines. The root of the “Meta-” philosophy we described 
earlier (see section 2.1.1 The Philosophy of “Meta-” , p30) is based on cyclical and 
self-sustaining  principles.   In  mathematics,  recursive  proofs  are  fundamental;  in 
linguistics,  Saussure realized that  the meaning of words is given by a network of 
mutually-defining  meanings;  in  psychology,  Piaget  emphasized  that  objects  and 
representational  schemes  are  mutually  defined.  In  biology,  Maturana  and  Varela 
introduced  the  concept  of  autopoiesis,  which  etymologically  means  self  (auto-) 
creation or production (-poiesis). In systems theory and engineering, both positive and 
negative  feedback  loops  are  crucial  concepts  to  understand  and  steer  complex 
processes. In stoic cosmogonies, the world goes through cycles of change, from chaos 
to  order,  until  a  catastrophe  brings  everything  to  chaos  again.  Such  a  cyclic 
cosmogony admits no absolute beginning, no permanent background, no end.
4.3.2  Cycles in Everyday Life
The cycle  is  also an attractor  for  evolutionary psychology reasons  (Davies 
2002, 41–42). In our past, survival depended on harmonizing our lives with natural 
cycles in nature, such as day and night cycles, menstrual cycles, astronomical cycles 
or seasonal cycles. It is not surprising that many creation myths are cyclical, such as 
in  Buddhism or  Hinduism. Another  fundamental  cycle  is  the  life  cycle.  In higher 
organisms, it is a more complex version of the cycle, which involves reproduction 
with a blueprint and variations. However, the life cycle is certainly less acceptable 
cognitively, because we can not predict fully its outcome. There is no strict repetition. 
In Darwin's (1859) famous words, “endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful 
have been, and are being, evolved.”
Yet, the famous chicken and egg paradox remains. What appeared first, the 
chicken who produced the egg or the egg which produced the chicken? We might 
unwittingly introduce such paradoxes by the very formulation of our questions about 
the origin of the universe. In the case of the chicken-egg problem, it was solved by 
evolutionary  theory,  which  unfolds  the  long  history  of  life  on  Earth  before  an 
organism such as a chicken appeared. In a similar way that evolutionary theories bring 
a  broader  context  to  settle  the  chicken  and  egg  paradox,  could  a  broader  theory 
explain the origin of the universe? We will develop later such a philosophical scenario 
of reproducing universes in Chapter 8.
4.3.3  Big Bang(s) Cycles
Cyclical  universes  with  successive  Big  Bang  expansion  phases  and  Big 
Crunches contracting phases are  not  favored by current  observations.  Since  1998, 
observations support  not  only that  the universe is  in  expansion,  but  also that  this 
expansion accelerates (Riess et al. 1998). However, the fashion of ever expanding and 
closed universes models seems also to be cycling (see e.g. Dyson 2002, 149). So it is 
certainly wise not to dismiss cosmological models too quickly.  
In the 1920s, relativistic cosmology showed that a static eternal universe was 
more and more difficult  to maintain without  ad hoc  fixes.  Friedman  (1922; 1924) 
80
showed that cosmological solutions to Einstein's equations were unstable, leading to 
prefered solutions with expanding or contracting universes. 
It is tempting to accept the idea of an oscillating universe, because it seems to 
solve both the causal and the thermodynamical challenge. On the one hand, we can 
assume that all the energy of the contracting universe is reused in the next expansion 
phase. On the other hand, the causal challenge is solved by the cycle itself. However, 
Tolman  (1934) studied oscillating universes and showed that  as the cycle repeats, 
universes grow bigger and bigger. If we apply this result to the past, it would make 
universes smaller and smaller in radius up to a tiny point, like in classical Big Bang 
models. The infinite regression in the past doesn't succeeds, because we start over 
with a point. Therefore, even if oscillating universes may solve the thermodynamical 
challenge,  the  causal  challenge  has  merely  been  shifted  to  a  point  and  remains 
unsettled. 
However, cyclical universes also open the way to avoid Tolman's assumption 
that  thermodynamics  would  hold  across  universal  cycles.  As  Davies  (1994,  146) 
pointed out, there may be a way out:
The conclusion seems inescapable that any cyclic universe that allows physical 
structures and systems to propagate from one cycle to the next will not evade the 
degenerative influences of the second law of thermodynamics. There will still be a 
heat  death.  One way to sidestep this  dismal conclusion is  to suppose that the 
physical conditions at the bounce are so extreme that no information about earlier 
cycles can get through to the next. All preceding physical objects are destroyed, 
all influences annihilated. In effect, the universe is reborn entirely from scratch.
This way to solve the thermodynamical challenge was also envisioned by Misner, 
Thorne and Wheeler (1973, 1215), in their classical book Gravitation: 
Of all principles of physics, the laws of conservation of charge, lepton number, 
baryon  number,  mass,  and  angular  momentum  are  among  the  most  firmly 
established. Yet with gravitational collapse the content of these conservation laws 
also collapses. The established is disestablished. No determinant of motion does 
one see left that could continue unchanged in value from cycle to cycle of the 
universe.
4.3.4  Objections against Cycles
Let us examine in more details uncomfortable ideas behind cycles. Are they 
satisfactory explanation schemes? Are they logically fallacious? Do they imply an 
eternal return with identical copies of ourselves appearing somewhere or somewhen? 
For each issue, we present some possible replies and remedies. 
The  first  problem  is  that  answering  the  causal  challenge  with  a  cyclic 
explanation may not satisfy us fully. Indeed, with cycles there is no endpoint in our 
quest for knowledge, so it seems that we have abandoned this quest of an ultimate 
explanation. In fact, the word “ultimate” comes from the latin ultimare, which means 
“come to an end”. With a cycle, we are never going to come to an end. We are never 
going to make our explanation converge into a firm foundation.  It  seems that  the 
explanation is less encompassing than a point. For,  where and how did it the cycle 
start? But of course, this very question betrays an attraction for the point explanation! 
It implicitly assumes that only a “point” explanation can satisfy us. Yet, in a truly 
cyclical way of thinking, this question has no point!
81
The second commonly perceived fallacy regarding cycles or  circles  is  that 
they are  always vicious and thus must be avoided at  all price. Yet, this is wrong. 
Accordingly, there are circularly vicious definitions or reasonings. But we must not 
systematically attribute them to cyclical or self-referential conceptualizations. As we 
saw, a wide variety of knowledge domains made impressive progresses by developing 
and  using  cyclical,  self-referential  or  bootstrapping  principles.  The  purported 
viciousness of circles hides instead a fear of infinite regresses. A major point is that 
circular  explanations  and  infinite  regresses  are  not  necessarily  vicious (Gratton 
1994).  One  attributes  viciousness  to  such  reasonings,  but  this  is  based  on  the 
assumption that “there is some obligation to begin a beginningless process or to end 
some endless process” (Gratton 1994, 295). To sum up, instead of trying to avoid an 
infinite explanatory regress, we can choose to embrace it, without any contradiction. 
Such a regress can take two forms, the cycle or the series. 
In the case of an infinite series, it is a very unsatisfactory explanation. The 
same problem is typically re-introduced in the solution, and the initial problem will 
recur infinitely and will never be solved. Such an infinite series may be even more 
unsatisfactory  than  an  infinite  cycle  because  it  shifts  the  problem  to  a  totally 
inaccessible  realm,  whereas  a  cycle  seemed  more  accessible,  with  some  kind  of 
repetition.  But  again,  as  Gratton  argued,  there  is  no  objective contradiction  with 
infinite series, although it certainly contradicts our subjective cognitive inclinations to 
reach either a point or a cycle. The idea of an infinite series constitutes an accepted 
infinite series of causes, instead of one which is quarantined in a  causa sui  God or 
ultimate theory. 
The third problem with cycles is that they would ipso facto imply an endless 
cycle  of  repetition,  a  veritable  eternal  return.  The  idea  of  an  eternal  return  is 
ubiquitous  in  primitive  world  civilizations,  religions  and  myths  (Eliade  1959).  In 
some  interpretations,  you  and  I  would  have  identical  copies  (doppelgängers)  of 
ourselves somewhere or somewhen in this universe or another. Barrow  (2005, 28) 
calls  it  the  infinite  replication  paradox.  Interestingly,  Paul  Davies  (2002,  44–45) 
reports that in his public talks, people find a cyclic universe palatable, but  not an 
endless  cycle  of  repetition.  Indeed,  we have  no experience whatsoever  of  endless 
cycles of perfect repetition. 
Yet, this idea of endless recurrence has reappeared in modern cosmological 
discussions  (see  e.g.  Ellis  and  Brundrit  1979;  Tipler  1980a;  Jaume  Garriga  and 
Vilenkin 2001; Knobe, Olum, and Vilenkin 2006; Vilenkin 2006a). But the infinite 
replication is not at all a necessary implication of infinite or cyclical models. As we 
will now see, it is doubtful for logical, thermodynamical, and cosmological reasons. 
Logically, the infinite replication paradox is groundless because it stems from 
a  confusion  between  infinity and  exhaustion  of  possibilities.  If  we  grant  that  the 
universe  is  infinite  –whatever  vague idea hides  behind such a  claim– the  infinite 
replication is at most a possibility, but not a necessity at all.
This can be explained by the following analogy (see Rucker 2004, 295). Let us 
consider the set of even numbers. It is infinite, but it does not contain all kinds of 
numbers since it  contains no uneven numbers.  Infinity does not necessarily means 
exhaustion of all possibilities. Another example is given by Heller (2009, 103). Let us 
consider the infinite set of real numbers. Despite the fact that the set is infinite, every 
number occurs just once in this set. And each number has its own individuality, in the 
sense that each has a different decimal expression (ex: 3,14159...)
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In 1871, Louis Auguste Blanqui, in a brochure entitled Eternity by the Stars: 
Astronomical  Hypotheses,  drew  consequences  of  Newtonian's  mechanics  and  the 
infinite  size  of  the  universe.  He  concluded  that  “each  man  possesses  within  the 
expanse an endless number of doubles who live his life, in absolutely the same way as 
he lives it himself.” (cited in Luminet 2007, 131)
The  idea  of  eternal  recurrence  could  also  be  supported  with  an  important 
recurrence theorem proven by Poincaré  (1890). It  is technically formulated, but in 
plain english it states that given: 
(1) a finite mechanical system of material points,
(2) which are subject to forces depending only on position in space
(3) and where coordinates and velocities do not increase to infinity, 
then,
(4) the system will return to its initial state an infinite number of times. 
 Ernst Zermelo noticed that Poincaré's recurrence theorem is in contradiction 
with the second law of thermodynamics. Indeed, a cyclic universe and an irreversible 
process towards heat death are incompatible  (Heller 2009, 26). This illustrates the 
difficulty to solve both the  causal challenge and respecting the second law in the 
thermodynamical challenge. 
Interestingly,  Tipler  (1980a) has  proven  the  more  complicated  general 
relativistic version of Poincaré's recurrence theorem. That time, the conclusion is the 
opposite, namely that recurrence  cannot happen in a closed universe. Accordingly, 
current  observations  favor  an  open  universe,  so  Tipler's  theorem does  not  refute 
eternal recurrence. 
Cosmologically, the eternal recurrence is unlikely. As  Luminet  (2007, 132) 
argues, one can underline
 
that the hypothesis of the duplication of all beings would perhaps be acceptable in 
an eternal and stationary Universe, where the average physical properties do not 
evolve over the course of time, but that the stationary theory has been rejected: the 
Universe evolves rapidly, as attested by the observation of the fossil radiation. 
The physical conditions of the big bang are radically different than those which 
will hold in a trillion years. The various configurations of physical systems are 
therefore not equally probable in time.
A thermodynamical interpretation of the infinite replication paradox states that 
strict cyclicity would imply that we are doomed to repeat the same events endlessly. 
Paul Davies (2002, 45) clarified and refuted this interpretation. He argues that it does 
not hold because it stems from a conflation between (i) the subjective psychological 
impression that time is flowing and (ii) objective time asymmetries in the world, of 
which the typical example is the entropy increase.
Finally, we should be very cautious when extrapolating specific, well-defined 
physics theorems to the whole universe. We must remain aware that such models only 
hold under many simplifying assumptions. There is no guarantee at all that recurrence 
theorems would hold if we would take into account more of the universe's complexity. 
For example, would the intrinsic indeterminacy of quantum mechanics prevent the 
eternal return? 
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4.4  Points, Cycles and Beyond
4.4.1  More Attractors
The point and cycle cognitive attractors are certainly limiting our imagination 
of what an ultimate explanation may be. In fact, deterministic models always reach an 
attractor,  and  thus  get  locked  in  at  some  point  in  the  future.  For  example,  the 
pendulum will  naturally  tend to  a  point  of  equilibrium.  More  precisely,  attractors 
appear under the following conditions (Wuensche 1998): 
Given  invariant  network  architecture  and  the  absence  of  noise,  a  discrete 
dynamical  network  is  deterministic,  and  follows a  unique  (though in  general, 
unpredictable)  trajectory  from  any  initial  state.  When  a  state  that  occurred 
previously is re-visited, which must happen in a finite state-space, the dynamics 
becomes trapped in a perpetual cycle of repetitions defining the attractor (state 
cycle) and its period (minimum one, a stable point).
If  those  insights  are  valid  for  our  cognitive  processes,  it  means  that  all  our 
deterministic models will lack creativity! A typical example of such creativity failures 
in our models are the predictions of the Club of Rome (1972). They predicted a social 
collapse, because of the exhaustion of finite resources (e.g. that oil would run out in 
1990). In such ambitious world-modeling, it is easy to miss many parameters, events, 
dynamics, non-linear effects, new energy sources, which did occur and made such 
gloomy predictions inaccurate.
It  seems  that  similar  biases  occur  in  discussions  about  the  origin  of  the 
universe where, as we saw, two attractors for explanations emerge: the point and the 
cycle. We should keep in mind that the full picture might well be more complicated. 
Indeed, in dynamical  system theory,  the fixed point  (0-dimensional)  and the limit 
cycle (1-dimensional) are just the simplest attractors. We have no reason to exclude n-
dimensional attractors or strange attractors (noninteger-dimensional) whose nature are 
fractal.
To  be  more  specific,  even  if  we  define  the  beginning  of  the  universe  as 
occurring in  a singularity,  there  is  room to interpret  it.  Quentin Smith  (1988,  45) 
reminds us that the singularity is not  in a three-dimensional space, “it is in a space 
either of 0 dimensions (if it is just one point), 1 dimension (if it is a series of points 
constituting  a  line  or  line  segment)  or  2  dimensions  (if  it  is  a  series  of  points 
comprising a surface-like space)”.  Yet, we have no theoretical reason to stop at the 
surface.  We  could  imagine  a  limit  torus  attractor,  and  indeed  the  space-time 
singularity inside a rotating black hole leads to a ring singularity  (Kerr 1963). We 
could also envisage any kind of complicated fractal topologies, beyond our day-to-day 
euclidian, newtonian or einsteinian prejudices.
4.4.2  Line and Combinations
A way to avoid the complications of describing the beginning or the end of the 
universe is  to  suppose that  it  essentially  stays in the same state.  The steady state 
cosmological theory is such a model, which was first developed by Sir James Jeans 
(1928),  then  in  greater  detail  by  Hermann Bondi,  Thomas Gold,  Fred  Hoyle  and 
Jayant  Narlikar.  It  assumes  the  universe  remains  unchanged,  it  has  no  cycle,  no 
beginning with a point, no end. We could associate it with a “line” cognitive attractor. 
It may have its roots in some subjective conceptions of time, or in our vision of the 
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horizon in a natural landscape. It is definitely an elegant way to avoid the difficult 
waters of the beginning and the end.
However,  Hoyle  had  introduced  an  ad  hoc “creation  tensor”  to  make  the 
steady state theory consistent, thereby introducing a violation of the conservation of 
energy. The steady state theory has later been progressively dismissed and replaced by 
big bang models. The full story however is richer and more subtle  (see e.g. Kragh 
1996).
The difference between the line and infinite cycles is that in cycles there is 
some repetition, and perhaps singularity points, while this is not the case with the line. 
Although it is certainly a healthy scientific attitude not to accept the big bang theory 
as  a  creation  myth,  but  as  it  is,  a  successful  scientific  model,  which  might  be 
improved or refuted by other models in the future, observations do converge to the 
idea that there has been a Big Bang. So this “line” cognitive attractor seems to be 
currently ruled-out. 
Of course,  it  is  also possible to imagine much more complicated scenarios 
combining points, cycles and lines. However, what do we have to gain by combining 
and producing more complex explanations, if anyway we cannot test them? Of course, 
if we do have strong theoretical or empirical evidence that we can test scientifically, 
we are justified to advance more sophisticated explanations. Otherwise, a pragmatic 
principle of rational economy should be at play, for example: 
rational economy: Never employ extraordinary means to achieve purposes you can 
realize by ordinary ones (Rescher 2006, 8)
4.4.3  Cosmological Models
It is crucial to take seriously our best theories to answer our questions about 
the origins. Major physical theories like quantum mechanics or general relativity can 
have counterintuitive consequences, which nevertheless we must take into account. 
Such  theories  are  more  reliable  than  intuitions  coming  from  our  brains,  a  mere 
product  of  evolution.  The  brain  is  well  adapted  to  recognize  cycles  in  natural 
environments, or to recognize starting points in human actions, but not to guess what 
happened at the big bang era.
For example, the point attractor and the idea of an origin with a foundation is 
deeply  problematic  if  we  want  to  make  it  consistent  with  the  first  law  of 
thermodynamics.  Indeed,  if  no  energy  can  be  created  or  destroyed,  how did  the 
causing “point” transfer the energy to the universe? 
We saw reasons why we have inclinations towards certain point-like or cycle-
like explanations. Now, how can we choose pragmatically between the two? We agree 
with Bitbol's  (2004) conclusion that autonomy or a cycle is more promising, as its 
underlying principle, co-creation or bootstrapping has proved very helpful in many 
sciences. Remarkably, it is this very same 'meta-' analysis technique which triggered 
our inquiry in this Chapter into our “metaorigins”, or the origin of our intellectual 
preferences to the origin of the universe. Less obvious for our hunter-gatherer brains, 
n-dimensional attractors should also be kept in mind.
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CHAPTER 5 -  Capturing Free Parameters
Abstract: We address the free parameters issue in cosmology, namely that there 
are free parameters in the standard model of particle physics and in cosmological 
models, which in principle can be filled in with any number. We do not know why 
they  should  have  the  value  they  do.  We  analyze  the  issue  with  physical, 
mathematical,  computational  and  biological  frameworks.  We  review important 
distinctions such as dimensionless and dimensional physical constants, and the 
classification of constants proposed by Lévy-Leblond. Then we critically discuss 
Tegmark's  proposal  of  the  mathematical  universe.  The  idea  that  our  universe 
might  be  modelled  as  a  computational  entity  is  analyzed,  and  we discuss  the 
distinction  between  physical  laws  and  initial  conditions  using  algorithmic 
information  theory.  Finally,  we  introduce  a  biological  approach  to  the  free 
parameters  issue  which  will  be  later  developed  in  Chapter  8.  Importantly, 
analogies  are  both  useful  and  fundamental  cognitive  tools,  but  can  also  be 
misused or misinterpreted, which is why this Chapter starts with a preliminary 
study of analogical reasoning in science.
Our  particle  physics  and  cosmological  models  have  free  parameters.  In 
particular,  the  standard  model  of  particle  physics,  despite  its  great  successes,  has 
many adjustable parameters. This is embarrassing, since we do not know why they 
have the values they do. In principle, they could take any value. Some parameters 
specify the masses of particles, others the relative strength of forces. Since we do not 
have theories to decide their value, they are determined by experiments and we then 
fill  them in our models. Lee Smolin  (2006, 13) described this situation as a great 
problem in theoretical physics: 
Explain how the values of the free constants in the standard model of particle  
physics are chosen in nature.
We will  call  such quantities “parameters” and not “constants”.  Indeed, if  they are 
“free”,  they  are  not  constants  anymore,  but  parameters  which  can  –at  least 
theoretically– vary.
More precisely, there are two families of free parameters  (see e.g. Demaret 
and  Lambert  1994,  chap.  5;  Stenger  2011).  Following  Stenger  (2011),  we  call 
parameters of the standard model physics parameters; and parameters of cosmological 
models  cosmic parameters.  Cosmic parameters include for example the expansion 
rate  of  the universe,  the mass density of the universe,  the ratio  of  the number of 
protons and electrons or the cosmological constant. Together, the standard model of 
particle physics and the standard cosmological model require 31 free parameters to be 
specified  (Tegmark et al. 2006). It is a main challenge of modern physics to build 
stronger theories able to reduce this number.  The  free parameters issue  can now be 
defined as: 
Free parameters issue: There are free parameters in the standard model and in cosmological  
models, which in principle can be filled in with any number.
The  role  of  physical  and  cosmological  models  is  to  reduce  this  number  of  free 
parameters,  possibly  to  zero.  Claiming  that  there  is  a  free  parameters  issue,  is 
claiming  that  at  least  one  parameter  will  never  be  determined  by  pure  theory. 
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Claiming  that  the  free  parameters  problem  is  solvable  is  claiming  that  a  future 
physical  theory  will  decide  every  parameter.  All  cosmological  models  have  free 
parameters except Tegmark's (2007) Mathematical Universe that we will soon discuss 
(in section 5.3 The Mathematical Universe, p94).
In this Chapter, I first review important distinctions such as the dimensionless 
and  dimensional physical constants, and the classification of constants proposed by 
Lévy-Leblond.  Generalizing  Lévy-Leblond's  insights,  I  argue  that  as  physics 
progresses, the number of free parameters decreases. I argue that free parameters will  
progressively be reduced to initial conditions of a cosmological model. I then discuss 
Max Tegmark's radical proposal of the mathematical universe, which indeed has zero 
free parameters. Then I examine our universe modelled as a computational entity and 
discuss the distinction between physical laws and initial conditions using algorithmic 
information theory. Finally, I mention the view of the biological universe, suggesting 
biological analogies as fresh perspectives to tackle the free parameters issue.
5.1  Analogical Reasoning in Science
In this Chapter, we will be using mathematical, computational and biological 
analogies to better grasp the nature of free parameters in physical and cosmological 
models. As a preliminary study to this survey, we analyze in this section analogies as 
cognitive  tools.  How can analogies  be  used  for  scientific  purposes?   Many great 
scientific discoveries have been triggered by analogies  (see Holyoak and Thagard 
1995, chap. 8 for plenty of examples). This constitutes an important motivation to 
understand  in  greater  detail  the  functioning  of  analogical  reasoning.  Yet,  since 
analogies are easily abused, they also need to be carefully used.
What is an analogy? It  is a structural  or functional similarity between two 
domains of knowledge. For example, a cloud and a sponge are analogous in the sense 
that  they  can  both  hold  and  give  back  water.  More  precisely,  we  can  give  the 
following definition: “an analogy is a mapping of knowledge from one domain (the 
base) into another (the target) such that a system of relations that holds among the 
base objects also holds among the target objects.” (Gentner and Jeziorski 1993, 448–
449).  In  this very simple  example,  the  relations “holding and giving back water” 
which are verified in the base (the cloud) are also verified in the target (the sponge). 
Analogical  reasoning  is  recognized  to  be  a  basic  cognitive  mechanism 
allowing us to learn and solve problems (e.g. Minsky 1986; Hofstadter 1995; Holyoak 
and Thagard 1995). Leary  (1990, 2) even argued that  language and every kind of 
knowledge is rooted in metaphorical or analogical thought processes. Indeed, when 
we  do  not  know a  domain  at  all,  we  must  use  analogies  as  a  cognitive  tool  to 
potentially gain some insights from what we already know. In this manner, we can 
draw a map from the known to the unknown. 
Specifically,  Holyoak and Thagard  (1995,  185–189) argued that  analogical 
reasoning is  helpful in  discovering,  developing, educating,  or evaluating  scientific 
theories.  Indeed, they enable us to propose new hypotheses, and thus  discover new 
phenomena.  These  new  hypotheses  trigger  us  to  develop new  experiments  and 
theories. Let us note however that there is nothing automatic or easy in this process. 
The relational system should first be examined in both domains, and then a more 
precise analogy or disanalogy can be found worthy of testing. 
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The  educating part of analogies is useful for diffusing scientific knowledge, 
both with colleagues and pupils.  Indeed,  it  is  well  known that  good teachers  use 
analogies to help others grasp a new idea, based on what they already know.
The  evaluating  part confronts us with one of the main dangers of analogies. 
One should emphasize that an analogy is not a proof. Analogies can thus not properly 
be  used  to  prove  statements,  but  their  main  utility  is  in  giving  heuristics for 
discovering and developing scientific theories. To illustrate this point, let us consider 
the teleological argument of God's existence popularized with William Paley's (1802) 
watchmaker analogy. It goes as follows:
(1) A watch is a fine-tuned object.
(2) A watch has been designed by a watchmaker.
(3) The Universe is fine-tuned.
(4) The Universe has been designed by God.
In the base domain (1-2), we have two objects, the watch and the watchmaker. They 
are linked by a “designed by” relationship. In the target domain (3-4), the Universe is 
like a watch, and God, like a watchmaker. That the relation (1)-(2) is a verifiable fact 
does not imply at all that the same  relation  “designed by” in (3)-(4) should be true. 
There is no causal relationship between the couple (1)-(2) and (3)-(4).  This reasoning 
at most gives us an heuristic invitation to ponder whether the universe is fine-tuned. 
Although it  is  a logically flawed argument,  one can appreciate its strong intuitive 
appeal. 
There are in fact other pitfalls associated with analogical reasoning. To avoid 
them,  Gentner  and  Jeziorski  (1993,  450) proposed  six  principles  of  analogical 
reasoning:
1. Structural consistency. Objects are placed in one-to-one correspondence and 
parallel connectivity in predicates is maintained.
2.  Relational  focus.  Relational  systems  are  preserved  and  object  descriptions 
disregarded.
3.  Systematicity.  Among  various  relational  interpretations,  the  one  with  the 
greatest  depth -  that is,  the greatest  degree of  common higher-order  relational 
structure is preferred.  
4.  No  extraneous  associations.  Only  commonalities  strengthen  an  analogy. 
Further  relations and associations between the  base  and target  –  for  example, 
thematic connections –do not contribute to the analogy.  
5.  No mixed analogies. The relational network to be mapped should be entirely 
contained within one base domain. When two bases are used, they should each 
convey a coherent system.
6. Analogy is not causation. That two phenomena are analogous does not imply 
that one causes the other. 
Is  it  possible  to  further  generalize  the  use  of  analogical  reasoning  into  a 
science which would focus only on the structural or functional aspects of systems? 
Studying  different  models  in  different  disciplines  having  structural  or  functional 
similarities  leads  to  the  development  of  very  general  interdisciplinary  scientific 
frameworks, like network or systems theory. Indeed, Ludwig van Bertalanffy defined 
general  systems theory as an interdisciplinary doctrine “elaborating principles and 
models that apply to systems in general, irrespective of their particular kind, elements, 
and  'forces'  involved”  (quoted  in  Laszlo  1972a,  xvii).  Analogies  can  be 
mathematically defined and specified to become different kinds of homomorphisms. 
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In a similar fashion, the study of networks is independent of the nodes and types of 
relations considered. 
To conclude this section, we can use Hesse's (1966, 8) pragmatically valuable 
distinction between  positive,  negative  and neutral analogies.  The positive analogy 
addresses the question: what is analogous? and constitutes the set of relations which 
hold  in  the  two  domains.  The  negative  analogy  addresses  the  question:  what  is  
disanalogous?  and  constitutes  the  set  of  relations  which  do  not  hold  in  the  two 
domains.  Finally,  neutral  analogies  trigger  the  question:  are  the  two  domains  
analogous? To answer this last question, one has to examine or test if such or such 
relation holds in the target domain.
 In which way are modern cosmological models analogous? They at least have 
one gross characteristic in common, they have free parameters. That is, parameters 
not specified by the model. Given this analysis of analogical reasoning, we can now 
carefully explore the free parameters issue, aided by mathematical, computational and 
biological analogies. Then we will analyze in Chapter 6 whether those parameters are 
fine-tuned. 
5.2  The Physical Universe
In  physics,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  between  dimensional and 
dimensionless physical constants (see e.g. Michael Duff’s contribution in Duff, Okun, 
and  Veneziano  2002).  If  a  constant  has  a  unit  after  its  value,  it  is  dimensional. 
Dimensional constants depend on our unit system choice and thus have a conventional 
aspect.  The velocity of light  c,  the reduced Planck constant  ħ  or the gravitational 
constant  G  are  all  dimensional  constants.  Their  respective  dimensions  are,  for 
example, m.s-1, eV.s and m3.kg-1.s-2. Certainly, we can for example make the velocity 
of light equal to 1, and thus apparently dimensionless. However, this applies only to a 
particular  unit  system, and the constant  will  be dimensional  again in another unit 
system. 
By contrast,  dimensionless constants are dimensionless in  any unit  system. 
They are ratios between two physical quantities, such as two forces or two masses. 
For example, the electron-proton mass ratio is me/mp = 1/1836.15...  Since the two 
quantities are masses, we can get rid of the units (i.e. the dimension), and keep only a 
pure number. Other dimensionless constants are deduced by a similar  dimensional  
analysis.  If  the  analysis  leads  to  a  pure  number  without  dimension,  we  have  a 
“dimensionless” constant.
Along  with  this  dimensional  versus  dimensionless  distinction,  Jean-Marc 
Lévy-Leblond (1979, 238) proposed another complementary classification of physical 
constants. Three types are distinguished, in order of increasing generality: 
A.  Properties  of  particular  physical  objects considered  as  fundamental  constituents  of 
matter; for instance, the masses of “elementary particles”, their magnetic moments, etc.
B.  Characteristics  of  classes  of  physical  phenomena:  Today,  these  are  essentially  the 
coupling  constants  of  the  various  fundamental  interactions  (nuclear,  strong  and  weak, 
electromagnetic and gravitational), which to our present knowledge, provide a neat partition 
of all physical phenomena into disjoint classes. 
C. Universal constants, that is constants entering universal physical laws, characterizing the 
most  theoretical frameworks,  applicable  in  principle  to  any physical  phenomenon;  Planck 
constant ħ is a typical example.
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The classification is  only intended to be a  basis  for  discussing and analysing the 
historical evolution of different physical constants. For example, the constant  c, the 
velocity of light, was first discovered as a type-A constant. It was a property of light, 
as a physical object. With the work of Kirchhoff, Weber, Kohlrausch and Maxwell, 
the constant gained type-B status when it was discovered that it also characterized 
electromagnetic phenomena. Finally, it gained type-C status when special and general 
relativity were discovered, synthesizing concepts such as spatio-temporal intervals, or 
mass and energy. For a detailed account of the status change of c see  (Lévy-Leblond 
1979, 252–258). 
What happens next, when a constant has reached its type-C status? The fate of 
universal  constants  (type-C),  explains  Lévy-Leblond  (1979,  246),  is  to  “see  their 
nature as concept synthesizers be progressively incorporated into the implicit common 
background of physical ideas, then to play a role of mere unit conversion factors and 
often to be finally forgotten altogether by a suitable redefinition of physical units.” 
More precisely, this remark leads him to the distinction of three subclasses of type-C 
constants, according to their historical status: 
(i) the modern ones, whose conceptual role is still dominant (e.g. ħ, c); 
(ii) the classical ones, whose conceptual role is implicit and which are considered 
as unit conversion factors (e.g. thermodynamical constants k, J); 
(iii)  archaic ones, which are so well assimilated as to become invisible (e.g. the 
now obvious ideas that areas are square of lengths). 
If all dimensional constants follow this path, then they all become “archaic”, 
and thus integrated in the background of physical theories. The fate of dimensional 
constants seems then to fade away. Is it possible to seriously consider this remark, and 
try to relegate all dimensional constants to archaic ones? Michael Duff  (Duff 2002; 
Duff,  Okun,  and  Veneziano  2002) convincingly  argued  that  the  number  of 
dimensional  constants  (type-C)  can  be  reduced  to  ...  zero!  Thus,  he  considers 
constants like  c,  G,  ħ, which are often considered as “fundamental”,  as merely unit 
conversion  factors.  According  to  his  terminology,  only  dimensionless  constants 
should  be  seen  as  fundamental.  Victor  Stenger  (2011) also  describes  dimensional 
constants as trivial and arbitrary parameters.
A dimensionless physics approach is also proposed in the framework of scale 
relativity (L. Nottale 2003, 16). Following the idea of relativity, one can articulate any 
physical expression in terms of ratios. Indeed, in the last analysis a physical quantity 
is always expressed relative to another. Of course, experimentalists still need to refer 
to metric systems, and often to many more dimensional physical constants than just 
the common c, G and ħ. The point here is that it is possible to express the results in 
physical equations without reference to those dimensional constants  (see also Lévy-
Leblond 1979, 248–251). 
What are the consequences of these insights for the free parameters problem? 
If  the fate of dimensional constants is  to disappear,  then we obviously reduce the 
number of free parameters. Considering what would happen if a type-C dimensional 
constant would have a different value has to be considered very skeptically. Such a 
scenario has unfortunately been famously popularized by Gamow's (1939) book Mr. 
Tompkins in Wonderland: or, Stories of c, G and h. Mr. Tompkins is subject to a world 
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where the arbitrary constants c, G and h vary, and the world changes accordingly. 
Again, as Duff argued, the problem is that dimensional constants are conventions, and 
changing them is changing a convention, not physics. It is thus only meaningful to 
express the possible changes in terms of dimensionless constants.
Parameters  involved  in  cosmological  models  can  be  explained  by  new 
physical  theories.  Such is  the  case  with  the  dimensionless  cosmological  constant, 
whose value has been predicted by scale relativity (L. Nottale 2010, 123–124). 
In January 2006, Bernard Goossens, an engineer with passionate interest for 
physics, cosmology, evolution, complexity and philosophy contacted me. He attracted 
my attention to the possible intersection of the work of my PhD supervisor Francis 
Heylighen with the work of Laurent Nottale, a physicist specialist of fractal space-
time. 
I was at that point very skeptical of Nottale's work, because I was unable to 
assess the technicalities of the theory he developed,  scale relativity.  I  had not the 
necessary physics background. Two years later, Bernard and I were having a drink at 
the Free University Brussels (VUB) and I told him that my skepticism stemmed from 
the fact that any good theory needs to make and validate concrete predictions. But 
when Bernard responded that scale relativity makes a lot of (verified!) predictions, 
this was a turning point. 
I then looked more closely at Nottale's work, starting with a popular book, La 
relativité dans tous ses états (L. Nottale 1998). I was astonished by the quality of this 
little book which tells the history of relativity theories from Copernicus, Galileo to 
Einstein  and  Poincaré.  The  last  chapters  introduce  scale  relativity  as  a  logical 
continuation of relativity theories, which that time aims to unify quantum physics 
with relativity theories. The principle of relativity has been successfully applied to 
positions, orientations and motions, and it is now extended to scales. It is one of the 
best popular science book I've ever read, and if you can't speak French, it's worth 
learning to read it!
Yet, I still couldn't understand the maths behind the theory. And I still can't. 
But my training as a philosopher of science made me see clearly that the theory had 
all major ingredients of sound theorizing. For once, philosophy would prove useful. 
Here is why.
Scale Relativity extends theories of relativity by including the scale in the 
definition of the coordinate system, then to account for scale transformations in a 
relativistic way. How is it possible? And why did Einstein not found this extension 
before? As often in the history of physics, part of the answer lies in the mathematical 
tools. 
Einstein struggled years to develop the general relativity theory of gravitation 
because  it  involved  non-Euclidean  geometries.  These  geometries  were  counter-
intuitive to manipulate and understand, and they were not used in physics before. 
Similarly, scale relativity uses a fundamental mathematical tool to deal with scales: 
fractal geometries. Including explicitly scale transformations in equations leads to an 
extension of general relativity including its previous results, with the construction of 
a  fractal  space-time  theory.  Indeed,  relativity  theory  equations  are  limited  to 
differentiable  equations;  scale  relativity  allows  an  extension  to  nondifferentiable 
equations, using fractal geometries. The constraint of differentiability is released and 
this leads to a more general theory which can deal both with the differentiable and the 
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nondifferentiable case. As non-Euclidean geometries were new for Einstein, fractals 
are  –relatively!–  new to  physicists  because  they  were  only  studied  in  depth  by 
Mandelbrot  in  the  1950's,  although  they  were  known  by  mathematicians  much 
before; for example with Georg Cantor's triadic set. 
This  simple  yet  fundamental  approach generates  a  proliferation  of  results, 
which are both theoretical and practical, with validated predictions. Let us mention a 
few of them. A new light on quantum mechanics can be thrown, since it is possible to 
derive  postulates of  quantum mechanics  from scale  relativity  principles (Laurent 
Nottale and Célérier 2007). As a philosopher also trained in mathematical logic, I 
knew that if a theory can derive axioms or  postulates, it is a certainly the hallmark 
that it works at a more fundamental level. Furthermore, scale relativity theory derives 
a  macroscopic  Schrödinger  equation,  which  brings  the  statistical  predictability 
characteristic  of quantum mechanics into other scales in nature.  For example,  the 
relative positions of (exo)planets can be predicted in a statistical manner. The theory 
successfully predicts that they have more chances to be found at such or such distance 
from their star. 
Moreover, it is possible to capture physics and cosmic free parameters thanks 
to scale relativity. Special scale relativity can indeed predict the value of  the strong 
nuclear force. This was predicted with great precision, and has been confirmed by 
experimental  measures  (L. Nottale 2010).  On cosmological  scales,  reasoning with 
universal  scales  allow to  predict  with great  precision the  value of  a  fundamental 
cosmic  parameter,  the  cosmological  constant  (L.  Nottale  1993). A  quantitative 
prediction on which our finer observations keep on converging (L. Nottale 2010, sec. 
3.1.2).
Models constructed with the general  idea of relativity of scales bring new 
insights not only in physics, but also in earth sciences, history, geography and biology 
(L. Nottale, Chaline, and Grou 2000; 2002). To further explore those themes, I invited 
Laurent Nottale and his colleagues Jean Chaline (evolutionary biologist) and Pierre 
Grou (economist) to a workshop held at the Free University Brussels (VUB) on May 
5-6 2009 (see a photo below).
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Scale Relativity is a fundamental approach which has consequences for nearly 
all  sciences.  It  suggests  that  cosmology,  fundamental  particle  physics,  structure 
formation,  biology,  geology,  economy and other  fields  might  be  approached with 
tools derived from the same few principles. Although, as Nottale explains in his 2010 
paper, a lot of work still  has to be done, the exposed vision is extraordinarily far 
reaching and inspiring. For these reasons, I was delighted to deliver Laurent Nottale 
the Evo Devo Universe 2008 Best Paper Award at the conference on the Evolution 
and Development of the Universe (Vidal 2010b).  
Story 4: Capture of two free parameters in Nottale's notable theory of scale relativity.
Following Duff, Lévy-Leblond and Stenger we saw that type-C constants are 
bound to disappear. Another challenge I would like to propose is the following:  could 
type-A and type-B constants emerge from initial conditions in a cosmological model? 
If we were able to explain all these constants in terms of a cosmological model, it 
would  certainly  be  a  great  achievement.  Smolin  (1997,  316) also  argued  that 
fundamentally, progress in quantum mechanics must lead to a cosmological theory. 
Indeed,  all  particles  ultimately  originate  from  the  big-bang,  thus  a  complete 
understanding of particle physics should include an explanation of their origin, and 
thus relate with a cosmological model.  
In  a  certain  sense,  progress  in  this  direction  has  already  happened,  if  we 
consider  the discovery of  big-bang nucleosynthesis.  Properties  of  atomic elements 
could be thought as fundamental constituents of matter, and thus type-A constants, 
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Figure 3: Workshop on Scale Relativity: Universe, Life, Societies, 5-6 May 2009. 
From left to right: Jean Chaline, Laurent Nottale, Francis Heylighen, Clément Vidal and Pierre 
Grou.
until we discovered they were actually formed at the big-bang era. If we extrapolate 
this trend, a future cosmological model may be able to derive many (or even all) type-
A constants from initial conditions. 
The same can be said about fundamental coupling constants (type-B). Special 
scale relativity can indeed predict the value of the strong nuclear force (αs) at the Z 
mass energy level. This was predicted with great precision, and has been confirmed 
by experimental measures (see L. Nottale 2010, 26–27). Thus, if physics continues its 
progress,  it  is  reasonable  to  conceive  that  particle  physics  models  would  become 
integrated  into  cosmological  models.  The consequence  for  free parameters is  that 
physics  parameters  will  progressively  be  reduced  to  cosmic  parameters.
We have outlined Duff's proposal that dimensional constants can be reduced to 
0.  We  have  suggested  that  fundamental  coupling  constants  could  be  in  future 
explained  from  more  general  principles,  and  that  many  apparent  “fundamental 
constants”  in  the  past  can  nowadays  be  explained  by  more  general  theories. 
Accordingly,  a  great  number  of  free  parameters  have  been  and  certainly  will  be 
explained by more advanced physical theories. 
What about the role constants play in physics and mathematics? Consider the 
famous  constant  π.  We can see  a  disanalogy,  because  mathematical  constants are 
defined  a priori by the axioms:  they are  internal  to  the system and are  generally 
definable and computable numbers. For example, we have plenty of algorithms to 
calculate  π.  This  is  not  the  case  with  physical  constants.  Many  of  them  remain 
external  to  the  system,  in  the sense that  they are  not  computable  from inside the 
model. At some stage there has been a measurement process to get their values. Can 
we hope that science will allow us to understand or compute these constants from 
more  fundamental  principles?  How far  can  we  get  in  this  direction?  Let  us  now 
examine the mathematical universe.
5.3  The Mathematical Universe
Can we  find  a  theory  with  zero  free  parameters?  Is  it  just  a  dream of  a 
theoretical physicist? Max Tegmark  (1998; 2004; 2007) makes this dream true by 
arguing that the theory of everything (TOE) is –simply– the ultimate ensemble theory. 
The  TOE  in  physics  is  the  same  as  the  TOE  in  mathematics.  He  argues  that 
Newtonian  gravity,  general  relativity  or  quantum field  theory  can  all  be  seen  as 
mathematical structures. More precisely, he assumes that there is a mathematically 
defined multiverse which actually exists, with all possible mathematical structures. 
Tegmark further distinguishes four types of parallel  universes,  with greater 
and greater diversity (Tegmark 2004, 460). In level I, we are simply speaking about 
regions  beyond our  cosmic  horizon.  In  level  II,  chaotic  inflation  (Linde  1990) is 
supposed to be correct, and so other post-inflation bubbles might exist. In level III, we 
assume Everett's (1973) many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics to be correct, 
where our universe keeps branching in parallel universes. In level IV, we assume a 
structural mathematical realism, where mathematical existence is the same as physical 
existence. More precisely, Tegmark  (2007, 102) makes two very strong ontological 
and epistemological hypotheses:
External Reality Hypothesis (ERH): There exists an external physical reality  
completely independent of us humans.
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Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH): Our external physical reality is a 
mathematical structure.
There are many good reasons to be very skeptical about those two assumptions, and 
about  multiverse  levels  II-IV.  But  for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  let  us  follow 
Tegmark's  reasoning,  and  see  its  implications  for  initial  conditions  at  Level  IV. 
Tegmark (2007, 117–118) writes: 
There is nothing “initial” about specifying a mathematical structure. Whereas the 
traditional notion of initial conditions entails that our universe “started out” in 
some particular state, mathematical structures do not exist in an external space or 
time,  are  not  created  or  destroyed,  and  in  many  cases  also  lack  any  internal 
structure  resembling  time.  Instead,  the  MUH  leaves  no  room  for  “initial 
conditions”,  eliminating  them  altogether.  This  is  because  the  mathematical 
structure is by definition a complete description of the physical world. In contrast, 
a  TOE  saying  that  our  universe  just  “started  out”  or  “was  created”  in  some 
unspecified state  constitutes an incomplete  description, thus violating both the 
MUH and the ERH.
This would indeed dissipate the problem of initial conditions. But how are we to solve 
concrete physics problems if physics is mathematics? Does it helps to know that there 
might be parallel universes with all possible mathematical structures? 
Indeed, we may be speaking of a theory of  everything, which unfortunately, 
has nothing to say. The literature aiming to solve challenges for ultimate explanations 
is often divided into two main classes of solutions: “God” or “Multiverse”. Either it is 
God who created the Universe with all its parameters fit for life and intelligence; or 
there is a huge number of other universes with different parameters, so that it is very 
probable that there is one containing life and intelligence. The fact that it is the one 
we happen to inhabit is an observational selection effect which thus makes the free 
parameters  and  their  possible  fine-tuning  less  mysterious  (e.g.  B.  Carr  2007;  N. 
Bostrom 2002). 
From a rational and scientific point of view, an appeal to God suffers from 
being a non-naturalistic explanation. Furthermore, God is often linked with the god-
of-the-gaps assumption.  If  we can not  understand a  phenomenon,  we use God to 
explain it, and we thus do not seek another explanation. This attitude can, by its very 
definition, explain everything. We can wonder if the hypothesis of a multiverse is any 
better. Indeed, the appeal to multiverse works everywhere and is not restricted by any 
limit; so it can also explain everything. Could it be that Tegmark is replacing the god-
of-the-gaps with the mathematics-of-the-gaps? 
As  Barrow  (2007a,  vi) noticed,  in  contrast  to  the  striving  of  theoretical 
physicists  toward  a  TOE,  the  idea  of  multiple  universes  has  on  the  contrary 
“undermined the  naïve  expectations  of  many,  that  a  Theory  of  Everything would 
uniquely and completely specify all the defining quantities of the Universe that make 
it  a  possible  home  for  life.”  By  equating  the  TOE  in  physics  with  the  TOE  in 
mathematics, Tegmark has actually totally turned upside down the logic and hopes 
behind a TOE. Instead of having one unique theory,  we have a space of possible 
theories as huge –and as hard to define– as the space of all mathematical structures! 
Such theorizing seems to me an interesting intellectual and metaphysical exercise, but 
it has lost touch with physics as a scientific discipline with its empirical desideratum.  
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Let us now outline a few more precise critiques, as Tegmark's extreme views 
constitute a unique opportunity to exercise a critical attitude on many issues. First, as I 
state in Appendix I, I hold a pragmatic, evolutionary constructivist epistemology. It 
took me years to see that constructivists are actually very realist –pun intended. This 
is a major disagreement with Tegmark's view, at the fundamental level of a worldview 
component. Indeed, if we study the history of science, and in particular the history of 
mathematics, the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences” 
(Wigner 1960) which fascinates Tegmark becomes a truism. Of course mathematics is 
effective to describe nature, we construct it for this purpose. 
The process of model construction is easier to see once we start studying other 
sciences. Psychologists, sociologists or businessmen are well aware that their models 
are always false, incomplete and make unrealistic assumptions  (see e.g. the classic 
book by Sterman 2000). They will not hesitate to swap their model for a better one. 
But  such  models,  despite  all  their  limitations,  are  good  only  if  they  can  make 
predictions or help to control the system at hand. 
The situation with mathematics is a bit more complicated, because there are 
two selection mechanisms at play. As in empirical sciences, the first selection is for 
external consistency. We insist that our mathematics to describe the world accurately. 
For  example,  arithmetics must  be respected.  If  you put  2+2 apples in  a  box, you 
expect to have four apples when you will open the box, not three. However, there is 
nothing really obvious in this. As Popper (1962, 211) analyzed, if you replace apples 
with rabbits or drops of water, you might end up having 2+2=5 or 2+2=1. In such 
cases, broader biological and physical models are needed to make reality consistent 
with arithmetic. 
The second selection mechanism in mathematics is for internal consistency. A 
theory which derives a contradiction can derive any proposition (thanks to the “ex 
falso quod libet” logical rule). So a self-contradictory theory is trivial and useless. 
Over  centuries,  mathematics  has  made tremendous  progress  by  using  the  internal 
consistency  criterion  only.  This  is  remarkable,  but  this  obscures  the  fact  that 
mathematics is initially a construction of tools to deal with real world problems. The 
history of mathematics enlighten this situation. Substraction were first invented to 
deal with economical debts, divisions to deal with succession problems in families. 
This connection with real world problems holds not only for basic mathematics. For 
example,  imaginary  numbers  were  first  introduced  to  solve  problems  in  physics. 
Additionally, there is still  a constant interaction between mathematics and physics, 
that we can see more clearly in the field of applied mathematics. 
Importantly,  Tegmark  (2004,  465) takes  Popper's  (2002) criterion  of 
falsifiability in a too liberal way when he writes:
Containing unobservable entities does clearly not per se make theory nontestable. 
For instance, a theory stating that there are 666 parallel universes, all of which are 
devoid of oxygen makes the testable prediction that we should observe no oxygen 
here, and is therefore ruled out by observation.
To which Heller (2009, 89) makes the following caustic comments:
We should realise, however, that not every statement (theory, model, hypothesis) 
the consequences of which may in principle be compared with observational or 
experimental results may be regarded as falsifiable, in the sense normally ascribed 
this concept in the philosophy of science. Taking Tegmark’s style of comparison 
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further, let’s imagine that someone before the age of space flight had claimed that 
the other side of the moon, which is not observable from Earth, is painted red and 
carries the inscription, ‘‘Coke is it!’’ in big white letters. It would definitely have 
been a falsified (and therefore falsifiable) prediction, but it could never be treated 
as a test of whether the hypothesis was scientific or not. It’s true that no theory or 
hypothesis which is not falsifiable even in principle may be regarded as scientific, 
but not all statements which are falsifiable (in the more colloquial sense of the 
word)  may  be  regarded  as  scientific.  The  question  of  criteria  distinguishing 
science from what is not science is a difficult methodological problem. Anyone 
who wants to write on this subject would do well to first look up the copious 
literature devoted to it.
There are many other problems related to  Tegmark's  proposal,  such as the 
unclear  definition  of  mathematical  structures,  problems  related  to  infinities,  to 
uncomputability of mathematical structures, to the inherent untestability of multiverse 
proposals, etc (see also Ćirković 2002 for critics based on physics). As Ellis (2007b, 
401) writes, “claiming existence of something you cannot even properly characterize 
has dubious scientific merit.” We can also object that the first law of thermodynamics 
(see the thermodynamical challenge in section  4.1.3  Thermodynamical, p76) raises 
further problems, as realizing an infinite multiverse would require an infinite amount 
of energy.
However, if we saw that future physics may understand physics parameters in 
terms of a cosmological model, it is unlikely that this would also include the initial 
state of that model. Indeed, if we were to have a theory deciding all values of initial 
state in a cosmological model, it then leads to the idea of a “final theory” or a “theory 
of everything”. Besides the conceptual difficulties and objections we encountered in 
Tegmark's attempt to describe such a TOE, ironically, a TOE is an act of faith and is 
thus similar to the God explanation (e.g. Davies 2008, 170). Smolin (1997, 248) also 
wrote that the “belief in a final theory shares with a belief in a god the idea that the 
ultimate cause of things in this world is something that does not live in the world but 
has  an  existence  that,  somehow,  transcends  it.”  Given our  analysis  of  Chapter  4, 
maybe we should not be so surprised, since both God and a TOE are cognitive points 
attractors. 
5.4  The Computational Universe
The idea that our universe is analogous to a computer is quite popular. We can 
see it as the modern version of a mechanistic worldview, looking at the universe as a 
machine. There are various ways to consider this analogy, with cellular automata, (see 
e.g. Zuse 1970; Wolfram 2002) with quantum computing (e.g. Lloyd 2005), etc. The 
analogy has been pushed so far that  a modern version of idealism has even been 
considered, namely that our universe would actually be run by a computer, and we 
might be living in a computer simulation (e.g. N. Bostrom 2003; Martin 2006). 
We saw that free parameters may ultimately be reduced to initial conditions of 
a cosmological model. Here, I first criticize an argument by Tegmark's claiming that a 
multiverse theory is more economical than a theory of one single universe. Then I 
analyze initial conditions from a computational perspective, and discuss the relation 
between physical laws and initial conditions. This is conducted within the framework 
of Algorithmic Information Theory  (AIT, Chaitin 1974; 1987). I will  conclude by 
pointing out some limitations of this computational analogy.  
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Tegmark has explored and replied to many critiques. A recurring objection 
Tegmark has to address is that multiverse theories are not simple and are ontologically 
wasteful, especially if they suppose the existence of an infinity of different worlds. 
Tegmark  (2004,  489) uses  algorithmic  information  theory  to  argue  precisely  the 
opposite, namely that a multiverse is actually extremely simple. Before seeing how he 
reached this conclusion, and how we can criticize it, let us summarize some basics of 
AIT.
AIT studies complexity measures on strings.  The complexity measure –the 
Kolmogorov complexity6– of an object  is the size of the shortest  program able to 
specify that object. Below is a simple example originally presented in the Wikipedia 
encyclopaedia (2008) :
consider the following two strings of length 64, each containing only lower-case 
letters, numbers, and spaces:
abababababababababababababababababababababababababababababababab
4c1j5b2p0cv4w1 8rx2y39umgw5q85s7ur qbjfdppa0q7nieieqe9noc4cvafzf 
The  first  string  admits  a  short  English  language  description,  namely  “ab  32 
times”, which consists of 11 characters. The second one has no obvious simple 
description (using the same character set) other than writing down the string itself, 
which has 64 characters.
The first string has a low complexity, because the short program “write ab 32 times” 
can generate it,  whereas the second one has a higher complexity because no short 
program can generate it.   
Tegmark  gives  another exemple.  If  we  pick  up  an  arbitrary  integer  n,  its 
algorithmic information content is of order log2n, which is the number of bits needed 
to write it. But “the set of all integers 1, 2, 3, … can be generated by quite a trivial 
computer program, so the algorithmic complexity of the whole set is smaller than that 
of a generic member.” Tegmarks concludes that  an entire ensemble is often simpler 
than one of its members. Tegmark extrapolates this argument to physical theories:
the set of all perfect fluid solutions to the Einstein field equations has a smaller 
algorithmic  complexity  than  a  generic  particular  solution,  since  the  former  is 
specified simply by giving a few equations and the latter requires the specification 
of  vast  amounts  of  initial  data  on  some  hypersurface.  Loosly  speaking,  the 
apparent information content rises when we restrict our attention to one particular 
element in an ensemble, thus losing the symmetry and simplicity that was inherent 
in the totality of all elements taken together. 
He also applies it to multiverse:
In this sense, the higher-level multiverses have less algorithmic complexity. […] a 
multiverse theory is arguably more economical than one endowing only a single 
ensemble element with physical existence.
6 also  known  as  algorithmic  information,  program-size  complexity,  Kolmogorov-complexity, 
descriptive complexity, stochastic complexity, or algorithmic entropy.
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The argument is correct, but is highly biased. Indeed, the Kolmogorov complexity 
measure focuses on the shortest length of the algorithm, but does not take into account 
the computating time. 
Fortunately,  Charles  Bennett  (1988a;  1988b) defined another  metric  called 
logical depth. It is defined as the computing time of the shortest program which can  
generate an object. In the case of integers, it is clear that the time to compute a single 
number would be very short  compared to the infinite time needed to compute all 
natural numbers. Similarly, no doubt that the time necessary to compute blindly the 
multiverse  makes  it  an  enterprise  everything  but  pragmatic,  realizable  and 
economical. 
What is the next best option after  zero  free parameter? It would be a  theory 
with just  one free parameter. Can we imagine such a theory? We could imagine the 
initial  state  of  a  universe contained in a  single parameter indeed.  But  what about 
physical laws which take as input this initial state? 
In the AIT framework, how can we interpret the difference between laws and 
initial  conditions?  Laws represent  information  which  can  be  greatly  shortened by 
algorithmic  compression  (like  the  “ab  32  times”  string  above);  whereas  initial 
conditions represent  information which cannot  be  so compressed (like the second 
string above). If we import this analogy into physics, a physical law is to be likened to 
a simple program able to give a compressed description of some aspects of the world; 
whereas initial conditions are data that we do not know how to compress. 
Can we interpret this distinction between physical laws and initial conditions 
in a cognitive manner? We either express our knowledge in terms of laws if we can 
compress information, and in terms of initial conditions if we cannot. In this view, 
scientific progress allows us to dissolve initial conditions into new theories, by using 
more general and efficient algorithmic compression rules. 
In  fact,  the  distinction  between  laws  and  boundary  conditions  is  fuzzy  in  
cosmology  (Ellis 2007a, sec. 7.1; Heller 2009, 93). One can see boundary conditions 
as  imposing  constraints,  not  only  on  initial  conditions  (lower  boundary  of  the 
domain), but also at the extremes of the domain. Both physical laws and boundary 
conditions play the same role of imposing constraints on the system at hand. Because 
we  can  not  re-run  the  tape  of  the  universe,  it  is  difficult  –if  not  impossible–  to 
distinguish  the  two.  In  this  view,  some  laws  of  physics  might  be  interpreted  as 
regularities of interactions progressively emerging out of a more chaotic state. The 
cooling down of the universe would progressively give rise to more stable dynamical 
systems, which then can be described by simple mathematical equations that we call 
physical laws. 
A similar situation occurs in computer science. One can distinguish between a 
program, which is a set of instructions, and the data on which the program operates. 
The program is analogous to physical laws, and the data to initial conditions. This 
distinction in computer science can be blurred, when considering a self-modifying 
program, i.e. a program which modifies itself. Also, at a lower level, both the program 
and the data are processed in the form of bits, and here also the distinction is blurred. 
In mathematics, Gödel's limitation theorems state that in any sufficiently rich 
logical system, there will remain undecidable propositions  in that system. But using 
another stronger system, one can decide such previously “undecidable” propositions 
(even  if  new  undecidable  propositions  will  arise  in  the  stronger  system...).  For 
example,  the  consistency  of  Peano's  arithmetic  cannot  be  shown to  be  consistent 
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within arithmetic, but can be shown to be consistent relative to modern set theory (in 
the axiomatization of Zermel-Fraenkel and the axiom of choice). 
There is a theorem similar to Gödel's incompleteness in AIT. Informally, it 
states that a computational system cannot compress structure in a system that is more 
algorithmically complex than this computational system. Let us assume again that 
physical  laws  represent  compressible  information,  and  initial  conditions 
incompressible  information.  Are  initial  conditions  in  cosmological  models 
algorithmically incompressible? There are two ways to answer this question. 
First, we can interpret this incompressible data in an absolute way. This data is 
then  “lawless,  unstructured,  patternless,  not  amenable  to  scientific  study, 
incompressible”  (Chaitin  2006,  64).  Suggesting  that  those  initial  conditions  are 
incompressible  implicitly  implies  that  we,  poor  humans,  will  never  be  able  to 
understand them. This attitude freezes scientific endeavor and thus has to be rejected. 
Limitation theorems are  only valid  within formal  systems,  because one needs the 
system to be completely formalized and specific  formal tools to be able to prove 
them. Therefore, we should be extremely careful when exporting  limitation theorems 
into other less formalized domains. Moreover, the history of science has shown that it 
is hazardous to fix boundaries on human understanding. Let us take the example of 
infinity, which was for many centuries thought to be understandable only by a God 
who is infinite, and not by finite humans. A rigorous theory of infinite numbers which 
constitutes the foundations of modern mathematics has finally been proposed by the 
mathematician Georg Cantor. Therefore, boundaries are likely to be broken. We will 
see  in  Chapters  6 and  7 how  the  multiverse  hypothesis or  computer universe 
simulations bring us beyond the apparently incompressible initial conditions. 
The second option is that incompressible information may reflect the limits of 
our  theoretical  models.  If  we  are  not  able  to  account  for  the  reasons  of  initial 
conditions, it is a hint that we need a broader theoretical framework to understand 
them. This situation can be illustrated by considering the problem of the origin of life. 
In this context, initial conditions for life to emerge are generally assumed without 
justification: chemical elements are assumed to be here, along with an Earth with 
water,  neither too far nor too near from the Sun, etc.  With these hypotheses (and 
others), we try to explain the origin of life. Now, what if we try to explain the origin 
of these initial suitable conditions for life? We then need a broader theory, which in 
this case is a theory of cosmic evolution. If we then aim to explain initial conditions in 
cosmology, we are back to the problem of free parameters. 
Multiverse models such as Tegmark's are precisely attempting to introduce a 
broader theory to explain or dissipate initial conditions, by proposing the existence of 
various other possible universes. The problem is that the multiverse hypothesis is a 
metaphysical assumption. George Ellis (2007b, 400) expressed it well:
There can be no direct evidence for the existence of other universes in a true 
multiverse, as there is no possibility of even an indirect causal connection. The 
universes are completely disjoint and nothing that happens in one can affect what 
happens in another.  Since there can be no direct or indirect evidence for such 
systems,  what  weight  does  the  claim  for  their  existence  carry?  
Experimental or observational testing requires some kind of  causal connection 
between an object and an experimental apparatus, so that some characteristic of 
the object affects the output of the apparatus. But in a true multiverse, this is not 
possible. No scientific apparatus in one universe can be affected in any way by 
any object in another universe. The implication is that the supposed existence of 
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true multiverses can only be a metaphysical assumption. It cannot be a part of 
science, because science involves experimental or observational tests to enable 
correction of wrong theories. However, no such tests are possible here because 
there is no relevant causal link.
To improve testability, Ellis further suggests examining a variation on the causally 
disconnected  universes,  considering  multi-domain  universes  that  are  not  causally 
disconnected (Level I parallel universes in Tegmark's terminology). Still, I would like 
to emphasize the philosophical importance of the multiverse hypothesis, because it is 
a logically consistent way to tackle the free parameters problem. How can we theorize 
more systematically about “other possible universes”? We will analyze this problem 
in Chapter 6.  
In  summary,  if  we  assume  that  initial  conditions  are  analogous  to 
incompressible information, then there are two possible reactions. Either we claim 
that we reached the limit of scientific understanding; or we recognize that we need an 
extended  framework.  Multiverse  and,  as  we  shall  see  in  Chapter  6,  computer 
simulations of other possible universes are examples of such extended frameworks. 
Let us now see some limits of this computational analogy. If we apply our 
insights about analogical reasoning, we can ask “what is disanalogous between the 
functioning of  our  universe  and  that  of  a  computer?”.  We can at  least  make  the 
following restrictions. In a computational paradigm, space and time are assumed to be 
independent, and non-relativistic.  Most of the well studied cellular automata even use 
only  two  spatial  dimensions,  which  is  of  course  a  limitation  for  complexity  to 
develop. 
A  fundamental  difference  between  a  physical  and  an  informational-
computational paradigm is that the former has at its core  conservation laws such as 
the conservation of energy, where the total amount of energy remains unchanged in 
the  various  transformations  of  the  system.  By  contrast,  the  bits  manipulated  by 
computers  are  largely not  subjected  to  such conservation  laws,  even if  running a 
computer has an energetic cost  (Bremermann 1982). We neither create nor destroy 
energy, whereas we easily create and delete files in our computers. 
Another  limitation of  this  computational  paradigm, which is  similar  to  the 
Newtonian paradigm, is that when we have initial conditions and a set of rules or 
laws,  then  the  evolution  of  the  system  is  trivial  and  predictable:  it  is  just  an 
application of rules/laws to the initial conditions. We have understood nature, end of 
story.
The  complexity  of  interactions  such  as  synergies,  feed-back  loops,  chaos, 
random errors, developmental processes, etc. is not in the focus of this approach.  The 
biological analogy is more appropriate in exploring those complexities. Embryologists 
know that  the  formation  of  a  fetus  is  a  process  of  an  incredible  and  fascinating 
complexity,  leading  from  one  single  cell  to  the  complexity  of  a  billions-cells 
organism. The development of the individual is certainly not as easy to predict from 
the genome to the phenotype as was the case with the computational paradigm: we 
just needed the initial conditions and a set of rules to understand the dynamic. By 
contrast, in biology, phenomena of phenotypic plasticity have been identified, i.e. the 
acknowledgement  that  phenotypes are not  uniquely determined by their  genotype. 
This becomes particularly clear when considering genetically identical twins. They 
exhibit  many identical  features,  but  also a unique differentiation due to stochastic 
processes  occurring  during  the  development.  As  Martin  Rees  (1999,  21) noticed, 
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cosmology deals with the inanimate world, which is in fact simpler than the realm of 
biology. A phenomenon is difficult to understand because it is complex, not because it 
has a huge extension.
5.5  The Biological Universe
In  2007,  John  M.  Smart  and  I  entered  in  contact  discussing  issues  about 
universal  change  and  broad  cosmological  and  futuristic  views.  We  noticed  that 
scholars studying the cosmos where mainly into theoretical physics. It is of course an 
indispensable approach, but it does not strongly connects with life, intelligence and 
technology. Yet, we were also aware of dispersed insights in cosmology, theoretical 
and evolutionary developmental (evo-devo) biology and complexity sciences, which 
are providing ways to understand our universe within a broader framework.
We  thought  that  these  results  and  hypotheses  deserved  to  be  explored, 
criticized,  and  analyzed  by  an  international  interdisciplinary  research  community 
which we set up in 2008: ‘Evo Devo Universe (EDU)’. Such a framework promises 
to  advance  our  understanding  of  both  unpredictable  “evolutionary”  processes  and 
predictable  “developmental”  processes  at  all  scales,  including  the  human  scale.  I 
welcome any researcher interested in these topics to join the research community!
I was surprised and delighted that cosmologist George Ellis (2007a, 1266) had 
very similar vision when he wrote:
Thesis H4: The underlying physics paradigm of cosmology could be extended to 
include  biological  insights.  The  dominant  paradigm  in  cosmology  is  that  of 
theoretical  physics.  It  may be  that  it  will  attain  deeper  explanatory power  by 
embracing biological insights, and specifically that of Darwinian evolution.
I wish to clarify that the expression “evo devo universe” does not imply that 
we naively see the universe as a living system. It is more an invitation to consider the 
general mechanisms of biological processes (especially evolution and development) at 
universal scales. As we saw in section (5.1  Analogical Reasoning in Science, p87) 
analogies are never proofs, they mainly provide valuable heuristics to formulate new 
hypotheses and theories. 
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Figure 4: The First International Conference on the Evolution and 
Development of the Universe,  8-9 October 2008, Paris, France
John Smart and I first started to work actively on building the EDU website in 
20087. However, we understood that having a website and a virtual community was 
not enough. To effectively collaborate, human beings still need to meet in flesh. We 
thus focused our energy into setting up “The First International Conference on the 
Evolution and Development of the Universe”, which was held at the École Normale 
Supérieure, Paris, 8-9 October 20088 (see photo above). I edited the proceedings of 
the conference which were published as a special issue of the journal Foundations of  
Science,  containing  12  peer-reviewed  papers  and  20  open  commentaries  and 
responses (Vidal et al. 2009).
Story 5: The Evo Devo Universe community.
The idea that our universe is similar to an organism has a rich and long story, 
which is still very inspiring. It can be traced back to the Ancient Greece (see Barrow 
and Tipler 1986 for historical aspects). One general aim of the “Evo Devo Universe” 
research  community  is  to  explore  how traditional  cosmology can  be  enriched  by 
introducing a biological paradigm, as suggested by George Ellis (2007a, Thesis H4). 
More specifically, the field of evolutionary developmental (“evo-devo”) biology (e.g. 
Carroll  2005) provides  a  great  source  of  inspiration,  acknowledging  both  the 
contingency  of  evolutionary  processes  and  the  statistically  predictable  aspect  of 
developmental processes.
A useful biological analogy to study the origin of the universe is to examine 
other origins, such as the origin of life. For example, biologists think it is unlikely that 
there has always been a single genetic code when life started. Rather, it is more likely 
that many genetic codes competed, maybe for millions of years, and the one we know 
outcompeted other codes. We have the impression to deal with a universal biological 
code, but it is probably just a selection effect, since other codes could have been as 
efficient.  Could a similar mechanism have appeared at  the origin of the universe? 
Could “universal”  physical  laws,  initial  conditions and free parameters  have been 
selected by a yet unknown process? 
In Chapter 8 I will describe two scenarios to analyze initial conditions and free 
cosmic parameters with a biological and evolutionary approach. The first model was 
proposed by Lee Smolin (1992) and is called “Cosmological Natural Selection”; the 
second was introduced by many authors,  and I  named it  “Cosmological  Artificial 
Selection”.
Even if Tegmark's model proves to be right in the future, our current physical 
and cosmological models need filling-in with free parameters. But  filling-in doesn't 
imply fine-tuning. Although this distinction between free parameters and fine-tuning 
was not clear in (Vidal 2010a), it has few consequences for the general reasoning of 
that  paper,  because  as  we  reduce  free  parameters  we  also  reduce  fine-tuning 
arguments associated with these parameters.
7  http://www.evodevouniverse.com
8  EDU 2008, http://evodevouniverse.com/wiki/Conference_2008 
103
CHAPTER 6 -  The Fine-Tuning Conjecture
Abstract: The aim of this Chapter is to propose a scientific approach to find out 
whether our universe is fine-tuned or not. The first difficulty is to define fine-
tuning, which requires three steps. First, to debunk common and uncommon fine-
tuning fallacies which constantly sneak into the debate (section 6.1 ). Second, to 
distinguish  fine-tuning  from  the  closely  related  issues  of  free  parameters, 
metaphysical  issues,  anthropic  principles,  observational  selection  effects, 
teleology and  God's  existence (section  6.2  ).  Third,  to  provide  a  fallacy-proof 
definition of fine-tuning (section 6.3 ). We advocate that computer simulations are 
needed  to  address  two  key  cosmological  issues.  First,  the  robustness  of  the 
emergence of complexity, which boils down to ask: “what would remain the same 
if the tape of the universe were replayed?” Second, the fine-tuning issue, which 
requires to answer the question: “are complex universes rare or common in the 
space of possible universes?” We first discuss definitions of possible universes 
and of possible cosmic outcomes – such as atoms, stars, life or intelligence. This 
leads us to introduce a  generalized Drake-like equation, the  Cosmic Evolution 
Equation. It is a modular and conceptual framework to define research agendas in 
computational  cosmology.  We  outline  some  studies  of  alternative  complex 
universes.  Such  studies  are  still  in  their  infancy,  and  they  can  be  fruitfully 
developed  within  a  new  research  field  supported  by  computer  simulations, 
artificial cosmogenesis. Thanks to those new conceptual distinctions, I critically 
outline classical explanations of fine-tuning: skepticism, necessity, fecundity, God-
of-the-gaps, chance-of-the-gaps, WAP-of-the-gaps, multiverse and design (section 
6.4 ). Chapter 7 will further support the importance of artificial cosmogenesis by 
extrapolating the future of scientific simulations, while Chapter  8 will examine 
two additional evolutionary approaches to fine-tuning.
We do not have any good way of estimating how improbable it is that the  
constants of nature should take values that are favorable for intelligent life.
Weinberg (1993a, 221)
The fascination for  harmony in Nature can be traced back to the dawn of 
civilizations.  Such  harmony  has  been  most  studied  in  natural  theology,  whose 
objective  is  to  look  for  design  in  nature  to  infer  the  existence  of  a  creator.  For 
example, we can marvel at a proboscis of a butterfly, perfectly adapted or fine-tuned 
to eat pollen in flowers.  The Earl of Bridgewater, a naturalist who truly loved the 
natural world –as his organization of diner parties for dogs can attest– commissioned 
eight  famous  Bridgewater Treatises.  They were  first  published between 1833 and 
1840 and intended to explore the goodness of God's creation in the natural world. For 
example, one treatise by Sir Charles Bell is dedicated to The hand, its Mechanism and 
Vital Endowments as evincing Design.
It is somehow surprising to see efforts to prove God's existence from the order 
in nature at this period, since Immanuel Kant's  (1781) Critique of Pure Reason had 
famously refuted such proofs.  He called such kind of  proofs  physical-theological, 
because they start from the physical order of the world, to infer the existence of a 
104
creator.  It  is  however  worth  mentioning  that  Kant  (1781,  A627/B655) hold  most 
respect for this proof, and made a subtle remark concerning its power:
This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an architect of the  
world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the material with which he 
works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all things are subject.
This distinction between architect and creator is important and we will go back to it 
in Chapter  8. Today, thanks to modern evolutionary biology, we know such design 
arguments  are  wrong.  When something  seems fine-tuned,  it  surprises  the  curious 
scientist, and requires an explanation. The moral of the story is that when some fine-
tuning  is  discovered,  the  scientific  attitude  is  to  invent  mechanisms and  to  build 
theories explaining how it emerged.
The scientific elucidation of whether there is a cosmic design for life is more 
recent.  It  is  generally  traced  back  to  Henderson's  (1913) The  Fitness  of  the  
Environment which points to the particular chemical properties of water for biology to 
work.  Interestingly, he emphasizes the importance to study not only the fitness of 
organisms,  like in Darwinian evolution, but also at the fitness of the  environment. 
Indeed, both do co-evolve,  and, as Francis Heylighen  (private communication and 
2007) has argued, the mechanism of stigmergy can be seen as the logical counterpart 
of natural selection (see table 4).
Natural Selection Stigmergy
Variation Organism Environment
Selection Environment Organism
Table 4: Natural selection and stigmergy as two fundamental evolutionary processes.
In natural selection, the variation occurs at the level of the organism (e.g. genetic mutations), and its 
fitness is measured against a selection from the environment. By contrast, in stigmergy the environment 
varies, in the sense that each organism (e.g. ant, termite, etc.) will encounter different stimuli triggering 
them to perform different actions. In sum, the organism selects the action to perform, and the 
environment provides variation.
 
Let us start with a general definition of fine-tuning in cosmology proposed by 
Ellis (2007b, 388):
if  any of  a  number of  parameters  which characterize the observed universe – 
including  both  fundamental  constants  and  initial  conditions  –  were  slightly 
different, no complexity of any sort would come into existence and hence no life 
would appear and no Darwinian evolution would take place.
However, the issue of fine-tuning in cosmology is so highly loaded, that it is 
worth  first  examining  fine-tuning  examples  in  non  cosmological  contexts.  Let  us 
switch on a good old radio tuner such as the one in Figure 5.
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To pick up a radio channel, you need to move the button in a delicate manner. There is 
just one parameter to vary between lower and higher radio frequencies (e.g. for FM 
Very High Frequencies, the signal varies from 30 MHz to 300 MHz). Let us suppose 
that your reception is of poor quality despite all your efforts to fine-tune the position 
of the button. What can you do? There are other parameters that you can try to vary in 
order to obtain the best possible reception. For example, you can move the antenna to 
improve the reception. Or maybe there are some interferences of your radio tuner with 
other electronic devices; so you might try to move your radio tuner in another room. 
Or you might also buy and install a roof antenna, which should bring you an even 
better reception.  Such solutions to improve the reception were not obvious if  you 
limited your attention to the only parameter of the radio tuner itself. This can illustrate 
the difficulty  to  capture all  relevant  parameters  involved in  a  phenomenon which 
needs fine-tuning.
In  engineering,  one  can  fine-tune  a  system by  trial-and-error  or  by  using 
optimization methods. When one needs to adjust, 1, 2, 3, ...,  n parameters the state 
space quickly becomes enormous to explore. Analytical solutions from mathematical 
equations  become  impractical,  and  this  is  where  we  need  computer  simulations 
(Sterman 2000, 37–39).
There are many natural ways which can lead to fine-tuned systems. In biology, 
organisms adapt and seek adaptation to their environment, for example as they look 
for a place which is neither too hot nor too cold, with food in the surroundings, etc. 
After some time, there is the phenomenon of niche construction. The logic is reversed 
since that time it is the organism which changes the environment in order to survive. 
For example, Inuits build igloos to be –relatively– at warmth.  
Is the universe fine-tuned? The idea of fine-tuning is highly controversial. The 
large literature shows a wide diversity of diverging positions about fine-tuning. The 
issue  stems  from physics,  but  is  often  motivated  by  philosophical  or  theological 
agendas.  We can find  skeptics  who insist  that  fine-tuning is  impossible  to  define 
rigorously,  physicists  who  either  maintain  that  it  is  a  central  issue  in  theoretical 
physics, or that there is no need for fine-tuning, while natural theologians use fine-
tuning arguments to prove the existence of God.
The difficulties are multiple because the precise formulation of the argument 
requires understanding of physics, cosmology, probability theory, dynamical systems 
theory, parameter sensitivity and philosophy.
Furthermore,  fine-tuning  is  often  mixed  with  related  issues  such  as 
observation  selection  effects,  teleology,  anthropic  principles  and  reasonings, 
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Figure 5: An analog radio tuner. 
To find a radio station, you need to adjust one parameter, with the round button on the right.
metaphysical  and  theological  issues.  It  is  also  a  confusing  domain  because  the 
question  “fine-tuning  for  what?” is  answered  differently  by  different  authors  and 
approaches.  The  fine-tuning  field  is  an  intellectual  minefield.  I  rarely  encounter 
authors  who  do  not  commit  a  fine-tuning fallacy  –I  also  was  guilty  of  one  in  a 
previous paper. How can we define fine-tuning? How can we scientifically progress 
on this issue?
Our aim is to propose a scientific approach to find out whether our universe is 
fine-tuned or not. But the first difficulty is to define fine-tuning, which requires three 
steps. First, to debunk common and uncommon fine-tuning fallacies which constantly 
sneak into the debate (section 6.1 Fine-Tuning Fallacies, p107). The second step is to 
distinguish fine-tuning from closely related issues (section 6.2 Fine-Tuning and Other
Issues, p115). Third, to provide a fallacy-proof definition of fine-tuning (section 6.3 
The Cosmic Evolution Equation, p122). Inspired by Drake's equation in the Search 
for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI), I present the Cosmic Evolution Equation as a 
skeleton to answer the question “fine-tuning for what?”. This equation defines cosmic 
outcomes which can be used to generate different definitions of fine-tuning. 
Thanks  to  those  new  conceptual  distinctions,  I  critically  review  classical 
explanations of fine-tuning (section  6.4  Classical  Fine-tuning Explanations,  p144). 
Later in Chapter 7 I show how studying possible universes with computer simulations 
could  guide  the  future  of  humanity.  I  will  then  examine  two  broad  evolutionary 
approaches to fine-tuning: cosmological natural selection and cosmological artificial 
selection (Chapter 8).
6.1  Fine-Tuning Fallacies
On June 25th 2009, Victor Stenger kindly agreed to give a seminar about fine-
tuning in our Evolution, Complexity and Cognition (ECCO) research group. Stenger's 
intellectual  niche  resides  in  skeptical  inquiry,  where  he  successfully  debunks 
pseudoscience  and religious arguments  which use  modern  physics  wrongly.   This 
includes centrally fine-tuning arguments in cosmology.
Before meeting him, I had expected a close-minded atheist. I was dead wrong. 
Victor Stenger is not only a very nice person to talk with, truly open minded, but also 
an outstanding scientific popularizer and scientist. He is able to explain difficult and 
advanced  scientific  theories  and  concepts  in  a  simple  way,  which  I  consider  the 
hallmark of a bright mind.
Since I was both impressed and convinced by his debunking of fine-tuning 
arguments, I emailed him later to let him know that I was writing a paper about fine-
tuning in which I wanted to include his important insights. He replied that he was just 
about  to  finish  a  book  entitled  The  Fallacy  of  Fine-Tuning!  We  then  pursued 
interesting discussions about a draft of this book and I tried in this chapter to take into 
account its lessons. I  now consider Stenger's (2011) book an essential  reading for 
anyone working on fine-tuning. 
Story 6: Victor Stenger in Brussels
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Victor Stenger is an atypical physicist. As an atheist, he has committed himself 
to seriously examine proofs of God's existence provided by natural theologians. Over 
the years,  he has fine-tuned his arguments against  fine-tuning,  and concludes that 
fine-tuning  arguments  are  unconclusive.  Unfortunately,  such  fallacies  are  also 
sometimes  committed  by  otherwise  very  respected  and  respectable  scientists. 
Stenger's books are widely accessible, educational and with a scientific content using 
only mainstream science. In this section, I will include some of Stenger's (2011) most 
important arguments.
Let  us  first  make  the  logical  structure  of  the  fine-tuning  argument more 
precise (inspired by Colyvan, Garfield, and Priest 2005):
1. Models of our universe display parameter sensitivity for some cosmic outcome O, when 
varying one parameter at a time.
2. Our universe displays cosmic outcome O.
3. Outcome O is improbable.
4. Our universe is fine-tuned to produce outcome O.
Before getting our hands dirty in the fine-tuning machinery, let us make some 
general  comments.  Propositions (1) and (2) can be verified for many physics and 
cosmic parameters. By cosmic outcome I mean a milestone in cosmic evolution, such 
as the emergence of stable atoms, stars, galaxies, planets, life or consciousness. I will 
be more specific about cosmic outcomes (in section 6.3.2 Possible Cosmic Outcomes, 
p124). The inference from (1) and (2) to (3) is not conclusive. Indeed, we need many 
more assumptions to make probability claims. Proposition (3) is very questionable 
because it is hard if not impossible to define and quantify this purported improbability 
(see next subsection 6.1.1 Probabilistic Fallacies, p109). For example, proposition (1) 
explicitly  acknowledges  that  we  vary  one  parameter  at  a  time.  Is  it  serious 
scientifically?  What  happens  if  we  vary  more,  ideally  all  free  parameters  of  our 
models? Would outcome O still remain improbable?
If we grant proposition (3), the inference from (3) to (4) is still incorrect. We 
would have proven that our universe is parameter sensitive, which is not the same as 
proving that our universe is fine-tuned. As we will see, a proof of fine-tuning requires 
that  this  improbability  is  shown  within  a  wide  space  of  possible  universes. 
Furthermore,  it  is  easy  to  misinterpret  improbabilities.  For  example,  the  odds  of 
having a particular hand of cards in the game of bridge is roughly one to 600 billion. 
Can we conclude from this high improbability that our hand was not randomly dealt?
These four steps then can branch into two different arguments, either towards 
a theological fine-tuning argument: 
5.1 The best explanation for this improbable fact is that the universe was created by some 
intelligence.
6.1 A universe-creating intelligence exists
Or towards a multiverse fine-tuning argument:
5.2 The best explanation for this improbable fact is that our universe is one in a much greater 
multiverse
6.2 A multiverse exists
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Further inferences from (4) to (5.1 or 5.2) and from (5.1) to (6.1) or from (5.2) to (6.2) 
are speculations. We will see other explanatory mechanisms other than (5.1) and (5.2) 
(see section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144 and Chapter 8). Regarding 
propositions (5.1) or (5.2), we can ask: what makes creation by some intelligence or 
the existence of a multiverse “the best explanation”? According to which criteria? In 
propositions (6.1) or (6.2), the issue becomes philosophical: what are our criteria to 
state that something “exists”? Is it because something is the best known explanation 
that it necessarily exists?
6.1.1  Probabilistic Fallacies
Probabilistic fallacies in fine-tuning discussions lie in the lack of precise and 
sound mathematical definition of proposition (3). The difficulties are multiple. First 
because  it  is  problematic  to  apply  probabilities  to  a  unique  object,  our  universe; 
second,  because  we  must  decide  the  probability  distribution  of  “interesting” 
universes;  third  because  we  must  choose  a  variation  range  allowed  for  each 
parameter; fourth, because we must know how to deal with infinities; fifth because we 
must choose the resolution at which the parameter is allowed to vary and thereby 
addressing the coarse-tuning argument.  Let us further examine these issues.
The first problem is that, as far as we know, our universe is unique. Obviously, 
speaking about the probability of a single object is problematic.  How can we define 
the probability of the universe? As Ellis (2007a, 1218) wrote:  
Thesis  A4:  The  concept  of  probability  is  problematic  in  the  context  of 
existence of only one object. Problems arise in applying the idea of probability  
to cosmology as a whole — it  is not clear that this makes much sense in the  
context of the existence of a single object which cannot be compared with any  
other existing object.
If  we  want  to  assign  probabilities  to  our  universe,  we  thus  need  to  assume  a 
multiverse,  virtual or real,  so  we  can  compare  our  universe  to  others.  We  thus 
implicitly assume in fine-tuning arguments that our universe's parameters could have 
been different. Otherwise, the probability of our universe would just be one, and there 
would be no need for fine-tuning. This is the necessity explanation we summarize in 
section 6.4.2 Necessity, p145.
Colyvan, Garfield and Priest  (2005) did make an important skeptical critique 
on the use of probabilities in fine-tuning arguments. We now summarize some of their 
most  salient  insights.  Let  us  assume  our  universe's  parameters  could  have  been 
different. Which modality do we mean when we ask “parameters  could have been 
different?” There are two main options:  logical possibility or  physical possibility. In 
this section, we focus on the logical possibility. It is more general than the physical 
possibility we will discuss (in the next section 6.1.2 Physical Fallacies, p111) which is 
restricted by various physics consideration such as other parameters, physical laws or 
initial conditions.
If we want to assign probabilities, we need a set on which to assign them. This 
set  can  be  either  continuous  or  discrete.  The  ideal  analog  radio  tuner gives  the 
intuition of a continuous set. A digital radio tuner where you can increase frequencies 
by steps of 0.5Mhz illustrates the discrete case, as in Figure 6.
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If the set is finite, then it is easy to use probabilities. With our digital radio 
tuner,  there are on the FM band 540 possible frequencies you can try from 30 to 
300Mhz. If you assume you live in a busy city where there is a radio station at every 
0.5Mhz, then you have one chance in 540 to have your digital radio tuner tuned on 
your favorite station as you unpack it. Of course, in a more realist picture, there is no 
radio station at every half megahertz. How can we estimate in a rigorous way the 
probability to have a radio station at a particular frequency? We need to know the 
probability distribution of having a radio station at a certain frequency. How can we 
know this distribution  a priori? There is no obvious way to answer or tackle this 
problem, neither for radio stations nor for universes. 
An additional difficulty in the case of the universe is that there is no obvious 
well defined range to vary the parameter, as there is for the FM band, which is from 
30  to  300Mhz.  Without  additional  constraints,  following  Laplace's  “principle  of 
indifference”, we must allow each physics and cosmic parameter to vary from - ∞ to + 
∞.  
Let us now imagine that you have bought an ideal analog radio tuner which is 
so sensitive that you can pick an infinite number of radio frequencies. There are two 
possibilities, either your radio tuner is “rationally sensitive”, or “really sensitive”. In 
the first case, the set is  dense like an interval in the set of rational numbers; in the 
second case, the set is continuous like an interval in the set of real numbers. Both sets 
are  infinite,  but  involve  different  mathematical  treatments,  the  one  with  discrete 
probability  tools,  the  other  with  continuous  ones.  In  probability  theory,  one 
distinguishes  on  the  one  hand  discrete  variables which  have  either  a  finite  or 
countably infinite number of possible values, from continuous variables which have 
an uncountably infinite number of possible values. 
Here we face an ontological problem. Should we use discrete or continuous 
variables?  Even  with  the  analog  radio  tuner,  we  could  argue  that  the  number  of 
possible  frequencies  is  either  huge  but  finite,  countably  infinite  or  uncountably 
infinite. Each option involves a different ontological position regarding the nature of 
the “real” world. A pragmatic approach is simply not to worry too much about this, 
and proceed with the mathematical tools which best help us to solve our problem. 
Let  us  assume  a  continuous  variable.  The  intuitive  idea  of  fine-tuning, 
Colyvan, Garfield and Priest (2005) argue, is the following. Some physical constant k 
must take a value in a very narrow range in order to a cosmic outcome to evolve. 
They write:
Let us suppose that the constant in question has to lie between the values  ν −  δ 
and ν +  ε. (Where  ν is the actual value of  k and δ and ε are small, positive real 
numbers.)  The  intuitive  idea  is  that  the  interval  [ν −  δ, ν +  ε]  is  very  small 
compared to all the logically possible values k might have taken (i.e., the whole 
real line), and since there is no explanation of why k = ν and not any other value, 
all possible values of k should be considered equally likely. Thus, the probability 
of k taking a value in [ν − δ, ν + ε] is also very small. That’s the intuitive idea, but 
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Figure 6: A digital radio tuner.
the  problem is  that  it’s  not  at  all  clear  how this  naïve  intuition  can be  made 
rigorous.
In an attempt to clarify this intuition, they continue:
One way to try to cash out this intuition is to compare the number of values that k 
can take in [ν − δ, ν + ε] to the all possible values it could take in the real line. But 
in each case there are values so the relevant probability would appear to be one. 
That, however, is misguided. We are not interested in the number of values k 
could take but rather the measure of the sets in question. Employing any standard 
measure (such as Lebesgue measure) will, as the fine tuning argument proponent 
suggests, indeed yield a very low probability for k  [∈ ν − δ, ν + ε]. The problem 
for the proponent of the fine tuning argument, however is that the probability is 
too low! Such measures will yield a finite value for the interval [ν − δ, ν + ε] and 
an infinite value for the whole real line. The resulting probability for k  [∈ ν − δ, ν 
+ ε] is zero (or infinitesimal if you prefer a non-standard analysis take on this). 
What is more, the probability that k takes a value in any finite interval will be the 
same – even those we intuitively think of as being extremely large. So, for 
example, the probability of k  [ν − 10∈
1010
 , ν + 10
1010
] is also zero (or 
infinitesimal).
In  summary,  the  probability  to  have  a  certain  value  of  a  parameter  in  any  finite 
interval is 0! Colyvan Garfield and Priest show that this constitutes a serious obstacle 
to rigorously argue that a parameter's particular value is improbable. The last remark 
also  shows  the  importance  to  consider  the  resolution  at  which  we  consider  the 
parameter's variation. This issue is often refereed to as the  coarse tuning argument, 
because it is unclear what constitutes a “fine” or “coarse” interval. Consequently, the 
fine-tuning argument works as well –or as badly– as the coarse-tuning argument (see 
McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001; see also Manson 2000)! 
In conclusion, the statement “outcome O in cosmic evolution is improbable” 
does  not  follow  from  existing  fine-tuning  arguments.  Showing  precisely  and 
rigorously the improbability of a particular outcome is a difficult task.
6.1.2  Physical Fallacies
We  just  outlined  fundamental  probabilistic  difficulties  in  formulating  a 
rigorous quantitative fine-tuning argument. A natural way to overcome those issues is 
to take into account not only logical, mathematical and probabilistic considerations, 
but also physical and cosmological ones. 
However there are even more fallacies lurking as we tackle the fine-tuning 
issue armed with physics and cosmology. I refer the reader to Stenger's (2011) book-
length  detailed  debunking  of  fine-tuning  claims  such  as  the  ratio  of  electrons  to 
protons;  the  ratio  of  electromagnetic  force  to  gravity;  the  expansion  rate  of  the 
universe;  the  mass  density  of  the  universe;  the  cosmological  constant;  the  Hoyle 
prediction or the relative masses of elementary particles. However, Stenger's book 
was  recently  criticized  by  an  extensive  review on  the  fine-tuning  issue  by  Luke 
Barnes  (2012). Indeed, scientists do not agree on specific instances of fine-tuning. 
And the debate has no reason to stop, as Stenger's (2012) reply to Barnes can attest. 
Let us debunk some general sources of fine-tuning fallacies: the dimensional 
constants variation; the inconstant coupling constants; the free parameters capture; the 
variation of only one parameter and the one-factor-at-a-time paradox.    
111
We already saw (in section 5.2 The Physical Universe, p89) that it only makes 
sense to vary dimensionless constants, and not dimensional ones like  c, G or h (see 
also Stenger 2011, 59–62). Again, these are arbitrary constants useful to establish a 
system of units. The only meaningful parameters to vary are dimensionless ratios. 
We also mentioned (section  5.2 The Physical  Universe,  p89) that  coupling 
constants  are  defined at  a  certain level  of  energy,  and change at  different  energy 
levels. For example, the weak nuclear force αW drastically varies from ~ 3x10-12 at low 
energy (1 Gev) to ~ 3x10-2 at high energy (100 Gev) (Demaret and Lambert 1994, 4). 
Without this energetic consideration, it doesn't make sense to speak about a variation 
of  coupling  constants,  which,  contrary  to  their  misleading  name,  are  not  always 
constant. 
Another fine-tuning fallacy is to ignore the phenomenon of  free parameters 
capture. It comes from overlooking readily available explanations in current physical 
and  cosmological  models.  We  already  saw  that  the  value  of  the  (reduced) 
cosmological constant can be predicted in the framework of scale relativity (see story 
4, p93).  Since its value is constrained and predicted by theory,  to speak of a free 
possible  variation  of  it  is  precipitous.  Victor  Stenger  refutes  similarly  other  fine-
tuning arguments, by taking seriously inflation theory. For example, the mass density 
of the universe is sometimes considered fine-tuned. If it were larger, the stars would 
burn too rapidly; and it if were smaller, too few heavy elements would form. But it is 
a prediction of inflationary theory that it should have its particular value.
Importantly,  the  point  here  is  independent  of  whether  scale  relativity  or 
inflation theory is true. It is just that if we want to speak meaningfully about fine-
tuning of the cosmological constant or the mass density of the universe, or any other 
parameter, we can't simply ignore existing models predicting their values. 
Fine-tuning  arguments  vary  just  one  parameter,  a  fallacy  which  is  nearly 
always committed. The underlying assumption is that parameters are independent. As 
Stenger (2011, 70) writes: 
This is both dubious and scientifically shoddy. As we will see in several specific 
cases, changing one or more other parameters can often compensate for the one 
that is changed. There usually is a significant region of parameter space around 
which the point representing a given universe can be moved and still have some 
form of life possible.
It  is both the most common and the most serious fallacy. If the history of physics 
taught  us  something  is  that  phenomena  which  where  thought  to  be  widely 
independent, turn out to have common underlying causes and principles. For example, 
our common sense fails to see a connection between the fall of an apple and the tides; 
magnetism and electricity; and even less between space, time and the speed of light. 
But all these phenomena have been unified thanks to physical theories. 
Additionally,  varying  several  parameters  without  care  can  lead  to  what  is 
known as the one-factor-at-a-time paradox in sensitivity analysis. The problem with 
the one-factor-at-a-time (OAT) method is that it is non-explorative. Let us see why. At 
first sight,  the method of OAT seems logical and rigorous, since it varies factors one-
at-a-time while keeping the others constant. It seems consistent because the output 
from a change can be attributed unambiguously to the change of one factor. It also 
never  detects  non-influential  factors  as  relevant.  However,  by  construction,  this 
method  is non-explorative, with exploration decreasing rapidly with the number of 
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factors.  For  a  simple  example,  consider  Figure  7,  which  shows clearly  that  OAT 
explores only 5 points forming a cross, out of 9 points in total. 
Let us now generalize this example. In n-dimensions, the n-cross will necessarily be 
inscribed  in  the  n-sphere.  The  problem  is  that  this  n-sphere  represents  a  small 
percentage of the total  parameter space defined by the n-cube.  For  example,  in 2 
dimensions, the ratio of the partially explored to the total area is r ≈ 0,78. In the figure 
above, it means that the corners areas outside the circle are not explored. The problem 
gets quickly worse as we increase the number of dimensions. In 3 dimensions, r  ≈ 
0,52 and in 12 dimensions, r  ≈  0,000326  (see Andrea Saltelli and Annoni 2010 for 
those calculations, as well as critiques and alternatives to OAT). 
Fine-tuning arguments typically vary one parameter at a time. So, they use the 
OAT method to explore the space of alternative universe by varying one by one some 
of the 31 fundamental physics and cosmic parameters, and actually explore only r ≈ 
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Figure 7: The one-factor-at-a-time method can only reach points on the cross. In this 
simple two-dimensional parameter space, each discrete factors can only take values 0, 1 
or -1. OAT can reach [0, 0], [0, 1], [0, -1] (points on the vertical line); and [-1, 0], [1, 0] 
(points on the horizontal line). The points explored are thus on a cross. The points not 
explored are the corners [-1, 1], [-1, -1], [1, 1], [1, -1]. In a geometrical interpretation, 
note that the cross is by construction inscribed in the circle. But OAT actually restricts 
the exploration to points on the cross, not inside the circle because exploring points 
inside the circle would imply varying two parameters at the same time. Now, that cross 
itself is inscribed in the circle. In sum, OAT restricts the exploration to the cross, not 
the circle, but the cross is inscribed in the circle. And this circle is inscribed in the 
square (2-cube), which is why OAT can’t reach the corners of the square.
4,56 x 10-15 of the parameter space. We conclude that such fine-tuning arguments have 
restricted  their  exploration  to  0,00000000000000456  % of  the  relevant  parameter 
space9! 
6.1.3  Fine-Tuning Disproofs
More and more authors debunk logical,  probabilistic  and physical  fallacies 
about fine-tuning. Scientific progresses provide the most elegant way to refute fine-
tuning arguments. Indeed, we saw that physicists build new theories which capture 
free parameters  (see Vidal 2010a and Chapter 5). This is the historical and logical 
scientific progress, which leads to a reduction of fine-tuning arguments.
One  might  object  that  some  modern  physics  theories  have  more free 
parameters,  not  less.  For  example,  the  simplest  supersymmetric  extension  of  the 
standard model displays 125 free parameters  (Smolin 2007, 330). How is this to be 
interpreted? Instead of the sudden emergence of an opposite historical trend where 
new physical theories should have more parameters, we can surmise that more work 
needs to be done at the level of the foundations of physics. Indeed, a theory with more 
free parameters is not a good one. It is well known that the more free parameters a 
theory has, the easier it is to make it fit any data.
Let  us  consider  the  cosmological  constant  as  an  example  of  fine-tuning 
disproof. For the sake of the argument, assume that we ignore Nottale's prediction of 
its value. Then, Don Page (2011) showed that the cosmological constant is not fine-
tuned for life since “the fraction of baryons that become living organisms would be 
higher if the cosmological constant were lower.” This example shows that these kinds 
of arguments can also prove the opposite: that our universe could have been better 
fine-tuned for life! However, one could reply that fine-tuning would still remain. Such 
an argument would show that the parameter (here the cosmological constant) is not 
optimized for a particular outcome (here the production of baryons). Optimization can 
be distinguished from parameter sensitivity. 
Once the basic fallacies are debunked, by varying more than one parameter, 
Stenger is able to show that our universe is not particularly fine-tuned. He actually 
avoids the OAT paradox by varying two parameters at a time, exploring a bit more of 
the parameter space.  This is  still  largely insufficient  if  our  standard is  a  systemic 
exploration  of  the  parameter  space,  but  enough  to  show that  our  universe  is  not 
uniquely fine-tuned. 
To take another example, Stenger reminds us that weak nuclear reactions rates 
which  give  rise  to  the  neutron-proton  mass  difference  depend  on  a  freeze-out 
temperature TF. By varying both the neutron-proton mass difference and TF , a wide 
range of life-permitting parameter space is possible (Stenger 2011, 182). 
By using computer simulations,  it  is  possible  to  explore even more of the 
parameter  space.  Stenger  (1995;  2000) has  performed a  remarkable  simulation of 
possible universes, varying four parameters. His conclusion is that our universe is not 
fine-tuned and other universes are possible. We will discuss this attempt and see how 
9 I used the formulae in (Andrea Saltelli and Annoni 2010, 1510) for this calculation. Note that this 
assumes that we can put upper and lower boundaries on each of the parameters, which is not at all 
warranted for physics and cosmic parameters. Note also that this is a very generous estimate, since 
the actual exploration of OAT will only be a tiny n-cross within the volume of the n-sphere, which 
itself represents only 4,56 x 10-15 of the full parameter space defined by the n-cube. 
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to test rigorously fine-tuning with virtual universes soon (see section 6.3 The Cosmic
Evolution Equation, p122).
6.2  Fine-Tuning and Other Issues
The fine-tuning issue is knotty and multidimensional. It is often mixed up with 
other closely related, yet different issues. The purpose of this section is to disentangle 
fine-tuning from other issues. I know few authors who have not confused at least once 
some of these issues... and I am no exception.
6.2.1  Fine-tuning and free parameters
In (Vidal 2010a; 2012a) I wrote about fine-tuning, while I was in fact tackling 
the free parameters issue. I confused the two and I apologize to my readers. However, 
this does not harm the argumentation of those papers, since reducing free parameters 
automatically  reduces  associated  fine-tuning  arguments  (see  Chapter  5).  I  already 
defined the free parameters issues as:
Free parameters issue: There are free parameters in the standard model and in cosmological  
models, which in principle can be filled in with any number.
This issue is thus not concerned with the particular values the parameters take or 
could take, and the impact of their variation for the development of cosmic outcomes 
in the universe. 
6.2.2  Fine-tuning and parameter sensitivity
Today,  there  is  no  rigorous  evidence  of  fine-tuning.  Nobody  has  run 
comprehensive  simulations  of  possible  universes  to  assess  the  likelihood  of  the 
emergence of life. The majority of“fine-tuning arguments” are not about fine-tuning,  
but remain one-parameter-at-a-time sensitivity arguments. All we can conclude with 
existing fine-tuning arguments is that our current models display parameter sensitivity 
when varying one parameter at a time. This is a considerably weaker claim than the 
full fine-tuning argument. Indeed, it is just the first step out of six in the fine-tuning 
argument we outlined above. The issue can be defined as follows:
Parameter sensitivity issue: Models of our universe display parameter sensitivity for some  
cosmic outcome O, when varying one parameter at a time.
Even Stenger  (2012) recognizes this fact when he writes: “I have never denied that 
life,  as  we  know  it  on  Earth,  would  not  have  evolved  with  slight  changes  in 
parameters.” In other words, the parameter sensitivity issue asks: why is the universe 
parameter sensitive? Rick Bradford (2011) showed with toy models and a statistical 
entropy argument that  parameter sensitivity  is inevitable in any complex universe. 
This is an important result, and the general idea of the argument can be summarized 
as follows:
The  thesis  has  been  presented  that  parameter  sensitivity  arises  as  a  natural 
consequence of the mathematics of dynamical systems with complex outcomes. 
The argument is as  follows: the emergence of  complexity in  a  sub-system,  א, 
requires a sequence of entropy reductions of  א,  which can be interpreted as a 
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sequence  of  reducing  phase  space  volumes.  This  leads,  via  a  very  general 
formulation of system evolution, to constraints on the set of universal constants. 
This is the origin of parameter sensitivity.
Bradford  (2011,  1584–1585) had  the  remarkable  insight  to  clearly  distinguish 
parameter sensitivity from fine-tuning: 
We contend that fine tuning actually consists of two distinct phenomena.
The first  phenomenon is the parameter  sensitivity  of  the universe.  This  is  the 
(apparent)  property  of  the  universe  that  small  changes  in  the  parameters  of 
physics produce catastrophic changes in the evolved universe. In particular the 
complexity of the evolved universe, and hence its ability to support life, would be 
undermined by small changes in the universal constants (in the pragmatic sense of 
‘small’ changes discussed above). Thus, ‘parameter sensitivity’ is the claim that 
the target in  parameter space which is  compatible  with a  complex universe is 
small  in  some sense.  The  smallness  of  this  target,  if  true,  is  a  feature  which 
requires explanation.
The second, and quite distinct, phenomenon is that nature has somehow managed 
to  hit  this  small  target—which  we  will  refer  to  as  “fine  tuning”.  The  actual 
constants in our universe have to be fine tuned to coincide with the requirements 
for a complex outcome. In other words,  given that only special values for the 
parameters will do (i.e., given parameter sensitivity), nature had to contrive to 
adopt these particular values (i.e., nature is fine tuned).
However, the first sentence of this citation confuses the two phenomena, since fine 
tuning is seen as  including both parameter sensitivity  and fine tuning. I make this 
distinction  exclusive,  so  I  see  Bradford's  argument  showing  “the  inevitability  of 
parameter sensitivity in a complex universe”, and not “the inevitability of fine tuning 
in  a  complex  universe”,  the  latter  being  the  title  of  the  paper.  As  Bradford 
acknowledges  himself,  the  “paper  is  concerned  only  with  the  first  phenomenon: 
parameter sensitivity and how it arises”. 
6.2.3  Fine-tuning and metaphysical issues
Metaphysics sells, physics doesn't. This is why ambitious physicists, in their 
metaphysical  quest  pursued with  scientific  tools,  will  sometimes  create  confusion 
between what they actually do and the titles of their papers and books. For example, 
Vilenkin  (1982) has  a  famous  paper  entitled  Creation  of  universes  from nothing; 
Krauss'  (2012) latest  book  is  entitled  A  Universe  from  Nothing:  Why  There  Is  
Something Rather than Nothing. Another recent example is Hawking and Mlodinow 
(2012, 180) who wrote that because “there is a law like gravity, the universe can and 
will create itself from nothing in the manner described in Chapter 6. Spontaneous 
creation is the reason there is something rather than nothing, why the universe exists, 
why we exist.” These titles and statements are misleading and philosophically naïve, 
because they confuse physics with metaphysics. It was to avoid such confusions that 
we made explicit the metaphysical challenge (see section 4.1.2 Metaphysical, p76):
Metaphysical challenge: Why not nothing?
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Ted Harrison wrote in (1995) a speculative paper which is the basis of Chapter 
8. He was then criticized harshly by John Byl  (1996).  Harrison  (1998) replied by 
clearly  distinguishing  the  metaphysical  problem of  creation from the  problem of 
fitness of the universe for life, i.e. the fine tuning issue. 
6.2.4  Fine-tuning and anthropic principles
Anthropic principles serve only to obfuscate.
(Swinburne 1990, 172)
To which I add:
A serious discussion of the anthropic principle
 does not mention the anthropic principle.
Statements about the “anthropic principle” raise passion in scientific circles. Some 
denounce  its  unscientific  nature,  others  its  tautological  aspect,  while  yet  others 
maintain that it is essential to scientific reasoning  (see Dick 1996, 527–536 for an 
historical summary). A thing is certain, it is a confusing idea. When Brandon Carter 
(1974) coined the term, he intended to speak about  selection effects.  However,  as 
Bostrom (2002, 6) reports, 
The term “anthropic” is a misnomer. Reasoning about observation selection 
effects  has  nothing  in  particular  to  do  with  homo  sapiens,  but  rather  with 
observers in general. Carter regrets not having chosen a better name, which would 
no doubt have prevented much of the confusion that has plagued the field. When 
John Barrow and Frank Tipler introduced anthropic reasoning to a wider audience 
in  1986  with  the  publication  of  The  Anthropic  Cosmological  Principle,  they 
compounded  the  terminological  disorder  by  minting  several  new  “anthropic 
principles”, some of which have little if any connection to observation selection 
effects.
A total of over thirty anthropic principles have been formulated and many of 
them have been defined several times over—in nonequivalent ways—by different 
authors,  and sometimes even by the same authors  on different  occasions.  Not 
surprisingly, the result has been some pretty wild confusion concerning what the 
whole thing is about.
Although Bostrom does not review the over thirty different anthropic principles, there 
are in practice two main uses of the anthropic principle today. Either the author wants 
to  speak about  observational  selection  effects  or  about  teleology.  There  are  good 
reasons to be careful and skeptical  with both.  The one refers to a basic  scientific 
methodology,  while  the  other  may  drift  us  into  unscientific  considerations.  To 
summarize,  when  you  see  a  mention  of  the  anthropic  principle,  you  should  ask 
yourself,  does  the  author  means  a  selection  effect,  teleology  or  yet  something 
different?  Let  us  now  discuss  the  two  main  meanings  of  selection  effects  and 
teleology, and thus follow my proposal not to use anymore the ambiguous “anthropic 
principle”. 
6.2.5  Fine-tuning and observational selection effects
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To illustrate what an Observational Selection Effect (OSE) is, imagine you go 
fishing with a fishing net (see Leslie 1989 for extensive discussions of this example). 
You catch a  fish of exactly  59.07 cm. Can you conclude anything about  the fish 
population? If you want to make any serious theory about the fish population, you 
should at least be aware that holes in your fishing net have a certain size, and thus for 
example that you will never be able to catch fishes 2 cm long, because they are much 
smaller  than  the  holes.  Thus  the  very  fishing  net  you  are  using  induces  an 
observational selection effect on the fishing outcome. Taking into account OSE is thus 
fundamental to draw meaningful conclusions. This holds for this example, but also in 
all scientific investigation.
Another example is the Malmquist bias in astrophysics (see e.g. Ellis 2007a, 
1199). Let X be a population of luminous objects, with different luminosities. At a 
distance  from X,  we  will  only  see  the  most  luminous objects.  Thus,  the  average 
luminosity will appear to increase with distance.
Now,  we  can  reformulate  Carter's  famous  “weak  anthropic  principle”  and 
“strong anthropic principle” as two OSE:
Observational Selection Effects:  
   Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP)  :  The existence of observers in the universe imposes 
temporal  constraints  on  the  positions  of  the  observers  in  the  universe.
   Strong Anthropic  Principle  (SAP):  The existence of observers  in  the universe imposes  
constraints on the set of cosmological properties and constants of the universe.
It is important to note that Carter always intended his anthropic principles, both WAP 
and SAP as OSE, not as teleological principles. It is only later that Barrow and Tipler 
(1986) wrongly  associated  the  idea  of  teleology  with  the  SAP.  This  error  is  so 
widespread that it has made John Leslie (1998, 295) wonder if we should still try to 
correct it.
Philosopher  John  Leslie  probably  worked  more  than  anyone  else  on  the 
anthropic principle as an OSE. In his (1990) paper, The Anthropic Principle Today, he 
reviews thirteen common misunderstandings of the anthropic principle as a selection 
effect. 
One  of  the  key  points  he  emphasizes  is  the  distinction  between  logical 
explanations and  causal  explanations.  OSE allow to make logical  or  probabilistic 
reasonings, but they do not aim at providing  causal  explanations. As Leslie  (1989, 
129) remarks, both WAP and SAP as  OSE “are not in the least questionable, for of 
course  the  universe  in  which  we  observers  exist  now  must  be  compatible  with 
observership  both  here  and  now  (Weak  Principle)  and  at  some  stage  (Strong 
Principle)”. This lack of causal explanation is a main reason why many scientists find 
those two anthropic principles useless or insufficient. This reaction stems indeed from 
the requirement that scientific theories must provide causal mechanisms. Thus OSE 
don't causally explain things. They can make things less mysterious (see Leslie 1989, 
141). They can also allow some predictions, because they set  boundary conditions. 
For example in the fishing story, you can predict that you won't catch fishes less than 
2 cm long. And you won't be able to catch a whale either, because it would just tear 
your net apart.
It is not our aim to develop or discuss theories on how to model OSE (see N. 
Bostrom 2002 for an extensive treatment). A way to do it systematically is to consider 
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science as  the endeavor to  construct  models of  the world,  and then to  model  the 
modeling  process.  We can note  that  this  is  an  other  instance  of  “meta-”  thought 
process,  where  the  concept  of  modeling  is  applied  to  itself  (as  we  had  a 
metaphilosophical approach in Part I or a “metaorigin” examination in Chapter 4). 
Such a study is known as second-order cybernetics  (see e.g. Heylighen and Joslyn 
2001).
Let us now consider an important and less trivial discussion of OSE regarding 
the Eddington-Dirac large number hypothesis. Dicke proposed a  logical explanation 
as an OSE which is now obsolete since Nottale advanced a more recent theoretical 
understanding from scale relativity.
Paul Dirac (1937) noticed some unexpected related ratios in cosmological and 
elementary particle scales. For example, the ratio between the scale of the observable 
universe and the microscopic scale are related to the ratio of the mass of the universe 
and the mass of an elementary particle. 
However, the size and age of the universe depend on the Hubble constant, 
which led Dicke (1961) to state that it “is not permitted to take on an enormous range 
of values, but is somewhat limited by the biological requirements to be met during the 
epoch of man.” In a later reply, Dirac was not satisfied with this reasoning (see Dick 
1996, 527–529 for a more detailed historical account). 
Now,  in  scale-relativistic  cosmology  (L.  Nottale  1993;  2003;  2011) the 
Eddington-Dirac large number hypothesis can be partially explained. Let us outline 
the general argument. The cosmological constant Λ has the dimension of a curvature. 
So  it  is  the  inverse  of  the  square  of  some  cosmic  length:  Λ  =  1/ L2.  L
is identified as the maximum cosmic scale, in the same way that the planck scale lP is 
the minimum scale. The ratio between the maximum and the minimum scale is then a 
new dimensionless  number  whose  value  is  K=  L/lP≈  5x1060.  The  next  step  is  to 
replace the factor c/H0, where H0 is Hubble's constant, with the invariant cosmic scale 
L.  Eddington-Dirac's large number hypothesis can now be written in Planck units, 
without varying constants such as Hubble's, as:
K= L/lP = (r0/lP )3 ≡ (mP/ m0)3
where  r0 = ħ/m0c is the Compton length associated with the mass scale m0. What this 
relation  says  is  simply  that  the  scale  of  elementary  particles   r0/lP
is at one third of the universal scale  L/lP in the scale space. Note that the relation 
(r0/lP )3 ≡ (mP/ m0)3 can be verified from the very definition of r0 = ħ/m0c . Now, how 
can we deduce this conclusion? It is possible by reasoning about scales. The idea is to 
consider the vacuum as fractal, and the energy density not as a number, but as an 
explicit  function of the scale. Without going into more details, this can be seen in 
Figure 8, where the r-6 line (the scale variation of the gravitational self-energy density 
of quantum vacuum fluctuations) crosses the scale of elementary particles (q) at one 
third of scales in the universe. I encourage the curious reader to study Nottale's papers 
and books for more details and impressive results.
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In  conclusion,  we  can  emphasize  again  that  OSE  are  indeed  no  causal 
explanation. This was illustrated with simple examples, as well as with the Dirac-
Eddington large number hypothesis.  Dirac's  intuition that  Dicke's “explanation” in 
terms of OSE was insufficient is confirmed with a more recent partial deduction of the 
Eddington-Dirac large number relation. OSE should not obscure the fact that regular 
scientific work needs to be done. 
The same limitation holds with the idea that  an OSE (e.g.  WAP), plus the 
hypothesis of the existence of a multiverse could “explain” the fine-tuning issue. The 
argument  is  to  say  that  there  exists  a  huge  multiverse  with  various  values  of 
fundamental cosmic and physics parameters. It  is thus not surprising that the only 
universe we can observe is fine-tuned. If it  were not fine-tuned, observers like us 
wouldn't have emerged, and wouldn't be here to observe anything. The bottom line is 
that our universe might seem fine-tuned, but the multiverse needs not to be. We will 
criticize this dubious “explanation” later as “WAP-of-the-gaps” (see section  6.4.6  
WAP-of-the-gaps, p147). 
120
Figure 8: Scale variation of vacuum energy density. 
From Nottale (2011, 545):“Variation of the vacuum energy density [in lP/r)4] and of the gravitational 
self-energy density of quantum vacuum fluctuations [in lP/r)6] in the framework of Galilean scale 
relativity. We have suggested in (L. Nottale 1993) that the r -6 gravitational self-energy contribution 
crosses the geometric cosmological contribution Λ at a scale of 70 MeV (electron “classical” radius and 
quark confinement transition denoted by q in the figure). This scale lies at the third of the full interval 
going from the Planck scale lP to the cosmic scale L (in scale space described by logarithms), which 
validates the Eddington-Dirac large number relation. (...)”
6.2.6  Fine-tuning and teleology
As with the expression “anthropic principle”, scientists bristle at “teleology”. 
And  as  we  saw  that  selection  effects  behind  anthropic  principles  are  not  cogent 
scientific explanations, let us see what problems are involved with teleology. 
First, in theology, teleological considerations have been and are often used to 
prove the existence of God (see e.g. the physico theological proof of God’s existence 
in Kant 1781). Such arguments attempt to show the existence of a plan, purpose, goal 
or design in the universe, and are known as teleological arguments or arguments from 
or arguments to design (Ratzsch 2010).  Indeed, fine-tuning arguments are used to 
substantiate this teleological and theological view (see e.g. Collins 2009; and Stenger 
2011 for debunking). So one can suspect attempts to prove the existence of teleology 
or purpose in nature to hide a theological agenda.
Second,  teleology is  associated with the Aristotelian categorization in  four 
types  of  causes  which  were  harshly  criticized  during  the  scientific  revolution. 
Especially, final causes are bad explanations,  as Francis Bacon  (1620, book 2,  II) 
denounces “the final cause rather corrupts than advances the sciences”. The reason is 
that if we say that some phenomenon happens “be-cause-final” it tends toward a final 
state,  it  doesn't  explain how this final  state will  be achieved, nor why the system 
acquired this goal-directedness in the first place. 
However,  teleology  can  be  and  should  be  addressed  in  a  purely  scientific 
manner. We can address the question to what extent systems are goal-directed without 
assuming  a  God  or  final  causes  driving  the  process.  A  major  contribution  by 
Rosenblueth,  Wiener  and Bigelow  (1943) was  to  identify  teleology with  purpose 
controlled by feedback. Such an interpretation is fully compatible with a materialist 
and deterministic worldview. More generally, that paper laid the foundation for the 
science of  cybernetics, which Wiener defined as the science of communication and 
control in the animal and the machine. 
Obviously, there are fields of scientific study such as biology or sociology, 
where it is more than useful to use concepts related to teleology or intentionality (see 
e.g.  Walsh  2008;  Dennett  1988).  In  biology,  to  distance  itself  from  the  bad 
connotations of teleology, the term “teleonomy” is sometimes used instead.
Now,  is  there  teleology  at  play  in  the  universe?  Has  our  universe  a 
developmental  dynamics?  Would  atoms,  galaxies,  stars,  planetary  systems,  life, 
intelligence re-appear if we would re-run the tape of the universe (see Davies 1998, 
317;  Vidal  2008b)?  How likely  was  it  to  have  such  or  such  outcome in  cosmic 
evolution? We will see how we can address these difficult questions through a study 
of the robustness of the universe (see section 6.3.3 Robustness in Cosmic Evolution, 
p133).
6.2.7  Fine-tuning and God's existence
The  study  of  teleology  in  the  universe  is  often  motivated  by  a  religious 
agenda. Indeed, if we can prove that there is a purpose of the universe, it's only a 
small step to argue that this purpose was designed by God. This situation shouldn't 
obscure the fact that the study of teleology is a legitimate scientific inquiry. As we saw 
in the previous section, if teleology is defined as purpose controlled by feedback, then 
its study is simply a part of complexity science.
As Leslie (1989) reminds us, the argument that the universe is fine tuned is not 
based on the assumption that there is a fine-tuner. What it shows is that the emergence 
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of life or complexity is parameter sensitive, one parameter at a time. Fine-tuning and 
teleology are thus quite distinct from the theological question of
God's existence: Does God exist? 
Ikeda  and  Jeffrey  (2006) advanced  a  new  critique  against  the  fine-tuning 
argument used to prove God's existence. It is particularly interesting because it grants 
the most difficult premise, namely that our universe is indeed improbably fine-tuned 
(Step  3.  “Outcome  O  is  improbable.”  in  our  reconstruction  of  the  fine-tuning 
argument above). The conclusion of Ikeda and Jeffrey is that if the universe is fine-
tuned, then God's existence is  less likely, not more likely! Why? They start with the 
following assumptions:
a) Our universe exists and contains life.
b) Our universe is “life friendly,” that is, the conditions in our universe (such as 
physical laws, etc.) permit or are compatible with life existing naturalistically.
c) Life cannot exist in a universe that is governed solely by naturalistic law unless 
that universe is “life-friendly.”
Now the point is that “a sufficiently powerful supernatural principle or entity (deity) 
could sustain life in a universe with laws that are not “life-friendly,” simply by virtue 
of that entity's will and power.” Indeed, if God can intervene in the course of cosmic 
evolution then why bother fine-tuning? You fine-tune because you do not want to or 
you can not intervene. So, as Stenger (2011, 253) summarizes, the “more finely tuned 
the universe is, the more the hypothesis of a supernatural creation is undermined.” I 
refer the reader to Ikeda and Jeffrey's paper for the stronger version of the argument 
which uses bayesian probabilities.
Of course, a professional theologian might laugh at this argument, because it 
interprets God in a simplistic way. It assumes the God of intelligent design, capable to 
intervene in the course of human and cosmic evolution. Theologians can have much 
more  sophisticated  conceptions  of  God  (see  e.g.  Spinoza's  or  Whitehead's 
philosophical-theological views).
6.3  The Cosmic Evolution Equation
Napoleon: M. Laplace, they tell me you have written this large book on 
the system of the universe, and have never even mentioned its Creator.
Laplace: I had no need of that hypothesis.
Cited in (Ball 1901)
Can we provide a general definition of fine-tuning avoiding all the logical, 
probabilistic and physical fallacies we spotted, as well as all the confusions with the 
seven other issues we outlined? This is my aim now. 
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Different discussions of fine-tuning focus on very different cosmic outcomes. 
We see fine-tuning discussions regarding the dimensionality of space (Rees 1999), the 
production of carbon atoms in stars (F. Hoyle et al. 1953), the existence of long-lived 
stars (Fred C Adams 2008); the number of black holes (Smolin 1992); biochemistry 
(Barrow et al. 2008); but also complexity of any sort (Ellis 2007b).
A key question to clarify the issue is thus to explicitly ask:  fine-tuning for 
what? Which cosmic outcome are we interested in? To answer these questions, I now 
introduce the  Cosmic Evolution Equation.  It is a modular conceptual framework to 
discuss possible universes, possible cosmic outcomes as well as the extend of the 
robustness and fine-tuning of our universe.
To define it, I build on Drake's (1965) equation in SETI and on the thoughtful 
discussion of possible universes by Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger  (2004). The Drake 
equation  estimates  the  number  of  communicative  intelligent  civilizations  in  our 
galaxy. By extension, one application of the generalized Cosmic Evolution Equation 
(CEE) is to estimate the likelihood of our particular universe in the space of possible 
universes. In other words, if Drake's equation allows to estimate the probability of life 
existing “somewhere in the galaxy”; one application of the CEE is to estimate the 
more  general  probability  of  life  existing  “anywhere in  the  space  of  possible 
universes”. 
The famous dialogue between Laplace and Napoleon above shows the strong 
scientific  position of Laplace,  who had no need of  the hypothesis  of God for his 
scientific work. Instead of God, do we need to assume an actual multiverse? No we 
don't. To study the fine-tuning issue, we need only possible or virtual universes, not 
actually realized ones. This interpretation still allows us to use the vast multiverse 
literature to define and explore possible universes, without making strong ontological 
claims regarding their actual existence. 
6.3.1  Possible Universes
What are the possible universes? How can we describe the space of possible 
universes? These questions underly enormous logical,  metaphysical,  philosophical, 
and scientific problems. Although possible universes or possible worlds have been 
discussed centrally in the history of philosophy (see e.g. Leibniz 1710; D. K. Lewis 
1986;  see  also  Dick  1982  for  a  wider  historical  perspective),  our  aim here  is  to 
formulate the issue of possible universes so that it can progressively exit metaphysics 
and enter the realm of operational science. 
We now follow Ellis', Kirchner's and Stoeger's (2004) definition of the class of 
all  possible universes.  Let  M be a structural  and dynamical  space of all  possible 
universes m. Each universe m is described by a set of states s in a state space S. Each 
universe  m  is  characterized by a  set  P of  distinguishing parameters  p,  which are 
coordinates on S. Such parameters will be logical, physical or dynamical. How will 
they dynamically evolve? The three authors elaborate: 
Each universe m will evolve from its initial state to some final state according to the dynamics 
operative, with some or all of its parameters varying as it does so. The course of this evolution 
of states will be represented by a path in the state space S, depending on the parametrisation of 
S.  Thus,  each  such  path  (in  degenerate  cases  a  point)  is  a  representation  of  one  of  the 
universes m in M. The coordinates in S will be directly related to the parameters specifying 
members of M.
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In such a procedure, we face a first major issue: 
Possibility space issue: What delimits the set of possibilities? What is the meta-law or meta-
cause which determines M?  
As the three authors argue, we can't avoid the meta-law issue, because otherwise we 
have no basis to set up a consistent description of M. We need to have a logic which 
describes  M.  There are other difficult issues related to identifying which different 
representations represent the same universe models – the equivalence problem – and 
the problem of dealing with an infinite space of possible universes. I refer the reader 
to the three authors' paper for more in depth discussions of these issues.
More directly related to the fine-tuning issue is the remark of Jean-Philippe 
Uzan that “the larger the possibility space considered, the more fine-tuned the actual 
universe appears to be” (reported in Ellis, Kirchner, and Stoeger 2004, 923). Indeed, 
we  can  easily  increase  the  unlikelihood  of  our  universe  simply  by  allowing  the 
parameter space to grow. You could ask for example, did you explore if universes 
with 42 dimensions generate life? Do we really want to capture the radical idea of “all 
that can happen, happens”? There is much variation in the space of possibility we can 
delimit. Ellis  (2007a, 1261) distinguishes four levels of variation,  weak,  moderate, 
strong and extreme:
• “Weak variation: e.g. only the values of the constants of physics are allowed to 
vary? This is an interesting exercise but is certainly not an implementation of the 
idea  ‘all  that  can  happen,  happens’.  It  is  an  extremely  constrained  set  of 
variations.
• Moderate variation: different symmetry groups, or numbers of dimensions, etc. 
We  might  for  example  consider  the  possibility  landscapes  of  string  theory 
(Freivogel  et  al.  2006) as  realistic  indications  of  what  may  rule  multiverses 
(Freivogel et al. 2006; Susskind 2005; 2007). But that is very far indeed from ‘all 
that is possible’, for that should certainly include spacetimes not ruled by string 
theory.
•  Strong  variation:  different  numbers  and  kinds  of  forces,  universes  without 
quantum theory or in which relativity is untrue (e.g. there is an aether), some in 
which string theory is a good theory for quantum gravity and others where it is 
not, some with quite different bases for the laws of physics (e.g. no variational 
principles).
•  Extreme  variation:  universes  where  physics  is  not  well  described  by 
mathematics; with different logic; universes ruled by local deities; allowing magic 
as in the Harry Potter series of books; with no laws of physics at all? Without 
even mathematics or logic?”
We indeed need to make a difficult choice between theoretical physics and magic... or 
anything in between. 
6.3.2  Possible Cosmic Outcomes
Once we settle on a framework to define possible universes, a second major 
issue is to specify the parameters which differentiate possible universes:
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Cosmic outcomes issue: What are the cosmic outcomes? What are the milestones of cosmic  
evolution?  What  parameters  differentiate  possible  universes?  How  do  we  find  those  
parameters? 
As the three authors mention, the values of the parameters may not be known initially. 
They  may  emerge  out  of  transitions from  one  regime  to  another.  For  example, 
sociologists do not explore alternative sociological structures by varying the mass of 
elementary particles. They start from different, less fundamental parameters, such as 
the  influence  of  population  density,  the  climate  or  the  media.  The  challenge  to 
understand complexity transitions in cosmic evolution is both of upmost importance 
and difficulty. For example, how did atoms emerge out of the big bang era? How did 
planets form out of stars and stardust? How did life originate out of molecules? How 
did consciousness emerge from biological organisms? Etc. 
The  ideal  of  reducing  such  parameters  is  a  major  goal  of  science.  The 
objective is  to build a  consistent  theory and narrative of cosmic evolution,  which 
explains a maximum of cosmic outcomes with a minimum of parameters. Scientific 
progress  is  achieved  when  new theories  capture  previously  free  and  unexplained 
parameters. We saw the reduction of free parameters in physics and cosmology in 
Chapter 5, but we can now extend this attitude to attempt a reduction of other higher 
parameters (such as life) to fundamental physics and cosmic parameters. However, 
since we are still very far from such a feat, in our description of possible universes we 
must include explicitly those higher parameters. Typically, when researchers tackle 
the issue of the origin of life, they don’t start from big bang nucleosynthesis, but they 
assume the existence of molecules.
Ellis, Kirchner and Stoeger categorize the parameters from the most basic ones 
to the most complex ones. They distinguish seven different categories of parameters 
pj  , with  j = 1 - 2 describing basic physics;  j = 3 - 5 describing cosmology and a 
category  of  parameters  j =  6  -  7  related  to  the  emergence  of  life  and  higher 
complexity.  
Each category pj  is composed of different parameters i. For example, p1 (i) are 
basic physics parameters, such that the fine-structure constant; masses, charges and 
spins of particles, as well as other dimensionless parameters. I refer the reader to the 
detailed description of the parameters given by the three authors. 
However,  in  each parameter  category  I  would  like  to  add explicitly  some 
random, chance or noise parameters. For example, these could include for  j  = 1 - 5 
quantum effects in the early universe;  or nonlinear chaotic dynamics which might 
trigger catastrophic events, such as meteorites impacting planets for j = 7. This would 
certainly complicate the dynamics, but would also make it much more realistic. A 
dynamical argument can even be advanced that such random events might be essential 
to the open-ended growth of complexity. Indeed, this can be illustrated in engineering, 
with the heuristic of  simulated annealing. One starts by adding important noise into 
the system and then gradually reduces it. The purpose of the noise is to shake the 
system to reach a maximally stable configuration and avoid being stuck in a local 
optimum.
Now, how do we decide which cosmic outcomes to keep, and which ones to 
leave out?  At first,  we can aim at including a maximum of parameters. Then, we 
would progressively reduce the number of parameters,  as we get better and better 
insights on how they emerge from more fundamental principles and theories; i.e. from 
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previous  parameters.  Robert  Aunger  (2007a,  1142–1144) did  compile  from many 
authors  a  list  of  more  than  100  different  cosmic  outcomes.  This  is  the  most 
comprehensive review I am aware of, ranging from the big bang, the formation of 
atoms, stars, solar systems, life, DNA, multicellularity, sexual reproduction, fishes, to 
mammals,  agriculture,  modern science and space exploration.  Table  5 summarizes 
this  comprehensive  review of  cosmic  outcomes,  which  Aunger  calls  “big  history 
events”. This list is certainly an excellent starting point for the endeavor of discussing 
the selection of cosmic outcomes.
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 AUTHOR
EVENT
Sagan Barrow
/
Silk
Chaisson Christian Modis Coren Spier Maynard  Smith/ 
Szathmary
Barbieri Klein Lipsey  
et al
Sanderson Johnson/ 
Earle
Freeman
Big Bang! X X X X X X X
Planck era X X
Inflation X X
Gravity! X X
Nuclear forces! X X X
Electromagnetic 
forces!
X X X
Hadrons X
Leptons X X
Nuclear particles X X X
Recombination X
Atoms* X X X
Stars! X X X X X
Black holes/ 
Quasars*
X X X
Solar wind^ X X
Galaxies* X X X X X
Second-
generation 
(Population  II) 
stars
X
Population I 
stars
X
Solar system/ 
Planets*
X X X X X
Cratering of 
planets
X
Formation of 
Earth
X X X
Oldest rocks 
form
X X
First replicators^ X X X X
First life* X X X X X X X X X
Chromosomes X
RNA/DNA/ 
protein division^
X X X
Photosynthesis! X X
Eukaryotes 
(complex 
nucleus)*
X X X X
Recombin-ation 
of DNA
X
Sexual 
reproduction^
X X X X
Atmosphere 
oxygenated!
X X X X X
Multi-cellular 
life*
X X X X X X X X
Earliest fossils X X X
Intensive 
volcanism
X
Worms X
Cambrian 
explosion 
(Vertebrates)
X X X X X
Genetic 
bauplane^
X
Trilobites X
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 AUTHOR
EVENT
Sagan Barrow
/
Silk
Chaisson Christian Modis Coren Spier Maynard  Smith/ 
Szathmary
Barbieri Klein Lipsey  
et al
Sanderson Johnson/ 
Earle
Freeman
Brains^ X X X X
Fish X X X
Vascular plants X
Insects 
(Devonian)
X X
Amphibians X
Reptiles X X
Dinosaurs 
(Permian)
X X X
Paleozoic X X
Mammals X X X
Sociality* X X
Birds X X
Cretaceous 
period
X X X
Primates X X X X
Orangutan X
Hominoids X X X X
Proconsul X X
Hominids X X X X X
Stone tools! X X X X X
Consciousness X
Fire! X X X X X
Most recent 
glacial period
X X
Settlement  of 
Australia
X X
Family-level 
foraging!
X X X X X X
Broad-spectrum 
food collection!
X X
Neolithic X X X
Local  group/ 
Bands*
X X
Cultural 
learning^
X X X
Modern humans X X X X
Tool kits! X X X X X
Clan (tribe)/ 
Village*
X X
Language^ X X X X X X
Wheel X
Pottery X
Sedentism X X
Horticulture! X X
Corporate group/ 
Big-man*
X X X
Neanderthal 
Burial
X X
Art  (cave 
painting)^
X X X X X X
Agriculture! X X X X X
Domestication 
of animals!
X
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 AUTHOR
EVENT
Sagan Barrow
/
Silk
Chaisson Christian Modis Coren Spier Maynard  Smith/ 
Szathmary
Barbieri Klein Lipsey  
et al
Sanderson Johnson/ 
Earle
Freeman
Pastoral society X X
Plow X
Chiefdoms* X X X
First cities* X X
First  dynasties 
(Archaic states)*
X X X X
Writing/ 
alphabet^
X X X X X
Hammurabic 
legal codes, 
taxation^
X X
Iron metallurgy!/ 
compass^
X X
Bronze 
metallurgy
X X
Kingdoms 
(Asokan  India, 
Ch’in  Dynasty, 
Athens)*
X
Christianity X X
Gunpowder X
Mayan  and 
Byzantine 
civilizations
X
Pulley X
World 
exploration/ 
Migrations
X X
Three-masted 
ship
X
Water mills! X X
Feudalism* X X
Market 
economy^
X X X X X
Rennaisance X X
Printing^ X X
Industrial 
Revolution 
(mechanization)!
X X X X X
Steam* X X X
Modern  science/ 
technology^
X X X X X
Democratic state X X
Factory 
systems^
X X
Railways^ X X X
Electrification! X X
International 
companies*
X X
Telegraph/ 
Telephone^
X X
Motorization 
(internal 
combustion 
engine)!
X X
Welfare state X
Mass education X
Multi-national 
agencies*
X X X
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 AUTHOR
EVENT
Sagan Barrow
/
Silk
Chaisson Christian Modis Coren Spier Maynard  Smith/ 
Szathmary
Barbieri Klein Lipsey  
et al
Sanderson Johnson/ 
Earle
Freeman
Computing^ X X
Nuclear energy! X X
Globalization* X X X X
Internet* X X
Electronics^ X
Space 
exploration
X X
Table 5: List of Cosmic Outcomes.
The original title by Aunger is “Candidate Events in Big History”.
!  energy innovation
* organisational novelty
^ development in control 
See References in (Aunger 2007a) for bibliographic details concerning the sources, and many more 
details regarding the selection of events.
However, we can already anticipate a fallacy lurking when considering a large 
list  of  cosmic  outcomes.  Similarly  to  Uzan's  remark  for  the  space  of  possible 
universes, we can note that the more cosmic outcomes we have, the more unlikely 
they  will  seem.  The  extreme  case  is  to  consider  one  single  object  as  a  cosmic 
outcome.  For  example,  in  intelligent  design discussions,  they consider  a  complex 
object such as a living organism or an airplane and try to assess the likelihood that it 
arose  by  chance.  Of  course  this  will  be  very  unlikely!  Additionally,  as  Dawkins 
(2008) argues,  natural  selection  would  still  constitute  a  much  better  candidate 
explanation than design. A scientist will look for possible mechanisms and theories 
which can explain the emergence of complexity. The  a posteriori probability of a 
single object isolated from its evolutionary or human context is of weak scientific 
interest.
To  avoid  such  an  error,  we  need  to  advance  theoretical  reasons to  select 
certain  cosmic  outcomes  and  not  others.  This  is  rarely  attempted.  Most  authors 
propose an arbitrary list without strong theoretical justification. Ellis, Kirchner and 
Stoeger did not justify their choice of distinguishing parameters; although it is clear 
that they included a lot of cosmological parameters necessary for their subsequent 
study of universes with different geometries.
A  promising  approach  to  select  cosmic  outcomes  is  to  focus  on 
thermodynamics.  Indeed, all  systems need to process energy, which is  therefore a 
universal concept, applicable from the beginning of the universe to our energy hungry 
technological  society.  Robert  Aunger  (2007a;  2007b) built  on  a  thermodynamical 
theory  to  select  cosmic  outcomes,  non-equilibrium  steady-state  transitions.  Each 
transition involves first an energy innovation, then a structural adjustment and finally 
a  new  control  mechanism.  He  thus  constructed  a  consistent  selection  of  cosmic 
outcomes and evolutionary transitions (see Table 6). 
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TRANSITION ASPECT NOVELTY FUNCTION DATE* PLACE
Electron 
(Atomic)
Transition
energy electron capture by 
nuclei 
neutralize atomic charge, 
separate matter and energy
13.6997 
billion
‘our’ universe
organisation atoms 
(hydrogen, helium)
electrically neutral and 
hence complex, stable matter
13.6997 
billion
‘our’ universe
control electro-magnetic forces nucleus/electron structural 
mediation
13.6997 
billion
‘our’ universe
Fusion
(Stellar) 
Transition
energy Proton-Proton reaction ignition of proto-stars into 
stars
13.5 billion ‘our’ universe
organisation  first generation stars first large-scale structures 13.5 billion ‘our’ universe
 control gravity vs gas pressure debris removal and star 
shaping 
13.5 billion ‘our’ universe
CNO 
(Planetary)
Transition
energy Carbon/Oxygen/ 
Nitrogen cycle
higher temperature fusion 
than Proton-Proton reaction 
(using heavier elements)
13.3 billion
(?)
‘our’ universe
organisation solar systems with 
planets 
first large-scale, 
hierarchically-structured 
clusters of matter
13.3 billion
(?) 
‘our’ universe
control gravitational torques vs 
solar wind
control of inter-planetary 
relations (migration)
13.3 billion
(?)
‘our’ universe
Quasar
(Galaxy)
Transition
energy quasars/black holes high-intensity 
electromagnetic radiation 
13
billion
‘our’ universe
organisation galaxies super-scale, hierarchical 
structures (star clusters)
12
billion
(?)
‘our’ universe
control gravity vs interstellar 
wind (produced by 
quasar)
force operational over long 
distances, galaxy shaping
13
billion
‘our’ universe
Metabolic
(Cell)
Transition 
energy  ‘metabolism’ (e.g., 
photo-synthesis)
a chemical reaction 
transition that produces 
energy in a form harnessed 
by other processes 
3.75 billion Planet  Earth; 
deep sea vents?
 organisation cell protected micro-environment 3.6 billion ocean?
  control genetic code (e.g., 
RNA, DNA)
self-catalyzing, durable 
inter-generational 
information storage system
3.25 billion
(?)
ocean?
Organelle
(Complex Cell)
Transition
energy mitochondria (animals), 
chloroplasts (plants), 
lipids 
use of free oxygen and 
photons as energy-rich 
source of ‘food’
2 billion
(?)
ocean?
 organisation eukaryote nested protective envelopes 
(cell nucleus)
1.75 billion ocean?
 control splicing codes (e.g. 
transfer RNA); genetic 
recombination [sex]
intracellular communication; 
division of labour and 
controlled trait 
recombination
1.75 billion
(?)
ocean?
Secondary  Aerobic 
Reactions
(Multi-Cell) Transition
energy complex aerobic 
reaction cycles 
(collection of) cells with 
improved long-term energy 
throughput and management 
700 million
(?)
ocean?
 organisation multi-cellular organism; 
sexual reproduction
greater variety of genotypes 
and phenotypes, including 
specialist tissues and organs
650 million ocean?
control pattern codes; neuronal 
networks (brains) 
chemical messengers and 
regulatory signals for 
determining body plans; 
intra-generational memory 
system (learning)
550 million ocean?
Tool 
(Multi-Organism) 
Transition 
energy cooperative foraging;  
 (learned) tool use and 
manufacture
extraction of inaccessible 
foods
25 million land 
organisation parental unit cluster 
(‘family’)
loosely-linked group sharing 
kinship
20 million
(?)
land
 control call system [e.g., 
birdsong]
coordination of groups 
through conventional 
signaling system
15 million
(?)
land
Fire
(Band)
Transition
energy fire use
 [early Homo]
increased diet breadth and 
efficiency of consumption
(cooked tubers)
2.5 million Africa
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organisation band egalitarian collection of 
intermarrying parental 
clusters
2 
million
(?)
Africa
 control cultural traditions/
norms
use of arbitrary signs, 
symbols or behaviours to 
identify group membership
1.5 million
(?)
Africa
Multi-Tool
(Tribal)
Transition
energy tool kits (wooden 
spears etc.)
[Homo heidel-
bergensis]
increased diet breadth
(new prey species)
500,000 Africa
 organisation tribe large-scale affiliation, 
sharing common ancestry 
and culture with neither 
formalized nor permanent 
leadership
400,000
(?)
Africa
 control grammatical language ; 
abstractly decorated 
tools
sophisticated inter-personal 
information transmission 
system; aesthetics
300,000
(?)
Africa
Compound Tool (Cultural) 
Transition
energy horticulture; compound 
tools (e.g., bow-and-
arrow), tools for 
making tools (e.g., 
burins)
[Homo sapiens]
increased diet breadth
(prey killed at distance); 
reduced variance in dietary 
intake
50,000 Africa
 organisation ‘Big Man’ society large-scale group with 
political leadership role 
based on personal ability 
(first division of labour)
40,000
(?)
Africa, Europe
 control iconic representation 
(cave art); common 
mythology (e.g., Venus 
figurines)
simple extrasomatic 
(environmental) memory 
system
30,000 Africa, Europe
Agricultural 
(Chiefdom)
Transition
energy cultural symbiosis 
(animal domestication/
plant cultivation);
metallurgy; irrigation
increased regularity of 
dietary intake (domesticated 
species); stronger tools; 
increased ecological capacity
10,000 Middle  East, 
Central 
America, Asia
organisation chiefdom/ 
city-state
institutionalized leadership 
with power to collect, store, 
and distribute surplus 
resources
7,500 Middle  East, 
Central 
America, Asia 
control symbolic representation 
(cuneiform writing,
alphabet); legal system; 
mathematics; money
sophisticated extra-somatic 
memory; regulation of social 
relations on principles other 
than kinship; system for 
managing technical 
information; coordination of 
market exchange
 5,000 Middle  East, 
Central 
America, Asia
Machine 
(Second  Agricultural)  
Transition 
energy watermill/ windmill; 
Medieval “agriculture 
transition”
muscles largely replaced as 
energy source; higher 
productivity levels
1,000 Europe/ China
organisation autocratic (feudal) state centrally directed super-
institution 
800 Europe/ China
control “measuring 
instruments”
(mechanical clock,
astrolabe);
printing press;
science
“active” information 
processing by artifacts; 
widespread dissemination of 
information; organized 
knowledge acquisition
500 Europe/ China
Steam 
(Industrial) Transition
energy steam more efficient, portable 
power source
250 Europe, USA
organisation democratic nation state, 
corporation
increased institutional 
stability (through 
legitimation), financial risk 
reduction(limited liability)
250 Europe, USA
 control canal, road and rail 
systems
greatly reduced transport 
costs
200 Europe, USA
Electricity
(Cartel)
 Transition
energy electricity systematic urban 
infrastructure for power 
generation and distribution
150 Europe, USA
organisation international cartels; 
‘Taylorist’ shop floors; 
collaborative international 
production; scientific 
150 Europe, USA
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industrial research 
laboratories
management of production
 control telegraph/
telephone; bureaucracy; 
advertising
information transmission at a 
distance; rapid circulation of 
people; continuity 
management within state; 
mass manipulation of 
consumer motivation
120 Europe, USA
Engine 
(Multinational)
Transition
energy oil/internal combustion 
engine
efficient, portable power 90 USA, Europe
organisation multinational agency
(e.g., UN); multi-
national corporation 
(e.g., Standard Oil, 
Microsoft)
supra-national government; 
international capitalism
70 USA, Europe
 control mass media (radio, 
TV); mass production; 
computer
fast, broad-scale information 
dissemination; standardized 
production; universal 
computation
60 USA, Europe
Nuclear
(Globalization)
 Transition
energy nuclear reactors controlled atomic fission 40 USA, Europe
organisation global markets; World 
Wide Web
significant international 
capital flows and 
investment; globalized social 
and economic network
30 USA, Europe
 control digital media unified representation 
system for multi-modal data
15 USA, Europe
Table 6: A theoretical selection of cosmic outcomes, by Robert Aunger (2007b).
Original title: “First known instances of non-equilibrium steady-state transitions”
* Dates in years before present; present taken to be year 2000. Uncertain dates include ‘(?)’.”
Which cosmic outcomes  are  contingent  and evolutionary?  Which ones  are 
necessary  and  developmental?  Are  there  attractors  in  the  dynamic  of  cosmic 
evolutionary development? To answer these issues, we need to explore the robustness 
of the emergence of complexity. Stated otherwise, if we would re-run the tape of the 
universe, would galaxies, stars, biology and technology arise again and again? The 
straightforward way to answer those question, in parallel to a theoretical rational like 
Aunger's, is indeed to re-run the tape of the universe. Let us now examine how we can 
conceptualize and operationalize this idea.
6.3.3  Robustness in Cosmic Evolution
what would remain the same if the tape of life were replayed?
Stephen Jay Gould (1990)
 what would remain the same if the tape of the universe were replayed?
Paraphrasing Gould's question to the universe (Vidal 2008b).
Answering  this  later  question,  Paul  Davies  (1998,  317) wrote  that  if  “the 
universe were re-run a second time, there would be no solar system, no Earth and no 
people. But the emergence of life and consciousness somewhere and somewhen in the 
cosmos is, I believe, assured by the underlying laws of nature.” This claim, as Davies 
acknowledges,  is  only  an  informed  intuition.  How  can  we  test  this  intuition  or 
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different ones scientifically? This is the issue of the robustness of the emergence of  
complexity in cosmic evolution. 
A first analyze of the tape metaphor shows its limits. Indeed, if the tape and its 
player were perfect, we should get exactly the same results when re-running the tape. 
So, the thought experiment would be trivial. Yet if our universe self-constructs, one 
question is whether small fluctuations, chance events, noise or random perturbations 
would lead to slightly different outcomes, or very different ones. This makes the issue 
of robustness in cosmic evolution highly stimulating.
This issue is very hard to tackle because of a great weakness of cosmology as 
a science: it has only one object of study, our unique universe. More precisely, we can 
distinguish two fundamental limitations that Ellis (2007a, 1216) pointed out:
Thesis A1: The universe itself cannot be subjected to physical experimentation. 
We cannot re-run the universe with the same or altered conditions to see what would happen if  
they  were  different,  so  we  cannot  carry  out  scientific  experiments  on  the  universe  itself. 
Furthermore,
Thesis  A2:  The  universe  cannot  be  observationally  compared  with  other 
universes.  We cannot  compare the universe with any similar  object,  nor can we test  our 
hypotheses about  it by observations determining statistical properties of a known class of  
physically existing universes.
Our thesis is that it is possible to address those limitations and the issue of robustness 
by running computer simulations of our universe. It is important to note that if we 
replay the tape of  our universe, we don't aim to actually explore the full space of 
possible universes. Here, we only aim to assess the robustness of the emergence of the 
different cosmic outcomes. We thus vary only nondeterministic dynamical parameters 
we  discussed  above  (quantum mechanical  effect,  random perturbations,  nonlinear 
chaotic  dynamics,  etc.).  An  open  question  is  also  how  we  vary  the  random 
parameters.  How often? How strong is  the variation? Various distributions can be 
tested, from gaussian distributions, where most random variations are of an average 
strength, few are weak or strong; to power-law distributions, where there are few very 
strong  variations,  some  medium  variations,  and  most  of  the  time  weak  random 
variations.
Because of the inclusion of such unpredictable parameters, it makes sense to 
re-run the same universe simulation. By running a multitude of times the simulation, 
it  is  possible  to  make  statistics  on  the  emergence  of  complexity.  An  even  more 
straightforward  way  to  make  such  statistics  would  be  to  drastically  intensify 
astrobiology –the search for extraterrestrials. If or when we will find extraterrestrials, 
we  would  be  able  to  progressively  study  the  “natural  re-runs”  of  complexity.  In 
particular,  searching for  extraterrestrials  more complex than us  would force us  to 
break with the implicit anthropocentric assumption that life and humans on Earth are 
the highest development in cosmic evolution. Such search invites us to think about the 
existence of higher cosmic outcomes, and this opens the way to test our theories of the 
general evolution of cosmic complexity. We will discuss more in depth the search for 
extraterrestrials in Chapter 9.  
An example of such ambitious simulations of our universe are the Millenium 
run simulations (Springel et al. 2005; Boylan-Kolchin et al. 2009; Guo et al. 2011). 
The authors studied the formation, evolution and clustering of galaxies and quasars 
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within the standard (or concordance) model of cosmology. Although they did not run 
the same simulation in its full complexity many times, the volume space explored is 
large  enough  to  extract  meaningful  statistical  properties  on  the  evolution  of  the 
distribution of matter.
Replaying  the  tape  of  our  entire  universe  is  still  a  much  more  ambitious 
project, which at present remains unrealistic. We should remain aware that our current 
models and their associated free parameters are most likely not the ultimate ones. Of 
course, new theories need to be developed to know what the key parameters of our 
universe are.  In the meantime, a way to progress is  to break down the issue into 
smaller solvable problems. For example, if we want to tackle the robustness up to the 
emergence  of  intelligent  life,  we  can  write  a  generalized  Drake  equation  (Ellis, 
Kirchner, and Stoeger 2004, 925) that I call the Cosmic Evolution Equation:
Nlife(m*) = Ng · NS ·  fS · fp · ne · fl ·  fi
where Nlife(m*) is the number of planets with intelligent life in our particular universe 
m*; and
(1) Ng is the number of galaxies in the model
(2) NS is the average number of stars per galaxy
(3) fS  is the fraction of stars suitable for life
(4) fp   is the fraction of such stars with planetary systems
(5) ne is the mean number of planets which are suitable habitats for life
(6) fl  is the fraction of planets on which life originates
(7) fi  is the fraction of life bearing planets with intelligent life.
There are  many implicit  assumptions in such a  framework,  for  example that  life-
supporting stars will be Sun-like; or that life starts necessarily on planets and not on 
more exotic places. We also implicitly assume that the parameters are independent. To 
deal with dependent parameters, one would need to introduce a bayesian probability 
framework. Additionally, we may have clear definitions of what stars or galaxies are, 
but the issues of defining higher cosmic outcomes such as life or intelligence remain 
of huge scientific debate.
The factors Ng and NS can nowadays be estimated, while the recent explosion 
of exoplanets  discoveries is  allowing us to  estimate more and more  precisely the 
factors  fS · fp · ne. However, huge uncertainties remain regarding the last two factors fl 
·  fi. 
The  main  benefit  of  such a  framework –whether  we consider  these  seven 
factors to be most relevant or others– is that we can in a first approximation estimate 
the factors independently. Additionally, the more we progress in our knowledge of the  
universe,  the  larger  the  distance  between  factors  we  can  assess.  For  example, 
assessing the number of  planets  with intelligent  life  knowing only the number of 
galaxies seems very hard. But shorter distances between factors are easier to assess. 
For example, Miller's (1953) famous experiment tells us that the probability to have 
amino acids out of a primordial soup and some energy source is high. Which is indeed 
an important insight to evaluate ne · fl . 
Let us now imagine that we run multiple times a model of our entire universe 
m*. We would be able to interpret the results of the multiple runs of the simulations as 
a  set  of  virtual universes.  We  would  end  up  with  a  distribution  function  f(m*) 
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combining the probability distributions obtained for each factor. However, we need to 
further  specify  a  possibility  space,  which  in  this  case  is  M* resulting  from  the 
variation  of  random parameters  only;  and a  measure  π* on  M* .  Such a  virtual 
ensemble of simulated universes V would thus be defined as:
V = {M*, π*, f(m*)}
 
The number of planets with intelligent life would then be:
Nlife(m*) = ʃf(m*) · Ng · NS ·  fS · fp · ne · fl ·  fi · π*
Note that the integral is necessary to normalize the result according to the measure π* 
and distribution function  f(m*). There are important and subtle issues to make this 
normalization sound and possible (see again Ellis, Kirchner, and Stoeger 2004). 
Let us give some more concrete possible results such simulation studies would 
bring. We might conclude that our universe is robust in galaxy-formation, i.e. most 
simulation runs lead to galaxy formation. However, it might turn out that our universe 
is not robust for intelligent life, i.e. most simulations do not lead to the emergence of 
intelligent life. 
We can now take a fresh eye on our question: are cosmic outcomes necessary 
or contingent? We can define a cosmic outcome as necessary if it appears again and 
again as we re-run the same universe, as  contingent otherwise. For example, let us 
take the DNA code in biology: is it necessary that there is a unique DNA code for 
terrestrial  or extraterrestrial  biology? In biology, this general  question is  a dispute 
regarding on whether evolution is  convergent  (see e.g. Gould 1990; and Conway-
Morris  2003 for  contrary viewpoints  and arguments).  But  here we generalize  this 
issue to the whole of cosmic evolution. An other example in economy: is it a necessity 
in civilizational development that monetary systems converge to a common currency? 
We can also compare the cosmic outcome selections. On the one hand we 
would have the ones resulting from “simulation experiments” (see e.g. Kleijnen et al. 
2005 for a discussion of this idea of simulation experiments); and on the other hand 
the  theoretical  considerations  (such  as  Aunger's).  Simulation  experiments in 
cosmology can play the role that  empirical experiments play in other sciences. This 
approach can be called “cosmology in silico” or “computational cosmology”. In fact, 
these  endeavors  are  already  developing  quickly,  as  illustrated  by  the  Virgo 
Consortium for Cosmological Supercomputer Simulations.
We have just begun to explore how robust the emergence of complexity in our 
universe  is.  If  we  want  to  understand  it  better,  we  need  to  perform  computer 
simulations and use existing conceptual, mathematical and statistical tools to design 
the simulation experiments and to assess the results.
However interesting and important this enterprise  is,  it  does not  tackle  the 
fine-tuning  issue.  Indeed,  in  studying  the  robustness  of  our  universe,  we  try  to 
understand the emergence of complexity in  our universe,  whereas to address fine-
tuning we must study the place of our particular universe in  the space of possible 
universes. 
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6.3.4  Artificial Cosmogenesis or the study of alternative Cosmic 
Evolutions
Now, we create a considerable problem. For we are tempted to make 
statements of comparative reference regarding the properties of our 
observable Universe with respect to the alternative universes we can 
imagine possessing different values of their foundamental constants. But 
there is only one Universe; where do we find the other possible universes 
against which to compare our own in order to decide how fortunate it is 
that all these remarkable coincidences that are necessary for our own 
evolution actually exist?
(Barrow and Tipler 1986, 6)
you might end up having a future subject which is “comparative 
universality” – we have all these laws for the universe that cannot be 
eliminated as ours and you study them, you talk about them, you compare 
them, this could be a future subject. Students would be required to pass 
exams on their ten possible favorite universes ...
Gregory Chaitin in (Chaitin et al. 2011, 339)
This first quote by Barrow and Tipler summarizes the core problem of fine-tuning. 
The second quote by Chaitin illustrates a core idea towards its resolution. With the 
robustness  issue,  we have  focused on  our universe.  To assess  to  what  extent  our 
universe  is  fine-tuned,  we  must  study  the  place  of  our  universe  in  the  space  of  
possible universes. We call this space the virtual multiverse. 
Let  us  first  call  a  fecund universe a  universe  generating  at  least  as  much 
complexity as our own. Are fecund universes rare or common in the multiverse? This 
is  the  core  issue  of  fine-tuning.  Answering  it  demands  to  explore  this  virtual 
multiverse. Milan Ćirković (2009) and I both converged on this conclusion. Ćirković 
used the  metaphor of  sailing the archipelago of  possible  universes;  I  proposed to 
perform  simulations  of  possible  universes,  an  endeavor  called  Artificial 
Cosmogenesis (or ACosm, see Vidal 2008b; 2010a; 2012a). Such simulations would 
enable us not only to understand our own universe (with “real-world modelling”, or 
processes-as-we-know-them) but also other possible universes (with “artificial-world 
modelling”,  or  processes-as-they-could-be).  We  thus  need  to  develop  methods, 
concepts and simulation tools to explore the space of possible universes (the “cosmic 
landscape” as Leonard Susskin (2005) calls it in the framework of string theory). In 
(Vidal 2008b), I proposed to call this new field of research Artificial Cosmogenesis 
because it  sets forth a “general  cosmology”, in analogy with Artificial Life which 
appeared with the help of computer simulations to enquiry about a “general biology”. 
However, recent work on the EvoGrid10 simulation project suggests that the growth of 
complexity  is  more  likely  to  remain  open-ended  if  stochastic,  non-deterministic 
processing is used at the bottom, instead of deterministic rules, like in ALife. So I do 
not mean to strictly limit ACosm to deterministic rules. 
10 http://www.evogrid.org
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Now that we have a framework to define possible universes, we will need to 
generalize the “Cosmic Evolution Equation” we used to assess the robustness of our 
universe to explore not only our universe m*, but also all universes m element of the 
wider class of possible universes  M. This constitutes a rigorous approach to assess 
how fine-tuned our universe is. However, it is important to understand that the results 
of such studies would not ipso facto provide an explanation of fine-tuning. Only if it 
turns out that our kind of complex universe is common, then an explanation of fine-
tuning would be a principle of fecundity: “there is no fine-tuning, because intelligent 
life of some form will emerge under extremely varied circumstances” (Tegmark et al. 
2006, 4).
We saw that most fine-tuning arguments just change one parameter at a time 
and conclude that the resulting universe is not fit for developing complexity. We saw 
it  leads  to  the  “one-factor-at-a-time”  paradox.  What  if  we  would  change  several 
parameters  at  the  same  time?  Systematically  exploring  the  multiple  variation  of 
parameters seems like a  very cumbersome enterprise.  As Gribbin and Rees wrote 
(1991, 269): 
If we modify the value of one of the fundamental constants, something invariably 
goes wrong, leading to a universe that is inhospitable to life as we know it. When 
we  adjust  a  second  constant  in  an  attempt  to  fix  the  problem(s),  the  result, 
generally,  is  to create three new problems for every one that we “solve”. The 
conditions in our universe really do seem to be uniquely suitable for life forms 
like ourselves, and perhaps even for any form of organic complexity. 
Back  in  1991,  it  indeed  seemed  very  difficult  to  explore  and  find  alternative 
universes. However, a way to overcome this problem is to use computer simulations 
to test systematical modifications of parameters' values. In varying just one parameter, 
parameter sensitivity arguments have only begun to explore possible universes, like a 
baby  wetting  his  toes  for  the  first  time  on  the  seashore.  Surely,  we  had  to  start 
somewhere. But it is truly a tiny exploration. Furthermore, maybe there is a deep link 
between the different  constants and physical  laws, such that  it  makes no sense to 
change  just  one  parameter  at  a  time.  Changing  a  parameter  would  automatically 
perturb other parameters (see Bradford 2011, 1581). Fortunately, recent research have 
gone much further than these one-parameter variations.
What happens when we vary multiple parameters? Let us first generalize the 
Cosmic  Evolution  Equation,  which  this  time  includes  other  possible  cosmic 
evolutions –notice the plural! Let us imagine that we run multiple times simulations of 
different models of universes  m. We interpret the results of the multiple runs of the 
simulations as a set of virtual universes. We end up with a distribution function f(m) 
combining the probability distributions obtained for each factor of the CEE. Another 
way to choose distribution functions was developed by Schmidhuber (2000). He used 
theoretical computer science to study and choose distribution functions for possible 
universes.
The possibility space in this generalized case is the huge M resulting from the 
definition  of  possible  universes;  and  we  add  a  measure  π  on  M.  The  resulting 
ensemble of simulated universes E would thus be defined as:
E = {M, π, f(m)}
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The number of planets with intelligent life would then be:
Nlife(m) = ʃf(m) · Ng · NS ·  fS · fp · ne · fl ·  fi ·π
We are now talking about cosmic outcomes in other universes. The topic becomes 
quite speculative, because it is not clear at all  which cosmic outcomes are the most 
relevant to assess. The factors in the equation above might be totally irrelevant. What 
if other possible universes do not generate objects like galaxies, stars and planets, but 
completely different kinds of complex structures? Nothing that we know may evolve 
anymore... but other things might! We now see the fundamental importance to define 
cosmic outcomes and the emergence of complexity in a very general manner, so they 
can  also  apply  to  other  possible  universes.  Bradford  (2011) proposed  such  a 
framework  when  he  analyzed  sequences  of  entropy  reduction.  Aunger's  (2007a) 
systems theoretical approach in terms of energy innovation, organization and control 
is also a higher-level approach. Valentin Turchin  (1977) also proposed a cybernetic 
theory of complexity transitions with the central concept of  metasystem transition. 
Mark Bedau (2009) did also articulate this issue in details in the context of artificial 
life. Theoretical computer science measures such as algorithmic complexity (see e.g. 
Li and Vitányi 1997) or logical depth (C. H. Bennett 1988b) are also precious tools to 
assess the complexity of systems in a universal  manner.  But these are just  a  few 
examples of frameworks to tackle the general, fascinating and fundamental problems 
of the evolution and measure of complexity.
We already saw that  higher  outcomes  fl ·  fi   are harder  to  assess.  This is 
precisely where computer simulations can be very helpful.  Typically,  there  are  so 
many local interactions in the evolution of complex organisms that it is very hard to 
analyze them analytically with a deterministic or Newtonian approach. For example, 
there  is  not  one  single  equation  which  allows  to  predict  the  development  of  an 
embryo.     
Let  us  now  outline  some  remarkable  alternative  complex  universes  that 
researchers  recently  studied.  Gordon  McCabe  studied  variations  on  the  standard 
model of particles, by changing the geometrical structure of space-time. The result is 
not the end of any complexity, but just  the beginning of a new set  of elementary 
particles. McCabe (2007, 2:38) elaborates: 
Universes of a different dimension and/or geometrical signature, will possess a 
different  local  symmetry  group,  and  will  therefore  possess  different  sets  of 
possible elementary particles. Moreover, even universes of the same dimension 
and geometrical signature will not necessarily possess the same sets of possible 
particles. To reiterate, the dimension and geometrical signature merely determines 
the  largest  possible  local  symmetry group,  and universes  with different  gauge 
fields, and different couplings between the gauge fields and matter fields,  will 
possess different local symmetry groups, and, perforce, will possess different sets 
of possible particles. 
It thus seems that we can vary basic physics parameters without compromising all 
kinds of cosmic evolutions. Who knows what kind of complexity can emerge from 
this new set of particles?
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As an illustration of their framework to define the multiverse, Ellis, Kirchner 
and Stoeger  (2004) did examine some parameter variations in Friedmann-Lemaître-
Robertson-Walker (FLRW) models. They found life-allowing regions in a phase space 
described by the evolution of FLRW models. The fact that they found regions and not 
a  single point  in the phase space  shows that there is room for some variation. So it 
seems that  we can vary fundamental  geometrical  cosmological  parameters without 
precluding the apparition of life. 
Harnik, Kribs and Perez  (2006) constructed a universe without electroweak 
interactions  called  the  Weakless  Universe.  They  show that  by  adjusting  standard 
model and cosmological parameters, they are able to obtain
a universe that is remarkably similar to our own. This “Weakless Universe” has 
big-bang nucleosynthesis, structure formation, star formation, stellar burning with 
a wide range of timescales, stellar nucleosynthesis up to iron and slightly beyond, 
and  mechanisms  to  disperse  heavy  elements  through  type  Ia  supernovae  and 
stellar mergers.
This  is  a  truly  remarkable  result  because  the  cosmic  outcomes  are  numerous, 
relatively high and non trivial. Three factors in the CEE are addressed more or less 
directly:  Ng · NS · fS.  Maybe  strong  living  creatures  could  live  in  the  weakless 
universe? This remains to be investigated.
Anthony Aguire  (2001) did study a class of cosmological models “in which 
some or all of the cosmological parameters differ by orders of magnitude from the 
values they assume in the standard hot big-bang cosmology, without precluding in any 
obvious way the existence of intelligent life.”  This study also shows that it is possible 
to vary parameters widely without obviously harming the emergence of complexity as 
we know it. 
Robert Jaffe, Alejandro Jenkins and Itamar Kimchi (2008) pursued a detailed 
study  of  possible  universes  with  modified  quark  masses.  They  define  congenial 
worlds  the ones in  which  the quark  masses  allow organic  chemistry.  Again,  they 
found comfortable regions of congeniality.
Fred C. Adams (2008) has conducted a parametric survey of stellar stability. 
He found that  a  wide region of  the parameter  space  provides stellar  objects with 
nuclear fusion. He concludes that the “set of parameters necessary to support stars are 
not particularly rare.”
An early attempt to explore alternative universes with simulations has been 
proposed by Victor Stenger (1995; 2000). He has performed a remarkable simulation 
of  possible  universes.  He  considers  four  fundamental  constants,  the  strength  of 
electromagnetism α; the strong nuclear force αs, and the masses of the electron and the 
proton. He then analysed “100 universes in which the values of the four parameters 
were generated randomly from a range five orders of magnitude above to five orders 
of magnitude below their values in our universe, that is,  over a total range of ten 
orders of magnitude”  (Stenger 2000).  The distribution of stellar  lifetimes in those 
universes shows that most universes have stars that live long enough to allow stellar 
evolution  and heavy elements  nucleosynthesis.  Stengers'  initial  motivation  was to 
refute  fine-tuning  arguments,  which  is  why  he  ironically  baptised  his  simulation 
“MonkeyGod”. The implicit idea is that even a stupid monkey playing with cosmic 
parameters can create as much complexity as God.
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In conclusion, other possible universes are also fine-tuned for some sort of 
complexity!  Those  remarkable  studies  show consistently  that alternative  complex 
universes are possible. One might object that such explorations do not yet assess the 
higher  complexity  factors  in  the  CEE.  They  do  not  answer  the  following  key 
questions:  would  other  interesting  complex structures  like  planetary  systems,  life, 
intelligence or technology evolve in those other universes? However, these are only 
early attempts in  conceptualizing and simulating other possible universes,  and the 
enterprise is certainly worth pursuing. The fine-tuning issue could then be seriously 
tackled, because we would know more and more precisely the likelihood of having 
our universe as it  is, by comparing it to other possible universes. Such pioneering 
studies are just a beginning, and future studies will certainly discover more and more 
complex alternative universes.
6.3.5  Summary
Let us now summarize the three main steps necessary to assess how fine-tuned 
our universe is. 
(1) Define a space M of possible universes
(2) Explore this space
(3) Assess the place of our universe in M
Let us review step (1). Our analysis on the historical trends of free parameters 
in Chapter 5 invites us to start by a  weak variation, i.e. varying free parameters in 
physical and cosmological models. Why not vary the laws of physics themselves? It 
seems a very difficult enterprise, because we do not even know how to make them 
vary (see Vaas 1998)! It can also be dubious to do so, since we saw that the distinction 
between laws and initial or boundary conditions is fuzzy in cosmology (Ellis 2007a).
This suggestion to focus on weak variation makes most sense for the following 
reasons.  First,  it  is  concrete  and  operational,  and  has  a  clear  meaning  with  well 
established  physics.  Second,  we  assume  supernatural  miracles  happening  in  the 
middle of cosmic evolution to be –by definition– impossible. We assume there is a 
consistency and continuity  in  cosmic  evolution.  We hypothesize  that  higher  level 
parameters are ultimately reducible to these physics and cosmic ones. The emergent 
higher  levels  occur  naturalistically.  Of  course,  this  remains to  be  shown,  and for 
practical  purposes we might  include as given such higher level parameters in our 
studies  and simulations.  New levels  of  emergence,  new levels  of  complexity  did 
historically emerge from lower levels, even if complicated top-down causation occurs 
(see e.g. Ellis 2008). Take for example an economic law like the law of supply and 
demand.  It  did not  and could not  exist  before  the apparition  of  organized human 
civilizations. It emerged out of such new organizations. It seems that what we call 
“natural laws” could be the result of more and more regular interactions. For example, 
as the universe cooled down, new organizations did emerge. Again, it is clear that a 
few billion years ago, there was no economic laws. 
We also need to be more specific to apply probabilities to the ensemble of 
possible universes, and avoid probabilistic fallacies we described. For example, we 
must decide, arbitrarily or not, parameter's upper and lower bounds. This is necessary 
for  all  practical  purposes,  because  we  can't  explore  the  parameter  space  of  all 
parameters varying from - ∞ to + ∞. We thus need to define the maximum deviation 
allowed for each parameter. 
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We  must  beware  of  the  one-factor-at-a-time  paradox.  We  must  define  a 
probability measure on the parameter space. I refer the reader to (Koperski 2005) and 
(Ellis, Kirchner, and Stoeger 2004) for detailed arguments that measure-theoretical 
grounds can be specified to  assess fine-tuning. It  is  also crucial  to  define  cosmic 
outcomes to specify the object of fine-tuning we aim to address. Do we talk about 
fine-tuning for nucleosynthesis? atoms? Stars? Life? Intelligence? Or a more general 
complexity emergence?
Step (2) requires to explore this space. The simplest exploration is to re-run 
the tape of  our universe.  But  this only tackles  the issue of  the  robustness of  the 
universe. If we want to address the fine-tuning issue we must also run and re-run tapes 
of  other  possible  universes.  This  will  bring  us  insights  into  how  our  and  other 
universes  are  parameter  sensitive,  and  how  they  generate  complex  outcomes. 
Although we always need good theoretical models to start with, it is necessary to use 
computer simulations to explore the huge parameter landscape we are talking about. 
That landscape is not just very big, but really huge. Because we do not want to and do 
not have the resources to explore the space blindly, it also makes most sense to use 
simulations to test particular hypotheses and theories. As we will see in Chapter 8, if 
we consider Lee Smolin's cosmological natural selection theory, and find alternative 
universes  with  more  black  holes  (the  cosmic  outcome  under  consideration)  by 
tweaking parameters, it is a way to falsify the theory.
The  last  step  (3)  is  to  compare  the  distribution  functions  of  the  cosmic 
outcomes of interests to the space M of possible universes. In other words, we assess 
the  probability  to  find  a  universe  with  outcome  O.  Note  that  this  is  the  crucial 
difference between tackling the robustness and the fine-tuning issue. In robustness 
analysis,  we  run  multiple  times  the  same universe  simulation  changing  only  the 
random dynamical parameters. We compare multiple runs of the same universe. In 
fine-tuning analysis, we run multiple different universe simulations, changing a wide 
number of parameters. We compare our universe to the set of possible universes. How 
typical or atypical is our universe in the space of possible universes? The results of 
such simulation experiments will enable us to answer this question. Ideally, we will be 
in a position to assess the likelihood or unlikelihood of complexity emergence in the 
space of  possible  universes.  Even better than assessing specific  cosmic outcomes, 
which  might  bias  us  to  a  universe-centric  perspective,  we  can  aim to  assess  the 
probability  to  find  universes  which  display  open-ended  evolutionary  mechanisms 
leading to ever increasingly complex cosmic outcomes. 
To  the  traditionally  trained cosmologist,  this  enterprise  might  seem totally 
unconventional.  And it  is.  This  is  why I  chose  to  give  it  a  new name,  artificial  
cosmogenesis.  It  might  also seem  out  of  reach given the  computational  resources 
needed. As we will see in Chapter 7, the sheer computational resources grow more 
than exponentially, this allows us in principle to increase accordingly the complexity 
and richness of our computer simulations.
However, computer simulations, even given huge computational resources, is 
not the whole of the story. It is only a necessary condition to solve these issues. We 
still need theories and fundamental understanding to set up simulations, know what to 
look for in the resulting data, and interpret the results. 
Additionally, engineers and professional model makers have developed a wide 
variety of tools to test multiple variables, rarely used in cosmological contexts. Let us 
just mention of few of them. A starting point is to use the tools of global sensitivity 
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analysis  (see  e.g.  A.  Saltelli,  Ratto,  and  Andres  2008).  These  include  advanced 
statistical  approaches  such  as  latin  hypercube  sampling,  multivariate  stratified 
sampling; Montecarlo simulations for finding dynamic confidence intervals. Systems 
dynamics and engineering have also many tools to offer such as phase portraits or 
probabilistic  designs.  The  classic  book  by  John  D.  Sterman  (2000) remains  a 
reference and quite comprehensive introductory book on complex systems modeling 
and simulations.
Let us now be scrupulous. What is a proof a fine-tuning? Let n be the number 
of free parameters. We have a logical and statistical version of what a proof of fine-
tuning would be:
Logical proof of fine-tuning:  If you vary one parameter, there exists no possible universe  
generating  outcome  O  by  adjusting  the  (n - 1) other  parameters. 
Which is equivalent to:
if you vary one parameter, there is no way whatsoever that all other possible universes can  
generate outcome O.
Probabilistic proof of fine-tuning: If you vary one parameter, adjusting the  (n - 1) other 
parameters won't make outcome O more likely.  
Which is equivalent to:
if you vary one parameter, there is no way whatsoever that all other possible universes can  
generate outcome O with a higher probability.
In sum, you need to have explored the relevant parameter space of possible universes 
to make serious claims about fine-tuning. Pretty hard to prove! This is even harder for 
outcomes as advanced as life or intelligence. 
Our conclusion is  not the one of Stenger  (2011, 22) that “the universe looks 
just like it  should if it  were not fine-tuned for humanity”. However, note that this 
quote  reflects  Stenger's  opinion.  Stenger  focuses  on  showing  that  theological 
arguments from design using fine-tuning are inconclusive. Criticizing and debunking 
arguments using fine-tuning claims is one thing, proving that our universe is not fine-
tuned for intelligent life another. 
Our conclusion is not either the opposite one of Barnes (2012, 561):
We conclude that the universe is fine-tuned for the existence of life. Of all the 
ways that the laws of nature, constants of physics and initial conditions of the 
universe  could  have  been,  only  a  very  small  subset  permits  the  existence  of 
intelligent life.
Indeed, it is a much stronger claim compared to the parameter space he reviews, and 
the cosmic outcomes he considers. This is despite the fact that Barnes (2012, 531) has 
well understood that the scientific way to progress on fine-tuning is by exploring the 
space of alternative possible universes, i.e. to engage in artificial cosmogenesis:
What  is  the  evidence  that  FT  is  true?  We  would  like  to  have  meticulously 
examined  every  possible  universe  and  determined  whether  any  form  of  life 
evolves. Sadly, this is currently beyond our abilities.
So, Barnes' conclusion hinges on the assumption that we have explored enough of the 
space of possible universes to make meaningful extrapolations. He continues: 
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Instead, we rely on simplified models and more general arguments to step out into 
possible-physics-space. If the set of life-permitting universes is small amongst the 
universes that we have been able to explore, then we can reasonably infer that it is 
unlikely that the trend will be miraculously reversed just beyond the horizon of 
our knowledge.
Given parameter sensitivity, fecund universes are likely to be rare, so this intuition 
may well be correct, but should certainly not considered as a proof, given the tiny 
exploration of the space that humanity did up to now. 
 Our  conclusion  is  rather  that  fine-tuning for  life  or  intelligence remains  a 
conjecture. Like in mathematics, we have strong reasons to believe the conjecture is 
true, but a proof is out of reach and certainly requires a huge amount of work. As a 
matter of fact, the challenge of simulating possible universes and comparing them is 
overwhelming. This is why the concept of the cosmic outcome is so important to ease 
the process. Indeed, we can break down the problem and progress by tackling higher 
and higher outcomes, with more and more connection between outcomes. We don't 
need nor can assess all outcomes at once. As our understanding, modeling capacities 
and computational resources increase, we can be more ambitious in simulating more 
and more as well as higher and higher outcomes in cosmic evolution. Tomorrow's 
cosmology is not restricted to empirical observations or highly theoretical models. It 
is also the science of simulating and experimenting with alternative universes.
Surprisingly, as we will see in Chapter 8, this quest to understand our origins 
through the examination of parameter sensitivity and fine-tuning might give us clues, 
insights and tools to successfully deal with our far-future. We have now framed how 
to evaluate fine-tuning seriously, but still haven't seen possible explanations. We will 
now  review  classical  explanations,  and  then  in  Chapter  8  two  evolutionary 
explanations: Cosmological Natural Selection and Cosmological Artificial Selection.  
6.4  Classical Fine-tuning Explanations
God or Multiverse?
We don't need these hypotheses to study fine-tuning...
 ...but we may need them to explain fine-tuning.
I went into much detail to define the fine-tuning issue precisely to allow its 
scientific study. I was addressing the question “Is there fine-tuning?”. My conclusion 
is that at most it is a conjecture, a proof being largely out of reach. More specifically, 
we saw that  parameter  sensitivity  is  different  from fine-tuning and is  in  fact  not 
surprising. Rick Bradford has shown that parameter sensitivity can be expected in any 
complex universe. Therefore, it is not surprising that varying one parameter would not 
lead to an interesting complex universe. But the problem of why we happen to inhabit 
a  parameter  sensitive  universe  in  the  space  of  possible  universes  remains  open. 
Suppose the fine-tuning conjecture is true. How can we explain fine-tuning? What are 
the possible explanations? 
144
I now briefly review the main “classical” explanations:  skepticism,  necessity, 
fecundity,  god-of-the-gaps,  chance-of-the-gaps,  WAP-of-the-gaps,  multiverse and 
design.  I  will  treat  two  additional  evolutionary  explanation  in  Chapter  8, 
cosmological natural selection and cosmological artificial selection. Once we analyze 
these possible solutions, we naturally tend to jump to the next arduous issues: the 
metaphysical ones  (see e.g. Parfit 1998). Indeed, whatever X your answer to fine-
tuning, you can ask: “Why is there X in the first place? Where did X come from?” To 
tackle those more speculative and metaphysical questions, we will in Chapter 8 not 
consider fine-tuning in isolation, but in connection with another great issue: our far-
future. 
6.4.1  Skepticism
Skeptics challenge that  fine-tuning would be an issue at all.  As we saw, it 
stems from difficulties in defining probabilities rigorously  (e.g. Colyvan, Garfield, 
and Priest 2005; McGrew, McGrew, and Vestrup 2001). However, we saw that with 
additional  measure-theoretical  considerations  and  hypotheses,  authors  are  able  to 
overcome this obstacle (see e.g. Koperski 2005; Ellis, Kirchner, and Stoeger 2004). 
Furthermore, if something like ACosm is pursued, probabilities can be derived 
from datasets resulting from simulation runs. They can then be treated with statistical 
tools  as  any  other  data  in  science.  There  would  be  no  room for  such  arguments 
anymore.
It  is  always  possible  to  remain  skeptic  on  any  issue.  Critical  reasoning 
(philosophical  dimension  4)  is  helpful  for  stimulating  dialectical  (philosophical 
dimension 5) discussions, but misses the connection with real world problems, and 
thus the first-order dimensions of our worldviews. The skeptical position is of second-
order nature, and thus does not even consider the issue worth an explanation. In sum, 
it is not even a position. I included it here however for comprehensiveness.
6.4.2  Necessity
The core of this position is that the key issue is free parameters, not fine-tuning. Since 
a lot of parameters have been captured in the past, there is no reason this trend would 
end. There is a mathematical or physical necessity in the fundamental parameters and 
laws that is still to be discovered. This question can be tackled by a scientific theory 
that could derive the values of these parameters. Therefore no parameters would be 
left to be fine-tuned, and the fine-tuning issue would be solved. It would lead to a 
“theory of everything” or ultimate explanation. That position is logically possible... 
but remains to be proven. 
This reasoning is the implicit position of most physicists because it seems to 
be the most  scientific  approach.  However,  it  is  unlikely that  all constants  will  be 
deduced from a theory. We need input from the physical reality at a certain point. The 
underlying assumption is that “nature is as it is because this is the only possible nature 
consistent with itself” (Chew 1968). On this camp, researchers might argue that it is 
certainly  wiser  to  interpret  the  size  of  the  possible  multiverse  as  the  size  of  our 
ignorance.   
Furthermore, even assuming it is possible, we saw many problems of a zero 
parameters theory as we examined Tegmark's proposal of the mathematical universe 
(see section 5.3 The Mathematical Universe, 94). It leads to a strange situation where 
physics and mathematics merge.
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Additionally, there is a tension between the logic of atomism and the desire of 
unification (Smolin 1997, 59). On the one hand, elementary particles have absolute, 
independent properties. On the other hand, unification requires that all particles and 
forces are manifestations of a single principle.  Can we reconcile the two? Smolin 
argues that such a desire for unification should stop. We also saw that such a position 
is almost mystical with an underlying “dream of a final theory” (see section 5.3 The
Mathematical Universe, 94). 
On top of that, in the last decades, the most active attempts to find a unique 
theory were within the framework of string theory. But instead of producing a unique 
theory, it lead to a huge landscape of possible theories. Then we face the problem of 
choosing a theory! As Smolin (2006, 159) writes, if “an attempt to construct a unique 
theory of nature leads instead to 10500 theories, that approach has been reduced to 
absurdity.”
But let's assume that those obstacles and objections can be overcome. What if 
we would end up with only one possible universe? Ellis (2007a, 1254) argues: 
Uniqueness of fundamental physics resolves the parameter freedom only at the 
expense of creating an even deeper mystery, with no way of resolution apparent. 
In effect, the nature of the unified fundamental force would be pre-ordained to 
allow, or even encourage, the existence of life; but there would be no apparent 
reason why this should be so.
This is correct, but that time, the mystery would be  metaphysical:  why something 
rather than nothing? Ellis is concerned about a genuine ultimate theory. However, we 
must acknowledge that such a hypothetical theory would solve the fine-tuning issue, 
albeit not the metaphysical one. Again, the metaphysical mystery of existence would 
remain whatever our explanation of fine-tuning (see also Vidal 2012a). 
Actively  pursuing  the  reduction  of  free  parameters  is  the  approach  most 
faithful to physics. However, it is unlikely to succeed to its upmost extrapolation up to 
zero parameter. 
In fact there are two opposite views on the matter:  necessity and  fecundity. 
Martin Gardner (1986) reminds us that the former is the view “that only one kind of 
universe is possible – the one we know. This was skillfully defended by the Harvard 
chemist  Lawrence  Henderson”.  The opposite  fecundity view comes from Leibniz, 
who “argued exactly the opposite. He believed an infinity of universes are logically 
possible and that God selected the one he liked best.” Let us consider the fecundity 
response more closely... and without God.  
6.4.3  Fecundity
The principle of fecundity is that “intelligent life of some form will emerge 
under extremely varied circumstances” (Tegmark et al. 2006, 4). Let us imagine that 
we have enough data from simulations or unforeseen theoretical argument to precisely 
assess the fecundity explanation. Two results are logically possible. Either we find 
that fecund universes are common, or they are not. If they are common, no more fine-
tuning explanation is needed, and it would indeed solve the fine-tuning issue. But the 
problem then shifts  to  a  metaphysical  one.  Why would  there  be  so  many fecund 
universes in the first place? Is it due to a special universe generating mechanism? If 
so, doesn't it require further explanation? 
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On the contrary, if we find that fecund universes are rare, the fine-tuning issue 
is not solved, and this needs further explanation. The limit case is reached if it turns 
out that there is only one possible universe, ours. Then we are back to the necessity 
explanation. Our universe wouldn't be fine-tuned, because there was simply no other 
option. Note that the study of alternative complex universes (outlined in section 6.3.4 
Artificial Cosmogenesis or the study of alternative Cosmic Evolutions, p137) already 
rules out this possibility for cosmic outcomes as high as star formation and heavy 
element dispersion. The question remains open only for higher outcomes such as life 
or intelligence. 
As  a  warning,  it  is  easy  to  manipulate  the  results  of  arguments  regarding 
fecundity,  simply by changing the definition of possible  universes.  If  we  a priori 
consider a small set  M of possible universes, the fecundity principle may easily be 
satisfied. If on the other hand, we consider a very widely defined M, then our kind of 
universe may be rarer in this space  M.  To gain further insights,  we will  need to 
explore the space M, both with theoretical considerations and computer simulations. 
6.4.4  God-of-the-gaps
God as both the creator and the fine-tuner of the universe is a popular view. It 
is in a certain sense an elegant solution, because it solves both the existence problem 
(metaphysical) and the fine-tuning problem at the same time. One could even argue 
that God as the great architect has had a very positive influence on the development of 
science. In this view of God, popular in medieval times, God doesn't intervene. She 
just  gives  a  blueprint,  which  is  very  different  from  a  controlling  God.  Such  a 
conception allows the development of science, because science consists in finding 
God's  laws,  which  are  nothing  else  than  physical  laws.  Doing  science  was  then 
equivalent to seek and worship God. 
God as  a  key feature  in  a  comprehensive  theological  worldview is  a  very 
consistent position. As we saw in details in Part I, a theological worldview scores high 
on  many  subjective  and  intersubjective  criteria.  In  this  philosophical  –and  not 
theological– work, I will not explore further this option because the problems of fine-
tuning and creation shift to theology. 
Obviously, as a rational explanation for fine-tuning, God suffers from the God-
of-the-gaps  critique.  Whatever  issue  remains  unexplained  in  our  worldview,  fine-
tuning or other, God can fill the gap.
6.4.5  Chance-of-the-gaps
The laws of physics and the parameters of our universe just happened by chance. 
There  is  nothing more  to  explain  here.  Scientifically,  this  is  an  empty  statement, 
which is not better than the God-of-the-gaps. As Ellis (2007a, 1258) wrote, “from this 
viewpoint there is really no difference between design and chance, for they have not 
been shown to lead to different physical predictions.” It is logically similar to the God 
(or  design)  explanation,  and  so  it  is  better  qualified  as  a  chance-of-the-gaps 
explanation.  
6.4.6  WAP-of-the-gaps
According to  this  view,  we first  start  by  claiming a  universality  principle 
according to which “all that can happen, happens” (Rees 1999; 2001; Tegmark 2004). 
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Then we add a selection effect such as the weak anthropic principle (WAP), which 
bias us to think that our universe is special. But this is not the case. Our universe as a 
whole might seem fine-tuned, but the multiverse is not. 
Such a reasoning can indeed make our existence less astonishing. But at what 
price!  Obviously,  such an option assumes the multiverse hypothesis,  but  does not 
support it (N. Bostrom 2002, 23). It does not causally explain existence of observers. 
As Swinburne (1990, 171) argues, the “laws of nature and boundary conditions cause 
our existence, we do not cause theirs.” Again, selection effects don't causally explain 
things.  The  ambiguous  expression  “anthropic  principle”  is  often  used  as  a 
combination of both the weak anthropic principle as a selection effect and an actually 
existing multiverse. The two combined would indeed provide an explanation of fine-
tuning.
In addition to the strong ontological claim, multiverse theories are notoriously 
hard if not impossible to test. As long as multiverse theories remain untestable, such 
theorizing can solve fine-tuning... or any other problem. There may be more subtle 
multiverse proposals to solve the fine-tuning issue, that we will now consider.
To sum up, from a scientific point of view, appealing to God, Chance or a 
universality principle with the WAP as a selection effect work everywhere and explain 
everything, anything ...  and nothing. Those options are last-aid kits  of intellectual 
survival.
6.4.7  Multiverse
A multiverse must be a physically realized multiverse and not a 
hypothetical or conceptual one if it is to have genuine explanatory power.
(Ellis 2007a, 1260)
Virtual  universes  generated  by  computer  simulations  we  discussed  do  not 
constitute any explanation of fine-tuning. They provide a rigorous framework only for 
the  study of  fine-tuning.  The  bottom line  is  that  we can study possible  universes 
without making claims about their existence or nonexistence.  It suffice to study a 
virtual multiverse, not an actual one. This is why so far we have not taken a position 
regarding the actual existence of a multiverse. 
Now, how can we use the multiverse hypothesis to explain fine-tuning? As 
Ellis writes above, we must first assume an actually existing multiverse. Can we use 
the multiverse hypothesis in a more subtle way than the WAP-of-the-gaps? Yes we 
can! For example, the theory of eternal inflation (Linde 1990) allows to calculate the 
free  parameters  of  other  possible  universes.  The  universe  generation  mechanism 
constrains the parameter variation in an actual multiverse space M. Other multiverse 
options might also be considered (see e.g. Tegmark 2004; Smolin 2012).
The  key  and  arduous  issue  is  then  to  find  smart  ways  to  test  such  bold 
hypotheses. The testability is certainly very limited, maybe only available with multi-
domain universes, and not to actually disconnected space-time regions (Ellis 2007b). 
Additionally, as with other options, the ultimate explanation is not addressed. Where 
does the multiverse comes from? How and why do the various universes exist and 
reproduce? From what? From which principles? This shifts the fine-tuning issue to the 
problem of the existence of a universe-generation mechanism. 
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6.4.8  Design
In this stance, our universe is the result of a purposeful design. Importantly, 
the agent responsible  for design is  not necessarily a supernatural  theistic God  (N. 
Bostrom 2002, 11–12). Of course, this is the most typical option, which leads to the 
God explanation. But logically, it needs not to be. 
Can we imagine naturalistic and not supernatural design? Certainly. Systems 
exhibiting features of design such as teleology or parameter sensitivity can emerge 
both from natural selection processes, for example a living organism, (see Dawkins 
1996) or from artificial processes such as engineering (e.g. a watch). A middle way 
between the two is found in artificial selection, where intentional breeding allows to 
select traits over others.
What if the same applies to the universe as a whole? In Chapter 8, we will see 
in more detail two such options, Cosmological Natural Selection and  Cosmological  
Artificial Selection. As usual, we have to recognize lurking metaphysical issues. How 
could  we  prove  naturalistic  design?  How  scientific  is  this  approach?  Aren't 
supernatural and natural design explanations banned from science?  Can we avoid the 
“design-of-the-gaps” trap?
6.5  Conclusion
We saw logical, probabilistic and physical fallacies around fine-tuning which 
are rarely avoided. The most striking logical fallacy is to vary just one parameter at a 
time, which drastically reduces the exploration of the parameter space. The use of 
probabilities is an essential step in formulating the fine-tuning argument. But it needs 
careful additional hypotheses to make it  cogent (e.g. choices of probability theory 
framework, of a measure, of a distribution function). The physics underlying fine-
tuning arguments is often wrong. Many fallacies occur and reoccur.  
Many  authors  mix  fine-tuning  with  other  issues,  such  as  free  parameters, 
parameter sensitivity, metaphysical issues, anthropic principles, observation selection 
effects, teleology or God's existence. 
Given the difficulty to assess fine-tuning for life seriously, it is too early to say 
whether there is  fine-tuning of  physics and cosmic parameters.  However,  we saw 
several examples of alternative possible universes which remarkably show complex 
cosmic outcomes and dynamics. The emergence of complexity is not our universe's 
sole  prerogative.  But  regarding complex cosmic outcomes such as intelligent  life, 
fine-tuning remains a conjecture.
Let us summarize three steps to clarify fine-tuning, once we have debunked 
fallacies and distinguished it from other issues. First, the scientific approach to tackle 
the  source  of  fine-tuning is  to  capture  free  parameters.  The  role  of  science  is  to 
propose new theories which need less free parameters.  This approach remains the 
most  robust  and  promising.  It  should  stay  the  absolute  priority.  Second,  if  free 
parameters remain, don't use explanations of the gaps! God-of-the-gaps, chance-of-
the-gaps or WAP-of-the-gaps are last-aid intellectual survival kits. It is important not 
to confuse selection effects with causal explanations providing mechanisms to explain 
fine  tuning.  Third,  we  assess  the  typicality  of  our  universe.  To  achieve  this,  it 
demands to explore the parameter space of possible universes. This includes not only 
simulating our universe (to assess its robustness) but also other possible universes (to 
assess its fine-tuning). The exploration of virtual universes will allow us to assess how 
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likely  the  production  of  astrophysical  bodies,  biochemistry,  life,  intelligence  or 
humanity are.
This  exploration  constitutes  the  Artificial  Cosmogenesis field  of  research, 
which  has  already  begun.  But  can  we  really  hope  to  play  or  replay  the  tape  of 
universes? How on Earth can we do that? To answer this, we now come to the third 
part of this thesis, a journey into our far future that we begin with an exploration of 
the future of scientific simulations. 
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Part III - Our Future in the Universe
the laws of the universe have engineered
   their own comprehension 
(Davies 1999, 146)
We are now entering the third part of our journey. Our challenge is to answer 
the age-old question “Where are we going?” (Chapters 7, 8 and 9) and “What is good 
and what is evil?” (Chapter 10). As usual, we ask these questions in a cosmological 
context, with a maximal stretch in space and time scope. So we are concerned about 
where we are going in the extremely far future. The most extreme point is the “last” 
point, which leads us naturally to the field of eschatology.  The word comes from the 
Greek  eskhatos (last),  and  logos (doctrine  or  theory).  The  word  “eschatology” 
introduces  a  bias  similar  to  the  word  “ultimate”.  We  saw  the  later  comes  from 
ultimare, which means to “come to an end”, while the former is the doctrine of last 
things. Taken literally, those words  a priori rule out cyclical views of the universe, 
where there is no past or future end point. 
Our discussion of cognitive attractors to understand the origin (Chapter 4) also 
applies to  the future.  Let  us give brief  hints  of  why it  is  the case.  What  are  our 
cognitive  attractors  for  the  future?  What  do  we  expect?  In  the  optimistic  case, 
civilizations long for a kind of immortality (see Chapter 10). It can take the form of a 
point (e.g. heaven) or a cycle (e.g. with reincarnation cycles). We find the idea of 
multiple reincarnation or resurrection not only in Eastern philosophies, but also in 
contemporary  Christian  theology  (see  e.g.  Hick  1976;  Steinhart  2008).  From  a 
physical perspective, as we will see below, the attractor point can be a cosmic doom 
scenario,  where  everything  is  stabilized  to  a  uniform  and  lifeless  state.  Many 
cosmological  models  are  cyclical,  such  as  Tolman's  (1934),  the  phoenix  universe 
(Dicke and Peebles 1979), the famous chaotic inflation (Linde 1990), Smolin's (1992) 
Cosmological  Natural  Selection  or  Penrose's  (2011) recent  conformal  cyclical 
cosmology.  We also mentioned in Chapter  4  the model  of  continuous creation of 
Hoyle and Narlikar, which is more associated with a line rather than a point or a 
cycle. There are also cosmological models which include a role for intelligent life that 
we  will  examine  in  more  details  in  Chapter  8.  As  with  the  origin,  there  are 
psychological difficulties to accept cycles in the future. But this is a problem only if 
one holds a point-like metaphysics which requires an ultimate beginning or end.
Importantly, different eschatologies focus on different “ends”. Do we mean the 
end of a human life? Of humanity? or of all things? Not surprisingly, we focus here on 
the end of all things, since we want to avoid anthropo- or species- centrisms. Inspired 
by Freitas (1979, chap. 22.4.4) I distinguish four kinds of eschatologies: eternalistic, 
historical, naturalistic and physical. 
Eternalistic eschatologies see time as an endless cycle of eternal recurrence. 
We already discussed eternal return (section 4.3.4 Objections against Cycles, p81) and 
its  many  associated  difficulties.  For  Stoics  of  the  ancient  Greek  and  for  Indian 
thinkers, time moves in cycles. Buddhists and hindus believe in cycles of creations 
and destruction. 
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Historical eschatologies are grounded in linear time. Western traditions such as 
Christianity, Judaism or Islam believe in a beginning and an end of time. Even the 
title of this thesis “The Beginning and the End” indeed shows such a western bias. In 
Plato's  Republic, death is accompanied with a judgment, where the immortal soul is 
given rewards and punishments before choosing the condition of its next existence. 
The nature of this new existence is a topic of theology. 
Naturalistic eschatologies emphasize harmony with nature. Goodness is seen 
as unity with nature, while wrongness is seen as alienation from nature. Interestingly, 
the main concern is to be in harmony with nature here and now, and not the prospect 
of a far future state after death. This is illustrated in Taoism, where there is virtually 
no interest for the beginning or the end of the universe (Ward 2002, 235).
Eschatology has most often been discussed within religious doctrines. But this 
needs not to be. Milan Ćirković (2003) wrote a review of scientific approaches to this 
topic, physical eschatology, gathering more than 200 references. Still, if we consider 
from a symmetry argument that past and future studies should have equal importance 
in treatment, there are surprisingly few studies about the far future universe compared 
to studies of the early universe. Ćirković argued that physical eschatology is a part of 
science:   
Since the laws of physics do not distinguish between past and future (with minor 
and poorly understood exceptions in the field of particle physics), we do not have 
a prima facie reason for preferring ‘‘classical’’ cosmology to physical eschatology 
in the theoretical domain.
It is correct that most physical laws are time reversible... with the notable exception of 
thermodynamics.  The  reconciliation  of  classical,  relativistic  and quantum theories 
with thermodynamics is a major challenge of contemporary physics. It gives rise to 
thorny  issues  such  as  the  arrow  of  time.  Inspired  by  a  science  fiction  novel  by 
Gregory Benford (1978), Freitas proposed that an advanced civilization would focus 
on a “thermodynamic eschatology” striving to halt or reverse entropic processes in 
this universe. However, it is not necessarily the best strategy to fight frontally against 
such a widely confirmed physical law as the second law. It leads to the dream of a 
perpetual motion (Ord-Hume 1977). On the contrary, it was by accepting the laws of 
conservation of energy that engineers were able to design more and more efficient 
engines and machines. 
Thanks to modern theoretical physics and astrophysics, many of the questions 
regarding  the  ultimate  fate  of  the  universe  are  thus  now quantitatively  addressed 
within the field of physical eschatology. What will happen to the Earth and the Sun in 
the far future? The story depicted by modern science is a gloomy one. In about 6 
billion years, it will be the end of our solar system, with our Sun turning into a red 
giant star, making the surface of Earth much too hot for the continuation of life as we 
know it. The solution then appears to be easy: migration. However, even if life would 
colonize other solar systems, there will be a progressive end of all stars in galaxies. 
Once stars have converted the available supply of hydrogen into heavier elements, 
new star formation will come to an end in the galaxy. In fact, the problem is worse. It 
is estimated that even very massive objects such as black holes will evaporate in about 
1098 years (F. C. Adams and Laughlin 1997).
Generally, the main lesson of physical eschatology is that in the long-term the 
universe will irreversibly go towards a state of maximum entropy, or heat death. This 
152
is a consequence of the second law of thermodynamics, one of the most general laws 
of physics. It was first applied to the universe as a whole by Hermann von Helmholtz 
in 1854. Since this heat death discovery, a widely spread pessimistic worldview sees 
the  existence  of  humanity  as  purposeless  and  accidental  in  the  universe  (e.g.  B. 
Russell 1923; S. Weinberg 1993b). The fatalism implied by this worldview may lead 
to a loss of the meaning of life.
Modern cosmology shows that there are some other models of the end of the 
universe (such as Big Bounce, Big Rip, Big Crunch..., see (Vaas 2006) for an up-to-
date review). The point is that none of them allows the possibility of the indefinite 
continuation of life as we know it. If any of the cosmic doom scenario is correct, it 
means that the indefinite continuation of life is impossible in this universe. What is 
the point of living in a universe doomed to annihilation? Ultimately, why should we 
try to solve mundane challenges of our daily lives and societies, if we can not even 
imagine a promising future for life in the universe? If we recognize this fundamental 
issue, then we should certainly do something to avoid it, and thus try to change the 
future of the universe.
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  apparent  paradox  between this  increase  of 
entropy and the accelerating  complexity increase (e.g. Livio 2000; Chaisson 2001; 
Morowitz 2002; Kurzweil 2006). Chaisson (2001) showed with a thermodynamical 
analysis that this paradox can be solved. Indeed, it is the  expansion of the universe 
itself which allows a decrease of entropy locally, while there remains an increase in 
entropy globally. Yet, which of the two trends will turn out to be dominant in the long 
term remains unsettled. 
So, where are we going ultimately, towards entropy increase or complexity 
increase? 
A few authors have proposed some speculative solutions, but we will see that 
they are insufficient because none of them presently allows the infinite continuation 
of intelligent  life.  I  will  instead argue that  intelligent  civilization could in the far 
future  make  a  new  universe  (Chapter  8).  Although  it  sounds  like  a  surprising 
proposition  resembling  science  fiction  scenarios,  I  will  consider  it  within  a 
philosophical agenda, seriously and carefully addressing and replying to objections 
and comparing it with alternative options.
What are the limits of this complexity increase?  The best way to test ideas 
regarding the future of complexity increase is to search for advanced extraterrestrial 
intelligence (ETI, see Chapter 9). For example, if we speculate that ETIs would play 
snooker with stars, we should see much more star collisions, and stars moving on 
unpredictable trajectories. This is not the case, so probably we don't miss the cosmic 
snooker. Philosophically, the search for extraterrestrials is also a topic of fundamental 
importance. Are we alone in the universe? If you want to know who you are as a 
human being, you must compare yourself to or interact with others. The same holds 
for humanity as a whole. If we want to understand our place in the universe, there is 
no other option than searching, and maybe finding and comparing ourselves to other 
life forms. 
It is easy to predict that as humanity becomes more and more connected, more 
and more in harmony as a globalized entity, the question “who am I in the universe?” 
will only be more pressing.  I chose to entitle this Part III “Our future in the universe” 
and not “The future of the universe”, because we are immersed and implied in the 
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universe. We are not merely spectators, we are actors in the great show of cosmic 
evolution.  And to act  in the universe,  we need values and an ethics.  This is  why 
Chapter 10 is key to this Part III. 
It should be noted that the proposition of involving intelligent life into the fate 
of  the  universe  is  at  odds  with  traditional  science.  Indeed,  the  modern  scientific 
worldview has often suggested that the emergence of intelligence was an accident in a 
universe that is completely indifferent to human concerns, goals, and values (e.g. S. 
Weinberg 1993b; Stenger 2007). I thus challenge this proposition, and another one 
that is commonly associated with it, which says that intelligent civilization can not 
have  a  significant  influence  on  cosmic  evolution.  A recurring  objection  to  the 
importance of this topic is that it is too far away to be worth of consideration. If this is 
your opinion, I invite you to read Story 7, “ Global warming and universal cooling”.
You are at a luxurious cocktail party, and you meet a rich CEO of a coal-fired power 
station. You attempt to start a conversation:
– You: What do you think about global warming?
– Him: It's not my job to think about it. 
– You: There is a wide agreement that coal burning largely contributes to global 
warming.
– Him: So what? 
– You: I am wondering how you can be morally comfortable about the major 
impact of your industry on the planet. Don't you care?
– Him: Not at all. Global warming is not my problem, it is for next generations. 
I focus on providing energy to people, and incidentally, making money. 
– You: But... who is going to tackle the problem if each generation reasons like 
you?
What would be your opinion about this CEO? At the very least, you'll think that he's 
not highly morally developed because he doesn't care about future generations. I do 
have the same impression when friends or colleagues quickly dismiss cosmic doom 
scenarios as “not their problem” because too far in the future. The fact that so many 
people on Earth care about global warming is a truly extraordinary shift of mindset. It 
means that we have extended our worldviews to future generations and to planet Earth 
as a whole. As we extend further our worldview, why should we stop our sphere of 
compassion to the boundaries of our tiny planet? I predict that future generations will 
more and more care not only about global warming but also about the heat death of 
the universe, which is actually a universal cooling – or any cosmic doom scenario 
which could threaten the survival of life in the universe. 
Story 7: Global warming and universal cooling.
This story is fictional.
Those issues are properly ethical. What is good and what is evil? I address this issue 
in  Chapter 10. What lessons can we learn from our cosmological worldview? What 
does this cosmological perspective imply for our actions and values here and now? 
What  is  our  purpose in  the  universe?  What  are  the  ultimate  goals  or  results  that 
intelligence  is  seeking  in  the  universe?  What  is  the  meaning  of  life  in  this 
cosmological perspective? At first sight, evolutionary reasoning tells us that survival 
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is the ultimate value. But survival of what? And for how long? Can we aim as high as 
immortality? If so, which kind of immortality can we long for? 
Guessing the future is a notoriously perilous enterprise. Part III will thus be 
more  speculative.  Chapter  8  explores  a  philosophical  extension  of  Lee  Smolin's 
Cosmological Natural Selection (CNS), which in itself is already often considered as 
speculative. In Chapter 9, I will explore heuristics to search ETI, and even argue that 
we may well already have found ETIs much more advanced than us. 
Speculating on those issues can easily lead us very far. For this reason, we 
need to have clear ideas on why we speculate. As I wrote in the preface, I distinguish 
three kinds of speculations to navigate into their variety (Vidal 2012a):
4. Scientific: a speculation is scientific if we have strong reasons to think that 
future observations or experimentations will corroborate or refute it.
5. Philosophical: a speculation is philosophical if it extrapolates from scientific 
knowledge  and  philosophical  principles  to  answer  some  fundamental 
philosophical problems.
6. Fictional:  a  speculation  is  fictional  if  it  extends  beyond  scientific  and 
philosophical speculations.
Let us sum up how we will tackle those numerous issues.  Chapter 7  explores the 
future  of  scientific  simulations,  and  its  implications  for  our  understanding  of  the 
universe. As Paul Davies wrote above, through cosmic evolution and the emergence 
of  humans  and  science,  “the  laws  of  the  universe  have  engineered  their  own 
comprehension”. This self-awareness is dazzling. Where will this trend lead to the 
limit? We further develop and motivate the already mentioned extension of Artificial 
Life to Artificial Cosmogenesis. 
Chapter  8  presents  cosmological  selections.  First,  Cosmological  Natural  
Selection (CNS),  a  remarkable  theory  applying   ideas  of  evolutionary  biology  in 
cosmology.  Second,  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection,  a  philosophical  scenario 
extending  CNS  with  a  philosophical  agenda.  I  discuss  the  history  of  both  and 
formulate critical objections. Through the CAS scenario, we will see surprising links 
between the study of the origin and our possible future of the universe! 
Chapter 9  addresses the big question: “Are we alone in the universe?” In 
Chapter 6, we unveiled the real difficulties behind the fine-tuning issue, namely, that 
we only know one universe, ours. To progress we concluded that we must study other 
possible universes. In a similar fashion, we know in details only one instance of the 
development of higher complexity: life on Earth. If we want to understand the general 
future of complexity in  the universe,  it  would be invaluable  to  find  other cosmic 
intelligences. The discipline of astrobiology promises to fill this gap, and we will put 
the foundations of  the more specific  sub-discipline of  high energy astrobiology.  I 
propose an observable hypothesis to test the existence of very advanced civilizations 
and suggest that we may already have observed them. Since they actively feed on 
stars, I call them starivores.
In  Chapter 10 we go back to Earth with cosmological  wisdom. I  explore 
foundations  for  ethics  on  a  cosmological  scale,  a  cosmological  ethics.  I  build  on 
thermodynamical, evolutionary and developmental values and argue that the ultimate 
good is the infinite continuation of the evolutionary process. I apply the framework to 
an ubiquitous longing of humanity:  the will to immortality. I survey five kinds of 
immortalities and how they relate to the definition and development of the self. 
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To sum up, Chapter 7 emphasizes the importance of scientific simulations for 
understanding  our  universe;  Chapter  8  presents  cosmological  selections  and  in 
particular CAS, a philosophical  scenario linking the beginning and the end of the 
universe,  providing  a  meaning  of  life  for  intelligence  in  the  universe;  Chapter  9 
attempts to understand who we are in the universe, by searching and maybe finding 
extraterrestrials far more advanced than us; Chapter 10 outlines basic principles of a 
universal cosmological ethics, illustrated with five different kinds of immortalities. 
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CHAPTER 7 -  The Future of Scientific Simulations
Abstract:  This  Chapter  explores  the  far  future  of  scientific  simulations.  It  is 
argued that  the path towards a simulation of an entire universe is an expected 
outcome  of  our  scientific  simulation  endeavors.  I  describe  the  exponential 
increase  of  computing  resources  in  a  cosmological  context,  using  Chaisson's 
energy rate density complexity metric. Simulating the open-ended rise of levels of 
complexity  in  the  physical,  biological  and  cultural  realms  is  the  challenge  of 
simulating an entire universe. However, such an effort will require to bridge the 
gaps in our knowledge of cosmic evolution, which is necessary to replay the tape 
of our and other possible universes. We elaborate the distinction between  real-
world and artificial-world modelling, the latter being at the heart of the artificial 
life and artificial cosmogenesis philosophy. We critically discuss the idea that we 
may be living in a computer simulation.
I see no reason (in the really distant future) why all model-making, 
and in this I include all “law-discovering”, 
should not be carried on, as a routine matter, inside computers.
(Ashby 1981a, 353)
How important are scientific simulations if an intelligent civilization is to have 
influence on future cosmic evolution? It  is increasingly clear that  simulations and 
computing resources are becoming main tools of scientific activity. More concretely, 
at a smaller scale than the universe, we have already begun to produce, run and even 
play with artificial worlds, with the practice of computer simulations. In particular, 
efforts in the Artificial Life (ALife) research field have shown that it is possible to 
create digital worlds with their own rules, depicting agents evolving in a complex 
manner.  We  will  see  that  such  simulations  promise  to  become  more  and  more 
complex and elaborated in the future. 
I argue that the path towards a simulation of an entire universe is an expected 
outcome of our scientific simulation endeavors. I will examine later in Chapter 8 how 
such a simulation could be realized (instantiated, made physical) and bypass cosmic 
doom scenarios, expected to happen at some future time. 
7.1  Towards a Simulation of an Entire Universe
Simulating the general emergence of complexity is a long-term desiderata of 
our  scientific  simulation  endeavors.  The  challenge  is  to  simulate  open-ended 
evolution not only in biology, but also to link it to physical evolution and to cultural 
evolution. To the limit, a simulation of an entire universe would allow us to probe 
what would happen if we would “replay the tape of the universe”. In this Chapter, I 
will discuss in more depth the status and potential usefulness of a simulation of an 
entire  universe,  making  a  distinction  between  real-world and  artificial-world 
modeling  (see  section  7.5  Real-World  and  Artificial-World  Modelling,  p160).  I 
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outline and criticize the “simulation hypothesis”,  according to which our  universe 
may be just a simulation (in section 7.6 The Simulation Hypothesis, p161). Let us first 
summarize the historical trend of exponential increase of computing resources.
7.2  Increase of Computing Resources
We may note two important transitions in the history of human culture. The 
first is the externalization of memory through the invention of writing. This allowed 
an accurate reproduction and a safeguard for knowledge. Indeed, knowledge could 
easily be lost and distorted in an oral tradition. The second is the externalization of 
computation  through  the  invention  of  computing  devices.  The  general  purpose 
computer was inspired by the work of Church, Gödel, Kleene and Turing, and its 
formal specifications constitute the most general computing device  (see Davis 2000 
for a history of computation). The consequences of this last transition are arguably as 
significant  –if  not  more–  as  the  invention  of  writing.  In  particular,  the  changes 
induced by the  introduction  of  computers  in  scientific  inquiry  are  important,  and 
remain  underestimated  and  understudied  (see  however  Floridi  2003  for  a  good 
starting point). 
Computing resources have grown exponentially, at least for over a century. 
There  is  much  literature  about  this  subject  (see  e.g.  Kurzweil  1999;  2006  and 
references  therein).  Moore's  “law”  famously  states  that  the  number  of  transistors 
doubles  every  18  months  on  a  single  microprocessor.  Exponential  increase  in 
processing speed and memory capacity are direct consequences of the law. What are 
the limits of computer simulations in the future? Although there is no Moore's law for 
the  efficiency  of  our  algorithms,  the  steady  growth  in  raw  computational  power 
provides free “computational energy” to increase the complexity of our models and 
simulations. This should lead to longer term and more precise predictions. Apart from 
the computational limitation theorems (uncomputability, the computational version of 
Gödel's theorem proved by Turing), the only limit to this trend is the physical limit of 
matter  or  the  universe  itself  (Bremermann  1982;  Lloyd  2000;  L.  M.  Krauss  and 
Starkman 2004). As argued by Lloyd (2000; 2005) and Kurzweil (2006, 362) it should 
be noted that the ultimate computing device an intelligent civilization could use in the 
distant future is a maximally dense object, i.e. a black hole. 
From a cosmic outlook, Moore's trend is in fact part of a much more general 
trend which started with the birth of galaxies. Cosmologist and complexity theorist 
Eric  Chaisson  proposed  a  quantitative  metric  to  characterize  the  dynamic  (not 
structural) complexity of physical, biological and cultural complex systems (Chaisson 
2001; 2003). It is the free energy rate density (noted ΦM) which is the rate at which 
free energy transits in a complex system of a given mass (see Figure 9). Its dimension 
is  energy per  time per  mass  (erg s-1 g-1).  Let  us  illustrate  it  with  some examples 
(Chaisson 2003, 96). A star has a value  ~1, planets ~102, plants ~103, humans ~104 
and  their  brain  ~105,  current  microprocessors  ~1010.  According  to  this  metric, 
complexity  has  risen at  a  rate  faster  than  exponential  in  recent  times.  Along this 
complexity increase, there is a tendency to do ever more, requiring ever less energy, 
time and space; a phenomenon also called ephemeralization (Fuller 1969; Heylighen 
2007),  or  “Space-Time  Energy  Matter”  (STEM)  compression  (Smart  2009).  This 
means that complex systems use increasingly less space and time, and become more 
dense in energy and matter flows. 
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In Tomas Ray's (1991) artificial life simulation Tierra, digital life competes for 
CPU time,  which  is  analogous  to  energy  in  the  organic  world.  The  analogue  of 
memory is the spatial resource. The agents thus compete for fundamental properties 
of computers (CPU time, memory) analogous to fundamental physical properties of 
our universe (energy, space). This design is certainly one of the key reasons for the 
impressive growth of complexity observed in this simulation. 
7.3  Bridging Gaps in Cosmic Evolution
We saw that a metric can be found to compare complex systems traditionally 
considered as different in nature. This important insight is just a first step towards 
bridging physical, biological and cultural evolution, and ideally a maximum of cosmic 
outcomes. 
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Figure 9 - The original caption is: “The rise of free energy rate density, 
ΦM, plotted as histograms starting at those times when various open 
structures emerged in Nature, has been rapid in the last few billion 
years, much as expected from both subjective intuition and objective 
thermodynamics. The solid curve approximates the increase in 
normalized energy flows best characterizing the order, form and 
structure for a range of systems throughout the history of the Universe. 
The circled insets show greater detail of further measurements or 
calculations of the free energy rate density for three representative 
systems - stars, plants and society - typifying physical, biological and 
cultural evolution, respectively. Many more measures are found in 
Chaisson (2001).” excerpted from (Chaisson 2003, 97). Note that 
microprocessors are outside the scale of this diagram since they appear 
at 1010 on the ΦM axis.
Artificial Life (ALife) is a field of research examining systems related to life, 
its processes, and its evolution through simulations using either computer models (soft 
ALife), robotics (strong ALife), or biochemistry (wet ALife). A general challenge for 
ALife is to obtain an artificial system capable of generating open-ended evolution (M. 
A.  Bedau et  al.  2000).  Some results  have  been obtained linking for  example  the 
evolution  of  language  with  quasi-biological  traits  (Steels  and  Belpaeme  2005). 
Working towards the design of  a  digital  universe  simulating  the  rise  of  levels  of 
complexity  in  the  physical,  biological  and  cultural  realms  is  the  challenge  of 
simulating an entire universe. We saw an important step in this direction (section 6.3.3
Robustness  in  Cosmic  Evolution,  p133),  with  the  “Millenium  Run”  simulation. 
However,  it  stays on the physical  level,  since its  starts  from the beginning of the 
universe to generate the large scale structures of the universe.
However,  we  must  acknowledge  important  difficulties  of  conceptual, 
methodological and cultural integration between the different disciplines involved. In 
such an endeavor, human-made social and academic boundaries between disciplines 
of knowledge must be overcome. In Part I (section 3.2 Scientific Worldviews, p57),  I 
proposed to construct synthetical scientific worldviews with systems theory, problem 
solving and  evolutionary theory as three generic  interdisciplinary approaches.  The 
ideal is to aim at a seamless link between simulations in physics, biology and social 
sciences  (culture).  If  this  would  happen,  we  would  have  the  basic  tools  to  work 
towards a model and a simulation of the entire universe. In fact the search for such 
bridges is obviously necessary if we want to tackle such difficult issues as the origin 
of  life,  where  we  aim  to  explain  the  emergence  of  life  out  of  physico-chemical 
processes.
7.4  Replaying the Tape of the Universe
Astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology are empirical, but  not experimental 
sciences. It is possible to gather a lot of data about a wide variety of astrophysical 
systems, but unlike in experimental sciences, we can't design smart experiments to 
force nature's  cosmic outcomes.  However,  computer  simulations are  progressively 
operating a revolution in science. They allow to conduct simulation experiments, even 
if such virtual experiments are imperfect compared to real experiments.
We saw (section  6.3  The  Cosmic  Evolution  Equation,  p122)  that  such  an 
approach holds promises to tackle the question of the robustness of the emergence of 
complexity  (by  replaying the  tape  of  our universe)  and the  fine-tuning issue  (by 
playing and replaying tapes of alternative universes).  
Let us take seriously the increase of computing resources. The simulation of 
an entire universe can be seen as perhaps the ultimate challenge of simulations in 
science. But what kind of simulation would it  be? What could it  be used for? To 
answer these questions we will now distinguish between two kinds of modelling. 
7.5  Real-World and Artificial-World Modelling
A computer simulation can be defined as a model where some aspects of the 
world are chosen to be modelled and the rest  ignored. When we run a simplified 
model on hardware more computationally efficient than the physical  system being 
modelled,  we can  run  the  model  faster  than  the  phenomenon modelled,  and thus 
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predict our world. The paradigm of Artificial Life (ALife) strongly differs from such 
traditional modelling, by studying not only “life-as-we-know-it”, but also “life-as-it-
could-be” (Langton 1992, section 1). We propose to extend this modelling technique to 
any process and not just to life, leading to the more general distinction of processes-
as-we know-them and processes-as-they-could-be (Red’ko 1999). I call the two kinds 
of modelling respectively real-world modelling and artificial-world modelling.
Real-world modelling is the endeavour to model processes-as-we-know-them. 
This  includes  traditional  scientific  modelling,  such as  models  in  physics,  weather 
forecast models, but also applied evolutionary models, etc. The goal of such models is 
to better understand our world, and make predictions about it. For what would a real-
world simulation of an entire universe be useful? We saw it would allow us to test the 
robustness  of  the  emergence of  complexity.  What  is  more,  we could think that  it 
would provide us very good understanding of and predictive power over our world. 
However, this is not so simple. First, if the simulation is really of the entire universe, 
it should be “without anything left out”, which is a strange situation. Indeed, it would 
imply that the model (simulation) is as complex as our universe. Such a simulation 
would thus not provide a way to systematically predict all aspects of our universe, 
because it would not be possible to run it faster than real physical processes. Another 
limiting argument is that more computational power does not necessarily mean better 
predictive abilities. This is pretty clear when considering chaotic systems such as the 
weather,  which rapidly become unpredictable.  A simulation still  has to be simpler 
than  reality  if  it  is  to  be  of  any practical  use.  This  means that  in  the  context  of 
“replaying the tape of our universe”, we would still have to investigate a simplified 
simulation of our universe. 
Artificial-world modelling is the endeavour to model processes-as-they-could-
be.  The formal fundamental  rules of the system (of life in the case of ALife) are 
sought. The goal of ALife is not to model life exactly as we know it, but to decipher 
the most simple and general principles underlying life and to implement them in a 
simulation.  With  this  approach,  one  can  explore  new,  different  life-like  systems. 
Stephen  Wolfram  (2002) has  a  similar  approach  by  exploring  different  rules  and 
initial conditions on cellular automata, and observing the resulting behaviour of the 
system. It is legitimate to emphasize that this is a “new kind of science”. Indeed, this 
is  in  sharp  contrast  with  traditional  science  focusing  on  modelling  or  simulating 
reality. There is thus a creative aspect in the artificial-world modelling, which is why 
many artists have enthusiastically depicted imaginary ALife worlds. What would an 
artificial-world simulation of an entire universe be useful for? We would be able not 
only to “replay the tape of  our universe”, but also to play and replay the tape of 
alternative universes.  We  saw  this  endeavor  constitutes  a  research  program  for 
tackling the fine-tuning issue in cosmology. 
Should this artificial world modelling of an entire universe be interpreted as a 
simulation or as a  realization (Pattee 1989)? Here we consider the first possibility, 
with the simulation hypothesis; the realization will be considered later in Chapter 8, 
with the philosophical scenario of Cosmological Artificial Selection. 
7.6  The Simulation Hypothesis
Let us assume what we have argued in the previous section, i.e. that intelligent 
life  will  indeed  be  able  at  some  point  to  simulate  an  entire  universe.  If  such  a 
simulation is purely digital, thus pursuing the research program of soft ALife, this 
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leads to the simulation hypothesis, which has two main aspects. First, looking into the 
future, it means that we would effectively create a whole universe simulation, as has 
been imagined in science fiction stories and novels such as the ones of Isaac Asimov 
(1956) or Greg Egan (2002). Very well then! A second possibility is that we ourselves 
could be part of a simulation run by a superior intelligence (see e.g. N. Bostrom 2003; 
Barrow 2007b; Martin 2006). Although these scenarios are fascinating, they suffer 
from two fundamental  problems. First,  the “hardware problem”: on what  physical 
device would such a simulation run? Is there an infinity of simulation levels? Second, 
such an hypothesis is uninformative. Indeed, following Bateson's (1972) definition of 
information as “a difference which makes a difference”, the simulation hypothesis 
makes no practical or theoretical difference. Unless we find a “bug” in reality, or a 
property that could only exist in a simulation and not in reality, this hypothesis seems 
useless,  a  mere  fictional  speculation. A more  comprehensive  criticism  of  these 
discussions can be found in (Polya 2004). 
The ontological status of this simulation would be reflected by the states of the 
hardware running it, whatever the realistic nature of the simulation. From this point of 
view, we can argue that it remains a simulation, and not a realization (Harnad 1994). 
Is there another possibility for realizing a simulation of an entire universe? That is 
what we will explore in the next chapter. 
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Open questions
• The  idea  of  simulating  whole  universes  raises  the  issue  of  computational 
requirements. What kind of computer is needed? What memory? What CPU 
speed? How many CPUs? Serial or parallel computing? What kind of software 
would be used? Where does the computer hardware exist? What power does it 
require?
These questions remain to further explore (see e.g. Bostrom (2003) for discussion and 
references to some of these issues).
Researchers spend a lot of time-energy writing research projects, which are, 
due to fierce competition often rejected. In 2010, I wrote a research project called 
“Big  history  and our  future:  extension,  evaluation  and significance  of  a  universal 
complexity metric”  (Vidal 2010c). The core idea is to update and further research 
Chaisson's (2001) energy rate density complexity metric. Unfortunately, despite good 
reviews and good academic support, it was not accepted. Disappointed, I decided to 
put the proposal on the website of the Evo Devo Universe community11, in the hope 
that  the  research  proposal  would  be  taken  up  further.  I  was  glad  that  it  indeed 
happened and researchers later contacted John Smart and I to further work on it. Some 
of the key research questions are:
• Can we complete the curve to understand the past (early universe) and the 
future (acceleration of technology)? 
• What happens if  we use this  metric  for the early universe? Indeed, 
Chaisson starts the measures with the birth of galaxies. But what about 
the energy rate density at the big bang era? 
• How well  does the free energy rate density curve fits  with Moore's 
law? If we extrapolate those two trends, do they have any functional 
relation?
• Has our universe a dynamics of reproduction? John Smart  (2009) suggested 
so, but this needs further research. He hypothesized the general trend through 
time would be a “U-shaped” curve, with extremely high energy densities at the 
big-bang era, decreasing as the universe cools down. The energy rate density 
then starts  to  grow more  than exponentially  at  the  apparition  of  life.  This 
energetic pattern bears a striking resemblance with the energy pattern of the 
life cycle of a living organism from its birth through its maturity stage.  
On  3rd february  2010,  I  gave  a  seminar  alone  at  my  office  about  “Cosmic 
Embryogenesis”  (Vidal  2010d)... Sad schizophrenia?  No,  cutting  edge  technology. 
Indeed, colleagues of mine were attending from several corners of the world. How 
was it possible? Richard Gordon did set up in the virtual environment “Second Life” 
an  online  “International  Embryo  Physics  Course”  to  stimulate  efforts  to  reverse 
11 http://evodevouniverse.com/wiki/Research_on_free_energy_rate_density   
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engineering the  process  of  embryological  development.  This  is  how the “Embryo 
Physics” seminar room looks like (figure 10):
• to what extent can a biological view on the universe give us new insights? 
In a landmark paper, Margaret Burbidge, Geoffrey Burbidge, William Fowler 
and  Fred  Hoyle  (1957) showed  the  mechanisms  responsible  for  the  progressive 
synthesis of heavy chemical elements,  or  stellar nucleosynthesis.  However,  we all 
learn at school the stable table of periodic elements. It gives a wrong picture because 
those elements have an history and it took billions of years for them to stabilize. Yet, 
the  formation  of  chemical  elements  is  now largely  stabilized.  John Smart  (2009) 
hypothesized that there might be a cosmic differentiation of chemical elements, which 
is now stabilized, as there is a cell differentiation in the development of multicellular 
organisms. Our blood cells don't suddenly turn into neuron cells, in the same way that 
hydrogen atoms don't suddenly turn into gold. We can also see the early universe 
nucleosynthesis as a progressive differentiation process, where protons and neutrons 
form atomic nuclei; then atom nuclei and electrons form atoms; and light elements 
nucleosynthesis produces hydrogen and helium. 
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Figure 10 - The Embryo Physics Course virtual seminar room... 
the seminar room of the future?
CHAPTER 8 -  Cosmological Selections
Abstract: This Chapter first describes three fundamental evolutionary selection 
mechanisms which shape the biological landscape: natural, artificial and sexual 
selection.  We  then  discuss  two  applications  of  selection  mechanisms  to 
cosmology. First the history, theory and limitations of the theory of Cosmological 
Natural Selection (CNS) proposed by Smolin. To remedy those limitations, we 
introduce  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection  (CAS)  and  review its  history  and 
theory. Since the theory is quite speculative, we propose six possible levels of 
universe making (from blind, accidental and artificial black hole production to 
cosmic  breeder,  cosmic  engineer  and  God  player).  We  defend  it  from  a 
philosophical point of view, and address many objections which naturally arise. 
These include the design and creation terminology, the comparison of CAS with 
other  fine-tuning  explanations,  the  causal  issue,  the  thermodynamical  issue, 
epistemological  issues,  its  feasibility,  its  underlying  motivation  and  some 
implications for  the  idea of  freedom. We then summarize four  different roads 
leading to CAS and recapitulate the case for CAS.  
The problem of just how intelligence changes the universe 
is a philosophical issue which (rather surprisingly)
 few philosophers have addressed
(Rescher 2009, 90)
as the spirit wakens, it craves more and more to regard all existence not 
merely with a creature's eyes, but in the universal view, 
as though through the eyes of the creator.
(Stapledon 1953, 150)
We saw classical explanations of fine-tuning (section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning
Explanations, p144). We also presented the general evolutionary thinking which has 
permeated  most  scientific  disciplines,  and  is  not  restricted  anymore  to  biology 
(section 3.2.3 Universal Darwinism, p59). Natural selection is the central mechanism 
to  explain  adaptation  and  fine-tuning  in  the  biological  domain.  Could  it  be 
successfully applied to the universe as a whole?
How can  we  apply  evolutionary  thinking  to  the  universe?  Which  kind  of 
evolutionary selection can apply? How would such a selection function? Lee Smolin 
has attempted to apply the paradigm of adaptive evolution to the cosmos, with the 
theory  of  Cosmological  Natural  Selection  (CNS).  What  are  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses of CNS? 
I  first  briefly  discuss  biological  selection  mechanisms  and  their  possible 
counterparts  as  cosmological  selections.  Then  I  outline  CNS  as  a  promising 
evolutionary  explanation  of  fine-tuning.  However,  I  point  out  its  weaknesses, 
especially  its  limited  scope.  I  then  take  a  wider  philosophical  scope  to  introduce 
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Cosmological  Artificial  Selection  (CAS),  an  extension  of  CNS  advancing  an 
evolutionary explanation of fine-tuning which includes a role for intelligent life. CNS 
and CAS apply evolutionary logic to the universe as a whole. Given the speculative 
nature of those theories, I formulate objections and address limitations of both. Since 
evolutionary theories successfully explained adaptation and complexity in so many 
areas, they hold good promise to explain the complexity of our universe at large. I 
also present CAS as a promising scenario to give a long term meaning of life and 
intelligence in the universe.
8.1  Evolutionary Selections
8.1.1  Biological Selections
In biology, there are three selection mechanisms: natural, artificial and sexual. Let us 
have a quick overview. 
Natural  selection is  the  central  mechanism  of  evolution.  There  are  four 
conditions for natural selection to occur to any property of a species  (Mark Ridley 
2004, 74):
1. Reproduction. Entities must reproduce to form a new generation.
2. Heredity.  The offspring must tend to resemble their  parents: roughly speaking, “like must 
produce like.”
3. Variation in individual characters among the members of the population. […]
4. Variation in the fitness of organisms according to the state they have for a heritable character. 
In evolutionary theory, fitness is a technical term, meaning the average number of offspring 
left by an individual relative to the number of offspring left by an average member of the 
population.  This  condition  therefore  means  that  individuals  in  the  population  with  some 
characters must be more likely to reproduce (i.e., have higher fitness) than others.
To  know  more  about  the  formidable  power  of  natural  selection  which  explains 
complexity and adaptation of living organisms, I refer the reader to some excellent 
entry points (e.g. Darwin 1859; Dennett 1995; Dawkins 1996; Mark Ridley 2004).
Interestingly,  Darwin introduced natural  selection drawing an analogy with 
artificial  selection.  In  artificial  selection,  breeders  select  organisms  allowed  to 
reproduce. In natural selection, it is the environment which plays this selective role. A 
striking  example  of  artificial  selection  is  found  in  the  wide  variety  of  dogs,  as 
depicted in Figure  11.  The artificial  change from a wolf to a chiwawa took 5000 
generations,  while  the  natural  change  of  Australopithecus  to  homo  sapiens  took 
200,000 generations (Wright 1994, 26). Artificial selection thus goes much faster than 
natural selection. In the words of Bell (2008, 221) , the “exuberant diversity of dogs is 
a striking testimonial to the power of selection to direct adaptive change far beyond 
the  limits  of  the  original  population  within  a  few  hundred  generations.” 
Understanding and  mastering  artificial  selection  is  also  a  key  to  tackle  global 
challenges  that  societies  face.  In  effect,  it  is  widely  used  in  microbial  genetic, 
molecular cloning, embryo screening and agriculture (Bell 2008). 
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Figure 11 - Neighbour-joining trees of domestic dogs and grey wolves 
(see vonHoldt et al. 2010 for the legend and details )
The variety of dogs produced by humans illustrates the power of 
artificial selection.
Interestingly,  sexual selection resembles artificial selection, but the selection 
doesn't occur through the breeder, but through male combat or female choice (Darwin 
1876, 69). The male combat is the fight for the female, the matrix to reproduce genes, 
while  female  choice  occurs  when  a  female  chooses  a  male  with  which  to  mate. 
Michael  Ruse  (2008,  19) compares natural  and  sexual  selections  with  artificial 
selection:  “natural  selection  is  like  choosing  bigger  and  fleshier  cattle,  sexual 
selection through male combat is like two fighting cocks going at each other, and 
sexual selection through female choice is like choosing the dog that most closely fits 
the standards that one favors.” Darwin  (1876, 69) describes sexual selection in the 
following way: 
This form of selection depends, not on a struggle for existence in relation to other 
organic beings or to external conditions, but on a struggle between the individuals 
of one sex, generally the males, for the possession of the other sex. The result is 
not death to the unsuccessful competitor, but few or no offspring. Sexual selection 
is,  therefore,  less rigorous than natural selection.  Generally,  the most vigorous 
males,  those  which  are  best  fitted  for  their  places  in  nature,  will  leave  most 
progeny. But in many cases, victory depends not so much on general vigour, as on 
having special weapons, confined to the male sex. A hornless stag or spurless 
cock would have a poor chance of leaving numerous offspring.
Of course, natural, artificial and sexual selection mechanisms can be combined 
and intertwined. Are there other selections we can think of? We should not confuse 
the  three  mechanisms  of  selection with  patterns  of  selection which  result  from 
evolutionary selections dynamics. These latter patterns include balancing, extreme, 
directional,  stabilizing  or  disruptive  selections  (see  e.g.  Mark  Ridley  2004;  Bell 
2008). 
In general terms, we can describe selection as blind-variation-and-selective-
retention  (D. T. Campbell 1974). Universal darwinist Gary Cziko (1995, 309–310) 
emphasized the power of multiple steps selection (constructive cumulative selection): 
This process of selecting and fine-tuning the occasional accidentally useful 
emergent system turns out to be so powerful that we should not be surprised that 
the adaptive processes of biological evolution, antibody production, […] learning, 
culture, and science all employ it, and that its power is now being explicitly 
exploited in the design of organisms, drugs and computer software by one of 
evolution's most complex and adaptive creations – the human species. 
The  importance  and power of  selection  is  also  clear  from a  cybernetic  principle. 
Indeed, the great cyberneticist Rosh Ashby went as far as to argue that intelligence is 
the power of appropriate selection. It is worth citing at length the closing words of his 
Introduction to Cybernetics, where Ashby discusses the amplification of intelligence 
and the importance of appropriate selection (Ashby 1956, 272):
 Now  “problem solving”  is  largely,  perhaps  entirely,  a  matter  of  appropriate 
selection. Take, for instance, any popular book of problems and puzzles. Almost 
every one can be reduced to the form: out of a certain set, indicate one element. 
Thus of all possible numbers of apples that John might have in his sack we are 
asked to find a certain one; or of all possible pencil lines drawn through a given 
pattern of dots, a certain one is wanted; or of all possible distributions of letters 
into a given set of spaces, a certain one is wanted. It is, in fact, difficult to think of 
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a  problem,  either  playful  or  serious,  that  does  not  ultimately  require  an 
appropriate selection as necessary and sufficient for its solution.
It is also clear that many of the tests used for measuring “intelligence” are scored 
essentially according to the candidate’s power of appropriate selection. Thus one 
test shows the child a common object and asks its name: out of all words the child 
must select the proper one. Another test asks the child how it would find a ball in 
a field: out of all the possible paths the child must select one of the suitable few. 
Thus  it  is  not  impossible  that  what  is  commonly  referred  to  as  “intellectual 
power” may be equivalent to “power of appropriate selection”. Indeed, if a talking 
Black Box were to show high power of appropriate selection in such matters—so 
that, when given difficult problems it persistently gave correct answers—we could 
hardly deny that it was showing the behavioral equivalent of “high intelligence”.
If this is so, and as we know that power of selection can be amplified, it seems to 
follow that intellectual power, like physical power, can be amplified. Let no one 
say that it cannot be done, for the gene-patterns do it every time they form a brain 
that grows up to be something better than the gene-pattern could have specified in 
detail.  What  is  new  is  that  we  can  now  do  it  synthetically,  consciously, 
deliberately. 
8.1.2  Cosmological Selections
Can we get inspired by selection mechanisms in biology and find analogues at 
a  cosmological  scale?  Pushing  the  analogy  to  cosmology,  we  logically  find 
Cosmological Natural Selection, Cosmological Artificial Selection and Cosmological  
Sexual  Selection.  Such cosmological  selections  implicitly  assume a  multiverse  on 
which  selection  operates.  As  we  already  mentioned,  the  idea  of  a  multiverse  is 
controversial scientifically –because it is hard if not impossible to test. For sure, those 
three extensions of selection mechanisms to the cosmos are increasingly speculative 
(as we defined three kinds of speculations at the beginning of Part III). Cosmological 
Natural Selection is a  scientific speculation aimed to explain the fine-tuning issue. 
Cosmological Artificial Selection is a philosophical speculation aimed to explain the 
fine-tuning  issue  and  the  meaning  of  life  and  intelligence  in  the  universe. 
Cosmological Sexual Selection is a fictional speculation which could take place if we 
make some further bold assumptions. It is fictional because it builds on the already 
speculative  assumptions  of  CNS  and  CAS,  and  further  assumes  there  are 
extraterrestrials  competing  for  making  baby  universes  with  a  dynamic  similar  to 
sexual  selection in  biology!  I  mention it  however,  for  three reasons.  First,  it  is  a 
logical extrapolation of a fundamental selection mechanism in biology to cosmology, 
and it is the purpose of this Chapter to follow such a heuristic. Second, we will see in 
Chapter  9 some empirical indications that it might be happening as you read these 
lines. Third, even is it is plain wrong, since it is a fictional speculation, I hope it will 
inspire science fiction authors.   
8.1.3  Biological and Cosmological Fitness
Fitness  is  a  central  concept  in  evolutionary  biology.  Generally,  fitness 
characterizes the ability to survive, grow and reproduce. For example, to be fit, a wolf 
has to be adapted to survive its cold environment, find resources to be able to grow 
and ready to compete for successful reproduction. 
Now, how can we interpret fitness in a cosmological context? Do we mean the 
survival of the universe as a whole, or of some of its constituents –like us humans? 
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Let us focus on the former. Modern physical eschatology shows that the death of the 
universe is  guaranteed –not its  survival. We indeed outlined various cosmic doom 
scenarios earlier. We know that the universe has been expanding exponentially fast at 
the big bang era and can roughly assimilate this as a growth process. The idea of 
universal  reproduction seems at  first  sight  more  far-fetched.  Yet,  in  the  last  three 
decades,  theoretical  physicists  have  advanced  various  mechanisms  for  natural 
production of offspring universes (see e.g. Sato et al. 1982; Linde 1984; Cornell 1989; 
Hawking 1993; B. Carr 2007). The interesting prospect with reproduction is the hope 
to tackle the thermodynamical challenge. We can hope that a new universe would 
reset its thermodynamical constraints (see e.g. Davies 1994, 146; and Penrose’s 2011 
Conformal Cyclical Cosmology). The biological analogy is a new-born baby who can 
start a fresh new life in contrast to the inevitable death of its parents.
Let  us  take the  more precise  definition of  fitness  Ridley gave above,  “the 
average number of offspring left by an individual relative to the number of offspring 
left by an average member of the population.” If we envisage a space of possible 
universes  M,  and  if  we  further  assume  some  properties  of  the  reproduction 
mechanism, we can indeed try to estimate the number of offspring universes in the 
framework of various multiverse theories, and thus the fitness of our universe. But let 
us now first introduce in more details CNS and CAS. 
8.2  Cosmological Natural Selection 
8.2.1  History
Smolin (2012) clearly articulated the root of the fine-tuning problem, which he 
calls more accurately the landscape problem. It is simply the fact that we can imagine 
a  huge  landscape  of  possible  universes  compatible  with  our  physical  and 
cosmological models. This begs the question:  why this universe? Smolin points out 
that there are two ways to explain this:
Either there are logical reasons it has to be that way, or there are historical causes, 
which  acted  over  time  to  bring  things  to  the  present  state.  When  logical 
implication  is  insufficient,  the  explanation  must  be  found  in  causal  processes 
acting over time.
Since  we  have  no  prospect  to  logically reduce  the  huge  landscape  of  possible 
universes anytime soon, it is worth looking at the other way: historical causes. Smolin 
mentions that this point was clearly seen by Charles Sanders Peirce  (1955, 318) in 
1891:
To suppose universal laws of nature capable of being apprehended by the mind 
and yet having no reason for their special forms, but standing inexplicable and 
irrational, is hardly a justifiable position. Uniformities are precisely the sort of 
facts that need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should sometimes turn up 
heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation; but if it shows heads 
every time, we wish to know how this result has been brought about. Law is par 
excellence the thing that wants a reason.
Now the  only  possible  way of  accounting  for  the  laws  of  nature  and  for 
uniformity in general is to suppose them results of evolution.
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Broadly speaking, the hypothesis of historical causes in scientific domains has lead to 
major  scientific  advances.  Let  us  see  three  example,  in  cosmology,  biology  and 
theoretical physics. First, when Georges Lemaître  (1927) introduced the idea of an 
expanding universe, it meant that the universe itself had an history. Cosmology would 
then  never  be  the  same.  Second,  Lamarck  and  Darwin  also  introduced  historical 
causes  with  evolutionary  theories  to  explain  the  living  world.  This  revolution  of 
evolution is so important that it is still ongoing. Finally, Lee Smolin has theorized that 
the laws and parameters of the universe themselves may have had an history. 
But this requires the idea that our universe is not unique –however paradoxical 
this  sentence  may  seem  at  first  sight.  Our  universe  would  be  one  in  a  vaster 
multiverse.  We can trace  the  idea  of  the  multiverse  –or  the  broadly  synonymous 
multiple  universes,  many  worlds,  pluriverse,  megaverse,  parallel  worlds–  back  to 
Anaximander in Antiquity, Giordano Bruno and also Leibniz (see Kragh 2011, 256–
259). 
However, vaguely assuming a multiverse is not enough. We saw earlier that to 
define  a  multiverse  we  need  to  explain  the  logic  of  the  universe  generation 
mechanism. The most general  way is to imagine a kind of random trial and error 
process. We may trace this idea back to Denis Diderot who wrote in 1749 a “Letter on 
the Blind, for the Use of Those who See” (Diderot 1875). Diderot imagines a debate 
between the blind Cambridge mathematician Nicholas Saunderson and a clergyman. 
The topic is the usual question whether order in nature implies the existence of God. 
After  Diderot  anticipates  the  darwinian  idea  of  selection  against  the  unfit  in  the 
animal world, he writes (Diderot 1937):
But why should I not believe about worlds what I believe about animals? How 
many worlds, mutilated and imperfect, were perhaps dispersed, reformed and are 
perhaps dispersing again at every moment in distant space, which I cannot touch 
and you cannot see, but where motion continues, and will continue, to combine 
masses of matter until they shall have attained some arrangement in which they 
can persist. O philosophers, transport yourselves with me to the confines of the 
universe; move over that new ocean, and seek among its irregular movements 
some trace of the intelligent Being whose wisdom so astounds you here! 
David Hume had a similar idea in 1779, when he wrote this passage in the famous 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Hume 2009):
Many worlds might have been botched and bungled, throughout an eternity, ere 
this system was struck out; much labour lost, many fruitless trials made; and a 
slow,  but  continued improvement  carried on during infinite  ages in  the art  of 
world-making. In such subjects, who can determine, where the truth; nay, who can 
conjecture where the probability lies, amidst a great number of hypotheses which 
may be proposed, and a still greater which may be imagined? 
Hume  probably  not  meant  this  many  worlds  trial-and-error  dynamics  actually 
happened. Charles Pantin (1965, 94) envisioned –without development–  that natural 
selection  and  a  selection  effect  could  explain  the  cosmic  coincidences  leading  to 
organic life:
If we could know that our own Universe was only one of an indefinite number 
with  varying  properties  we  could  perhaps  invoke  a  solution  analogous  to  the 
principle  of  natural  selection;  that  only  in  certain  universes,  which  happen to 
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include ours, are the conditions suitable for the existence of life, and unless that 
condition is fulfilled there will be no observers to note the fact.
The  mechanisms  of  multiple  universe  production  were  later  pioneered  in 
modern cosmology. John A. Wheeler  (1977, 4) proposed that the basic laws of the 
universe might fluctuate during a big bang or a big crunch (see also Misner, Thorne, 
and Wheeler 1973, chap. 44). In the 1980’s theorists in quantum gravity began to 
theorize about  multiple  universes  (see  e.g.  Hawking 1987;  1988;  Coleman 1988). 
Hawking  (1987) and Frolov  (1989) even  suggested  that  new universe  production 
might happen in the singularity region of black holes.
Quentin Smith  (1990) proposed a scenario to explain the very existence of 
basic physical laws. He developed a model where some black hole singularities could 
give  birth  to  new  universes.  This  would  provide  a  statistical  explanation  of  the 
existence of basic laws, since only a small fraction of black holes would be fit  to 
produce universes. Two years later, cosmologist Lee Smolin started to develop this 
idea in much more details. Let us take a closer look. 
8.2.2  Theory
If we take seriously universal darwinism, we can try to apply Darwinism to the 
universe itself. This is the visionary attempt of Lee Smolin's Cosmological Natural 
Selection  (CNS)  hypothesis  to  address  the  fine-tuning issue  (Smolin  1992;  1997; 
2007). Let us introduce this theory with an analogy (see table 7 below). The situation 
in contemporary cosmology is analogous to the one in biology before the theory of 
evolution, when one of the core questions was  (1)  Why are the different species as 
they  are? It  was  assumed  more  or  less  implicitly  that  (2)  Species  are  timeless 
categories. In present physics, the question behind the fine-tuning problem is (1') Why 
are  physics  and cosmic  parameters  as  they  are? Currently, it  is  usually  assumed 
(probably from the remains of the Newtonian worldview) that  (2')  Parameters are 
timeless. It is by breaking assumption (2) that Darwin was able to theorize about the 
origin  of  species.  Analogously,  Smolin  is  trying  to  break  assumption  (2'),  by 
theorizing about the origin of parameters. 
Biology (yesterday) Physics (nowadays)
(1) Why are the different species as they are? (1’)  Why  are  physics  and  cosmic 
parameters as they are?
(2) Species are timeless (2’) Parameters are timeless
Table 7 Smolin's (1997, 260) analogy to present Cosmological Natural Selection.
The situation of nowadays physics is analogous to the biologists’ before Darwin.
According to this natural selection of universes theory, black holes give birth to new 
universes by producing the equivalent of a big-bang, which produces a baby universe 
with slightly  different  parameters.  This  introduces variation,  while  the  differential 
success  in  self-reproduction  of  universes  (via  their  black  holes)  provides  the 
equivalent  of  natural  selection.  This  leads to  a  Darwinian evolution of  universes, 
whose parameters are fine-tuned for generating a maximum number of black holes, a 
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prediction  that  can  in  principle  be  verified.  Vaas  (1998) did  summarize  the  core 
argument of CNS:
1. If a new universe is born from the center of a black hole, i.e. if the bounce of a 
singularity leads to a new expanding region of spacetime,
2. and if the values of the fundamental free parameters of physical theories can 
change thereby in a small and random way, i.e. differ from those in the region in 
which the black hole formed (in particular, Smolin has in mind the dimensionless 
parameters of the standard model of particle physics), 
3. then this results in different reproduction rates of the physically different 
universes. 
4. Hence, our universe has been selected for a maximum number of black holes. 
It is a descendant of a series of universes, each of which had itself been selected 
for the same criterion. 
5. Thus, the values of the parameters are the way they actually are, because this 
set of values leads to a (local) maximum of descendant universes.
8.2.3  Objections
However, the prediction that most changes in parameters would lead to less 
black holes has been challenged. Rothman and Ellis (1993) pointed out that changing 
cosmic or physics parameters may lead to either more black holes, or that the number 
of black holes can be insensitive to a parameter change. The problem is that in CNS, 
changing parameters should lead to a decrease of the number of black holes. This is 
necessary if we assume that our universe is fit in the sense that it is a typical member 
of the multiverse where cosmic natural selection takes place. Joe Silk (1997), Martin 
Rees  (1997, 251) and Alexander Vilenkin  (2006b) did also propose ways to tweak 
cosmic parameters to  increase the number of black holes, thereby questioning the 
validity of CNS.
Yet,  Smolin  did  reply  to  most  of  these  issues  in  subsequent  works  (see 
especially the appendix in Smolin 1997; 2013). Smolin (2012) also noted that there is 
a trade-off to consider between primordial black holes and stellar black holes.
One might be surprised by the unconventionally speculative aspect of CNS. 
Although Smolin emphasizes the refutability of CNS and thus its scientific aspect in 
Smolin (2007), he himself is not proud that the theory talks about processes outside 
the universe  (Smolin 1997, 114). This conjectural aspect of the theory puts it at the 
edge of science and philosophy (Vaas 1998). Let us stress once again that when we 
attempt to answer the question “why is the universe the way it is?”, we must be ready 
to  cross  the  border  of  the  common  experimental  and  observational  science. 
Attempting  to  answer  this  issue  leads  to  the  construction  of  speculative  theories. 
Thus, CNS should be compared to other multiverse speculations. It should also be put 
in  perspective  with respect  to  other  attempts  to  explain the fine-tuning issue  (see 
section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144; and story 8, p174). And in this 
respect, it is arguably the best variant amongst the speculative multiverse universe. It 
is  parsimonious  because  it  includes  both  a  universe  generation  mechanism and a 
selection  principle.  This  goes  beyond  a  vague  statement  that  “all  other  possible 
universe exist”. Most importantly, it provides empirical tests such as the number of 
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black holes observed or an upper-bound mass for neutron stars (Brown, Lee, and Rho 
2008). 
Nevertheless, the epistemological difficulties are real  (see also Vaas 1998 for 
an in depth examination of CNS). Couldn't we find systematic ad hoc solutions to any 
objection against CNS? If the tests of CNS fail, couldn't we claim that we are simply 
not yet in the optimal universe generation, leading to the maximum number of black-
holes? It seems that CNS can easily be saved with such ad hoc hypotheses.
On 21-23 January 2008, I went to Bad Honneff in Germany to a workshop entitled 
“Evolution and Physics - Concepts, Models and Applications”. I presented a poster 
(Vidal 2008c) introducing CNS and its extension to CAS. Discussing with a scientist, 
he was uncomfortable with the speculative nature of those ideas. I replied that CNS 
and CAS should first be put in the context of the fine-tuning issue, so that we can 
compare them to alternative explanations. I then argued that CAS is “better” than the 
God or the multiverse hypothesis, because it is naturalistic and can be subjected to 
tests.  Having  made  explicit  my  problem-solving  attitude,  and  the  weakness  of 
alternative explanations, he seemed more open-minded. I finally won the best poster 
prize,  even  if  I  suspect  the  nice  poster  design  helped  more  than  the  speculative 
content.
Story 8: CNS, CAS and alternative explanations. 
Why speculate? It is important to be clear on which problem we tackle when we engage in 
speculations. 
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Figure 12 - WE-Heraeus-Seminar. Evolution and Physics - Concepts, Models and Applications. 21-23 
January 2008 at the Physikzentrum Bad Honnef, Germany.
Let us now raise five more fundamental objections against CNS, besides the 
number of black holes which may not be optimal. 
(1) CNS has no environment where selection operates
(2) CNS has no hereditary mechanism
(3) CNS unsuccessfully deals with parameter sensitivity
(4) CNS focuses on limited cosmic outcomes
(5) CNS does not address broader metaphysical issues
The first objection is that there is no environment where selection operates. 
This is a disanalogy with the darwinian mechanism of natural selection, where the 
environment plays the critical role of selection. Smolin defined natural selection as 
the selective growth of a population on a fitness landscape. The fitness is defined as 
the rate of reproduction. All this is correct, but, as Vaas (1998) argues, in biology the 
spread of populations is constrained by external factors which limit resources, such as 
space, food (energy) and mating opportunity (sexual selection). The problem is that 
there is no analog of these crucial elements in CNS. It seems that CNS could better be 
described as internal selection (or self-organization), rather than natural selection in a 
biological  fashion.  We  will  see  in  the  next  section  (8.3  Cosmological  Artificial
Selection, p176) how CAS can remedy this issue.
The  second  objection  is  that  CNS lacks  a  hereditary  mechanism.  Edward 
Harrison  (1995) noted that CNS lacks a process that selects for reproduction only 
universes that are inhabitable by organic life, in order to solve fine-tuning for life. 
James N. Gardner  (2003, 85) also pointed out the lack of hereditary mechanism in 
CNS. Why should baby universes resemble their parents? 
The  third  issue  regards  parameter  sensitivity.  How  reliable  is  universal 
reproduction? If there is a perfect reliability in the reproduction mechanism, there is 
no  evolution.  If  there  is  slight  variation  on  one  single  parameter,  universe 
reproduction will  most  likely fail.  This is  indeed the point  of  existing fine-tuning 
arguments, which are in fact just  one-parameter sensitivity arguments. Even Victor 
Stenger  (2011), the  most  vigorous  critique  of  fine-tuning,  concedes  this  point  of 
parameter sensitivity. This is why it is important to distinguish parameter sensitivity 
from fine-tuning.  Indeed,  if  almost  any slight  variation  in  the  physical  constants 
renders a universe sterile to complex outcomes, then CNS is very likely wrong. Most 
small random variations will prevent the emergence of a complex universe. The rate 
of new universe production should be extremely high to randomly hit in the cosmic 
landscape congenial regions for complexity. It remains an open question whether the 
rate  of  black  hole  production  and  universe  production  would  be  high  enough  to 
meaningfully explore the landscape.
The fourth issue concerns the key question “fine-tuning for what?”. Which 
cosmic outcome is CNS busy with? At first sight, only black holes matter, because 
they directly influence the amount of baby universes. But which black holes sizes are 
we  considering?  Primordial  black  holes?  Stellar  black  holes?  Supermassive  black 
holes? In the case of stellar black holes, Rothman and Ellis (1993) made explicit the 
connection with star formation. Indeed, since stellar black holes are –usually– thought 
to be the remnant of a dead massive star, if we increase the number of massive stars, 
we would at the same time increase the number of black holes. So, it seems that CNS 
is mainly concerned with cosmic outcomes such as the formation of massive stars and 
the number of black holes. But what about higher cosmic outcomes such as life or 
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intelligence? Do they conform or not with CNS? CNS is in fact indifferent to higher 
cosmic  outcomes  such  as  life  or  intelligence.  Simply  ignoring  the  growth  of 
complexity in the universe up to life and intelligence may prove a too narrow scope 
when considering the problem of the origin and evolution of the cosmos.
The fifth objection is that CNS has a too narrow scope. Indeed, one can greatly 
vary  the  scope  of  cosmological  issues,  from  observational  cosmology  up  to 
speculative  mathematical  theories  or  broader  cosmological  scenarios  and 
metaphysical issues (see Ellis 2007a, 1245–1247). In addition to the restriction to low 
cosmic outcomes, the scope of CNS is also too narrow from a philosophical point of 
view. What about “ultimate” explanations? Is there is a fine-tuning from generation to 
generation,  in  the  sense  that  each  universe  becomes  better  at  producing  new 
offspring? If so, did universes progressively become more and more complex? Where 
does the “first” universe comes from? Was there a first universe at all? Of course, we 
saw  that  these  are  different  issues  from  fine-tuning,  and  that  all  fine-tuning 
explanations we reviewed (see section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144) 
are incomplete in this regard. 
There is no particular meaning or role for intelligent life in CNS. In this essay, 
since our primary objective is to understand life and intelligence in the universe in a 
broad cosmological and philosophical way, CNS is too restrictive. We will now see 
how Cosmological Artificial Selection, a variation on CNS with a wider scope, can 
remedy to these five objections. 
8.3  Cosmological Artificial Selection
It is wonderful what the principle of selection by man, 
that is the picking out of individuals with any desired quality, 
and breeding from them, and again picking out, can do. 
Even breeders have been astounded at their own results.
Darwin's 1858 letter to Asa Gray. 
Reprinted in (Bajema 1983, 191–192)
8.3.1  History
Before remedying to objections to CNS (see next section 8.3.2 From Natural
to  Artificial  Cosmological  Selection,  p179),  let  us  dig  the  historical  roots  of 
Cosmological Artificial Selection. We saw (section 8.2.1 History, p170) that theorists 
have speculated that new universes could naturally emerge out of singularity regions 
inside black holes. Yet, other theorists made an even bolder step and explored the 
possibility of  artificially making universes. Such an early study was conducted by 
Fahri and Guth (1987) who pointed out, as their paper's title indicates, “An obstacle to 
creating a universe in the laboratory”. The obstacle being that the creation of such a 
universe in the laboratory would require an energy-density far too high with respect to 
what we can reach with our current technology. Others speculated that an advanced 
civilization could transfer information into their baby universe (see e.g. Ćirković and 
Bostrom 2000; J. Garriga et al. 2000). Ansoldi and Guendelman (2006) did review the 
literature  about  making  child  universes  in  the  laboratory.  Interestingly,  they  also 
advocated a more active approach to cosmology, not just with passive observations, 
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nor with virtual simulations as in Soft Artificial Cosmogenesis, but also with attempts 
to build real child universes in the laboratory, or Hard Artificial Cosmogenesis.
However,  we  can  find  much  deeper  roots  to  the  idea  of  a  naturalistic 
intelligence advanced enough to make a universe (see also Dick 2008). This advanced 
intelligence is not a supernatural God but a natural Demiurge. In contrast with a God, 
a Demiurge is not omnipotent and, like an architect, has to work within the constraints 
of the material world. Such a  non ex nihilo creation myth was elaborated in Plato's 
Timaeus. However, for Plato the demiurge made the cosmos out of an ideal bluebrint 
(see also Kragh 2007, 23). Plato's myth thus keeps a idealistic component.
More  recently,  Fred  Hoyle  (1983,  211–215) made  an  intriguing  reasoning 
regarding the possible intelligent control  from an advanced future intelligence. He 
noticed that the past-to-future sense of time is a special case of Maxwell's equations. 
The opposite time-sense from future-to-past  is in principle not forbidden. He thus 
speculated that “biological systems are able in some way to utilize the opposite time-
sense in which radiation propagates from future to past. Bizarre as this may appear, 
they must somehow be working backwards in time.” This is an example of a superior 
yet natural intelligence at play in our universe.
However, even if we grant this provocative idea as plausible scientifically, it 
remains extravagant. Indeed, it is more cautious and natural to study the increase of 
complexity through the thermodynamics of open-systems and biological systems in 
particular, rather than assuming time travel of some kind of information from  future 
to past.
In  the context  of  the search for  advanced extraterrestrial  life,  Allen Tough 
(1986, 497a) speculated that an advanced civilization would try to avoid a cosmic 
doom scenario, heat death or big crunch. For this grand purpose, “some way may be 
found to break out of this Universe into another one, either existing parallel to it or 
arising subsequent to it. That is, perhaps the best of our knowledge, consciousness, 
and genes can somehow be transferred to this other universe.”  
In 1994, Louis Crane  published on the arXiv preprint repository a paper –later 
published in (2010)–  with the intriguing title “Possible Implications of the Quantum 
Theory of Gravity: An Introduction to the Meduso-Anthropic Principle”. Although I 
do not treasure the introduction of new anthropic principles, this one is worth closer 
examination.  Indeed,  Crane  was  the  first  to  propose  a  variation  on  Smolin's 
Cosmological Natural Selection by introducing a contribution for intelligent life. He 
conjectured that “successful  advanced industrial civilizations will eventually create 
black  holes”.  He gave  reasons why (for  scientific  purposes,  energy source,  waste 
disposal, starship propulsion) but we will get back to this idea more systematically 
later (see section 9.3 Black Holes as Attractors for Intelligence, p228). Such artificial 
black holes experiments would incidentally increase the overall number of black holes 
in the universe, and thus strengthen the basic mechanism of CNS. In the words of 
Crane, fine-tuning then reaches the cosmic outcome of “successful civilization”, not 
only stars and natural black holes:
If both Smolin’s two conjectures and mine are true, then the fine tuning of physical constants 
would not stop with physics which produced stars and gas clouds which cool. Rather, the 
selection would continue until physics evolved which resulted in successful civilizations
One year later, eminent cosmologist Edward Harrison (1995) published in the 
Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society a remarkable paper describing in 
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much details the possible influence of intelligence in Smolin's CNS. Harrison was 
probably not aware of Crane's paper, since he doesn't cite it. Instead of the meduso-
anthropic  principle,  Harrison  named  the  scenario  a  Natural  Creation  Theory. 
Importantly,  Harrison  contrasts  “natural”  with  “supernatural”.  So,  natural  is  not 
opposed to artificial, it includes it. Instead of a Natural Creation Theory, it would thus 
be more accurate to speak of a “Natural and Artificial  Creation Theory”. This was 
also noticed by Barrow (1998, 175) who proposed instead the terminology of “forced 
breeding” or “artificial selection”.
Harrison did articulate very clearly a very inspiring cosmogenic reproduction 
scenario. He did address in his paper the main issues this picture raises. We will come 
back to the details, but his core idea was simply to combine two lines of thought. 
First, the possibility of universe creation in the laboratory (Farhi and Guth 1987) and 
second, Smolin's cosmological natural selection hypothesis. 
In January 1997, the Edge.org website published a short discussion between 
Smolin and Dawkins about CNS. Dawkins commented on the fact that CNS is only 
concerned with basic outcomes (Smolin et al. 1997):
Smolinian selection may account for the fact that our universe has the necessary 
constants, dimensionality and laws to last for last for a long time (not fizzle out or 
crunch immediately its initiating bang), long enough to spawn daughter universes 
(and INCIDENTALLY long enough to breed life).
But what about higher outcomes? Dawkins continues:
 
But  Smolinian  selection  cannot  account  for  the  fact  that  our  universe  is 
specifically  congenial  to  life,  or  to  intelligent  life,  or  to  us.  My  negative 
conclusion would break down only if life itself is in the habit of engineering the 
spawning of daughter universes. As far as I am aware, this hasn't been suggested, 
but it is, I suppose, a theoretical possibility that daughter universes are generated 
as a consequence of the fooling around of highly evolved physicists. 
As we saw, the idea was suggested and developed earlier, at least by Louis Crane and 
Ted  Harrison.  But  it  is  remarkable  that  those  three  researchers  all  independently 
suggested  to  complete  CNS with  a  role  for  high  intelligence.  However,  Dawkins 
perhaps vaguely realizing that he is extrapolating evolutionary reasoning further than 
usual, ends his reply with: “But this may not be very coherent since I am suffering 
from flu”. 
In November 1998,  Steven J. Dick (2000), reflected about Cosmotheology, or 
the impact  of  the  new worldview of  cosmic  evolution.  He also envisioned that  a 
natural God could have had made our universe. He writes (Dick 2000, 204) that such 
“advanced intelligence could have fine tuned the physical constants”. He did not link 
the idea with Smolin's CNS however. 
James N. Gardner later developed the scenario much further, in a series of 
papers (J. N. Gardner 2000; 2001; 2005) and a beautifully written book, Biocosm. The 
New Scientific Theory of Evolution: Intelligent Life Is the Architect of the Universe. 
(J.  N. Gardner 2003). He named the scenario the  Selfish Biocosm Hypothesis,  the 
cosmos itself selfishly aiming at its own replication, as genes want to replicate in 
Dawkins' famous metaphor of evolution.
In 2001, at  the 12th Congress of the International Association “Cosmos & 
Philosophy”,  Baláz  (2005) further  elaborated  the  scenario  that  he  named  the 
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cosmological  replication  cycle and  made  connections  with  the  search  for 
extraterrestrials. 
Whereas most  authors who developed this scenario focused on solving the 
fine-tuning issue, there is one exception. It is the work of futurist and developmental 
system  theorist  John  M.  Smart  (2000;  2009;  2012).  Extrapolating  the  trends  of 
increasingly dense and energy intensive technologies, he came to the conclusion that 
ultimate technology should reach a black hole density. As we saw, black holes can 
then be hypothesized to generate new universes. It is then a small speculative step to 
assume that  sufficiently advanced civilizations could actually foster the making of 
universes. He named the scenario  Developmental Singularity Hypothesis  and in the 
context of SETI, the  Transcention Hypothesis. Importantly, the singularity Smart is 
talking  about  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  large  literature  about  technological 
singularity. The latter technological singularity pertains to the exponential increase of 
computing  resources  and  the  predictable  merging  of  humans,  machines  and  the 
internet (see e.g. Heylighen 2005; Kurzweil 2006). Smart's singularity is a few million 
years ahead. His reasoning is very interesting, because it shows that we can arrive to 
CAS not only by thinking deeply about solving the fine-tuning issue (the beginning) 
but also by extrapolating the ultimate future development of civilizations (the end).
The topic has been further discussed from different perspectives in a variety of 
popular books  (see e.g. Chown 2003; Kurzweil 2006; Martin 2006; J. N. Gardner 
2007; Davies 2008; John Gribbin 2009) and papers (Barrow 2001; Dick 2008; Vidal 
2008b; Stewart 2010; Vaas 2009; Vidal 2010a; Vaas 2012; Vidal 2012a).
To sum up, a variety of authors have discussed the same idea of intelligent life 
playing a role in a universal reproduction cycle. They used different terminologies to 
describe  the scenario:  meduso-anthropic  principle,  natural  creation history,  natural 
God,  selfish  biocosm hypothesis,  cosmological  replication  cycle  or  developmental 
singularity hypothesis. I will use Cosmological Artificial Selection (CAS), because the 
scenario  is  a  variation  on  Smolin's  Cosmological  Natural  Selection  (CNS)  where 
natural selection is simply replaced by artificial selection. But how and why could we 
and should we shift from CNS to CAS?
8.3.2  From Natural to Artificial Cosmological Selection
Let us now see how CAS can remedy the objections we formulated against CNS, and 
thus understand the worth of extending CNS to CAS. We claim the following:
(1) CAS uses a virtual multiverse environment where selection operates
(2) CAS has an intelligence-driven hereditary mechanism
(3) CAS successfully deals with parameter sensitivity
(4) CAS reaches high cosmic outcomes
(5) CAS can be completed to address broader metaphysical issues
The first remedy to CNS is to re-introduce an environment, which is a vital 
component for selection to operate. The environment is here a set of virtual universes 
tested and fine-tuned by a naturally very advanced intelligence. This can in principle 
be conducted with artificial cosmogenesis, where virtual universes compete with each 
other.  This  also  introduces  competition  (which  you  don't  have  in  CNS)  between 
artificially  generated  universe  simulations.  One  can  interpret  this  approach  as  a 
variation on the multiverse proposal. However, the selection of universes would take 
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place  on  virtual  universes,  replacing  Smolin's  natural  selection  of  real  universes 
(Barrow 2001,  151).  In CNS, we need many generations of universes in  order  to 
randomly generate an interesting fine-tuned universe. In contrast, these simulations 
would  dramatically  improve  the  process  by  artificially  selecting  (via  simulations) 
which universe would exhibit the desired features for the next generation universe. 
This would facilitate the daunting task of making a new universe. In this case it is 
indeed  appropriate  to  speak  about  a  “Cosmological  Artificial Selection”  (CAS), 
instead of a “Cosmological  Natural Selection”.  This can be achieved as a far-off 
application of a mature Artificial Cosmogenesis research program. Accordingly, we 
are not only talking about simulations here, but also a much greater feat, which is the 
realization or the making of a new universe. Are these feats possible? We will discuss 
this  objection  soon  (in  section  8.3.9  Objection  –  Are  Simulation  and  Realization
Possible? , p190).
The second remedy is to introduce intelligent life as performing or helping the 
hereditary mechanism. The pioneer authors of CAS put forward the hypothesis that 
life  and  intelligence  could  perform  this  mechanism  of  heredity,  thus  playing  an 
essential role in the Darwinian evolution of universes. To better grasp this extension 
of  CNS,  Baláz  and  Gardner  proposed  to  consider  von  Neumann's  (1951) four 
components of a self-reproducing automaton. I summarized this completion of CNS 
in table 8 below. 
Let  us  describe these four  components in more detail.  Physics  and cosmic 
parameters  are  analogous  to  DNA in  biology,  and  to  the  blueprint  of  this  self-
reproducing automaton. The universe at large or the cell as a whole constitute the 
factory.  When furnished with the description of another automaton in the form of a 
blueprint,  the  factory  will  construct  this  automaton.  The  reproducer reads  the 
blueprint  and  produces  a  second  blueprint.  In  the  cell,  these  are  reproduction 
mechanisms of the DNA. The controller  will cause the reproducer to make a new 
blueprint,  and  cause  the  factory  to  produce  the  automaton  described  by  the  new 
blueprint.  The  controller  separates  the  new  construction  from  the  factory,  the 
reproducer and the controller. If this new construction is given a blueprint, it finally 
forms a new independent self-reproducing automaton.
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COMPONENTS DESCRIPTION BIOLOGY(cell)
COSMOLOGY
(universe)
Blueprint
Gives  instructions  for  the 
construction  of  the 
automaton
Information  contained 
in the DNA
Physics  and  cosmic 
parameters
Factory Carries out the construction Cell The universe at large
Reproducer Reads  the  blueprint  and produces a second blueprint
The reproduction of the 
DNA
CNS:?
Intelligence  unravelling 
the universe's blueprint
Controller Ensures the factory follows the blueprint
The  regulatory 
mechanisms  of  the 
mitosis
CNS:?
A cosmic process, aiming 
at universe reproduction
Table 8: Components of a von Neumann’s (1951) self-reproducing automaton.
The second column  provides a general description of the automaton functions. The third and fourth 
columns propose examples respectively in biology –the cell– and in cosmology –the universe.
We now clearly  see  the  limits  of  CNS,  which  is  not  specifying  what  the 
reproducer  and controller  are.  Intelligence unravelling the universe's  blueprint  can 
precisely  fulfill  the  reproducer's  function.  This  reproducer  component  is  indeed 
essential for providing a mechanism for heredity. Without heredity, there can be no 
Darwinian evolution. The controller in this context would be a more general process 
aiming at universe reproduction with the help of intelligence. In table 8, I completed 
in bold font these two missing components of CNS, thus including intelligence in this 
hypothesized cosmic reproduction process.  
A consequence of this speculative theory is that intelligent life, unravelling the 
universe  through  scientific  understanding,  generates  a  “cosmic  blueprint”  (an 
expression used by Paul Davies 1989). The cosmic blueprint can be seen as the set of 
physics  and  cosmic  parameters.  In  CAS,  the  fine-tuning of  this  cosmic  blueprint 
would take place in “virtual universes”, that is in simulated universes (Vidal 2008b; 
2013). 
Third,  CAS  successfully  deals  with  parameter  sensitivity.  The  solution  is 
simply that natural intelligences take good care of it. CNS is insensitive to parameter 
sensitivity. We saw that small variations of one or several parameters generally don't 
lead to fecund universes. Here is a way to distinguish CNS from CAS. We could 
predict that the number of off-spring universes produced in CNS would be insufficient 
to make it statistically probable that random variation would lead to an off-spring 
universe with complex outcomes (e.g. life, intelligence or technology). Of course, the 
number of offspring universes is hard to assess given our present knowledge of black 
holes  and  the  speculative  nature  of  universe  generation  inside  black  holes.  For 
example,  do  we  consider  laboratory-sized  black  holes,  stellar  black  holes  and 
supermassive  black  holes?  Could  it  be  that  rotating  black  holes  generate  several 
universes?  
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Fourth, CAS reaches high cosmic outcomes. Let us ask the key question: fine-
tuning  for  what? In  both  CNS and  CAS,  the  ultimate  aim of  the  universe  is  to 
replicate.  However,  the cosmic outcomes which allow replication are  different.  In 
CNS, it is the sheer number of black holes which matters. In CAS, it is the number of 
intelligent civilizations actually making universes. Crane already noticed that fine-
tuning would concern successfully advanced civilizations, and not just stars massive 
enough to collapse into black holes. More precisely, in CAS the universe is fine-tuned 
for  recursive  self-replication  driven  by  intelligent  life.  The  recursive  aspect  is 
fundamental. It involves the idea of fertility or immortality of the cosmic replication 
process (we will discuss this fundamental aspect at the end of this work, in section 
10.4 Voyage to Five Immortalities, p293). Indeed, why bother making a new universe 
if it will be sterile and doomed to annihilation?
The fifth point regards the respective scopes of CNS and CAS. Since CNS is 
already a quite speculative theory difficult to test, why develop CAS, an even more 
speculative one? The answer is that the scope of CAS is different from CNS. 
Rüdiger Vaas (2012) criticized CAS on the basis that CNS is “simpler” than 
CAS. I disagree. Since this claim is quite unexpected, I must first make an important 
epistemological  remark  about  the  concept  of  simplicity.  It  is  well  known  that 
simplicity is very hard to define, and specialists consider it to be either subjective 
(Heylighen 1997a), or largely context dependent (T. S. Kuhn 1977; McMullin 2008). 
So we need to make explicit the cosmological context at play here, or the scope of the 
inquiry, as Ellis (2007a, 1245) already suggested. The scope we discuss here concerns 
four fundamental issues:
(1) Why do the laws of physics, constants and boundary conditions have 
the form they do? 
As we saw in details in Chapter 6, this concerns the fine-tuning issue. 
(2) Why not nothing? 
This  is  certainly  one  of  the  deepest  metaphysical  question.  The 
formulation here is a shorter version proposed by Apostel  (1999) of 
Leibniz' “why is there something rather than nothing?”. Again, we saw 
that  it  is  an  unavoidable  metaphysical  challenge  (see section  4.1.2  
Metaphysical, p76).
(3) What is the meaning of the existence of intelligent life in the universe? 
This question asks about the meaning of intelligence in the universe. 
Here, meaning is interpreted as “purpose” or “significance”. Are life 
and intelligence merely epiphenomena in cosmic evolution? Or could 
their  presence  have  deeper,  yet  to  be  discovered  implications?  As 
Davies  (1999, 246)  formulates it, why did the laws of the universe 
engineer their own comprehension? 
(4) How can intelligent life survive indefinitely?
The future of the universe is gloomy. Physical eschatology teaches us 
that none of the known scenarios seem to allow indefinite continuation 
of life and information processing in the very long term (Vaas 2006). 
These four questions are more philosophical than scientific. Another way to put it is 
to  see  CNS as  a  scientific  speculation,  tackling  question  (1),  whereas  CAS is  a 
philosophical  speculation,  tackling  questions  (1),  (3)  and  (4).  Question  (2)  has  a 
182
special status, because it is metaphysical, and both CNS and CAS –and any “ultimate” 
explanation–  has to deal with it.
To put it otherwise, it is worth mentioning that in this inquiry we reformulated 
and  focused  the  philosophical  worldview questions  into  mixed  philosophical  and 
cosmological  questions.  Arguing in favor of CAS is better  seen as an exercise in 
synthetical philosophy,  i.e. the construction of a worldview answering consistently 
and comprehensively the worldview questions. I translated the issue of the beginning 
of the universe into free parameters and fine-tuning (1). Regarding the “end of the 
universe”, I focused on the future of scientific simulations, and the predictable end of 
the universe in a cosmic doom (4). The combinations of the answers should provide a 
synthetical worldview giving a meaning of life (3).
Looking at question (1) alone, CAS is indeed not a simple explanation at all, 
and CNS is much better. However, CAS is ultimately busy with those three (or four) 
questions together. Broadening the context is often necessary to solve complex and 
difficult problems. I insisted strenuously in my papers  (Vidal 2008b; 2010a; 2012a) 
that  CAS  shall  foremost  be  seen  a  speculative  philosophical  scenario,  precisely 
because of its more philosophically ambitious and comprehensive scope than CNS. In 
one sentence,  CAS is a speculative philosophical scenario to understand the origin 
and future of the universe, including a role for intelligent life. 
Now, as Vaas notices, since CAS is a close relative of CNS, it might also have 
scientific  aspects.  However,  they  are  quite  difficult  to  define  and  assess.  Still, 
indirectly, the line of thinking behind CAS and universe making will give us precious 
clues to look for advanced extraterrestrials (see Chapter 9). Interestingly, the Cosmic 
Evolution Equation can help to frame research agendas to test CAS. For example, we 
discussed the CEE in the context of studying how fine-tuned our universe is.  But in 
the context of CAS, if the outcome is to artificially make a new universe, the CEE can 
be  used  in  a  different  manner.  We  can  reduce  the  parameter  space  of  possible 
universes by focusing on universes possible to make from our universe. The space of 
possibilities may thus be reduced not only by the physical constraints of new universe 
formation (as in CNS or other multiverse models), but also by the limits of cosmic 
engineering capabilities of cosmic intelligence(s). What are these limits? What are the 
different levels of universe making we can foresee? 
8.3.3  Six Levels of Universe Making
CAS raises  the  question:  did  our  universe  originate  out  of  some  kind  of 
natural intelligence? If so, what is the level of influence of the previous intelligence? 
Could  there  be  a  kind  of  upbringing  of  baby  universes?  This  is  highly 
doubtful.  Indeed,  transmission  of  information  between  universes  is  unlikely.  In 
analogy with biological organisms, evolutionary theorist John E. Stewart  suggested 
that a “parent universe” could transmit information to its offspring universe (Stewart 
2010,  401).  Although  it  is  an  exciting  scientific and  philosophical speculation, 
physical constraints are likely to rule out this possibility. Indeed, constraints related to 
the  physics  of  hypothesized  baby  universes  production  are  too  strong  to  pass  on 
messages.  Let  us  assume  that  a  whole  new  disconnected  space-time  structure  is 
generated from one  universe to  another.  Such a  space-time has a  different  causal 
structure from the previous universe. Therefore, it is by definition impossible to make 
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the  two  communicate,  because  the  common  causal  relationship  between  the  two 
vanishes after the reproducing event.
Yet, even if transmission is impossible, it is important to distinguish six levels 
of universe making, summarized in table  9. I draw inspiration from and extend the 
three levels of universe making that Gribbin (2009, 197) proposed.
Level Description
1) Blind The  blind  level  of  universe  making  is  illustrated  by  CNS, 
where there is no role for intelligence. The random variation of 
parameters  at  each  universe's  bounce  provides  minimum 
ingredients to explore the parameter space. No intelligence is 
necessary in the process. 
2) Accidental Louis  Crane  (2012),  in  response  to  my commentary  (Vidal 
2012d) on his 1994 paper was more explicit in his vision of 
artificial  black  hole  production.  He  argued  that  black  holes 
would be useful mainly for energy production. He wrote that 
“production  of  new universes  is  only  a  byproduct”.  At  this 
level, universe making is a variation on Smolin's CNS: more 
black  holes  are  produced  accidentally,  without  explicit 
intention  of  universe  making.  As  Crane  writes,  if  artificial 
black  holes  “result  in  the  creation  of  new  universes,  that 
explains  the  overall  evolutionary  success  of  fine  tuned 
universes”. 
3)  Artificial  black 
hole production
The  next  level  is  to  manufacture  intentionally –not 
accidentally–   black  holes  and  baby  universes,  without  any 
attempt to influence the new universe. Of course, this raises 
the  motivational  question:  why  would  you  make  a  new 
universe? Furthermore, imagining that you can produce black 
holes and baby universes why not nudge their characteristics to 
a desired outcome? 
4) Cosmic breeder Cosmic breeders have the ability to nudge the properties of the 
baby universes in a certain direction. This level is the most 
faithful to the metaphor of artificial selection. Indeed, breeders 
on  Earth  are  totally  incapable  of  designing  from  scratch  a 
living  organism.  But  they  can  selectively  cross-fertilize  and 
reproduce plants or animals to foster desired traits. In a similar 
way, cosmic breeder don't know how to design from scratch a 
universe. But they can play in a constrained way with physics 
and cosmic parameters. 
184
Level Description
5) Cosmic engineer Cosmic engineers have the ability to set precisely the physics 
and cosmic parameters in the baby universe, thereby designing 
the baby universe in detail. Parameters are then analogous to 
DNA in living organisms  (see also J. N. Gardner 2003 who 
explores the analogy between DNA and parameters). Genetic 
engineers select and modify DNA to foster the making of new 
organisms in a certain direction. Cosmic engineers select and 
modify parameters to foster the making of baby universes. It is 
probably the level that Andrei Linde (1992, 440) had in mind 
when  he  wrote  about  artificial  universe  production  in  the 
laboratory and asked: “Does this mean that our universe was 
created by a physicist hacker?”
6) God player Could the level of cosmic engineers be outclassed? The “God 
players”  have  the  ability  to  control  every  parameter  of  the 
universe produced. There are playing God because the whole 
space  of  possible  universes  is  accessible  to  them.  Not  only 
they have the power to set values of free parameters, but any 
universe  is  possible  (e.g.  creating  Harry  Potter  kinds  of 
universes, see our discussion about possible universes, section 
6.3.1 Possible Universes, p123). They can choose to create the 
best or the worst possible worlds. 
Table 9 - Six levels of universe making 
In sum, we could speak of the “intelligent design” movement as an intelligent 
reactive design, where one passively wonder and admire order in nature. Nothing is 
done  to  further  explain  and  explore  the  mechanisms  at  play  in  nature.  Instead 
proponents of intelligent design try to show the insufficiency of current darwinian 
mechanisms and infer or suggest –hastily– the evidence of a divine creation. This is in 
stark contrast  with those different levels of universe making, which we could call 
intelligent proactive design. This time, if CAS holds for the future, we will make new 
universes.  The  logic  is  turned upside  down.  Instead  of  looking for  a  creator,  we 
speculate to what extent our future intelligence could approach the skills to breed or 
design  baby universes.  The  extent  of  this  design  can  vary  a  lot,  from accidental 
production, to playing God. Obviously, the question remains open regarding which 
level may be correct. So, when we speak about universe making in what follows, all 
levels are  possible  (except  the “Blind” one).  Let  us now turn to many objections 
against CAS, that we shall formulate and address.
8.3.4  Objection – Design and Creation
Cosmological Artificial Selection:
Creation out of Something?
Title of Vaas' (2012) paper.
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CAS presents real epistemological, logical, and metaphysical difficulties. I did 
address them while  replying to  a  critical  paper  that  Rüdiger  Vaas wrote  in  2009, 
entitled “Life, the Universe, and almost Everything: Signs of Cosmic Design?” (Vaas 
2009). A shorter version of these critiques was published under a no less provocative 
title: “Cosmological Artificial Selection: Creation out of Something?” (Vaas 2012) . 
What follows is based on my replies to Vaas' critiques (Vidal 2012a). I will show that 
the difficulties raised by Vaas can largely be weakened and put into perspective. 
I  start  by inviting to  carefulness when using terms such as  “creation” and 
“design”. Then I invoke a principle of rational economy to tackle fine-tuning, and to 
compare the competing explanations. I discuss the causal issue and propose a possible 
metaphysical  framework to  approach the  question “how did the cosmic  engineers 
emerge in the first place?”. I also discuss the thermodynamical issue in the context of 
CAS. I then examine CAS epistemologically to determine wether it is part of science 
or philosophy. Then I discuss if universes can be simulated and realized. I discuss the 
motivations underlying universe making, although I will dig in more details into this 
key issue in Chapter 10. I briefly discuss the idea of freedom within CAS and argue 
that the scenario implies no fatalism. In the last two subsections, I first draw four 
converging  roads  to  CAS and  finally  recapitulate  the  case  for  CAS.  I  hope  this 
dialectic between objections and responses will help to clarify the scope and even 
beauty entailed by CAS.
First,  I  would  like  to  forcefully  stress  that  the  whole  CAS  scenario  is 
naturalistic,  and,  as  Vaas notices,  is  fully  compatible  with ontological  naturalism. 
This is why I would rather be careful with the term “create”, because it generally 
supposes an origin out of nothing, whereas here it is indeed question of a “creation out 
of something”. The roman philosopher Lucretius famously said that “nothing can be 
produced from nothing” (ex nihilo nihil fit) is a principle that not even the gods can 
violate. We already analyzed in details in Chapter  4 the difficulties associated with 
creation, more precisely with “point-attractor” explanations. For these reasons, instead 
of the verb “create”, I will rather use “produce” or “make”  (following e.g. Davies 
2008; John Gribbin 2009).
Since  Vaas  speaks  about  “design”  when  discussing  CAS,  well  trained 
scientists will surely brandish red flags. Design is associated with intelligent design or 
other  bad  explanations.  Scientists  indeed  loath  the  term  “design”  in  explanatory 
contexts.  Why? Because  it  freezes  scientific  explanation.  If  we  are  confronted  to 
something to explain, the “design” answer, like the god-of-the-gaps explanation, will 
at  the  same  time  always  work,  and  explain  everything  (nay,  rather  nothing).  We 
already discussed these limitations when discussing classical  explanations of  fine-
tuning (see section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144). In a cosmological 
context, words like intentionality, purpose or design are immediately associated with 
supernatural causes. But this needs not to be!  
Importantly, the intentional explanatory mechanisms involved in CAS do not 
interfere  at  all  with  normal  scientific  explanation.  On  the  contrary,  maybe 
surprisingly, CAS as a whole can be seen as an invitation to a fantastic scientific and 
technological challenge: making a universe. This is why in my first papers about CAS 
(Vidal  2008b;  2010a) I  presented  CAS  as  happening  in  the  future.  Ultimately, 
pondering the fundamental metaphysical uncertainties about the origin of it all, I think 
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it is more fruitful to try to contribute to shape the future than to understand the past. 
However,  the  full  CAS scenario  is  also  about  the  origin  of  the  universe  and the 
meaning of intelligent life in it. So, let us have a closer look.
8.3.5  Objection – CAS versus other Fine-Tuning Explanations
Vaas  describes  four  major  responses  to  fine-tuning  corresponding  to  the 
explanations we have given (in section 6.4 Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144): 
fecundity,  chance-of-the-gaps,  necessity and  fine-tuning explained as  a  product  of 
selection.  This  selection  can  be  an  observational  selection  or  WAP-of-the-gaps;  a 
divine  selection  (God-of-the-gaps);  a  natural  selection  (Cosmological  Natural 
Selection) or an artificial selection (Cosmological Artificial Selection). From a logical 
point  of  view,  he  correctly  points  out  that  such  explanations  are  not  mutually 
exclusive.  However, each of them was developed to be an independent and sufficient 
response.  Since  all  of  them lack  definitive  support,  what  benefit  do  we  gain  by 
combining  them?  Taking  seriously  those  combinations  as  explanations  resembles 
more fictional speculation than anything else. One might argue that such an attempt 
would please at the same time proponents of the different options, but even this is not 
certain. The principle of rational economy afore mentioned should be at play here:
Never  employ  extraordinary  means  to  achieve  purposes  you  can  realize  by 
ordinary ones  (Rescher 2006, 8)
In the complete CAS scenario, we assume an intentional cause, which is not 
present in other naturalistic scenarios. However, it is still logically possible to assume 
that CAS will happen in the future, but did not happen in the past. In that case, there 
would be no original intentional cause, no “natural intelligent design”  involved to 
explain the origin of the universe. If we consider CAS as only valid in the future, it is 
perfectly possible to hold the following logically consistent positions: 
(a) God as the first universe maker and CAS
(b) Fundamental theory and CAS
(c) Multiverse and CAS
(d) Skepticism and CAS
A religious person might go with (a), a scientist might like (b) or (c). The skeptic (d) 
might say that we should stop arguing about the origin of the universe, since anyway 
it is unlikely that we get unambiguous support for such or such option. Still, he could 
agree that CAS is an interesting prospect for the future of intelligence in the universe. 
Those four options would still  allow intelligent  life  to take up the future of their 
universe.
However, as Vaas also remarks, adhering to one of these four options would 
violate  the  Copernican  principle.  Indeed  our  universe  would  be  central  in  the 
supposed cosmological replication cycle. So, how can we avoid this bias? Following 
the  Copernican  principle  and  being  faithful  to  the  principle  of  rational  economy 
against the combination of fine-tuning explanations, what could the scenario (e) “CAS 
and CAS” be? 
Vaas points out that “CAS tries to explain something complex with something 
even more complex”. This critique was also made in  (Byl 1996; Barrow 1998, 132; 
Vidal 2012c). It is indeed correct, and Vaas explains:
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Furthermore  one  might  wonder  whether  CAS has any  convincing explanatory 
force  at  all.  Because ultimately CAS tries  to  explain something complex (our 
universe)  with  something  even  more  complex  (cosmic  engineers  and 
engineering).  But  the  usual  explanatory  scheme  is  just  the  converse:  The 
explanans should be simpler than the explanandum. 
This  is  correct,  however  the  underlying  fundamental  problem  is  that  the  usual 
explanatory scheme does not hold when we bring a kind of “ultimate theory” at play 
(see our detailed analysis in section 4.1.1 Epistemological, p74). By ultimate theory, I 
do not necessarily mean a “theory of everything” like it is sometimes speculated in 
physics; but a general “all encompassing” scheme of explanation. Accordingly, the 
explanatory  scheme  of  CAS  is  not  usual,  but  comparing  the  scope  of  classical 
explanations and CAS, we can argue that the explanatory force of CAS is much wider 
(see also Vaas 2009 where Vaas acknowledges this broad view on CAS). We can now 
summarize three levels to interpret CAS, where each level includes the precedent: 
(i) CAS in the future
This  is  the  scenario  I  have  described in  my papers  (Vidal  2008b;  2010a),  which 
provides a response to cosmic doom, a promise to scientifically progress on the fine-
tuning issue and a role for intelligent life in cosmic evolution. For what happened in 
the past, positions (a)-(d) are all logically possible options. 
(ii) CAS in the future and in the past
This scenario chooses option (e) “CAS with CAS” to tackle the origin of the universe. 
This implies that our universe has been made and fine-tuned to some degree by an 
intelligent civilization. 
(iii) CAS in the future, past and a metaphysics
However, position (ii) implies further metaphysical problems. A metaphysics for CAS 
is needed to avoid a  shift  of  the fine-tuning issue, and to propose a framework to 
answer  metaphysical  questions  like  “who  created  the  creators?”  or  “why  not 
nothing?”. I attempt in the following lines the sketch of one such possible framework. 
Although it is at odds with our knowledge of cosmic evolution, to avoid a shift 
of the fine-tuning issue and a tower of turtles, one can suppose that the tuning of new 
universes is  not enhanced as the universal reproduction cycle repeats. Indeed, if we 
assume a complexification between universes, we will automatically shift the fine-
tuning problem. In addition, we must assume that there is no “first universe”. This 
sounds strange for  our  inclinations towards point-like  cognitive attractors.  We are 
used to think in a linear way, with a beginning, a middle and an end. However, it is 
possible to postulate a cyclical metaphysics (the cycle-like cognitive attractor), where 
there is no beginning at all, only a cycle. To sum up, in this metaphysical picture (iii), 
CAS describes an infinite cycle of self-reproducing universes mediated by intelligent 
civilization.
Again,  it  is  important  to  emphasize  that  circular  explanations  and  infinite 
regresses are not necessarily vicious  (Gratton 1994).  One attributes viciousness to 
such reasoning, but this is based on the assumption that “there is some obligation to 
begin a beginningless process or to end some endless process” (Gratton 1994, 295). 
Again, instead of trying to avoid an infinite explanatory regress, we can choose to 
embrace it, without any contradiction. 
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8.3.6  Objection – The Causal Issue 
“Who created the creators?” is typically a metaphysical issue steming from 
our metaphysical yearning to reach an ultimate point-like explanation. But whatever 
reply X will be to this question, we can always ask: “where does X which created the 
creator  comes  from?”.  In  the  last  analysis,  whatever  we  reply,  at  least  the 
metaphysical  question  (2),  “why  not  nothing?”  will  remain.  These  questions  are 
metaphysical and should not be confused with the fine-tuning issue  (E. R. Harrison 
1998). The fine-tuning issue is concerned with question (1) above, and “who created 
the creator?” is of a metaphysical nature, like question (2). 
If we take into account this distinction, then it follows that no response to fine-
tuning escapes metaphysical issues. Indeed, if we could prove that there is indeed a 
fundamental theory, we could still wonder why it is here, and why it gave rise to our 
universe, rather than having just nothing. If we could prove that there is indeed a God, 
we run into the same problem of “who created the creator?” that time in a theological 
context. If we could prove that there is indeed a multiverse, we must answer: how did 
the multiverse start in the first place? Where do the generative mechanism, the space 
of possible universes and the variation of this space from one universe to another 
come from? In conclusion, to properly respond to “who created the creator?” in the 
framework of CAS, as with other options, we need to develop a metaphysics. Barrow 
(1998, 132) mocked Harrison's CAS scenario when he wrote: 
Unfortunately, this amusing idea cannot explain why the constants were such as to 
allow life to originate long before the ability to tune baby universes existed
However, it should now be clear that Barrow has introduced an implicit hypothesis. 
Namely, that  the ability to tune baby universes evolved progressively. But this is not 
necessary for CAS. Indeed, it complicates the theory uselessly.
8.3.7  Objection – The Thermodynamical Issue
But  where  do  we  find  the  free  energy  to  sustain  an  infinite  cosmological 
replication cycle? I find this open question exquisitely difficult. There is indeed an 
essential  tension between the first  law of thermodynamics (no new energy can be 
created) and the second law (entropy can only increase). Taking the two together, it 
means that if the supply of energy is finite, energy is doomed to be dissipated.
On a closer analysis, one can criticize the applicability of thermodynamics on 
a cosmological scale. We could also try to relax either the assumption of the finiteness 
of energy available, or to remark that a rigorous formulation of the second law says 
that entropy can increase  or stay the same. Regarding the first option, although not 
logically excluded, I find it hard to believe in an infinite supply of energy. Even with a 
finite  supply  of  energy,  the  second  option  raises  hope  to  stabilize  the  universe 
thermodynamically and stop generating entropy. But then it is not clear if something 
like life which needs an energy gradient  could still  subsist  in an active state (see 
section 10.4.5 Cosmological Immortality, p304 for a discussion and a short critique of 
such a scenario using the concept of reversible computation). 
But there is another way out. It  is to assume that the densities involved in 
universe making are so high, that no thermodynamical information is retained in the 
process. Each new universe makes a fresh thermodynamic start. We already saw that 
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Misner, Thorne, Wheeler and Davies pointed at such a possibility (see section 4.3.3 
Big Bang(s) Cycles , p80).
8.3.8  Objection – Epistemological Issues: Science or Philosophy? 
Is CAS science or philosophy? It is definitely philosophical by its wide scope, 
rather than scientific.  It  is  a big picture philosophical  scenario,  which may in the 
future lead to more specific scientific predictions. In my opinion, we are still far from 
this. Yet, Gardner  (2003, 135–136) proposed four “falsifiable predictions” of CAS 
(which he calls the selfish biocosm hypothesis). The first is the success of SETI; the 
second is convergent evolution toward sentience in nonprimate species; the third is 
the creation of a conscious artifact in Artificial Life evolution; and the fourth is the 
emergence  of  transhuman  intelligence.  Unfortunately,  they  are  more  general 
conjectures which, if verified, would tend to support the general CAS view. But they 
are not really specific and precise tests of CAS. Gardner  (2005) also associated the 
Biocosm hypothesis with modern physical theories, such as M-theory or the ekpyrotic 
cyclic universe scenario (Steinhardt and Turok 2002). It is a laudable effort to try to fit 
speculative theories with scientific ones. However, scientific theories change and can 
be refuted, and it would be a shame to associate too strongly this inspiring view of the 
cosmos with specific scientific theories. For example, the epyrotic scenario requires a 
big  crunch,  which  is  not  favored  by  our  current  knowledge  of  the  accelerating 
expansion  of  the  universe.  String  theory  or  M-theory  is  also  under  very  serious 
criticisms (see e.g. Smolin 2006; Woit 2007).
Was our universe made by an intelligence? This question is in principle open 
to scientific investigation. More specifically, it is a field of research yet to be started 
that we call  Search for ExtraUniversal Intelligence (SEUI). We will go back to this 
topic in Chapters 9. 
Furthermore CAS is a philosophical theory because we are involved. We are 
actors, not spectators of cosmic evolution. Any theory conferring a cosmological role 
to intelligent life has a self-referential aspect. One could imagine proponents of CAS 
have a cosmo-political agenda thus making it a self-fulfilling prophecy! We humans 
are more than an independent subject looking to nature as an external object in an 
objective  way.  This  limitation  of  objectivity  is  actually  not  new,  since  two 
revolutionary  physical  theories,  quantum mechanics  and  general  relativity  had  to 
include the observer to make any sense.
Furthermore, if we assume that we are alone in the universe (a big assumption, 
but  still  reasonable  until  a  proof  of  the  contrary),  then  the  future  of  the  cosmos 
ultimately  depends on  our  choices  and values.  What  do  we want  to  do  with  our  
intelligence in the cosmos? This is a much broader question than a purely scientific 
one. 
8.3.9  Objection – Are Simulation and Realization Possible? 
Can universes be simulated and instantiated? Vaas asks whether CAS can be realized. 
The two underlying questions are:
(a) Can a universe be simulated?
(b) Can a universe be instantiated?
Those two questions underly major challenges, and efforts to answer them are still in 
their  infancy. The domain of Artificial  Cosmogenesis (ACosm) is  meant to tackle 
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those challenges explicitly. As in Artificial Life (ALife), ACosm can be divided in 
two efforts, soft ACosm and hard ACosm. It is clear however that the analogue of soft 
ALife (universe simulation) is  only in its infancy, and the analogue of strong/wet 
ALife (universe realization) lies in the far future.
Soft  ACosm consists  in  making  computer  simulations  of  other  possible 
universes and is therefore busy with question (a). Indeed, as we saw, cosmologists 
have already started to simulate and model other possible universes (see section 6.3 
The Cosmic Evolution Equation, p122). Performing simulations for this purpose does 
not require to simulate every detail. A simplified simulation to understand the general 
principles of cosmogenesis would suffice. It is useful here to remember the metaphor 
of artificial selection in biology, where the breeder does not need to understand all the 
biological processes involved. Knowing how to foster traits over others is enough. 
Hard ACosm consists  in actually making universes (question (b)). As Vaas 
mentions,  there  are  already  early  attempts  in  this  direction  with  preliminary 
propositions to  make universes  in  the  laboratory.  Universe  making is  a  challenge 
which  is  probably  orders  of  magnitudes  more  difficult  than  soft  ACosm,  but  not 
impossible. We should certainly not underestimate the continuing, accelerating and 
impressive progress of science,  technology and engineering.  Black holes are  good 
candidate for the realization of universe making. First, from a physical point of view, 
they  exhibit  enormous  densities  (similar  to  the  big  bang  singularity),  which  are 
susceptible to modify the structure of space-time and give birth to baby universes. 
Second, from a computational point of view, Lloyd  (2000) argued that the ultimate 
computing device would be a black hole. 
So one might speculate that, in the very far future,  the hypothetical  use of 
black hole computers will  meet  with universe making. Interestingly,  Lloyd  (2000, 
1052) argued that at the density of a black-hole, the computation is entirely serial. 
Could  the  baby  universe  produced  be  computed  as  it  expands?  It  would  be  an 
intriguing  situation,  where  computer  hardware  and  software  collapse.  The  most 
advanced computation might ironically function like the first computing machines, 
where  hardware  and software  were  not  distinguished.  Indeed,  the  first  computing 
machines were physical  machines which could only run one software,  which was 
embedded it  its  construction.  Could a  black hole  ultimate computer  run only one 
blueprint of a universe? But how exactly universe making may be achieved may be 
left to our descendants (E. R. Harrison 1995, 198). For other hints towards realizing 
universe making, see also (J. N. Gardner 2003, 167–173; Vidal 2008b; Smart 2009).
This  idea  of  a  giant  computer  raises  a  frightening  question.  Are  we  in  a 
simulation? Indeed, Bostrom (2003) reasoned that given reasonable premises, we are 
likely to be living in a computer simulation. 
I  totally  agree  with  Vaas  that  the  question  “how can  something  simulate 
something else which is comparably complex?” is highly problematic. This is why in 
soft ACosm we do not have to simulate every detail. As Vaas acknowledges, to run 
computer simulations, we also need some kind of hardware. As we saw (section 7.6 
The Simulation Hypothesis, p161) the ontological status of a simulation would be 
reflected by the states of the hardware running it, whatever the realistic nature of the 
simulation. Because of this hardware requirement, running a simulation indefinitely in 
our universe seems very difficult, if not impossible. It means that even if we are in a 
simulation, we do need to worry about a cosmic doom. In the end, I consider the 
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question  of whether we are in a simulation or not as a  fictional speculation which 
therefore does not deserve that much attention (see also Vidal 2012c). 
8.3.10  Objection – What Motivation?
The  question  of  motivation  naturally  arises  when  considering  CAS.  Why 
would intelligent life want to make a new offspring universe? Jim Gardner (2003, 224) 
argued that a high intelligence would produce a new universe because of altruistic 
motives. I do agree, but I think an accomplished cosmic wisdom would transcend the 
selfish  v.s.  altruistic  alternative.  It  would  identify  with  the  whole  of  space-time-
energy, as we sometimes wonder with awe that we are stardust. We will come back to 
such wisdom in Chapter 10.
Harrison  (1995, 200) suggested three motives.  First,  to prove the theory is 
correct,  and  the  technology  adequate.  This  may  be  a  good  motive,  but  largely 
insufficient to engage in the great enterprise of universe making. Second, to make 
universes  even  more  hospitable  to  intelligent  life.  This  may  indeed  motivate  an 
intelligent civilization. However, we should keep in mind that it leads to a shift of the 
fine-tuning issue to previous universes. And let us remember that explaining the fine-
tuning issue is the main reason we engage is such speculations. The third motive is to 
inhabit the universe created. I think it is unlikely. First, we saw that the transmission 
of information would be difficult in the process of universe making. Again, as with 
Gardner's proposal of altruism, if we care enough for and identify with evolution at 
large, there is no need to inhabit the new universe. It would be a similar motivation as 
parents sometimes have towards their child: they want their offspring to be exactly 
like them. In short,  to inhabit them. Of course, a more mature educational school 
would  leave  more  freedom  to  the  child.  Since  motivation  has  to  do  with  our 
worldviews and values, we will further address these questions in Chapter 10 where 
we will deal with ethics on a cosmological scale. 
Stewart (2010, 401) emphasized the importance to motivate intelligent life to 
take part into a supposed cosmic developmental process. However, even if we had the 
certainty to be in an developmental process, this would be just part of the motivation 
to produce a new universe. Two other drivers are likely to be central. 
First, as described by Stewart  (2010, 404), the most fundamental values an 
intelligent  civilization  evolves  to  are  life-affirming  and  meaning-seeking.  Those 
values  are  likely  to  be  strongly  connected  to  the  idea  of  surviving  indefinitely: 
immortality (Lifton and Olson 2004). A strong commitment to these values would 
reinforce the willingness of an intelligent civilization to participate actively to the 
evolutionary process. The will to immortality, which is nothing less than the drive to 
stay alive, is arguably a strong motive to make a new universe. Indeed, even if CAS is 
wrong, this search for infinite evolution will continue, whatever its form. Existing 
speculations  to  achieve  infinite  evolution  include  a  simulated  universe  using 
reversible logical gates thus using no energy; hibernation near black holes  (Dyson 
1979);  the  speculative  and controversial  Final  Anthropic  Principle  of  Barrow and 
Tipler (1986); or the theological omega point theory of Tipler (1997). We will discuss 
these alternative options below (section 8.3.13 The Case for CAS, p197).
However, there is a second driver for intelligence to reproduce the universe. It 
is  the  growing  awareness  of  a  cosmic  doom.  This  fate  would  arguably  drive  an 
intelligent  civilization  to  act,  and  make  a  new  universe.  The  core  problem  an 
intelligent  civilization  has  to  deal  with  in  the  very  far  future  is  the  inevitable 
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thermodynamical decay of stars, solar systems, galaxies and finally of the universe 
itself. In the realm of biology, the solution to aging is reproduction. Could it be that an 
analogous solution would take place at the scale of the universe? This is the proposal 
of  CAS.  Pursuing  this  cosmic  replication  process  would  in  principle  enable  the 
avoidance of  heat  death in  a  particular  universe  (Vidal  2008b).  Cosmic  evolution 
would then continue its course indefinitely.
Is  this  issue  far  too  far  in  the  future  to  be  a  serious  preoccupation?  The 
situation here is analogous to global warming, except the problem concerns an even 
larger scale than the Earth. A few decades ago, few people were seriously concerned 
with global warming. Nowadays, people, various organizations and governments have 
started to seriously mobilize to tackle this complex issue. What produced this shift? 
Among other factors, the strong integration and globalization of societies contributes 
to this sensitivity about climate change. Indeed, it is only since recently that we have 
such numerous and precise channels of information from every corner of the world, 
providing us an unprecedented understanding and awareness of the planet as a whole. 
This leads us to a global awareness and compassion of what happens on a planetary 
scale.
Similarly, a  universal awareness will eventually emerge from our increasing 
understanding of the cosmos. Only  after  such  an  awakening  will  an  intelligent 
civilization  start  to  actively  tackle  such  a  large-scale  challenge.  If  this  thesis 
contributes to this awakening, it will have achieved its purpose. 
CAS implies a huge responsibility for intelligent life in the cosmos. Are we 
willing and ready to assume it? What if we fail? What if we self-destruct? Maybe we 
share  this  responsibility  with  our  distant  cosmic  cousins,  other  extraterrestrial 
civilizations? It is worth pondering if more advanced civilizations would already have 
gone towards this way. In fact CAS will even give us fruitful heuristics to search for 
advanced extraterrestrials (see next Chapter 9). 
8.3.11  Objection – No Freedom in CAS?
Is there freedom in CAS? Does CAS promote fatalism? This question would 
require a much longer treatment, since the idea of freedom has been debated across 
centuries (see e.g. Adler 1973). But let us mention some possible responses. CAS in 
its fullest form, i.e. (iii) CAS in the future, past and a metaphysics (see section 8.3.5 
Objection – CAS versus other Fine-Tuning Explanations, p187) includes cycles. Old 
worldviews are cyclical and imply that nothing really changes. The same comes back 
again and again if we wait long enough for the cycle to complete. However, I rather 
see CAS as supporting a progressive evolutionary worldview than a fatalistic one. 
Indeed,  the  idea of  progress  in  science and technology contrasts with the idea of 
destiny. Science and technology bring out radical novelties in our societies. Who did 
predict the Internet? Arguably not many thinkers. 
The analogy of family is more appropriate here. Imagine you are 10 years old. 
Your parents ask you to sit down because they want to tell you something important. 
They tell you: “My dear child, when you will grow up, you will certainly find a lover 
and  have  children.”  Somehow  disappointed,  your  reply  “That's  all?”;  and  your 
parents: “Yes it is!”. This is indeed a likely outcome given the configuration of our 
society and our biology, but not even necessary. There is no fatality for you to have 
children.  More  importantly,  your  disappointment  regarding  the  triviality  of  the 
statement means that it does not spoil the way. How, when or with whom this will be 
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achieved and what  the  children  will  be  like  remains full  of  surprises  –except  for 
sociologists. Now, CAS is a comparable trivial statement at the level of the universe. 
It doesn't involve any fatality, just a general direction. 
To conclude, in contrast to what Vaas wrote, I would like to stress that CAS is 
more than a “physical experiment”, “a simulation” or an attempt to build a “rescue 
universe”. The response of an intelligent civilization as they awaken to cosmic doom 
(heat death or another gloomy scenario) is likely to be a strong driver to make a new 
universe. Therefore, CAS is not about playing with virtual universes, nor making a 
physical experiment to see what it is like to produce a universe. The “rescue universe” 
idea remains interesting, although it would be more about rescuing cosmic evolution 
at large, rather than the memory of a particular intelligent civilization. But to care 
about cosmic evolution, we need a cosmological ethics (see Chapter 10).
8.3.12  Four Roads to Cosmological Artificial Selection
Nature can never be completely described, 
for such a description of Nature would have to duplicate Nature.
Tao Teh King (Laozi 1958). 
I  chose  to  present  CAS  as  a  natural  extension  and  remedy  to  CNS. 
Importantly,  taking  this  road  we  focused  on  our  past,  since  CNS  was  initially 
developed to  provide  a  cogent  answer  to  the  free  parameters  and the  fine-tuning 
issues. But reasoning from other starting points can also lead to CAS. Let us see three 
other roads. It is almost a truism that the major goal of science is to describe nature. 
Yet, there is a profound truth in the above opening lines of the Tao Teh King. Every 
description is an incomplete simplification of nature. So, to the limit, a full description 
of nature would indeed have to duplicate Nature. Instead of an impossibility, in CAS 
the  tendency  towards  a  duplication  of  Nature  translates  into  a  tendency  towards 
universe making.  
On 24th November 2007, at the Downing College in Cambridge was held a conference 
entitled  “God  or  Multiverse”.  It  was  a  laudable  attempt  to  confront  views  from 
theologians and theoretical physicists. Bernard Carr organized the meeting and had 
recently edited an excellent book called Universe or Multiverse?  (B. Carr 2007). At 
the end of the day, he invited the audience to propose short talks to complement the 
viewpoints presented during the day. I seized the opportunity and was excited to make 
a short talk about “God and Multiverse”. I drafted some words to explain this idea. 
Indeed,  CAS can be interpreted that  way.  From God,  it  keeps an ability  to  make 
universes –with, as we saw (section 8.3.3 Six Levels of Universe Making, p183) six 
different  levels  possible.  From  the  Multiverse,  it  retains  the  possibility  of  other 
universes through the idea of the  virtual multiverse –but not their actual existence. 
Instead of “God or Multiverse”, we thus have “Natural God and Virtual Multiverse”. 
Unfortunately my proposal was not picked up by the organizing committee. That day, 
the gap between God and Multiverse was only widened. Yet this “God or Multiverse” 
dichotomy is artificial. As Harrison (1995, 199) wrote, fortunately “for the inquiring 
mind, a natural creation theory offers a third choice”.
Story 9: “God or Multiverse” or “God and Multiverse”? 
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As the story above relates, the second road to CAS is to choose the option of 
“Natural  God  and Virtual  Multiverse”.  One might  think that  CAS also assumes a 
multiverse. This is not the case, since a real multiverse is not necessary, a virtual one 
is enough for the purpose of cosmic selection. Indeed, it might be that there is only 
one universe which recycles itself (like the phoenix universe), if a big crunch scenario 
is  after  all  favored at  the end of time.  Another  way is  if  intelligent life  becomes 
powerful enough to reverse the expansion of the universe. But this is much much 
more speculative.
A third road to CAS is to follow the logic of evolutionary theory. The last 
chapter  of  Dawkins'  (1995) River  of  Eden,  is  entitled  “The  Replication  Bomb”. 
Dawkins describes two kinds of bombs in our universe. Supernovae in astrophysics 
and replication in biology. He reports 10 replication thresholds which went on on 
Earth. In summary, these are:
1. Replicator threshold (self-copying system, e.g. DNA-RNA molecules)
2. Phenotype threshold (consequences of replicators that influence the replicators' 
success but are not themselves replicated). 
3. Replicator team threshold (genes do not work in isolation, e.g. in bacterial 
cells)
4. Many-cells threshold (phenotypes and functions are on a much greater scale 
than the cell). 
5. High-Speed-Information-Processing threshold (nervous system)
6. Consciousness threshold
7. Language threshold
8. Cooperative technology threshold
9. Radio threshold
10. Space travel threshold
Gardner  (2003,  116) noticed  that  if  CNS is  validated,  it  would  constitute  an  11th 
replication threshold, which he calls the “Cosmic Replication Threshold”. However, 
since the replication threshold is a compositional (whole-part) hierarchy, the higher 
levels  include  the  lower  ones.  So,  it  is  more  logical  to  assume  that  CAS would 
constitute  this  threshold,  and  not  CNS.  Indeed,  CAS  is  in  continuity  with  the 
evolutionary process of higher replication thresholds.  John E.  Stewart  (2000) also 
came to the conclusion that evolution writ large goes towards cooperation on larger 
and larger scales. The last scale being the universe as a whole.
The fourth road to CAS is built by thinking about the future and meaning of 
science. As strange as it may seem, looking towards the far-future might provide new 
heuristics to approach those ultimate questions. As Gardner  (2003, chap. 9) argued, 
CAS is  indeed  very  much  consistent  with  various  futuristic  visions  of  Kurzweil, 
Wheeler, Barrow-Tipler, Dyson and Dawkins. 
I  already  argued  that  the  future  of  scientific  simulation  goes  towards  a 
simulation of an entire universe (see Chapter 7). As an echo to Galileo, if the science 
of today reads the book of Nature, the science of tomorrow will write its next chapter. 
Futurist Michio Kaku (1997, 15) also shares this vision when he writes:
For most of human history, we could only watch, like bystanders, the beautiful 
dance of Nature. But today, we are on the cusp of an epoch-making transition, 
from being passive observers of Nature to being active choreographers of Nature. 
It is this tenet that forms the central message of  Visions. The era now unfolding 
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makes this one of the most exciting times to be alive, allowing us to reap the fruits 
of the last 2,000 years of science. The Age of Discovery in science is coming to a 
close, opening up an Age of Mastery
This  perspective  offers  a  new  way  to  think  about  the  cosmos,  which  I  call  the 
architect point of view. It can be formulated as: 
Architect Point of View: The more we are in a position to make a new universe,  
the more we will understand our own universe.
If  we  extrapolate  the  steady  growth  of  complexity  and  especially  the  amazing 
progress  of  science,  then  it  may not  be  so  difficult  to  imagine  a  stage  at  which 
intelligent life is able to conceive and make new universes. Accordingly, the question 
of motivation remains. We will see later that it can be grounded in a cosmological 
ethics and especially in the idea of cosmological immortality (see Chapter 10). 
What  is  the  meaning  of  science  in  CAS?  Pondering  the  mysteries  of  the 
cosmos, we often marvel about the existence of life in the universe. Why are there so 
complex structures such as life or consciousness? But the most recent outcomes of 
complexity on Earth are not life nor consciousness. It is arguably the phenomenon of 
science, which is a natural continuation of the evolution of complex intelligent life 
(Turchin 1977; D. T. Campbell 1974).
Albert Einstein famously wrote that the “most incomprehensible thing about 
the universe is that it is comprehensible” (cited in Hoffmann 1972). What he meant is 
that  matter  self-organized  up to  a  point  where  it  can  comprehend itself.  Through 
humans and science, the universe is self-comprehending. This self-referential aspect is 
perplexing and awe-inspiring.
Scientists  are  by  definition  embedded  in  science.  Somehow,  this  is  quite 
ironic.  Indeed,  if  we  are  very  “scientific”,  meaning  giving  a  maximum value  to 
objectivity (i.e. observations independent of the particular properties of the observer) 
then we forget the very fact that there  are observers! Which is itself a fundamental 
mystery. This is why I presented CAS as a philosophical theory and not as a scientific 
one. In CAS, we are  involved... and other putative extraterrestrials too (see Chapter 
9)! That is another reason why it is so important to try to search and find them. Our 
cosmic vision remains limited if we have only one example of the emergence of life. 
Obviously, it is difficult and scientifically dubious to assess any general trend out of 
one example. 
What is the meaning of science in a cosmological perspective? Why did the 
cosmos generate structure not only capable of understand itself (self-consciousness); 
but also understanding and controlling its surroundings in a more and more developed 
and precise manner? What is the most complex model we can imagine, and which 
activity can provide it? We saw that it is a model of the whole universe, more and 
more assisted by computer simulations. As we extrapolate the phenomenon of science 
in the far future, we approach knowledge of the entire universe. CAS hypothesizes 
that this knowledge coupled with activities in soft and hard Artificial Cosmogenesis 
will provide all the ingredients for future universe making.  
One can now throw a new light on the fact that cosmic evolution gave rise to 
scientific activity. In CAS, the increasing modelling abilities of intelligent beings is 
not an accident, but an indispensable feature of our universe, to ensure new offspring 
universes.  In  CAS, scientific  activity  does not  seek an ultimate explanation but  a 
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pragmatic  solution  to  a  real  problem:  a  lurking  cosmic  doom.  The  quest  for  an 
ultimate explanation is not anymore a quest for disinterested and absolute knowledge. 
Knowledge is useful and near complete knowledge about our universe should at some 
point be useful.
In  the  future,  science  is  not  anymore  only  a  search  for  understanding the 
world;  in the long run, it  will tend to become a simulation or computation of the 
world. In the far future, such a simulation could be concretely implemented to make a 
new universe.  CAS offers  a  fresh  look to ponder  the  big  questions Heinz Pagels 
(1986, 379) raised: 
Is it possible that life, or whatever it may become, can alter the program of the 
cosmic computer, changing the course of its destiny? It  will  take more than a 
metaphor  to  answer  that  important  question;  it  will  take  a  far  deeper 
understanding of life and the cosmos than we currently possess. Yet the desire to 
know the answer to such questions about our destiny will never go away. And that 
desire is perhaps the profoundest program in our cosmic computer so far. 
8.3.13  The Case for CAS
When you have eliminated the impossible,
 whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.
“Sherlock Holmes' rule”, by Arthur Conan Doyle (1890).
We saw in Part I that a worldview's merit can only be compared relatively to 
others. We now aim to show that CAS is, relative to other theories, the best solution to 
make sense of the beginning, the end and the meaning of life in the universe. 
Inquiring  into  the  mysteries  of  our  universe  is  like  a  difficult  crime 
investigation. You have few clues, but you need to build a consistent story to make 
sense of seemingly disparate pieces of a puzzle. Sherlock Holmes is of course expert 
in investigations and his rule above stimulates us to compare CAS with other theories. 
 Since  we  argued  that  CAS is  foremost  a  philosophical  theory  and  not  a 
scientific one, we can use the criteria and conceptual tools we developed in Part I. Let 
us make explicit  the  metaphilosophical  criteria  we use.  First,  we consider a  wide 
scope in agenda, looking for a framework to understand in a consistent manner the 
origin, the future and the meaning of life. In other words, from a philosophical point 
of view, we want to show that CAS is at present the “best” attempt to answer at the 
same time: “where does it all come from?”; “where are we going?” and “what is the 
meaning of life in a cosmological perspective?”. Since our work is cosmological, our 
scope in time and space is also maximally large. We also are very much committed to 
the scientific method and the values of objectivity, and thus we do not assume any 
kind of supernatural forces.
Of course, the value judgment behind the word “best” must be read in the 
context of worldview construction, and is criteria-dependent. The word “best” is thus 
relative to a choice of criteria we discussed in Chapter  2 and a weighted choice of 
criteria I made explicit in Appendix I. 
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A classical example of conflicting criteria is found in the “God or Multiverse” 
debate. For example, Martin Rees (see e.g. his 1997 book) argues that a multiverse is 
more rational, while Leslie (1989) argues that postulating a God is more economical. 
Who is right? What should we value more? Rationality or economy? The core of the 
disagreement lies in our cognitive values. Are we ready to assume the actual existence 
of a huge –possibly infinite– number of universes? This is a natural explanation, but 
rather extravagant. Or do we prefer to assume one single all-mighty God at the origin 
of  the  universe?  This  seems  indeed  more  economical...  but  at  the  price  of  a 
supernatural  explanation.  A price  that  most  scientists  are  not  willing  to  pay.  My 
position was to send away both explanations when I called them “God-of-the-gaps” 
and “WAP-of-the-gaps” (see section  6.4  Classical Fine-tuning Explanations, p144). 
Let us take a bird-eye view on fine-tuning explanations and their broader implications 
for  the  future,  the  meaning  of  life  and  the  associated  metaphysics  (see  table  10 
below). 
Question Origin Future Meaning Metaphysics
Explanation
Skepticism - - - -
Necessity Unexplained - - -
Fecundity Explains  fine-
tuning, not the 
causal issue
- - -
Chance-of-the-gaps No causal 
explanation
- - -
WAP-of-the-gaps No causal 
explanation
- - -
CNS Natural 
selection
Baby universe 
generation
- Cyclical  or 
branching  ?
(unspecified)
Hibernation 
(Dyson)
- Infinite 
subjective 
time
- -
Reversible 
computation
- Infinite  future 
information 
processing
- -
God-of-the-gaps Point 
explanation
Spiritual 
immortality
Religious 
values
Theologica-
lly addressed
Omega Point  
Theory (Tipler)
God Computational 
resurrection
Religiously 
inspired
Cyclical
CAS Artificial 
selection
Universe 
making  and 
cosmological 
immortality
Fundamen-
tal  role  of 
intelligence 
in a cosmic 
replication 
cycle
Cyclical
Table 10: Candidate explanations for the origin and future of the universe. The last two columns show 
the associated meaning of life and metaphysics
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What is striking in the table above is that few explanations have a scope large enough 
to touch upon all the questions. In fact, there are only three, God, Tipler's Omega 
point theory and CAS. 
The line for “skepticism” is empty and this reminds us that it is a second-order 
knowledge attitude and not an attempt to answer our big questions. I do very much 
value skepticism as a second-order knowledge attitude, but it is good to remember 
that it is silent if we want to take a first-order position on the big questions. 
The  necessity, fecundity,  chance-of-the-gaps,  WAP-of-the-gaps  explanations 
are concerned only with the origin and do not aim to cope with a greater scope. We 
saw that the possible meaning of life and intelligence in the universe is not within the 
scope of Cosmological Natural Selection.
There are two promising options for life to continue in the far future. The first 
option is  hibernation and was articulated in the landmark article about the future of 
civilizations  written  in  1979  by  Freeman  Dyson  (1979).  Dyson  shows  that  even 
assuming a  finite  supply of  energy, it  would be possible  for  a  civilization to  live 
forever. The scenario takes profit of time dilation effects due to relativistic effects. An 
advanced civilization would hibernate near black holes, and use the energy of black 
holes. Despite the finiteness of the energy source, by hibernating longer and longer, 
and thus using less and less energy, a civilization would be able, to the limit, to live 
for as long as it wants in its subjective time. Of course, “life” is defined here not in 
terms  of  DNA and  biochemistry,  but  in  a  more  general  information  processing 
capability. 
However, this scenario does not work if the universe continues its accelerated 
expansion  (Dyson 2004, xv). A very stimulating debate arose between Dyson and 
Krauss and Starkman (2000). In their 2000 article “Life, The Universe, and Nothing: 
Life  and Death  in  an  Ever-Expanding Universe”,  Krauss  and Starkman criticized 
Dyson's  proposal  and showed that  eternal  life  in  our  universe is  impossible.  Yet, 
Dyson  showed  that  the  core  argument  can  be  maintained  if  we  replace  digital 
computers by analog ones (see Dyson 2007). 
The  second  option  of  reversible  computation is  highly  promising  for  a 
civilization to endure forever. Rolf Landauer (1961) proved the theoretical possibility 
of logic gates that consume no energy.  Given a computer built out of such gates, a 
possible  solution to  the problem of  an ever-expanding and slowly dying universe 
would be to simulate a new universe on a collection of matter that would forever float 
into  emptier  and  emptier  space.  Krauss  and  Starkman,  although  recognizing  the 
theoretical possibility of this scenario, criticized it. They argue that “no finite system 
can perform an infinite number of computations with finite energy”, if it is to host 
evolved  information  processing.  Why  not?  The  main  reason  is  that  reversible 
computation is not possible for the operation of erasure. Deleting information has a 
thermodynamical  cost,  and  the  authors  argue,  consciousness  or  sophisticated 
information processing will certainly need to erase information (see also Zenil 2012). 
Note that these two options of hibernation and reversible computation remain neutral 
regarding issues of the origin, the meaning of life or a metaphysics.  
The  explanation  of  a  God  is  satisfying  from  a  worldview  construction 
perspective. But it is unsatisfying if we aim at a naturalistic philosophical worldview 
and not a  theological one. Of course, there is still  the issue of God as filling our 
knowledge gaps, but this can be tempered with appropriate theological interpretations. 
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As a side remark, the God explanation induces a metaphysical asymmetry. Indeed, it 
is a point-like attractor for the origin, but supposes an immortality in the future, which 
is more like an infinite line of continuation. Why not an immortality in the past? And 
why not a point in the future? 
Our reasonings about the origin of the origins in Chapter  4 largely holds for 
extrapolations into the future. It  is thus not surprising to find the idea of a point-
attractor in the future. Such a future ultimate point, the  omega-point, was famously 
and beautifully articulated by the paleontologist and jesuit Pierre Teilhard de Chardin 
(1959) in his posthumous book  The Phenomenon of Man. The vision of evolution 
Teilhard proposes is remarkably inspiring. Teilhard is arguably one of the very rare 
thinkers  who  foresaw  the  emergence  of  the  Internet,  when  he  introduced  the 
noosphere, an evolutionary stage of development dominated by information processes 
on a global scale. This evolutionary vision was further elaborated into the concept of 
the global brain (see Heylighen 2005 for an historical review). 
In a very controversial book, Frank Tipler (1997) revived Teilhard's vision of 
the omega point and articulated a theological  vision using modern cosmology and 
computer  science.  His  book  is  entitled  The  Physics  of  Immortality:  Modern 
Cosmology,  God  and  the  Resurrection  of  the  Dead  and  clearly  has  a  theological 
agenda. This was further confirmed by Tipler's  (2007) following book entitled The 
Physics of Christianity. Tipler's book on the physics of immortality has quite some 
value  from  a  synthetical  worldview  perspective.  It  is  highly  ambitious  and 
speculative, in order to solve not philosophical questions, but theological ones. The 
problem is that Tipler presents his work as a piece of science, whereas it is not. His 
use and abuse of reductio ad absurdum and general scientific logic is either wrong or 
very doubtful. In his book review, Ellis (1994) called Tipler's book a “masterpiece of 
pseudoscience”. 
What worries me even more is a total and constant confusion of genres. One 
need  only  to  read  the  opening  words  of  the  preface,  where  Tipler  asserts  that 
“theology is a branch of physics, that physicists can infer by calculation the existence 
of God and the likelihood of the resurrection of the dead to eternal life in exactly the 
same  way  as  physicists  calculate  the  properties  of  the  electron.”  That  is  for  the 
confusion between theology and science. A few pages later he goes on to affirm that 
“reductionism is true”. Hard to swallow for any philosopher who worked more than 
half an hour in epistemology.  
I see Tipler's essay as remarkable modern theology, naïve philosophizing and 
unsound science. Why is it remarkable theologically? Because Tipler tries to rescue 
traditional  doctrines  of  Christianity  in  a  modern  cosmological  and  computational 
framework. And if you have faith in the arguments, it might even be inspiring. Of 
course, I am sure many theologians would still disagree with Tipler's approach.
Despite these critiques, there are some very interesting and provocative ideas 
in the book, provided that we exorcize Tipler's work from its theological inclinations. 
David Deutsch (1997, chap. 14) did reconstruct the core of Tipler's argument. Deutsch 
summarizes that the “omega-point theory is that of a class of cosmological models in 
which, though the universe is finite in both space and time, the memory capacity, the 
number  of  possible  computational  steps  and  the  effective  energy  supply  are  all 
unlimited.” This assumes a closed universe which will re-collapse into a big crunch. 
Unfortunately for the omega-point theory, the empirical discovery in 1998 that our 
200
universe  is  in  an  accelerating  expansion  (Riess  et  al.  1998) refutes  the  core 
assumption of the theory.
We saw in the introduction of Part III that with the implicit assumption that 
intelligent  civilization  cannot  have  any significant  influence  on  cosmic  evolution, 
modern cosmology invites us to prepare for a cosmic doom. I share Darwin's (1887b, 
70) reaction to the heat death of the universe when he wrote: 
Believing as I do that man in the distant future will be a far more perfect creature 
than he now is, it is an intolerable thought that he and all other sentient beings are 
doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued slow progress.
What can we do? What if  we challenge the assumption of intelligence having no 
influence on the future? What if life and  intelligence could have influence on the 
future of the cosmos? 
In  the  last  Chapter  of  The Anthropic Cosmological  Principle (Barrow and 
Tipler 1986) the two authors speculate about the far future of intelligence. They call 
the  Final  Anthropic  Principle  (FAP)  the  proposition  that  “intelligent  information-
processing  must  come  into  existence  in  the  Universe,  and,  once  it  comes  into 
existence, it will never die out” (Barrow and Tipler 1986, 23). The FAP is in fact an 
embryonic  form  of  the  omega  point  theory  that  Tipler  later  developed.  Not 
surprisingly,  it  had  already  been  subject  to  tough  criticism,  famously  by  Martin 
Gardner  (1986), who  called  it  the  Completely  Ridiculous  Anthropic  Principle 
(CRAP). I was very disappointed by Tipler's (1986) reply to Gardner which does not 
address  most  of  the  excellent  objections  raised  by  Gardner,  and  even  more 
disappointed by Gardner's reply to Tipler: “I’m speechless.” There is still so much to 
debate! 
The  reversible  computation  scenario  is  certainly  to  keep  in  mind  for  the 
extremely far future, but as long as billions of stars are shining in billions of galaxies, 
there is really no reason for an intelligent civilization to go on such a drastic energy 
diet.
In  contrast  to  using  less  and  less  energy  to  endure  forever,  which  is 
biologically a strategy of delaying senescence, there is another more radical solution. 
It  is  to  replicate  and start  anew. Reproduction is  a highly successful  strategy that 
evolution uses to maintain and adapt living systems to their environment. Ashby's 
(1981b, 80) analysis showed that “reproduction is not something that belongs to living 
organisms  by  some  miraculous  linkage,  but  is  simply  a  specialized  means  of 
adaptation  of  a  specialized  class  of  disturbances”.  On  a  cosmological  scale,  the 
proposal  of  CAS  is  indeed  to  aim  for  a  cosmic  replication.  Assuming  that  the 
thermodynamical constraints are reset in the new universe made, there is hope for life 
in another universe to endure forever.  Philosophically, CAS thus promises to fulfill 
subjective and intersubjective criteria, by giving a general direction and meaning for 
intelligence in the universe.
In sum, holding the scope in agenda, the criterion of naturalism, and the wide 
scope in time and space, there is no comparable theory to CAS. The closest attempt is 
arguably Tipler's omega point theory, albeit it is more focused on the future than on 
the past, and is largely theologically inspired. 
I  fail  to  see  evidence  for  a  God,  a  fundamental  theory  or  a  proof  of  a 
multiverse actually realized. Yet, I see overwhelming evidence of our exponential use 
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of  computing  resources  such  as  memory  storage,  computational  power  and 
bandwidth. Those advances have a tremendous impact on our lives and societies, and 
this is only the beginning. In particular, computers are more and more ubiquitous in 
scientific  activities,  for  example  in  mathematics  (to  assist  in  proofs),  in  studying 
complex systems (by simulating them),  in biology (e.g.  with biotechnologies,  and 
their databases of genomes or protein networks), in cosmology (with many projects of 
large-scale simulations of the universe) and of course with ALife and its legitimate 
successor, ACosm. If we choose and manage to successfully conduct soft and hard 
ACosm,  (i)  CAS in  the  future  would  be  realized.  It  would  then  give  us  strong 
indications and inspirations to think that broader interpretations of CAS, (ii) or (iii) 
are accurate.
Can the general perspective of CAS help to search for extraterrestrials? Could 
it  be that extraterrestrial intelligence is on its way to black hole manipulation and 
universe making? How can we further explore this speculative possibility? Can we 
find  more  general  reasons  towards  this  path,  and  confront  the  reasoning  with 
observations?  Let  us  now  scrutinize  these  issues  by  searching  for  advanced 
extraterrestrials. I mean it, really advanced. 
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CHAPTER 9 -  High Energy Astrobiology
Abstract: This Chapter proposes a new concrete hypothesis to search and assess 
the  existence  of  advanced  extraterrestrial  life.  We  first  point  out  two 
methodological fallacies that we call  naturality-of-the-gaps and  artificiality-of-
the-gaps and propose a  more balanced  astrobiological  stance,  which does not 
prejudices  the  naturality  or  artificiality  of  suspicious  phenomena  which  we 
observe. We point out many limiting and implicit assumptions in SETI, in order to 
propose a “Zen SETI”, thus opening the search space. In particular, we outline the 
case  for  postbiological  evolution,  or  the  probable  transition  from a  biological 
paradigm to a  nonbiological  paradigm. We then discuss  criteria  to  distinguish 
natural  from  artificial  phenomena.  We  start  with  global  criteria  (strangeness  
heuristic, non-exclusiveness heuristic, equilibrium heuristic and inverse distance-
development  principle);  then  thermodynamical  criteria  (thermodynamic 
disequilibrium and energy flow control); and finally present living systems criteria 
(Miller's  nineteen  critical  functional  subsystems).  Then  we  introduce  a  two-
dimensional metric for civilizational development, using the Kardashev scale of 
energy consumption increase and the Barrow scale of inward manipulation. To 
support  Barrow's  scale  limit,  we  argue  with  energetic,  societal,  scientific, 
computational,  and  philosophical  arguments  that  black holes  are  attractors  for 
intelligence.  Taken together, these two civilizational development trends lead to 
an  argument  that  some  existing  binary  stars  may  actually  be  advanced 
extraterrestrial beings. Since those putative beings actively feed on stars, I call 
them starivores. I elaborate another independent thermodynamical argument for 
their existence, with a metabolic interpretation of some binary stars in accretion. 
We  further  substantiate  the  hypothesis  with  a  tentative  living  systems 
interpretation. Ten critical living subsystems are suggested to apply to interacting 
binaries  composed  of  a  primary  white  dwarf,  neutron  star  or  black  hole.  We 
critically discuss the hypothesis by formulating and replying to ten objections. 
The  question  of  artificiality  remains  open,  but  I  propose  concrete  research 
proposals and a prize to further continue and motivate the scientific assessment of 
this hypothesis.
Rather than propose a new theory or unearth a new fact, 
often the most important contribution a scientist can make is 
to discover a new way of seeing old theories or facts.
Richard Dawkins (2006, xvi)
What are the general outcomes of the increase of complexity in the universe? 
We have only one such example: life on Earth. Unfortunately, we cannot carry out a 
scientific investigation with only one object of study. So, in order to know more about 
the  ability  of  the  cosmos  to  generate  many  times  and  in  different  circumstances 
complexity and intelligence, it is crucial to know whether or not we are alone. It is 
also  very  important  for  evolutionary  and  theoretical  biology,  to  assess  how 
convergent evolution is or the extent to which the origin of life was a unique cosmic 
event. 
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Steven J.  Dick  (2000,  196) summarized stages in  cosmological  worldview 
development from Geocentrism, Heliocentrism, Galactocentrism to Biocentrism12. We 
add two worldview stages,  Intellicentrism and  Universecentrism. Three “centrisms” 
have been refuted scientifically: Geocentrism, Heliocentrism and Galactocentrism. It 
is  not  my  aim  to  develop  the  debate  between  Geocentrism  and  Heliocentrism 
featuring Ptolemy and Copernicus, nor the discovery by Shapley that our solar system 
is not at the center of our galaxy, nor that our galaxy is just one amongst many others. 
I invite the reader to consult the relevant literature in the history and philosophy of 
science. These were moments of great scientific advances, but it is good to remember 
that such changes in worldview did not happen overnight. Indeed, even if Copernicus' 
astronomical techniques were quickly appreciated by his peers, it took decades before 
his Heliocentric worldview would be taken seriously (T. S. Kuhn 1957). The reasons 
of such a resistance are not only scientific but also psychological, philosophical and 
religious. It is hard to shake a world where the Earth had always been considered the 
center of the universe. 
The  same  holds  for  astrobiology.  It  will  not  be  easy  to  quickly  reach  a 
consensus on what constitutes proof of extraterrestrial life. What is likely to happen is 
that we will be able to model some intriguing phenomena both from an astrophysical 
perspective  as  well  as  from  an  astrobiological  perspective.  As  with  Copernicus' 
refutation of Geocentrism, refuting Biocentrism or Intellicentrism will have a huge 
philosophical and religious impact. In the case of Intellicentrism, we would not be the 
only –let alone the most– intelligent species in the universe. 
Certainly,  there  is  still  work  to  pursue  the  broad  Copernican  revolution 
because Biocentrism, Intellicentrism and Universecentrism still  hold today. Indeed, 
we lack any definitive proof that life exists elsewhere in the universe, that intelligent 
life exists elsewhere, or that other universes exist. Let us say a few words about those 
three major challenges. 
Biocentrism  continues  to  hold  in  the  sense  that,  even  if  most  scientists 
subjectively  believe the existence of extraterrestrial life is highly probable, we still 
haven't  proved it  yet.  In  recent  years  discoveries  of  exoplanets  have  grown 
exponentially, so there is a lot of hope that one of these rocky Earth-like planets will 
harbor life. 
Intellicentrism sill  holds, since, obviously, we haven't discovered intelligent 
life either. However, it is important to distinguish the two, not only because the impact 
of refuting one of them would be very different, but also because the search methods 
are different. In the search for Earth-like planets we look for signatures of a biosphere. 
But the main method in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) is to search 
for traces of an intelligent communicative signal in the electromagnetic spectrum. If 
Biocentrism is refuted, that is, if we find a primitive extraterrestrial lifeform, we will 
still hold to Intellicentrism and be proud to be the only and most intelligent species in 
the  universe.  The  psychological  and  philosophical  consequences  of  refuting 
Intellicentrism  are  much  more  radical  and  disrupting  than  those  of  refuting 
Biocentrism.  Finding  an  extraterrestrial  bacterium  is  indeed  very  different  from 
finding advanced civilizations two billion years older than us. 
12 Dick calls Biocentrism the “extraterrestrial/biophysical” worldview. It simply means that “life on 
Earth is unique in the universe”, not the view or belief that the rights and needs of humans are not 
more important than those of other living things.
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Universecentrism holds today in the sense that we lack proof that our universe 
is one of many. We have seen examples of multiverse theories (see e.g. section 5.3 
The Mathematical Universe, p94), and it is a fact that many modern cosmologists are 
very open-minded about the existence of multiple universes. But, as with Biocentrism, 
being  subjectively  open-minded  about  the  multiverse  is  not  the  same  as  having 
objective  proof.  We lack  empirical  evidence  of  eternal  inflation  or  Cosmological 
Natural Selection. In the multiverse theory of conformal cyclical cosmology, Penrose 
(2011) proposed to look for subtle irregularities in the cosmic microwave background 
to find traces of a previous universal cycle. This is indeed one of the rare proposals 
for testing a multiverse theory, but the attempt remains preliminary. If we follow the 
theory  of  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection  (see  Chapter  8),  proof  of  artificial 
universe  making  would  also  refute  Universecentrism.  In  fact  such  a  “Search  for 
ExtraUniversal Intelligence” (SEUI) has already been hinted at (see e.g. Pagels 1989, 
155–156; J. N. Gardner 2003; Dick 2008). Another way to refute Universecentrism is 
if access to other universes becomes possible. 
In  any  case,  refuting  Biocentrism,  Intellicentrism  and  Universecentrism 
requires more and more speculation. So it makes them increasingly difficult to refute. 
But  let  us  focus  on  our  universe.  We  can  summarize  ten  main  possible 
detection scenarios with a level-attitude matrix (see Figure 13 below).
First, the point “alone” should not be forgotten because we could truly be alone in the 
universe.  It  is  important  to  acknowledge  that  the  dimension  of  “level”  implicitly 
assumes that all life in the universe follows a similar developmental path. But if life 
starts, adapts and specializes to very different environments, it might be very hard or 
impossible to compare two biospheres. For example, even on Earth it is not easy to 
argue whether a shark or a bird is “superior”. They are both very well adapted to 
water or to air. But let's assume we can find some kind of universal metric to assess 
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Figure 13: Ten possible detection scenarios of extraterrestrials
the level of life or civilizational development. Extraterrestrials may be found to be 
inferior, equal or superior to us. Their attitude towards us can be competitive, neutral 
or collaborative.
What is the most interesting prospect for humanity? To find extraterrestrial 
bacterial  life,  or  to  discover  a  civilization  with  immense  technology,  know-how, 
wisdom and science? In what follows, I focus on superior extraterrestrial intelligence 
(ETI), and do not speculate much about their attitude towards us. Focusing on this 
search strategy is especially interesting because,  if  successful, it  would kill  a bird 
(Biocentrism) and a shark (Intellicentrism) with one stone.
How will the accelerating change we experience end up in thousands, millions 
or billions of years? An answer to this fascinating question could come if we find 
advanced ETI. Indeed, our cosmic cousins might give us a glimpse of our possible 
future  on  astronomical  timescales  (see  e.g.  Kardashev  1978). Such  a  search  also 
makes sense scientifically, since, if ETIs exist, they are arguably much more advanced 
than us. 
Why is ETI likely to be more advanced? To answer this question, we need to 
estimate the  maximum age of extraterrestrial intelligence. I refer here the review of 
Steven Dick (2009b, 467–468). The starting point of the reasoning is our knowledge 
of cosmic evolution (see e.g. Delsemme 1998; Chaisson 2001). Dick elaborates:
Recent results from the Wilkinson Microwave Anisotropy Probe (WMAP) place 
the age of the universe at 13.7 billion years, with one percent uncertainty, and 
confirm the first stars forming at about 200 million years after the Big Bang (C. L. 
Bennett et al. 2003; Seife 2003). Although these first stars were very massive—
from 300 to 1,000 solar masses—and therefore short-lived, it is fair to assume that 
the oldest Sun-like stars formed within about  one billion years,  or  about  12.5 
billion years ago. By that time enough heavy element generation and interstellar 
seeding had taken place for the first rocky planets to form (Delsemme 1998, 71; 
Larson and Bromm 2001). Then, if Earth history is any guide, it may have taken 
another five billion years for intelligence to evolve. So, some six billion years 
after the Big Bang, one could have seen the emergence of the first intelligence. 
Accepting  the  WMAP  age  of  the  universe  as  13.7  billion  years,  the  first 
intelligence could have evolved seven and a half billion years ago. By the same 
reasoning,  intelligence  could  have  evolved  in  our  galaxy  four  billion  to  five 
billion years ago, since the oldest stars in our galaxy formed about 10 billion to 11 
billion years ago (Rees 1997). 
You've read correctly, ETIs could maximally be 7.5 billion years our senior! More 
fine-grained  estimates  by  Lineweaver  and  collaborators  (Lineweaver  2001; 
Lineweaver, Fenner, and Gibson 2004) show that Earth-like planets on other stars are 
on average 1.8±0.9 billion years older than the Earth. Indeed, they showed that 75% 
of stars suitable for life are older than the Sun. Furthermore, Bradbury, Ćirković and 
Dvorsky (2011, 161) have a good point when they add that since “the set of intelligent 
societies is likely to be dominated by a small number of oldest and most advanced 
members [...], we are likely to encounter a civilization actually more ancient than 1.8 
Gyr (and probably significantly more).”
What do these important insights imply? We need not be overcautious in our 
astrobiological speculations. Quite the contrary, we must push them to their  extreme 
limits  if  we  want  to  glimpse  what  such  advanced  civilizations  could  look  like. 
Naturally, such an ambitious search should be balanced with considered conclusions. 
Furthermore,  given  our  total  ignorance  of  such  civilizations,  it  remains  wise  to 
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encourage  and  maintain  a  wide  variety  of  search  strategies.  A commitment  to 
observation,  to  the  scientific  method  and  to  the  most  general  scientific  theories 
remains our best touchstone.
All right, but if these reasonings hold, shouldn't the universe be teeming with 
advanced ETI? How come we only observe a Great Silence (Brin 1983)? Could it be 
that we are hearing without listening? I mean, may ETI already be in the data? This 
was the opinion of Shvartsman (cited in Heidmann and Klein 1991, 393):
I  am  convinced  that  among  the  several  ten  thousand  radio  sources  in  the 
catalogues of radio astronomy as well as among the several ten million optical 
sources  on  star  maps  there  are  plenty  of  artificial  origin.  These  sources  are 
recorded even today but they are misinterpreted since the recognition of ETI is not 
only a scientific, but also a global cultural problem.
Paul Davies shared this point of view when he wrote (Davies 2010, 124)  that the “ 
universe is a rich and complex arena in which signs of alien intelligence might be 
buried amid a welter of data from natural processes, and unearthed only after some 
ingenious sifting.” I will attempt such sifting in this Chapter. Of course the idea that 
ETI is already in our data might seem premature. We have not explored all possible 
ways  to  see  the  universe.  For  example,  we have  not  yet  explored  the  spectra  of 
neutrino radiation or gravitational waves. We might detect intelligent activity only in 
such spectra. 
But humanity is not ignorant about the cosmos either. We have explored and 
are exploring the universe well beyond the visible. In fact we investigate the whole 
electromagnetic  spectrum:  radiowaves,  microwaves,  infrared  light,  visible  light, 
ultraviolet, X-rays and gamma-rays. These new ways to observe the cosmos led to 
amazing progresses in astrophysics. Even if the cosmos is huge and very varied, we 
do see and study many kinds of stars,  white  dwarfs,  neutron stars,  pulsars,  black 
holes, interstellar clouds, clusters of stars, planets, galaxies or clusters of galaxies in 
all wavelengths. If extraterrestrials are not particularly small or discrete, they may be 
observable or we may have already observed them in the form of natural processes. 
Let us critically examine orthodox SETI. There is a double limitation in it, 
which stems from the famous Drake (1965) equation:
N = R* · fp · ne · fl · fi  · fc· L 
where N is the number of technological civilizations in the galaxy; and
(1) R* is The rate of formation of stars suitable for the development of intelligent 
life
(2) fp   is the fraction of such stars with planetary systems
(3) ne is the mean number of planets which are suitable habitats for life
(4) fl  is the fraction of planets on which life originates
(5) fi  is the fraction of life-bearing planets with intelligent life
(6) fc is  the  fraction  of  planets  with  intelligent  life  that  develop  technological 
civilizations
(7) L is the lifetime of a technological civilization
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This equation has inspired much of our understanding of cosmic evolution and helped 
us  to  frame  agendas  for  SETI.  By  extending  and  generalizing  it  to  the  “Cosmic 
Evolution  Equation”,  it  also  was  very  helpful  to  frame  new research  agendas  in 
cosmology (see section 6.3 The Cosmic Evolution Equation, p122). This equation is a 
tool to assess  “the number of  communicative civilizations which might exist in our 
galaxy”  (my  emphasis).  However  inspiring  and  helpful  it  has  been,  it  has  also 
introduced two fundamental biases in SETI.
First, it focuses on communication. This is the orthodox way of searching for 
messages coming from an ETI. This program has failed so far. One may advance 
many good reasons for this failure,  but the bottom line is that  we do not need to 
assume communication to conduct astrobiology. The equation introduces a second 
bias  by  focusing  on  our  galaxy  only.  By  endorsing  the  Drake  equation's  agenda 
uncritically,  we  study  one  object,  our  galaxy,  out  of  the  170 billion  (1.7  ×  1011) 
galaxies estimated to shine in the observable universe (see e.g. Gott et al. 2005). For 
more  critique  on  this  limiting  focus  on  our  own  galaxy,  see  also  (Ćirković  and 
Bradbury 2006; Vidal 2011; Bradbury, Ćirković, and Dvorsky 2011). The good news 
is that if we extend Drake's equation to the whole universe, then our detection chances 
increase. More precisely, looking at further and further away galaxies is like traveling 
through  time,  so  it  constitutes  an  opportunity  to  test  wide-ranging  scenarios  for 
civilizational development at different periods (Kardashev 1997).
Those two biases have shifted SETI's fundamental question from (1) “Are we 
alone?” to (2) “Who wants to chat in the galaxy?”. Of course, it would be much more 
enriching and fun to communicate or to have direct contact with ETIs. Accordingly, 
starting SETI in our own galaxy is also the first logical and practical step to take. Yet, 
if we really wish to find out whether we are alone or not (1), it demands to extend our 
search strategies.
Who are you? It is nearly impossible to have a meaningful answer without 
knowing and comparing yourself with others human beings. Similarly, when we ask 
“who  are  we?”,  where  “we”  refers  to  the  human  species,  or  better,  as  a  cosmic 
complexity pocket on Earth, we will not find a meaningful answer without comparing 
ourselves to putative extraterrestrials. SETI then becomes a search for meaning. It is 
easy to predict that it will become a more and more important field of research, more 
and more taught in schools and universities.  Indeed, as we are becoming a single 
unified globalized living entity,  arguably a global  brain  (see e.g.  Heylighen 2002; 
2007), we will be more and more curious about life elsewhere. Visionary politicians 
and philanthropists have been and will continue to give support to  astrobiology and 
SETI.
Besides improved self understanding at the level of humanity, there are many 
other benefits of astrobiology, both with a positive outcome –we find extraterrestrials– 
or with a negative outcome –we don't find extraterrestrials– (see e.g. A. A. Harrison 
1997, 21–26; Tough 1986; 1998). 
Equally informative would be to know that we are truly alone. There are some 
dubious such arguments, for example Tipler (1980b) argues that we are alone in the 
universe. Sagan's dictum provides a sufficient answer: “absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence”. Another much debated probabilistic argument from Brandon 
Carter  (1983) suggests  we  are  most  likely  alone  (see  Ćirković,  Vukotić,  and 
Dragićević  2009 for a review, a critical discussion and a possible resolution). The 
bottom line is that proving that there are no extraterrestrials also requires to explore 
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the whole cosmos to confirm that there is no sign of life. This is an interesting point 
because it means that SETI pessimists should be as motivated as SETI optimists to 
explore  the  cosmos.  They just  have different  hopes or  expectations  regarding the 
outcome of the search. As Arthur C. Clarke put it, “sometimes I think we’re alone in 
the  universe,  and  sometimes  I  think  we’re  not.  In  either  case  the  idea  is  quite 
staggering” (cited in Davies 2010, x).
Searching for ETI opens the field of the possible. The universe is so vast and 
so varied that it makes it delicate to choose where to start from or what to look for. I'll 
now tell you how I concluded that some peculiar interacting systems are excellent 
“candidates”  of  very  advanced  ETI,  the  starivores.  Before  that,  I  will  tackle  the 
difficult issue of finding criteria for artificiality (section 9.1 Criteria for Artificiality, 
p209),  introduce a two-dimensional metric for civilizational development, using the 
Kardashev scale of energy use and the Barrow scale of inward manipulation (section 
9.2  Two  Scales  for  Civilizational  Development,  p224).  Then  we  will  make  an 
excursion into the speculative topic of black hole technology and advance energetic, 
societal, scientific, computational, and philosophical arguments that black holes are 
attractors  for  intelligence  (section  9.3  Black  Holes  as  Attractors  for  Intelligence, 
p228). I will then apply the criteria for artificiality to starivores and propose a very 
straightforward thermodynamical  argument  for  their  existence.  I  will  then address 
many  objections  against  the  arguments.  If  this  new  search  strategy  is  further 
developed  and  confirmed  it  will  be  the  refutation  of  two  “centrisms”  at  once: 
Biocentrism and Intellicentrism! To know whether it is correct or not will require a lot 
of work and debate, within the  High Energy Astrobiology  research field. In the last 
section,  I  propose  general  predictions  as  well  as  concrete  and  refutable  research 
proposals for high energy astrobiologists. I will be glad to offer a prize regarding the 
confirmation or refutation of these high energy astrobiology research proposals.
9.1  Criteria for Artificiality
9.1.1  What is Your Methodological Fallacy?
I fully support Shklovsky's dictum
 that every object must be assumed natural until proven otherwise. 
Freeman Dyson in (Dyson et al. 1973, 189)
Extraterrestrial intelligence is the explanation of last resort,
when all else fails. 
Carl Sagan in (Dyson et al. 1973, 228)
To which I add the following statement:
I  fully  disagree  with  Shklovsky,  Dyson  and  Sagan  and  hold  that  every  strange 
phenomena must be assumed natural or artificial unless proven otherwise.
During the first international SETI conference at Byurakan in Armenia, Shklovsky 
(1971) advocated a carefully reasoned search for extraterrestrials, but he may well 
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have handcuffed  the  endeavor  (see  Rubtsov 1991). He advocated  what  I  call  the 
naturality-of-the-gaps principle:
Naturality-of-the-gaps: unless proven otherwise, assume phenomena to be of natural origin. 
If by “natural” we mean “respecting physical laws”, everything we observe, living or 
non-living, will be natural. So the principle is trivially true. By definition, all systems 
in nature  follow physical  laws.  In  particular,  every  ETI must  respect  the  laws of 
physics. The principle is in fact utterly useless for SETI, since living systems, like any 
other  object  in  the  universe,  are  subject  to  physical  laws  like  gravitation  and 
thermodynamics. Derogating to this principle is equivalent to searching for magic.
Of course what Shklovsky and Sagan had in mind was something else. They 
warned  against the  fallacy  of  seeing  extraterrestrials  when  facing  an  unknown 
phenomenon.  One  should  not  quickly  qualify  a  phenomenon  as  artificial  without 
having first exhausted all the possible natural explanations. But are we really ever 
going to exhaust all the possible natural explanations? As Almar  (in Heidmann and 
Klein 1991, 393) wrote, while “the principle is scientifically logical, it did not turn out 
to be constructive because one can never determine the moment  when all  natural 
explanations have been exhausted.” 
Even more  difficult  is  the  question  “on which  conditions  will  we  give  up 
modelling the phenomenon as natural, and conclude that it must be artificial?” If we 
consider the analogy with the situation between Geocentrism and Heliocentrism, the 
principle would be equivalent to say “unless proven otherwise, assume the Earth is the 
center  of  the  universe”.  Today,  who  would  dare  to  say  this  is  a  scientifically 
constructive  principle?  For  the  fruitfulness  of  scientific  development,  history  of 
science has learnt us that we better be open-minded in allowing a wide variety of 
models  to  explain a  same phenomenon,  to  allow them to co-exist  and to  rely on 
objective criteria to decide which model or theory to endorse. As Rubtsov (1991, 307) 
analyzed in the context of searching extraterrestrial astroengineering structures:
In reality a “normal” astronomical investigation will never need an “artificial”(A-) 
approach to its object of study. Any refuted hypothesis will be replaced only with 
a new “natural”(N-) one. On the contrary, searches for astroengineering structures 
require the equal status of A- and N- explanations from the very beginning of the 
investigation.  When  studying  an  object  or  phenomenon  selected  by  some 
preliminary criteria, one should bear in mind both of these hypotheses.
He adds that Aritificial (A-) and Natural (N-) research programs should
 
develop, interact and enrich each other, seeking, on the one hand, for the most 
complete representation of the object of phenomenon in its description and, on the 
other  hand,  for  the  best  possible  conformity  between  the  description  and  a 
theoretical explanation of the phenomenon. During this process, one of the two 
explanations will be gradually superseded by the other, and a correct explanation 
will result.
If by “natural” we mean a purely physical process, not living (biological) and 
not intelligent, then we need to define what we mean by “artificial” or non-natural. 
This implies to address the thorny questions of defining what life and intelligence are. 
In sum, the principle of naturality-of-the-gaps becomes useful only if we already have 
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criteria to discriminate between natural and artificial. But proponents of naturality-of-
the-gaps generally do not give such criteria. 
The naturality-of-the-gaps has its exact logical counterpart, the artificiality-of-
the-gaps principle:
 
Artificiality-of-the-gaps:  unless  proven  otherwise,  assume  phenomena  to  be  of  artificial  
origin.
If we hold that principle, we generate false positives; i.e. detection of extraterrestrials 
where there is only natural phenomena. It is hold by UFOlogists who quickly jump 
from some strange light or object in the sky to the conclusion that it was an alien. 
They  make  the  mistake  not  to  review  systematically  other  explanations  (unusual 
meteorological  phenomenon, human artifact, secret  military weapon or hoax).  The 
reasoning is “we don't understand how it works, therefore it is ETI”.
The  principle  of  artificiality-of-the-gaps  underlies  an  unscientific  attitude 
because every terrestrial or astrophysical phenomena hard to model would be driven 
by  extraterrestrial  intelligence,  and  this  leads  to  an  “extraterrestrials-of-the-gaps” 
explanations,  which,  like  the  god-of-the-gaps  explanation,  explains  nothing  and 
anything at the same time.
Importantly  it  would  be  normal  not  to  fully  understand  a  system  more 
advanced than us by millions or billions of years. But it remains a fallacy to say that 
because  we  do  not  understand  something,  it  is  the  manifestation  of  advanced 
intelligence. Difficulty of modelling is a necessary condition for advanced ETI, not a 
sufficient one. Advanced extraterrestrials will not be obvious to model with known 
astrophysics. As a counter example, if we would say that our Sun is an intelligent big 
yellow man who sneezes every 11 years, it would not be very credible, because its 
activity is better explained by traditional stellar physics. 
To sum up, it is equally fallacious to hold uncritically and by default any of 
naturality-of-the-gaps or artificiality-of-the-gaps. The establishment of the scientific 
search for extraterrestrials focused on avoiding artificiality-of-the-gaps. This was of 
course in order to distinguish itself from the unscientific ufology field. Needless to 
say,  Shklovsky,  Dyson and Sagan had this  threat  in  mind.  Holding such a  strong 
condition may even have been a  necessary step to  establish SETI as a  legitimate 
scientific field of study, in contrast to unscientific ufology. But this was at the steep 
price of introducing the opposite bias of naturality-of-the-gaps.
Let us see another logical way to clarify this point. Harrison  (1997, 44–48) 
elucidated the logical outcomes of our search for extraterrestrials. For this purpose he 
used two dimensions, first, the interceptions of signals and second, our interpretation 
of these interceptions. There are then four possible outcomes, summarized in table 11 
below.
     Interpretation Positive Negative Interception
Extraterrestrial True positive False negative
Other False positive True negative
 Table 11 - Possible interpretations of extraterrestrial and non-extraterrestrial signal interceptions
A true positive is when we detect extraterrestrials and we are right about it. A false 
negative is when we detect extraterrestrials, but our interpretation is that it is not an 
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extraterrestrial. A false positive  is when we think we have detected extraterrestrials, 
whereas the signal is either natural or man-made. A true negative is simply a normal 
interception of signals accurately known to be irrelevant to SETI. 
Now, it is easy to see that artificiality-of-the-gaps leads to false positives. An 
over  enthusiasm  for  the  possible  existence  of  extraterrestrials  will  make  us  see 
extraterrestrials everywhere. On the other side, the naturality-of-the-gaps brings us to 
false negatives. An over skepticism for the existence of extraterrestrials will make us 
blind to extraterrestrial manifestations in front of our telescopes.
It  is  worth  mentioning  a  kind  of  false  negative  which  arose  from  an 
overconfidence in natural explanations. In 1989, a team of astronomers discovered 
rapid pulses coming from a pulsar remain of supernova 1987A (Kristian et al. 1989). 
Another set of rapid pulses were later discovered. The astronomer teams concluded 
that  it  was again the pulsar,  whereas it  was only a  human interference  (Anderson 
1990).
So, how do we avoid both fallacies of false positives and false negatives? How 
can we avoid contact  with both artificiality-of-the-gaps and naturality-of-the-gaps? 
We can now formulate the more balanced astrobiological stance:
Astrobiological stance: unless proven otherwise, assume phenomena to be of either natural  
or artificial origin. 
Following  this  stance,  astrobiologists  explore  as  much  the  hypothesis  that  some 
astrophysical  phenomena  may  be  natural  or  artificial.  However,  searching  for 
extraterrestrials need not to be the exclusivity of SETI researchers or astrobiologists. 
Any astrophysicist can take the astrobiological stance by asking: is the phenomenon I 
am studying easier and more cogently explained assuming naturality or artificiality?
That's enough for logic. What about practice? How can we recognize ETI? For 
a meaningful discussion regarding whether known phenomena are natural or artificial, 
we need criteria to correctly distinguish them. Where are we to search these criteria? 
From our best, most universal, most context-independent theories. These are foremost 
physical laws and systems theory. However, since we are interested in extraterrestrial 
life and intelligence, we can restrict the scope of systems theory to a subset of it, 
living systems theory. 
At a closer look, the distinction between natural and artificial might well be ... 
artificial  (see e.g. Davies 2010)! Could it be that the difference between natural and 
artificial phenomena is more of a continuous nature? Or should we rather consider 
criteria distinguishing simple versus complex processes? If  so,  what kind of more 
continuous criteria can we define? A thing is certain, we need to avoid to be too 
Earth-centric, and start the search with a strict minimum number of assumptions. So 
let us waive a maximum of our prejudices and enter the temple of Zen SETI. 
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9.1.2  Zen SETI
There are two moments when we start to think about what Ćirković  (2012) 
calls  the  astrobiological  landscape. The  first  is  to  use  divergent  thinking  and 
brainstorm about  all  the possible ways and places ETs could thrive.  The list  may 
become very long. This is an essential step to avoid a premature restriction of the 
search space. As we extend the possible, the exercise can become speculative and 
even fun. Such entertainment is actually the job of hard science fiction authors when 
they develop weird yet scientifically plausible scenarios. But it is not science. So, how 
do we make the second step and shift from science fiction to science? How would you 
put your speculations into the scientific track? If you were given 5 million euros to 
lead a search for extraterrestrials, where would you start? This practical constraint 
forces us to restrict the search space, or at least prioritize what we want to look at 
first. This is a critical step, prone to many biases. In his (1989) book The Inner Limits  
of Outer Space, psychologist John C. Baird criticized assumptions behind the SETI 
enterprise being “as much a function of the principles of human psychology as they 
are of engineering and physics.”
To make SETI scientific, the key is to connect speculations with what we can 
observe.  Dyson  (1966) thus  advocated  a  focus  on  the  most  conspicuous 
manifestations  of  intelligence  and  technology,  so  that  we  have  something  big  to 
observe. If we assume that  ETIs are operating at a quantum scale using very few 
energy, they would leave virtually no trace, and we would not be able to search nor 
find them, even if they were thriving here on Earth. Such an idea and many others are 
quite credible, but if there is no hope to test them, they should remain in the province 
of science fiction. But if we say that an ETI uses the energy of stars in such or such 
particular way, and stars should be modified in that way because of this interaction, 
there is more hope for testability.
In  his  seminal  paper,  Dyson  (1966,  643) assumed  that  ETIs  would  use 
technology  we  can  understand.  He  qualified  his  own  assumption  as  “totally 
unrealistic”. I do agree. If we look only at technology we understand, we restrict our 
search  to  civilizations  roughly  at  our  developmental  level,  not  really  higher.  The 
search for ETI more advanced than us is bond to fail. If we release this rule, it will be 
hard  –if  not  impossible–  to  argue  that  a  phenomenon  we  do  not  understand  is 
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Figure 14 Calvin ponders a new proof of intelligent extraterrestrial life.
Calvin and Hobbes © 1989 Watterson. Dist. By Universal Uclick. Reprinted with permission. 
All rights reserved.
artificial,  since its  technology will,  by definition,  be alien to  us.  That  is  why we 
absolutely need criteria which minimally depend on our known technology. 
Paul Davies (2010) advocated a renewal of search strategies and he calls for a 
“New SETI”. Bradbury, Ćirković and Dvorsky (2011) did also call for a New SETI 
which they call Dysonian SETI. They summarize the salient differences with the table 
12 reproduced below:
Orthodox SETI Dysonian SETI
Main object of search Intentional messages Artifacts, traces, and signatures
Working ATC model Biological,  post-industrial 
analog existence
Postbiological, digital existence
Temporal window of opportunity Narrow Wide
Quantitative theoretical potential Limited Unexplored (large?)
Prejudicates ETI behavior? Yes No
Two-way communication? Yes (?) No
Interstellar travel Irrelevant Relevant
Operational risks? Yes No
Main working frequencies Radio (cm) Infrared
Natural mode of search Active Parasitic
Data resolution High Low (?)
Practical extragalactic SETI? No Yes
Table 12 -A Comparison Between the Orthodox and the Dysonian Approach to SETI (by Bradbury, 
Ćirković, and Dvorsky 2011). Note that ATC means Advanced Technological Civilization.
It is important to emphasize that orthodox SETI and Dysonian SETI are not opposed. 
Accordingly,  Dysonian SETI criticizes  orthodox SETI,  but  does not  dismiss  it.  It 
mainly extends the number of search targets. In what follows, I take such a Dysonian 
approach to  SETI,  emphasizing  the  search  for  extraterrestrial  technological 
manifestations  and  artifacts  (see  e.g.  Dyson  1960;  1966;  Ćirković  2006).  This 
approach is also in line with the framework of the postbiological universe introduced 
by Steven J. Dick, which includes insights from astrobiology, computer science and 
futures studies  (Dick 2003; Ćirković  and Bradbury 2006).  This framework invites 
examination  of  new  kinds  of  objects.  For  example,  Seth  Shostak  (2010,  1029) 
recently proposed to widen the search to bok globules (cold molecular clouds), hot 
stars, neutron stars and black holes. Importantly, this means that the search recently 
widened not only to planets but to other objects in the universe. We thus get rid of the 
assumptions that ETI should necessarily thrive on a planet.
We take Calvin's remark seriously in the comic strip above, and will try to 
look for ETI also if they don't want to communicate with us: generally, they can be 
willing to communicate or not. Extending the search to non-communicative ETI also 
allows extragalactic SETI. As Sagan (1973b) wrote about advanced ETIs:
There  is  a  serious  question  about  whether  such  societies  are  concerned  with 
communicating with us, any more than we are concerned with communicating 
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with our protozoan or bacterial forebears. We may study microorganisms, but we 
do not usually communicate  with them. I  therefore raise  the possibility  that a 
horizon  in  communications  interest  exists  in  the  evolution  of  technological 
societies,  and  that  a  civilization  very  much  more  advanced  than  we  will  be 
engaged in a busy communications traffic with its peers; but not with us, and not 
via technologies accessible to us. We may be like the inhabitants of the valleys of 
New Guinea who may communicate by runner or drum, but who are ignorant of 
the vast international radio and cable traffic passing over,  around and through 
them.
Carl Sagan did also debunk common chauvinisms in SETI. He identified 
oxygen, carbon, sun like-star (G-star), planetary and temperature chauvinisms (Sagan 
1973a, chap. 6). 
To  sum up,  we are  now more  Zen  in  SETI,  because  we  have  abandoned 
unnecessary assumptions: ETIs using oxygen, carbon, living on a planet around a sun 
like-star; using technology we know, striving on temperatures we know are suitable 
for life on Earth, ETIs communicating with us and searching ETIs in our galaxy only. 
We mentioned the radical proposal that advanced life might be in a  postbiological 
form. This may seem odd, since it requires to abandon the idea that ETI must function 
on the biological substrate we know. I will now explore this important suggestion in 
more  details,  and  then  propose  criteria  to  distinguish  natural  versus  artificial, 
grounded in general criteria, thermodynamics and living systems theory. 
9.1.3  The Case for Postbiology
Surely the essence of humanity is what we do and think, not the 
chemical make-up of our bodies.
(Davies 2010, 201)
Already in the 1980's, Feinberg and Shapiro  (1980) stigmatized the carbon-
and-water  proponents  as  “carbaquists”.  Those  fail  to  imagine  that  basic  building 
blocks of life could be very different. If not the chemical building blocks, what is the 
essence of life, then? It is the activity of a biosphere, which is itself  (Feinberg and 
Shapiro 1980, 147): 
a highly ordered system of matter and energy characterized by complex cycles 
that maintain or gradually increase the order of the system through the exchange 
of energy with the environment.
It  is very important to notice the high generality of such a definition. There is no 
mention of carbon, water or DNA. What remains are energetic exchanges leading to 
an increase of order. Free from limiting assumptions of carbaquists, the two authors 
conceptualize possible living beings living in lava flows, in Earth's magma or on the 
surface of neutron stars. The idea of life on neutron stars was explored in science 
fiction (see e.g. Forward 1980) but also by scientist Frank Drake (1973). 
We can think much more systematically about life-as-we-don't-know it. This 
was  done  by  Robert  A.  Freitas  Jr.  who  wrote  Xenology  (1979), the  most 
comprehensive  and  systematic  study  of  extraterrestrial  life,  intelligence  and 
civilization I am aware of. This long volume covers a much broader scope than the 
classical –and also very good– book by Shklovskii and Sagan (1966). I consider it a 
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rare scientific masterpiece. Most of the book was written in 1979, although Freitas is 
constantly updating it, and made it freely available on the web (www.xenology.info). 
Freitas (1981) takes a similar starting point as Feinberg and Shapiro and writes 
that  life  “requires  metabolism,  a  systematic  manipulation  of  matter-energy  and 
information. But manipulation can only be accomplished by the application of force.” 
Right, but which force? Freitas systematically analyses possible metabolisms of living 
systems  based  on  the  four  fundamental  physical  forces:  nuclear  force 
(chromodynamics),  electromagnetism,  weak force, and  gravitation. Those forces are 
weaker and weaker, and as Freitas argues, we “can imagine four broad classes of 
metabolic entities – chromodynamic or nuclear lifeforms, electromagnetic lifeforms 
(e.g.,  all  Earth life, including humans), weak lifeforms and gravitational lifeforms. 
Each is most likely to evolve in those environments where the forces upon which they 
most depend predominate over all others.”
Let us see how chromodynamical lifeforms would thrive: 
Chromodynamic creatures may evolve in an environment where nuclear forces 
are predominant. While the chromodynamic force is the strongest in nature, it is 
effective only over ranges of about 10-15 meter, so very special conditions might 
be required for such life to exist. 
Where in the universe could such conditions be met? Freitas pursues: 
These conditions possibly could be found inside a neutron star. Neutron stars are 
heavy, rapidly spinning objects 10-20 kilometers in diameter with approximately 
the mass of a star. They have densities like nuclear matter, tremendous magnetic 
fields, surface gravities in excess of 100 billion Earth-gees, and are thought to be 
the energy source for pulsars. Neutron stars have atmospheres half a centimeter 
deep and mountains at most one centimeter high. Under the three-kilometer crust 
of crystalline iron nuclei a sea of neutrons circulates at a temperature of hundreds 
of millions of degrees. In this sea float a variety of nuclear particles including 
protons  and  atomic  nuclei.  Scientists  believe  that  there  may  be  neutron-rich 
“supernuclei” or “macronuclei” dissolved in the neutron sea. These macronuclei 
might contain thousands of nucleons (as compared to only a couple of hundred in 
normal matter) which could combine to form still larger supernuclei analogous to 
the  macromolecules which make up earthly life.  The  neutron sea may be the 
equivalent of water in the primordial oceans of Earth, with macronuclei serving as 
the equivalents of amino acids, carbohydrates, and nucleotides in the prebiotic 
origin of life. It is possible to conceive of life evolving in neutron stars much as it 
did on our own planet nearly five billion years ago, but substituting atomic nuclei, 
supernuclei and neutrons for atoms, molecules and water.
To study  eletromagnetic lifeforms, it suffices to open a terrestrial biological 
textbook. But not only. A computer science textbook is as relevant. Indeed, as Freitas 
writes, machine lifeforms also fall into this category, since “the advancing intelligence 
and versatility of electronic computers suggests that some sort of solid state “machine 
life” may be plausible. Such entities would survive by manipulating electron flows 
and fields in order to process matter-energy and patterns of information.”
However, weak lifeforms hold weak promises. Freitas elaborates:
 
Weak force lifeforms would be creatures unlike anything we can readily imagine. 
Weak forces are  believed to operate  only at  subnuclear  ranges,  less than 10-17 
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meter. They are so weak that unlike other forces, they don't seem to play a role in 
actually  holding  anything  together.  They  appear  in  certain  kinds  of  nuclear 
collisions or decay processes which, for whatever reason, cannot be mediated by 
the strong, electromagnetic or gravitational interactions. These processes, such as 
radioactive beta decay and the decay of the free neutron, all involve neutrinos.
A weak  lifeform  might  be  a  living  alchemist.  By  carefully  controlling  weak 
interactions within its environment, such a creature could cause its surroundings 
to change from a state of relatively high “weak potential” to a condition of low 
“weak potential”  and  absorb  the  difference  into  itself.  A state  of  high  “weak 
potential”  might  be  characterized  by  extreme  instability  against  beta  decay  – 
perhaps these beings are comprised of atoms laden with an excess of neutrons and 
become radioactive only when they die.
Gravitational lifeforms are very fascinating and promising if we look for the 
most advanced possible extraterrestrials. Indeed, if we follow the general theory of 
evolution, proportionately “to the decrease of bonding energies we find an increase in 
level of organization.” (Laszlo 1987, 27). Freitas elaborates: 
gravitational  lifeforms,  should  they  exist,  survive  by  making  use  of  the  most 
abundant form of energy in the universe. Gravity is also the most efficient – this is 
why a hydroelectric power station which converts the energy of falling water into 
electricity (essentially a controlled gravitational contraction of the Earth) can have 
an efficiency close to 100%. In theory, gravity beings could be the most efficient 
creatures in the universe. Their energy might be derived by arranging encounters 
of  collisions  between  black  holes,  galaxies  or  other  celestial  objects,  or  by 
carefully regulating the contraction of various objects such as stars or planets. 
We should also note that these four life forms are not necessarily postbiological, but 
could simply be nonbiological. I mean, if extraterrestrial life starts based on another 
physical  force  than  electromagnetism,  instead  of  developing into  another  physical 
substrate and organizing around another physical force. 
The theoretical study of such a wide scope of lifeforms is still in its infancy. 
But the field of Artificial Life of course has been busy with defining and producing 
life-forms based on general principles. A promising direction is to develop the study 
of possible lifeforms within the framework of Chemical Organization Theory (see e.g. 
Dittrich,  Ziegler,  and  Banzhaf  2001). It  started  with  chemistry,  but  it  could  be 
extended to nuclear reactions. The framework has indeed been generalized to describe 
any kind of dynamical systems as a network of reactants and reactions, where closed 
and self-maintaining networks are called organizations.
What does postbiology look like? Let us take our closest energy hungry and 
high information  and computation processing relative,  the  computer.  The  material 
support  on  which  computers  operate  has  already  changed  five  times  since  their 
invention! Kurzweil (2006, chap. 3) reminds us that computers went through several 
revolutions,  from  electromechanical  calculators,  relay-based  computing,  vacuum 
tubes, discrete transistors to today's integrated circuits. Of course, it won't stop here 
and  Kurzweil  predicts  the  sixth  computational  paradigm  to  be  three-dimensional 
molecular computing. It is also natural to see that at some future point, we will use 
quantum  computation,  manipulating  the  smallest  information  markers  physically 
possible. 
Each computational paradigm uses quite a different material support or scale 
at which computations operate. What is the lesson for SETI? Imagine a computer 
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engineer of the 1940's teleported in our modern world. There is only  70-odd years 
between  his  world  and  yours,  but  you  challenge  him:  where  is  our  technology? 
Wouldn't  it  be  laughable  to  see  him  searching  state-of-the-art  computers  in  light 
bulbs?  Searching  advanced ETI  only  with  biology  as  we  know  it  is  as  naïve, 
restrictive and laughable.
The moral of the story is that in SETI, matter doesn't matter (much). What is 
important is the ability to manipulate matter-energy and information, not the material 
substrate itself. The case for postbiology is strong, and I invite skeptical readers to 
many  more  arguments  in  the  literature  (e.g.  start  with  Dick  2003;  or  2009b  and 
references therein).  Abandoning the hypothesis  of  ET using a  biological  substrate 
such as carbon, water, DNA molecules or proteins makes us focus on the functional 
aspects of living systems. This focus on function is the basis and conceptual strength 
of  systems theory, aimed to be independent of a particular material substrate. This 
makes system theory the interdisciplinary research field  par excellence  and also an 
indispensable tool in astrobiology and SETI. 
Let us now turn to a search for criteria to distinguish natural versus artificial 
astrophysical  phenomena.  I  start  with  global  and  thermodynamical  criteria  and 
continue with living systems criteria. 
9.1.4  Global Criteria
It is always extremely hard to do science with a unique object. We saw this 
clearly in the case of cosmology. I proposed to study general aspects of our universe 
by making statistics on possible universes resulting from computer simulations (see 
section 6.3 The Cosmic Evolution Equation, p122). This allows to scientifically study 
how robust the emergence of complexity is and how fine-tuned our universe is. 
Focusing on one isolated object or phenomenon, it will also be very difficult to 
decide if it is natural or artificial. This invites us to take a more global approach in 
astrobiology, to look at several similar objects available to observation, and if needed, 
do statistics on them. We have the chance to live in a universe full of billion of stars 
and other structures. It's thus possible to gather a lot of data and do statistics. Let us 
see three general heuristics we can use.
Strangeness heuristic: Advanced extraterrestrials manifestations will not be easy to model.
An ETI two billion years more advanced than us will not manifest a trivial behavior. 
As we mentioned, difficulty of modelling is a necessary condition for advanced ETI, 
but of course not a sufficient one (see Rubtsov 1991, 307). We should not commit the 
artificiality-of-the-gaps  fallacy.  So  those  strange  phenomena  should  attract  our 
attention and be carefully analyzed with an astrobiological stance (as defined above).
The  non-exclusiveness  heuristic: “diversity  will  tend  to  prevail  unless  there  exists  a  
mechanism to enforce conformity” (Brin 1983, 287).
Indeed, we should not expect life or intelligence to look exactly the same from one 
side of the galaxy to the other, or from one galaxy to the other. Of course, we can 
imagine mechanisms to enforce some conformity, such as arguments from convergent 
evolution,  or  a  more  speculative  “galactic  club”  (Bracewell  1974) which  would 
regulate the activities of intelligent civilizations at a galactic scale.  
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Another heuristic Brin proposes is the following: 
The equilibrium heuristic: “It is generally considered sound scientific practice to assume a  
state  of  quasi-equilibrium  when  beginning  to  explore  a  previously  undeveloped  field  of  
knowledge,  since  most  natural  phenomena  with  long  time-scales  can  be  modelled  as  
perturbations of an equilibrium state.” (Brin 1983, 287)
Brin then gives an example of a violation of this heuristic, criticizing an argument 
explaining that the absence of ETIs is explained by the fact that they have 'not arrived 
yet'. It would imply a situation of profound disequilibrium.
The  inverse  distance-development  principle: “the  more  distant,  the  less  developed  we  
expect” (Kardashev 1997)
This statement looks almost trivial, but for that very reason it constitutes a genuine 
and very important principle. It is well known that, because it takes time for light to 
travel unto us, the more distant astrophysical objects are, the younger they appear. 
Unfortunately  this  principle  should  also  be  balanced  with  the  maximal  age  of 
extraterrestrial life, which we saw varies between 2 and 7.5 billion years older than 
us.
Futurists and science fiction authors might dislike the finiteness of the speed 
of light, but it constitutes a very informative constraint to model cosmic evolution in 
general, and the putative development of extraterrestrials in particular.  As we already 
mentioned, this is a way to test wide-ranging scenarios for civilizational development 
at different periods. If we have a general theory of extraterrestrial life, we can test its 
various development stages by looking at farther and thus younger stars and galaxies. 
A very general search strategy derives from this principle: 
1. Take a list of cosmic objects
2. Compare their number, distribution, properties, in further and further away 
galaxies.
3.  Do  patterns  emerge?  Compare  the  predictions  of  natural  and  artificial 
evolutionary models. 
4. Beware of selection effects; further away objects will be more difficult to 
observe. 
9.1.5  Thermodynamical Criteria
In speculating about alien super-science, then, 
the second law of thermodynamics should be the last one to go.
(Davies 2010, 150)
We can read Davies' recommendation in another equivalent way. The second 
law of thermodynamics –and thermodynamics in general– should be the first tools to 
go with in SETI speculations. In fact, cosmologist Eric Chaisson (see e.g. Chaisson 
2001; 2003; 2011a; 2011b) has championed the fruitfulness of an energetic view to 
describe  the  unfolding  of  13.7  billion  years  of  cosmic  evolution.  We  already 
mentioned  his  free  energy rate  density  metric,  a  quantitative  complexity  measure 
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based on the energy flowing through a  system of  a  given mass (see section  7.2  
Increase  of  Computing  Resources,  p158),  which  allows  to  describe  physical, 
biological and technological systems. Given such a billion-years applicability, we can 
reasonably hope that it would also apply to advanced extraterrestrials. Indeed the tool 
is allowed in the Zen SETI temple, since it uses only the very general concepts of 
energy, time and mass. 
We saw that a universal feature of living beings is their having a metabolism, 
which implies a thermodynamic disequilibrium. Carr and Rees (1979) also maintained 
that  thermodynamical  disequilibrium is  a  strong  necessary  condition  for  life  and 
intelligence elsewhere in the universe:  
life  requires  elements  heavier  than hydrogen and helium,  water,  galaxies,  and 
special types of stars and planets. It is conceivable that some form of intelligence 
could  exist  without  all  of  these  features  –thermodynamic  disequilibrium  is 
perhaps the only prerequisite that we can demand with real conviction.
The simplest thermodynamical criterion is thus:
thermodynamic  disequilibrium,  a  necessary  condition  to  recognize  life  and 
intelligence
Let us be more specific. We can distinguish three kinds of more and more 
complex thermodynamical structures. First are  equilibrium structures which are the 
subject-matter of classical thermodynamics, when it is applied to liquids or crystals. 
Then come the dissipative structures where the structure is in a nonequilibrium state, 
which generates self-organization  (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977). A good example is 
the  Belousov-Zhabotinsky  (Belousov  1958;  Zhabotinsky  1964) reaction.  It  is  a 
fascinating chemical reaction, where the concentration oscillates periodically, leading 
to the formation of non-trivial  patterns.  However,  as Nicolis and Prigogine  (1977, 
340) write,
Eventually the oscillations die out, as the system remains closed to mass transfer 
and the raw materials necessary for the reaction are exhausted. Thus, although the 
initial  mixture  may  be  removed  very  far  from thermodynamic  equilibrium,  it 
finally tends to the state of equilibrium where oscillatory behavior is ruled out. 
Could a system sustain a non trivial behavior and stay in nonequilibrium? This leads 
us to the third kind of thermodynamical structures, living structures.
From the point of view of classical thermodynamics, life is a miracle. It is able 
to  sustain  a  very  far  from  equilibrium  state,  despite  the  second  law  of 
thermodynamics, which states that all systems tend to equilibrium. This seemed very 
paradoxical. The key to unlock the mystery of living systems was to consider them in 
a larger thermodynamical context. They should be modelled as open systems, meaning 
that a  flux of energy goes through them, and not as  closed systems. The second law 
only applies to closed systems, not to open systems. All in all, the second law is not 
violated because living systems increase local order at the expense of a more global 
disorder generated in the environment.
Additionally,  energy flow regulation or control is a necessary condition for  
the growth,  maintenance,  evolution and reproduction of  complex systems (see e.g. 
Aunger 2007b; Chaisson 2011a). For example, a stone processes virtually no flow of 
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matter-energy, and most people will agree that it is dead. On the opposite side, we 
have  a  wild  fire,  which  grows,  uses  a  lot  of  energy,  but  is  totally  uncontrolled. 
Whatever shaman's view on the matter, scientists generally don't consider fire as alive. 
Living systems are in between these two extreme examples. They are able to regulate 
their energy flow. To take humans as an example, if we eat too few or too much, we 
die. We thus regulate the amount of food that we eat to stay alive. 
energy flow control: living systems control their energy flow to grow, maintain 
themselves, evolve and reproduce.
A living organism can be described broadly by three components: a source of  
energy, an organized entity, and a sink to waste (to export entropy). The living system 
increases its  internal  organization –or  negentropy– thanks to  this  energy flow.  As 
Freitas (1979, sec. 6.2.3) puts it, life “drives its environment to physical or chemical 
disequilibrium, establishing an entropy gradient between itself and its surroundings”. 
He adds that  all  living systems “possess this feature,  and it  is  contended that  any 
system engaging in  such negentropic  operations must  be considered  “living” to  a 
certain extent”. This leads to the criterion of metabolism:
metabolism:  living  systems  maintains  its  organization by  using  a  source  of 
energy and producing entropy.
The most straightforward astrobiological search strategy is thus to look for  
this kind of non-equilibrium systems in the universe. We will soon apply these criteria 
to high energy astrophysics, and see that it leads to very promising and intriguing 
results (if you can't wait, see section 9.4 Signs of Starivores?, p232). 
But of course, the thermodynamical criterion alone is insufficient. As Sagan 
(1975, 145) put it, thermodynamic disequilibrium “is a necessary but of course not a 
sufficient condition for the recognition of extraterrestrial intelligence”. So, what else 
do we need?
9.1.6  Living Systems Criteria
The game of SETI is to get rid of a maximum of assumptions about what we 
know regarding terrestrial life, to extract only life's essential characteristics. The hope 
is that our resulting concepts of life and intelligence will be so general that they will 
also apply to extraterrestrial life. James Grier Miller (1978) wrote a very impressive 
1100  pages  book  entitled  Living  Systems.  Miller  shows  that  this  general  theory 
successfully applies to many different kinds of living systems at different levels, from 
cells, organs, organism, groups, organizations, societies to the supranational system. 
This  opus magnum constitutes a very useful guide to think in general terms about 
extraterrestrial life (see A. A. Harrison 1997 for an extensive application).
Miller distinguishes 19 critical subsystems that all living systems have, which 
can be divided in three broad categories. First, subsystems which process both matter-
energy and information; second, subsystems which process  matter-energy and third, 
subsystems  which  process  information.  See  Table  13 for  details  about  these 
subsystems.
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MATTER + ENERGY + INFORMATION
1. Reproducer the  subsystem  which  is  capable  of  giving  rise  to  other  systems 
similar to the one it is in. 
2. Boundary the subsystem at the perimeter of a system that holds together the 
components  which  make  up  the  system,  protects  them  from 
environmental  stresses,  and  excludes  or  permits  entry  to  various 
sorts of matter-energy and information.
MATTER + ENERGY 
3. Ingestor the  subsystem  which  brings  matter-energy  across  the  system 
boundary from the environment.
4. Distributor the  subsystem  which  carries  inputs  from  outside  the  system  or 
outputs from its subsystems around the system to each component.
5. Converter the subsystem which changes certain inputs to the system into forms 
more useful for the special processes of that particular system.
6. Producer the  subsystem  which  forms  stable  associations  that  endure  for 
significant  periods  among  matter-energy  inputs  to  the  system or 
outputs  from  its  converter,  the  materials  synthesized  being  for 
growth, damage repair, or replacement of components of the system, 
or  for  providing  energy  for  moving  or  constituting  the  system's 
outputs of products or information markers to its suprasystem.
7. Matter-
energy storage
the subsystem which retains in the system, for different periods of 
time, deposits of various sorts of matter-energy.
8. Extruder the subsystem which transmits matter-energy out of the system in 
the forms of products or wastes.
9. Motor the subsystem which moves the system or parts of it in relation to 
part  or  all  of  its  environment  or  moves  components  of  its 
environment in relation to each other.
10. Supporter the  subsystem  which  maintains  the  proper  spatial  relationships 
among components of the system, so that they can interact without 
weighting each other down or crowding each other.
INFORMATION
11. Input 
transducer
the  sensory  subsystem which brings  markers  bearing  information 
into the system, changing them to other matter-energy forms suitable 
for transmission within it.
12. Internal  
transducer
the  sensory  subsystem  which  receives,  from  subsystems  or 
components within the system, markers bearing information about 
significant alterations in those subsystems or components, changing 
them to other matter-energy forms of a sort which can be transmitted 
within it.
13. Channel  the  subsystem composed  of  a  single  route  in  physical  space,  or 
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and net multiple  interconnected  routes,  by  which  markers  bearing 
information are transmitted to all parts of the system.
14. Decoder the  subsystem  which  alters  the  code  of  information  input  to  it 
through the input transducer or internal transducer into a “private” 
code that can be used internally by the system.
15. Associator the  subsystem  which  carries  out  the  first  stage  of  the  learning 
process, forming enduring associations among items of information 
in the system.
16. Memory the subsystem which carries  out  the second stage of the learning 
process,  storing  various  sorts  of  information  in  the  system  for 
different periods of time.
17. Decider the executive subsystem which receives information inputs from all 
other  subsystems and  transmits  to  them information  outputs  that 
control the entire system.
18. Encoder the subsystem which alters the code of information input to it from 
other  information  processing  subsystems,  from  a  “private”  code 
used internally  by the system into a  “public” code which can be 
interpreted by other systems in its environment.
19. Output 
transducer
the subsystem which puts out markers bearing information from the 
system,  changing  markers  within  the  system  into  other  matter-
energy forms which can be transmitted over channels in the system's 
environment.
Table 13 - 19 critical subsystems of all living systems, according to Miller (1978, 3)
The  biological  world  is  robust  and  full  of  exceptions.  This  is  why  living 
systems will have most of the subsystems, but not necessarily all of them. Indeed, let 
us  imagine  a  living  system whose  reproducer subsystem is  absent.  Should  it  be 
considered as dead? It would be harsh for the mule and a woman in post-menopause. 
Still, Miller maintains that if a system lacks a critical subsystem, it will be eliminated 
by natural selection. This is of course most obvious for the reproducer. 
Traditional  astrophysics  is  concerned  more  about  matter-energy  than  of 
information. Orthodox SETI is looking for an  output transducer (19). However, the 
other information components will be hard or impossible to guess unless we make 
contact  with  an  alien  and  we  indulge  into  its  dissection.  However,  pursuing  a 
Dysonian  SETI,  we  can  still  look  for  the  10  first  subsystems,  without  excluding 
informational subsystems, if ever they become available. 
We can now raise a fundamental question for SETI. What are the criteria for 
artificiality (or complex living system)? Would we consider having a proof of ETI if  
and only if we recognize a system displaying these 19 subsystems? Ideally, yes. In 
practice, there might be shortcuts. Indeed, the orthodox SETI is very smart in this 
regard, because by looking only at one subsystem, the output transducer, there is the 
possibility –and hope– that we will be informed about the 18 others. Again, it requires 
many assumptions (ETIs want to communicate, ETIs communicate in a manner we 
can detect, we will be able to decode their message, ETIs send information about their 
18 other subsystems, etc.). 
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Is orthodox SETI the only way to bring a sufficient condition for proving the 
existence  of  ETI?  It  may  be.  Indeed,  even  a  vehement  SETI  skeptic  would  be 
complied to accept the evidence of a message from the stars saying “Hello Earth, here 
is the recipe for cold fusion: …. ”. However, there is hope for success in Dysonian 
SETI if we cleverly combine global, thermodynamical and living system criteria. 
To sum up, these sets of criteria are just a starting point, and more advanced 
concepts in non-equilibrium thermodynamics, living systems theory, because of their 
general concepts and applicability, will certainly provide key conceptual frameworks. 
The energy rate density metric is certainly very informative because it suggests that 
the  distinction  natural  versus  artificial  may  be  of  a  continuous  nature.  Artificial 
intelligence and artificial life in particular are also important fields to further explore 
because they face many similar problems as SETI (Dick 2003). For example, how do 
you decide that a software simulation is “alive” or “intelligent”? 
Now  that  we  have  some  general  criteria,  we  need  “candidate”  advanced 
extraterrestrial civilizations to try them out. A typical strategy to find advanced ETI is 
to  extrapolate  general  trends  of  our  own development.  Although  it  is  admittedly 
Earth-centric, we have to start somewhere, and we have just one option: life on Earth. 
So, let us try.
9.2  Two Scales for Civilizational Development
Our destiny is density.
(Smart 2012)
We can  distinguish  two  very  general  scales  for  civilizational  development 
(Table  14). Kardashev's scale measures the energy consumption of a civilization. It 
has been refined since its original publication, but its original version will suffice for 
our purpose. Barrow's scale measures a civilization's ability to manipulate small-scale 
entities. It has been largely ignored up to now.
Kardashev Scale Barrow Scale
KI – energy consumption at ~ 4 x 1019 erg s-1 BI – manipulates objects of its own scale ~ 1 m
KII – energy consumption at ~ 4 x 1033 erg s-1 BII – manipulates genes ~ 10 -7  m
KIII – energy consumption at ~ 4 x 1044 erg s-1 BIII – manipulates molecules ~ 10 -9  m
BIV – manipulates individual atoms ~ 10 -11 m
BV – manipulates atomic nuclei ~ 10 -15 m
BVI – manipulates elementary particles ~ 10 -18 m
BΩ – manipulates space-time's structure ~ 10 -35 m
Table 14: Energetic and inward civilizational development.
Kardashev's (1964) types refer to energy consumption; Barrow's (1998, 133) types refer to a 
civilization's ability to manipulate smaller and smaller entities. In section (9.4.1 Two Scales Argument, 
p232), I combine those two scales. 
9.2.1  Kardashev Scale – the Energetic Increase
Our civilization uses more and more energy. Energy is all-purpose, so we don't 
even need to understand the how or the why of this energy use to see that this trend is 
robust.  Extrapolating  this  exponential  increase  of  energy  consumption,  Kardashev 
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(1964) showed that this would lead our civilization to type KII in year ~5164 and to 
type KIII in ~7764. Although Kardashev's original scale is an energetic one, it has 
often been interpreted as, and extrapolated to a spatial one. This is probably because 
the order of magnitude of the energy processed is as follows. Type KI harnesses the 
energy of a Earth-like planet; type KII harnesses the energy of a star and type KIII the 
energy  of  a  galaxy  (see  e.g.  Baugher  1985,  116  for  KIII  speculations).  We  are 
currently  a  ~KI  civilization.  Let  us  examine,  as  a  typical  example,  our  possible 
transition from type  KI  to  type  KII.  Where  are  we in  this  scale?  Probably  in  an 
unstable transition phase between KI and KII, as clearly illustrated in Figure 15.
What motivations could we have to evolve to KII and harness the energy of 
the Sun? There are essentially two reasons. First, simply to meet our growing energy 
consumption needs; second, to avoid the predictable death of our Sun, associated with 
the destruction of life on Earth. 
Let  us  first  consider  how  to  meet  a  civilization's  growing  energy  needs. 
Einstein famously formulated the matter-energy equivalence formula E=mc².  If we 
consider our solar system, where can we find most of its mass-energy? It is above all 
in the Sun, since 99.8% of our solar system's mass is in the Sun. That is, 99.8% of the 
energy in our solar system is to be found in the Sun. For any long-term use, the Sun is 
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Figure 15 Freitas (1979, chap. 25.2.1) comments his figure: “the vast majority of sentient societies may 
lie on either side of the step (assuming humanity is a typical case) (Gunkel 1975). Most cultures may 
be regarded as “impotent” or “omnipotent” insofar as technical abilities are concerned. Only a tiny 
fraction of all evolving technological societies will be in the transition phase occupied by present-day 
humanity. Or, to put it in another more striking way, in any contemporary first contact situation humans 
are vastly more likely to encounter gods or animals, almost never peers. Indeed, it may be viewed as 
unethical for any omnipotent civilization to contact a society which is technologically impotent or in 
transition.”
thus the obvious resource to harness energy from. Exploiting the energy of a star is an 
explorative engineering field known as star lifting, also called stellar mining or stellar 
engineering (see e.g. Reeves 1985; Criswell 1985; Beech 2008).
The second incentive to engineer our Sun is to avoid its red giant phase which 
will begin in ~5 billion years. This enterprise is vital if we are concerned about saving 
life on Earth. Various processes have been proposed for this purpose, resulting in an 
elimination of this red giant phase. The topic is treated extensively by Martin Beech 
(2008). From a SETI perspective, this leads to concrete and observable predictions. 
Beech  (2008, 190–191) indeed proposes 12 possible signs of stellar rejuvenation in 
progress.
9.2.2  Barrow Scale – the Inward Manipulation
John Barrow  (1998) classified technological  civilizations by their ability to 
control smaller and smaller entities, as depicted in Table 14. This trend leads to major 
societal revolutions. Biotechnologies, nanotechnologies and information technologies 
are progressing at an accelerating pace and all stem from our abilities to control and 
manipulate  small  scale  entities.  This  pivotal  and  omnipresent  trend  toward  small 
spatial  scales  is  largely  overlooked  in  SETI,  resulting  in  the  Barrow scale  being 
somewhat unknown. Barrow estimates that we are currently a type ~BIV civilization 
which  has  just  entered  nanotechnology.  We could  estimate  that  chromodynamical 
lifeforms Freitas  described  are  type  ~BV,  weak  lifeforms  ~BVI  and  gravitational 
beings ~BΩ.
In contrast to the Barrow scale, many large-scale engineering or space travel 
projects  have  been  proposed  (see  e.g.  Badescu,  Cathcart,  and  Schuiling  2006). 
However, there are strong obstacles against such grand projects. As Donald Tarter 
(1996, 292b) puts it:
The  unanswered  question  with  these  visionary  proposals  is  economic,  not 
technological. Our technology is fully capable of realising such projects, but our 
chequebooks forbid it. We are held on Earth not by the laws of physics but by 
laws of economics.
Taking economical factors into accounts, thoughtful speculations about space travel 
consider instead small scale self-replicating machines (see e.g. Bracewell 1960; 1962; 
Freitas Jr 1980). 
Another argument for the importance of the Barrow scale is that, from the 
relative human point of view, there is more to explore in small scales than in large 
scales. As counter-intuitive as it is, space exploration offers more prospect in small 
scales than in large scales! This is illustrated in Figure 16. 
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In contrast with large cosmological scales, manufacturing, testing, exploring 
and exploiting small scale technologies is easier, cheaper and more controllable. It is 
also more efficient energetically. Accelerating progresses on small scale engineering 
has no reason to slow down until we reach the Planck scale. Futurist and systems 
theorist  John  Smart  (2009) characterized  this  trend  as  Space-Time-Energy-Matter 
(STEM) efficiency and density, or “STEM Compression”. It can also be summarized 
by the motto “doing more with less”.
I am more impressed when I look at a SDXC memory card the size of a post 
stamp,  containing  256 GB of  data,  rather  than  contemplating  the  Great  Egyptian 
Pyramids. And I can be sure that my children will find my astonishment for such a 
small amount of memory stored on such a big structure laughable. The feats of today's 
architects and engineers are to organize small scales, not large ones.
The two-dimensional metric complies with Zen SETI standards, because both 
the sheer energy use and the engineering scale are independent of goals or a particular 
technology. Putative ETIs can use energy for whatever they like; they can construct, 
organize and engineer at small scales whatever they deem useful. In SETI discussions, 
Kardashev's scale is widely accepted and used precisely because energy is technology 
neutral. The same holds for the scale-density, it is technology neutral. We can simply 
assume that an intelligent civilization will develop to type KII, KIII, and/or up to BΩ, 
whatever their purpose.
227
Figure 16 - Scales in the Universe.
That humans are not in the center of the universe is also 
true in terms of scales. This implies that there is more to 
explore in small scales than in large scales. Richard 
Feynman (1960) popularized this insight when he said 
“there is plenty of room at the bottom”. Figure adapted 
from (Auffray and Nottale 2008, 86).
Still,  it  is intriguing and stimulating to speculate about what would further 
motivate an advanced civilization to climb those two developmental trends. I must 
warn  the  reader  that  the  next  section  contains  scientific  and  philosophical 
speculations, so the reader averse to such speculations, if any is still reading, might 
thus jump directly to section (9.4.1 Two Scales Argument, p232) for an application of 
the two-dimensional metric. 
9.3  Black Holes as Attractors for Intelligence
I love this topic, but it stretches my brain beyond its capabilities
Internet user Aaron commenting on 
Ray Villard's (2011) news report
 about my (2011) paper.
Les trous noirs, c'est troublant13
9.3.1  Unknown Black Hole Technology
If we extrapolate the Barrow scale to its limits, we come to a civilization able 
to  manipulate  space-time,  or  what  Freitas  called  gravitational  beings.  However, 
because gravitation is such a weak field, a lot of mass and density must be present to 
obtain significant effects. What are the densest objects in the universe? Black holes. 
They are fascinating attractors, not only because of their staggering gravitational field, 
but also because they are an intelligence's  greatest  potential.  I  now invite  curious 
readers to explore this idea via a short adventure into the speculative topic of black 
hole technology. 
9.3.2  Energetic
Black holes are the densest objects in the universe. If we want to address the 
need of continually increasing energy consumption, it would be beneficial to be able 
to store or extract energy from black holes. Roger Penrose (1969, 270–272) imagined 
the following extraction mechanism. It consists of injecting matter into a black hole in 
a  carefully  chosen  way,  thereby  extracting  its  rotational  energy  (see  also  Misner, 
Thorne,  and  Wheeler  1973,  908  for  more  details).  Blandford  and  Znajek  (1977) 
suggested a similar process with electrically charged and rotating black holes. Other 
proposals suggest collecting energy from gravitational waves of colliding black holes. 
Misner  imagined  this  in  1968  as  a  personal  communication  to  Penrose  (1969). 
Frautschi  (1982) also proposed to merge black holes as a way to produce a power 
source. Louis Crane  (2010, 370) has also suggested that small black holes could be 
used as an energy source, since they can convert matter into energy via the Hawking 
radiation with great efficiency. 
13This is an untranslatable wordgame... let's try anyway. Literally it means “Black holes are troubling”; 
but in French, “troublant” (troubling) has the same pronunciation as “trou blanc”, which means “white 
hole”. 
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9.3.3  Societal
The Hawking radiation,  Crane argues,  could make them the perfect  waste-
disposal device. Chaisson (1988, 197–198) also envisioned that a black hole would be 
an ideal solution for a civilization like ours, short on energy and long on garbage. 
Crane and Westmoreland (2009)  conducted an extensive study on the possibility of 
black hole starships. Paul Davies (2010, 142) also speculated that a black hole could 
be used to launch a spacecraft at a relativistic speed, by smartly using its gravitational 
field. Furthermore, general relativity leads to the fascinating topic of time travel via 
worm holes, theoretical cousins of black holes. Although their existence is extremely 
implausible, they could in theory provide shortcuts for traveling in space-time  (for 
popular accounts see Thorne 1994; Randall 2005). 
9.3.4  Scientific
Of all the entities I have encountered in my life in physics, none approaches the 
black hole in fascination. And none, I think, is a more important constituent of 
this universe we call home. 
John A. Wheeler in (Taylor and Wheeler 2000, F–31)
Let us assume that terrestrial and ETIs are curious and continue to develop 
science. Black holes, especially their interiors, currently challenge our knowledge of 
the three fundamental physical theories: quantum mechanics, general relativity and 
thermodynamics. For scientific purposes, there might be an incentive to artificially 
produce black holes to better understand them. Although it remains an engineering 
challenge, Westmoreland  (2010) showed how artificial optical black holes could be 
created out of electromagnetic radiation. Even though improbable sources of danger, 
some concerns have been raised regarding the accidental production of micro black 
holes in particle accelerators  (Giddings and Thomas 2002). Still, we might want to 
produce them intentionally in the future. 
A more concrete scientific application of black hole technology is to use them 
as  telescopes  or  communication  devices.  How  is  it  possible?  An  established 
consequence of general relativity theory is that light is bended by massive objects. 
This is known as gravitational lensing. For a few decades, researchers have proposed 
to use the Sun as a gravitational lens (see e.g. Von Eshleman 1979; Drake 1988). At 
22.45AU  and  29.59AU  we  have  a  focus  for  gravitational  waves  and  neutrinos. 
Starting from 550AU, electromagnetic waves converge. Those focus regions offer one 
of the greatest opportunity for astronomy and astrophysics, offering gains from 2 to 9 
orders of magnitude compared to  Earth-based telescopes.  Over the years,  Claudio 
Maccone (2009) has detailed with great technical precision such a scientific mission, 
called FOCAL. It is also worth noting that such gravitational lensing could be used 
not only for observation, but also for communication. If we want to continue and 
improve our quest for understanding the cosmos, this mission is a great opportunity to 
complete our fuzzy astronomy with a focused one. In other words, the time may be 
ripe to put on our cosmic glasses and to use cosmic loudspeakers. 
But other ETIs may already have binoculars. Indeed, it is easy to extrapolate 
the maximal capacity of gravitational lensing using instead of the Sun a much more 
massive object, i.e. a neutron star or a black hole. This would probably constitute the 
most  powerful  possible  telescope.  This  possibility  was  envisioned  –yet  not 
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developed– by Von Eshleman in  (1991). Recently, Claudio Maccone (2012) studied 
the gravitational lensing potential of supermassive black holes, and showed that even 
intergalactic communication would be feasible thanks to them. He writes  (Maccone 
2012, 119–120) that 
this line of thought clearly shows that the central massive black hole of every 
galaxy is by far the most important ‘‘resource’’ of that galaxy for SETI purposes. 
In fact, it is like the ‘‘central radio station’’ of that galaxy that every civilization 
living in that galaxy would like to control in order to keep in touch with other 
aliens living in nearby galaxies.
Since objects observed by gravitational lensing must be aligned, we can imagine an 
additional dilating and contracting focal sphere or artificial swarm around a black 
hole, thereby observing the universe in all directions and depths. Maybe such focal 
spheres  are  already  in  operation.  The  gains  offered  by  such  devices  are  largely 
unknown, but this is an exciting topic for an open minded researcher or a PhD student 
in general relativity. 
9.3.5  Computational
What is the maximal information that can be processed by an advanced ETI? 
Elaborating  on  the  work  of  Bremermann  (1982),  Robert  A.  Freitas  Jr.  (1984) 
introduced the sentience quotient, which is a quantitative “scale of cosmic sentience 
universally applicable to any intelligent entity in the cosmos”. It is defined as I/M, the 
ratio of the information processing rate I to the entity's mass M.
At its limits, we have the maximal computational density of matter, what Seth 
Lloyd  (2000) more  recently  called  the  “ultimate  computer”.  What  does  such  a 
computer look like? Lloyd argues that it is a black hole. Interestingly, if Moore's law 
is extrapolated, we attain such a maximal computational power by 2205 (Lloyd 2005, 
162).
Kurzweil argued that the “computational power of a computer is a function of 
its mass and its computational efficiency”. He adds (Kurzweil 2006, 362):
Once we achieve an optimal computational efficiency, the only way to increase 
the  computational  power  of  a  computer  would be  to  increase  its  mass.  If  we 
increase the mass enough, its gravitational force becomes strong enough to cause 
it to collapse into a black hole. So a black hole can be regarded as the ultimate 
computer.
But black holes can be even more than ultimate computers. At the edge of 
theoretical  computer  science,  some  models  of  computation  outperform  Turing's 
original  definition.  Such  devices  are  called  hypercomputers (see  e.g.  Earman  and 
Norton  1993).  They  are  theoretically  possible  assuming  particular  space-time 
structures  or  with  slowly  rotating  black  holes  (see  e.g.  Etesi  and  Németi  2002; 
Andréka, Németi, and Németi 2009). If the construction of such hypercomputers is 
successful and indeed possible, this would bring qualitatively new ways to understand 
and model our universe. A breakthrough perhaps comparable to the invention of the 
computer itself. 
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9.3.6  Philosophical
Intelligence is the capacity to solve problems. It is by focusing on universal 
and long-term problems that we have the highest chances to understand the purpose of 
presumed  ETIs.  I  see  only  two  such  serious  problems.  The  first  is  the  already 
mentioned red giant phase of a star, capable of wiping out life in a solar system like 
ours. This is a fundamental challenge any civilization born on the shore of a Sun-like 
star will have to face. A promising SETI strategy is thus to search for civilizations 
refusing this  fate,  by  looking at  artificially  modified stars.  According to  Criswell 
(1985, 83) star  lifting can considerably extend a civilization's  time with matter to 
energy conversion, up to 2 millions times the present age of the universe, assuming 
the civilization stays at ~KI. Yet, even this runs out in the long term because the star 
will ultimately run out of usable energy. 
What happens then? Possibly migration to other solar systems, but that also 
cannot continue forever, because new star formation comes to an end in the very long 
term  (F.  C.  Adams  and  Laughlin  1997).  After  realizing  that  the  fate  of  stars  is 
doomed,  the  longest  term  and  truly  universal  problem is  the  continuation  of  the 
universe as a whole, to avoid its inevitable global entropy increase and death  (see 
Ćirković 2003 for a review paper on physical eschatology).
The  second  challenge  is  thus,  “How  can  we  make  life,  intelligence  and 
evolution survive infinitely?” We already mentioned two proposals which include a 
role for black holes (see section  8.3.13  The Case for CAS, p197 and Chapter 8). 
Freeman  Dyson  proposed  in  his  landmark  (1979) paper  that  a  civilization  could 
hibernate and exploit the time dilation effects generated by black holes to survive 
forever.
Another speculative solution is to reproduce the universe (see Chapter 8 and 
e.g. E. R. Harrison 1995; J. N. Gardner 2003; Baláz 2005; Smart 2009; John Gribbin 
2009; Stewart 2010). The authors of such scenarios combine the origin and future of 
the  universe  with  a  role  for  intelligent  life.  Based  on  these,  I  have  developed  a 
scenario  which  I  call  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection (see  Chapter  8  and  Vidal 
2008b;  2010a;  Vaas 2009;  2012 for  critical  commentaries;  and Vidal  2012a for  a 
response) as it  is  a  philosophical  extension  of  Smolin's  (1992;  1997) theory  of 
Cosmological Natural Selection. It is also worth noting that the emerging discipline of 
Artificial Cosmogenesis (see Chapters 6, 7 and Vidal 2008b), analogous to Artificial 
Life  but  extended  to  the  cosmos,  would  benefit  the  power  of  putative  ultimate 
computers, to run simulations of whole universes.
Finally, if we assume that our universe is a black hole (e.g. Pathria 1972), the 
puzzling fine-tuning of universal constants could itself be interpreted as an intelligent 
signal from previous universe makers (Pagels 1989, 155–156; J. N. Gardner 2003). As 
we mentioned, if this radical Search for ExtraUniversal Intelligence would succeed, it 
would lead to a refutation of Universecentrism.
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9.4  Signs of Starivores?
The later the stage we look at in a binary's evolution, 
the more difficult it is to see how a binary could have so evolved.
(Lipunov 1989, 311)
9.4.1  Two Scales Argument
In a SETI mindset, considering seriously that black holes are attractors for 
intelligence, we can now start to ask the following questions. What are the observable 
manifestations of a black hole when it's used as an energy source? as waste disposal? 
as a  time-machine? as a starship engine? as an ultimate or hyper computer? as a 
universe production facility?
The exercise is highly speculative, and raises the efficiency objection. We saw 
that  the  Barrow  scale  trend  makes  civilizations  develop  with  more  and  more 
efficiency.  This  would  make  small  black  holes  more  useful  and  thus  hard  or 
impossible to detect. It  would be like trying to detect from Earth the existence of 
nanotechnology on the Moon. This line of argument is the essence of Smart's (2009; 
2012) response to Fermi's paradox. We don't see other ETIs because they are confined 
inside  black  holes.  Another  example  is  if  a  civilization  develops  the  capacity  to 
perform thermodynamically reversible computation. It would then generate almost no 
entropy,  and therefore  be undetectable.  Yet,  as  Krauss  and Starkman  (2000) have 
argued,  erasure  of  unnecessary  memories  are  essential  for  something  like 
consciousness to continue in the universe,  and this operation has an entropic cost 
(Landauer  1961).  So,  we  can  expect  that  a  very  efficient  civilization  would  still 
generate entropy.
Does  a  civilization  has  to  choose  between  energy  intense  technology  and 
energy efficiency, as Donald Tarter  (1996, 3) suggested? No! At least we never did. 
Our technology has always been more efficient,  yet  it  has also always been more 
energy hungry. The two trends of more energy use and more energy efficiency are 
definitely not incompatible. The key lies in the availability of energy. If it is poor, 
efficiency  will  strongly  constrain  civilizational  development.  If  energy  is  largely 
available,  then  efficiency  matters  less  and  civilizations  can  also  grow  on  the 
Kardashev scale. 
To summarize, on the Kardashev scale, we saw that a Type KII civilization 
would be able to use an amount of energy of the order of a star, with an endeavor 
called star lifting.  Considering the magnitude of such an undertaking, it  has good 
chances to be observable. On the Barrow scale, we have argued that density attracts 
intelligence, up to black hole organization. We call such a civilization type BΩ. It is 
the culmination of a civilization on that scale.
Now, can we derive a concrete astrobiological search strategy, combining both 
the  Kardashev  and  the  Barrow  scale?  Could  a  civilization  harness  with  great 
efficiency  the  energy  of  a  star,  to  run  its  organization  at  black  hole  –or  lower– 
density? Can we imagine one day detecting such a configuration?
232
We don't need to imagine or to wait because such configurations already exist! 
Indeed, about 20 systems composed of a black hole accreting gas from a star have 
been found today (e.g. GRO J1655-40, GRS 1915+105, 1659-487, SS433, etc.). They 
are part of the family of binary systems, called X-Ray Binaries (XRB) because of 
their emissions in the X-Ray electromagnetic spectrum. For decades, they have been 
studied  as  natural  astrophysical  systems.  However,  we  will  now  take  an 
astrobiological  stance  and see  to  what  extent  they  can  be  considered  as  artificial 
astrophysical systems.
Importantly, researchers have concluded that a thin accretion disk around a 
rotating black hole is one of the most efficient power source in the universe, a process 
up to ~50 times more efficient than nuclear fusion occurring in stars  (e.g. Thorne 
1974; Narayan and Quataert 2005). There is only one more efficient process, which is 
the reaction between matter and its corresponding anti-matter particle, which is 100% 
efficient, converting all of the mass into energy. If any civilization is to climb the 
Kardashev scale,  it  would  certainly at  some point  want  to  master  those  energetic 
sources.
The  trend  towards  black  hole  density  was  aimed  at  finding  maximally 
advanced civilizations. But we can easily downgrade the argument to less energy use 
and less density. So we can replace the black hole (BH) with a neutron star (NS) or a 
white dwarf (WD) or even a planet. And this opens the door of the fascinating binary 
zoo. 
9.4.2  A Partial Visit to the Binary Zoo
Traditional astrophysics sees white dwarfs, neutron stars or black holes as the 
stellar graveyard, because in most cases such dense bodies are theorized to be the 
remains of dead stars. However, these bodies are perplexing through the variety of 
their  behavior.  Binary  astrophysicists  speak of  the  “binary  zoo”,  because  of  their 
staggering variety. As Lipunov (1989, 206) puts it:
Looking back at the late 1960s, the study of variable stars seemed a wonderland. 
Articles,  books,  and  catalogues  swarmed  with  the  types  of  variables  whose 
diversity  terrified  the  theorist.  There  were  novae,  novae-like  stars,  recurrent 
novae, dwarf novae, flare stars, cataclysmic stars, eruptive stars, etc. Some stars 
were known simply as irregular variables, while some stars of the same type were 
often called different things. Any attempt at classification seemed hopeless.
If you don't know anything about the subject, an excellent introduction at a popular 
science level is the book In the World of Binary Stars (Lipunov 1989). 
The population of binary stars is large. Although it is commonly believed that 
two third of stars are multiple, it is based on a quick generalization of the study of G 
stars by Duquennoy and Mayor (1991). Indeed, recent research also counting faint red 
dwarf stars shows that two third of stars are actually single (Lada 2006). 
The phenomenological diversity of binaries makes the subject very difficult 
and technical. Why is it so difficult? After all, shouldn't Newton's equations close the 
issue and easily deal with two gravitational bodies? The many complications arise 
because, in some rarer cases, the two bodies interact. They exchange matter-energy, in 
rough  or  subtle  ways,  which  changes  their  evolutionary  course.  This  makes  our 
knowledge of single star physics insufficient. How and why do they exchange matter? 
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What is the evolutionary outcome of such interactions? These are some of the core 
questions of binary stars astrophysics. 
Let us try to draw a map of the binary zoo with an astrobiological mindset. 
Some classify  binaries  by  the  method  by which  they  are  discovered  (e.g.  visual, 
spectroscopic,  eclipsing,  astrometric).  This classification is  useful for astronomers, 
but not directly relevant for theoreticians. A better classification is the one made by 
Kopal  (1955) which  classifies  binaries  in  three  types:  detached  binaries,  semi-
detached binaries and contact binaries (see Figure 17). This depends on how they fill 
their  Roche Lobe. What is the Roche lobe? It is the largest volume that a star can 
occupy without disturbing its neighbor companion (see Figure 18 below). If the two 
stars do not fill their Roche lobe, they don't interact and are called detached binaries. 
If one star expands or if the binary orbit shrinks, material is lost from the point nearest 
the companion,  the  Lagrangian point L1.  The binary is  semi-detached.  If  the star 
continues to extend its Roche lobe, exchange of matter can also occur through the 
Lagrangian points L2 or L3. Such stars are called contact binaries. 
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of 2, in the co-rotating frame. The droplet-shaped figures in the equipotential plot at the bottom of the 
figure are called the Roche lobes of each star. L1, L2 and L3 are the points of Lagrange where forces 
cancel out. Mass can flow through the saddle point L1 from one star to its companion, if the star fills its 
Roche lobe. Author: Marc van der Sluys, 2006, Wikimedia.
Figure 17 - “Left: A detached binary with both stars within their Roche lobes. Middle: A semi-
detached binary: the secondary fills its Roche lobe emitting a stream of material from L1. If the 
primary is small enough, the stream will orbit around it. If it were larger, the stream would hit the 
primary, as occurs in some Algol-type binaries. Right: A contact binary, with both stars overfilling 
their Roche lobes.” From (Hellier 2001, 22)
What does this all  mean for SETI? Let us remember the thermodynamical 
criteria.  Broadly  speaking,  detached  binaries are  like  two  stones,  they  do  not 
exchange matter and influence each other only through gravitational pull.  Contact 
binaries often  evolve  to  a  common envelope phase,  where  stars  exchange  matter 
unstably and rapidly until  the system reaches an equilibrium. This is  alike a wild 
forest fire, which involves a lot of energy and reaches a state of equilibrium when the 
fire has nothing left to burn. However, semi-detached binaries are suspect. The energy 
flow exists, it is irregular but does not appear out of control. Let us have a closer look 
at these interacting binaries.
In his (2006) book, Peter Eggleton distinguishes three main ways binaries can 
interact. They can interact via a conservative process, where the overall mass of the 
binary system is conserved during interactions. The rapid non-conservative processes 
involves mass which is expelled out of the system. The most famous case in this 
category are type Ia supernovae, triggered when a compact star (white dwarf or WD) 
accretes more matter than it can support, and explodes. The third category are the 
slow non-conservative processes, where mass is expelled out of the system, but in a 
slow way.
Let us consider again our thermodynamical criteria for living systems. Which 
ones of the three interactions are most alike a living system? Conservative processes 
are not good candidates because no matter is expelled in a sink out of the system. 
Rapid non-conservative processes are also not promising because the duration is short 
and the end point is the total destruction of the system. The third category is more 
promising because all  the conditions of a  metabolism are put together.  There is  a 
regulation of the energy flow from one star to the compact object, an energy gradient 
between the two components, and some matter is regularly ejected through cataclysms 
(novae) or jets.  Importantly,  unlike supernovae,  novae and jets do not destroy the 
system. So, it makes sense to narrow again our focus to this category.
Eggleton  reviews  many  different  processes  driving  slow  non-conservative 
processes,  such  as  gravitational  radiation,  tidal  friction,  wind processes,  magnetic 
braking or stellar dynamos. It is beyond my expertise to explain or explore in details 
the complicated physics of such systems. 
Indeed, such processes become very hard to model. They require to take into 
account simultaneously the most important physical theories. Thermodynamics for the 
energetic exchanges, magnetohydrodynamics to describe the flux of gas driven and 
channelled  by  magnetic  fields  from one  component  to  another,  relativistic  effects 
when bodies are very dense (white dwarf, neutron stars, black holes) and quantum 
effects because of their high densities. This is without mentioning the indispensable 
prerequisite of stellar (single stars) astrophysics. Such extreme regimes are unique 
opportunities to test physical theories, because we have no way to even approach such 
conditions by setting up experiments here on Earth. This is why there are so important 
and interesting to physicists and astrophysicists. In most cases, the gainer of mass 
(usually  the  dense  body)  develops  an  accretion  disc,  where  matter  is  stored  and 
rotates before interacting with the dense body. The physics of accretion discs is very 
challenging, notably because it involves phenomena of turbulence and viscosity, still 
poorly understood. 
Accretion  is  an  ubiquitous  astrophysical  process  in  galaxy  and  planetary 
formation, so we may object that all binaries may simply always be natural. Let me 
however  introduce  an  analogy.  Fission can be  found in  natural  forms,  as  well  as 
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fusion, which is one of the core energetic processes in stellar evolution. Yet, humans 
try to copy them, and would greatly benefit to –always–  control them. So it is not 
because  a  process  is  known to  be  natural  that  its  actual  use  is  not  driven by an 
intelligence. In fact, the situation may even be more subtle. The formation of XRBs 
might be natural, but controlled or taken over by ETIs, like a river flowing down a 
mountain  is  a  natural  gravitational  energy  source  humans  can  harness  with 
hydroelectric power stations.
We now have enough concepts to define more precisely a putative ETI in a 
binary system. It is an extraterrestrial civilization using stellar energy (Type KII), in  
the  configuration  of  a  slow  non-conservative  transient  accreting  binary 
(thermodynamic criterion),  with the  dense  primary  (Barrow scale)  being  either  a  
planet,  a  white  dwarf,  a  neutron  star  or  a  black  hole. I  call  such  hypothetical 
civilizations starivores, defined simply as:
starivore: a civilization that actively feeds on stars. 
This is a convenient shorthand for the more accurate definition above. Note that if 
such binary systems are  starivores,  then we should find the primitive versions of 
them, extracting energy from a star with a planet, which is  not dense compared to 
WDs, NSs or BHs. This would happen at a low accretion rate, and planetary accretion 
is one of the concrete prediction from the starivore hypothesis (and indeed planet-star 
interactions have recently been discovered, see e.g. Lecavelier des Etangs et al. 2012). 
Up to now, we have only raised suspicion on some peculiar binary systems, 
out of thermodynamical equilibrium. But again, this is only a necessary condition for 
extraterrestrial life, not sufficient. We will now apply the criteria we developed to 
further probe the starivore hypothesis.
9.4.3  General Arguments
Putative starivores comply with the  strangeness criterion,  because they are 
difficult to model and predict, and display an impressive variety of behavior. This 
invites us to study them with an astrobiological stance. 
The heuristic of non-exclusiveness is clearly triggered because the literature on 
binaries  shows a  wide  variety  of  them.  The  variety  of  white  dwarfs  in  so-called 
“cataclysmic variables” is particularly puzzling (see the reference book, Warner 1995; 
and Hellier 2001 for a more accessible account). The accretion process itself can be 
quite varied. There are of course accretion discs, but Warner (1995, 334) also reports 
cataclysmic variables accreting magnetically not on 1 or 2 magnetic poles, but on 3 or 
4!
The equilibrium heuristic seems also to be respected because there are already 
plenty of binaries (and putative starivores) out there. 
The  inverse  distance-development  principle  leads  to  a  concrete  testable 
prediction. We should see less and less putative starivores as we look in further and 
further  away  galaxies.  We  can  even  refine  the  prediction  and  state  that  higher 
accretion rate, i.e. energy use, or higher development on the Kardashev scale should 
be less and less prominent as we look further away. The same holds with density or 
the Barrow scale.  We should see less and less semi-detached binaries in transient 
accretion as we look in further and further away galaxies. For example, black holes or 
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neutron stars in transient accretion should be even rarer than cataclysmic variables. Of 
course,  such  “artificial”  evolution  reasoning  must  be  confronted  with  “natural” 
evolution models, to see which of the two explains and predicts more.
9.4.4  Thermodynamical Arguments
Biological complexification leads to high energy, far-from-equilibrium 
systems, rather than the lower energy, equilibrium systems 
that are the target of non-biological complexification, 
so in that fundamental sense the two are quite distinct.
(Pross 2005, 153–154)
The non-equilibrium thermodynamical argument for the existence of starivores can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Living systems are far-from-equilibrium metabolic systems
2. We can look in the universe for such systems
3. A subclass of binary systems are the most obvious such systems
This  straightforward  argument  is  purely  thermodynamical  and  totally  independent 
from the two-scales civilizational development extrapolation and reasoning (section 
9.4.1 Two Scales Argument, p232). Of course, it only points to a necessary and not a 
sufficient condition for the existence of starivores, but it is remarkable that it leads to 
the same result as the two scales argument.
Furthermore,  as Pross writes in the quote above, the evolutionary trend of 
complexification is towards high-energy living systems. Could life's complexification 
indeed lead in the long-term to remarkably high-energy systems such as cataclysmic 
variables or microquasars?
Of course the weakness of the argument is in step 1. Not only living systems 
are out of equilibrium. Also dissipative self-organized systems can achieve this state. 
This is why we need to inquire more about binaries, notably to establish if there is an 
energy flow control which allows the regulation of metabolic processes.
Imagine that you go hiking. You stumble upon a waterfall, which is quiet. As 
you peacefully look at it, suddenly an enormous strain of water flows, and the next 
second, it becomes quiet again. And this would go again and again at regular yet not 
quite predictable intervals. Would you bet the phenomenon is natural or artificial? 
This is today the main challenge of proving or disproving the starivore hypothesis. Is 
the accretion behavior natural, like a sudden ice melting strengthening the waterfall? 
Or is the accretion due to a purposeful behavior, like the sudden water release from a 
dam to regulate a hydroelectric power station? 
When I browse through the binary literature in astrophysics, I find it striking 
that the question is not whether there is accretion control, but how it operates. As an 
example,  it  is  worth  quoting  Hellier  (2001,  111–112) on  magnetically-controlled 
accretion of the system AR Uma:
237
 As the stream approaches the white dwarf, the increasing magnetic pressure of 
the converging field lines first squeezes the stream, causing it to break up into 
dense 'blobs' of material. The field cannot easily penetrate such blobs because of 
screening, so they continue ballistically for  a  while.  As the magnetic  pressure 
climbs the blobs are  forced to  change direction; collisions in the stream form 
shocks, energy is dissipated and radiated away, and a pool of material can collect 
in a 'stagnation' or 'threading' region. This region extends over a range of radii, 
owing to the range of blob densities. Material from the pool –a mixture of blobs 
and a fine 'mist' of material stripped from the surface of the blobs– then diverts 
along field lines and flows onto the white dwarf.
It is also worth mentioning that the accretion is not rough in the sense that it reaches a 
small region of the white dwarf, 1/100th of its radii  (Hellier 2001, 111). Figure  19 
shows different accretion types in accreting white dwarfs. They are called cataclysmic 
variables,  and  if  a  strong  or  less  strong  magnetic  field  is  present,  polars or 
intermediate polars.
To sum up, a robust necessary condition for life is a metabolism, that is, the 
utilization of a flow of energy to draw order from chaos and build internal complexity, 
while  dissipating  entropy.  This  situation  appears  to  be  fulfilled  in  some  binary 
systems like cataclysmic variables, X-Ray pulsars or microquasars. They all display 
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Figure 19 Schematic illustrating the different types of accretion flow in cataclysmic variables. ( a) Non-magnetic 
systems; (b) intermediate polars and (c) polars. From (Cropper et al. 2002, 2915).
an energy flow coming from their companion star, and dissipate entropy in the form 
of  regular  cataclysms  (in  cataclysmic  variables)  or  jets  (X-ray  pulsars  and  black 
holes). Such binaries therefore have a kind of metabolism, a fundamental property of 
living systems. Admittedly, we have not established whether or not such system build 
internal complexity. Up to now the arguments presented are only suggestive and prove 
nothing definitely, so let us now see if some binaries can do better and fulfill more 
living systems criteria.
9.4.5  Living Systems Arguments
Let us take again the first 10 critical subsystems that all living system have, 
and see if putative starivores display them (see table 15 below).
MATTER + ENERGY + INFORMATION
1. Reproducer The hypothesized  cosmological  artificial  selection  scenario,  where 
black holes play a key role in universe reproduction (see Chapter 8).
2. Boundary White dwarfs have atmospheres (hydrogen and helium layers), which 
regulates the energetic outflow of the star.
Neutron stars have outer and inner crusts. 
Black holes  in  rotation have  an ergosphere and an event  horizon, 
which delimit boundaries for radiation or light to escape or not.  
MATTER + ENERGY 
3. Ingestor Binaries display many different types of accretion methods. We saw 
that magnetic white dwarfs make the accretion follow fields lines. 
Other  accretion  types  include  Roche-lobe  overflow,  tidal  friction, 
gravitational  radiation,  magnetic  activity  driven  by  rapid  rotation, 
stellar winds, magnetic braking, accretion disc and accretion curtain. 
4. Distributor This  component  is  unclear,  unless  a  mechanism  to  distribute  the 
accreted energy is found in WD, NS and BH. 
5. Converter Conversion of energy extracted from the secondary, for changing the 
orbit, changing the rotation; increasing the magnetic field; regulating 
the  accretion  flow  or  maintaining  an  hypothetical  internal 
organization. In white dwarfs, note that the material extruded (nova 
ejecta)  has  a  different  chemical  composition  from  the  accreted 
material.
6. Producer Subject  to  different  interpretations.  In  white  dwarf,  the  system of 
accretion and recurrent dwarf novae outbursts. 
In neutron stars and black holes, the system of accretion and periodic 
jets. 
7. Matter-
energy 
storage
Matter-energy storage in binaries is mainly in the accretion disc. The 
disc can also act as an energy buffer. However, energy can also be 
stored in the rotation of the dense component, or in its sheer mass. 
8. Extruder In white dwarfs, recurrent novae, or classical novae. 
In  neutron  stars and  black  holes,  the  relativistic  jets.  Their 
composition remains a matter of debate. 
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9. Motor We  should  expect  small  motor  control,  such  as  orbital  period, 
rotation speed, inclination (e.g. in polars to move the magnetic fields 
lines and thus control the accretion rate).
Some binaries also move at high speed through the galaxy (e.g. the 
neutron star IGR J1104-6103 or the black hole XTE J1118+480).
10. Supporter Unclear.  But  accretion  control  may  require  adjustments  of  many 
parameters in the binary system to be effective. 
Table 15: Tentative living systems interpretation of some binary systems, from a high energy 
astrobiological perspective. Ten critical living subsystems are suggested to apply to interacting binaries 
composed of a primary white dwarf, neutron star or black hole .  
I will now discuss and comment on this tentative living systems interpretation, 
starting with white dwarfs then neutron stars and black holes. I will italicize critical 
subsystems when I mention them.
One could think that the accretion rate of white dwarfs is simply determined 
by the orbital period and the masses of the two stars. This is wrong. As Hellier (2001, 
171) writes, “systems that are very similar in these respects can have  Ṁ [accretion 
rate] values differing by factors of 100-1000”. This discrepancy is huge and accretion 
rate is really a difficult parameter to explain.
But  let  us  hypothesize  that  starivores  use  strong  magnetic  fields  as  their 
ingestor. Then there is at least a way to control accretion. It is “simply” to tilt the 
inclination of the white dwarf, as shown in Figure 20.
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Another important  strategy to understand living systems is  to look at  their 
waste products expelled through the extruder. If we apply this to white dwarfs, we are 
invited to look at  the novae ejectas, which are expelled during novae or recurrent 
novae. We follow here a review by Prialnik (2001). At first we could think that it is 
just the accreted matter which is ejected. However, analysis of the composition of 
nova ejecta shows that it is not possible, since they display unusual heavy-elements 
abundance. And such heavy elements are not present in the accreted star. Another 
possibility  is  that  the  heavy elements  are  produced during  the  nova.  This  also  is 
unlikely because temperature is not high enough to produce heavier elements than 
helium. There remain two possibilities. Either the accreted matter is somehow mixed 
with white dwarf material, or the accreted material is used as fuel to perform work 
and produces waste as heavy elements. 
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Figure 20 - Field lines of the white dwarf which are contained within the  
Roche lobe for different values of dipole inclination: (a) 0° (b) 45° (c)  
90°. From (Ferrario, Tuohy, and Wickramasinghe 1989). Under the 
starivore interpretation, case (a) provides a low accretion rate, (b) a high  
accretion rate and (c) no accretion. 
But how could work be performed at such extreme conditions of temperatures 
or  magnetic  fields?  At  least  strong  magnetic  fields  do  not  seem  to  prevent 
organization. In fact, they even open up new way of organizing matter. Indeed, Lange 
and collaborators (2012) recently identified a third mechanism for chemical bonding 
in  strong  magnetic  fields.  This  is  a  remarkable  and  fundamental  result  because 
chemistry classically distinguishes only two kinds of strong bonds between atoms in 
molecules: the  covalent bond and the  ionic bond. This new paramagnetic bond,  the 
authors remark, plays a role in the magnetized atmospheres of white dwarfs. Such a 
result  shows that  new and complex chemistry  is  available  under  strong magnetic 
fields. 
Let  us  now turn to  the no less  fascinating neutron stars.  The  density  of  a 
neutron star (about 2.8 x 104 g.cm-3) is equivalent to the one you would get if you 
would put a Boeing 747 not in a shoebox, but in a grain of sand. As with white 
dwarfs, the accretion flow is a critical parameter. As Shapiro and Teukolsky  (1983, 
450) write:
One crucial, but complicating, feature of neutron star accretion is the presence of 
a strong magnetic field extending from the stellar surface outward into the stellar 
magnetosphere. This field can control the manner in which gas flows onto the 
stellar  surface,  the  torques  exerted  on  the  spinning  star,  the  pulse  shape  and 
spectrum of the emitted radiation, and so on.
It  is  possible  to  interpret  the different  manners  in  which gas flows from a living 
systems  perspective.  Figure  Error:  Reference  source  not  found shows  three  such 
different states of a neutron star, corresponding to the  extruder,  motor and  ingestor 
subsystems. 
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Figure 21 “Three states of a neutron star in a binary system: (a) an ejecting pulsar; (b) a “propeller”; (c) 
an accreting neutron star.” From (Lipunov 1989, 173). With a living system perspective, state (a) 
corresponds to the extruder function; (b) to the motor function; (c) to the ingestor function. 
The behavior of neutron stars can be varied and challenging to explain. In 
particular,  they  display  quasi  periodic  oscillations  (QPOs).  Those  QPOs  are 
traditionally attributed to instabilities in the accretion disc. However, other models 
propose that a special mode of nuclear burning takes place on the surface of neutron 
stars, which are responsible for the QPOs  (see e.g. Revnivtsev et al. 2001; Heger, 
Cumming,  and  Woosley  2007).  Interestingly,  in  some systems  the  bursts  are  not 
frequent  enough  to  burn  all  the  accreted  fuel.  A possible  –yet  of  course  very 
speculative–  explanation  is  that  this  free  energy  is  being  used  for  the  internal 
organization of the neutron star. 
Let us now turn to black holes again. Black holes in binaries which accrete 
matter and emit jets are called microquasars. Their names comes from their behavior, 
which resembles  the behavior  of  supermassive black holes  found at  the center  of 
galaxies,  called  quasars and  which  also emit  jets.  Again,  the  accretion pattern  is 
varying, a property challenging to explain. As Meszaros (2010, 101) puts it, the “most 
puzzling property found in micro-quasars and in a subset of X-ray binaries is that the 
accretion is variable”. This can be illustrated by a sample of X-ray lightcurves of 
GRS 1915+105 in Figure 22. 
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Figure 22 - The varieties of X-ray lightcurves coming from black hole binary GRS 
1915+105. Picture from (Hellier 2001, 186), who writes: “A sample of the X-ray lightcurves 
of GRS 1915+105, obtained with the RXTE satellite in the 2-30 keV band. All the plots are 
on the same scale, and illustrate the astonishing range of behaviour this one star exhibits. 
(Based on work by Michael Muno, Edward Morgan & Ronald Remillard (1999))”. 
The ingestor function of black holes is arguably more efficient than the one of 
white dwarfs. Indeed, black holes accrete more carefully energy than white dwarfs. 
Black holes in binaries display soft X-ray, periodically. This is why such sources are 
called Soft X-ray Transient (SXT). As Hellier (2001, 184) writes:
In dwarf novae the outburst ends when a cooling wave moves through the disc in 
1-2 days (the 'thermal timescale' on which disc material can heat or cool the next 
annulus). In SXTs the irradiation prevents the cooling wave from moving inwards, 
and so the disc is maintained in a high state. It is gradually depleted of material on 
a longer timescale of ~ 1 month (the 'viscous timescale' on which material flows 
through the disc). Thus SXT discs are nearly completely accreted by each outburst 
(whereas only ~ 10% of a dwarf-nova disc is accreted during an outburst), and so 
decades can elapse before the disc is sufficiently replenished for the next outburst 
(compared to the ~ monthly recurrence of dwarf novae).
Regarding its hypothesized reproducer function, although very speculative, it 
is possible to make a quantitative estimate of the time needed to reproduce a universe. 
There are few universal laws in biology, but the replication time (τ) in function of the 
replicator  mass  (M)  is  one  of  them.  It  actually  also  applies  to  manmade  self-
replicating machines. Freitas and Merkle (2004, 175) did gather data about biological 
and  manmade  self-replicating  machines  in  126  species  and  9  manmade  self-
replicating machines. They found a trend across 20 orders of magnitudes, in which 
replication time appears to follow a 1/4-power law function of replicator mass (see 
Figure 23). The trend line is more precisely:
 τ = 1.78 x 107 M1/4.
In  their  systematic  study  of  self-replicating  machines,  they  also  considered  the 
extreme  case  of  the  maximum  possible  self-replication  time:  the  duration  of  the 
universe's existence. It exists since 1.37 x 1010  years (4.30 x 1017 sec),  so the power 
law above gives M ~ 3.4 x 1041 kg or about one third of the mass of the milky way. 
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But we can also apply the law the other way around and ask the following 
question. Assuming black holes indeed fulfill a reproducer function, how long would 
it  take  to  make  a  universe?  It  depends on  the  mass of  the  black  hole,  stellar  or 
galactic. Let us consider these two cases. If we take a stellar mass black hole of 4 
solar masses (7.95 x 1033 kg) it takes τ = 30 million years. A black hole of 10 solar 
masses takes just a bit more time since τ ~ 37,7 million years. This might seem a lot, 
but it is not in comparison to the 13.7 billion years of cosmic evolution. 
Now let us consider a supermassive black hole, such as the one at the center of 
our galaxy, Sagittarius A*. Its mass is more than 6 million solar masses (8.57 x 1036 
kg)  (Gillessen  et  al.  2009).  The  time  for  a  hypothetical  replication  is  then  much 
longer, about 966 million years (τ ~ 9,66 x 108 years). 
Why  is  it  interesting  to  speculate  about  supermassive  black  holes?  The 
Chandra  X-Ray  spatial  telescope  provided  data  showing  that  Low-Mass  XRB 
(LMXB) are overabundant within 1 parsec of the galactic center  (M. P. Muno et al. 
2005). Could these be civilizations migrating toward the supermassive black hole?
It seems worth exploring. Indeed, the galactic center displays an asymmetry 
when observed at high energies, in the gamma-ray line of 511-keV. This energy level 
is the signature of electron-positron annihilation, which is, let us remember, a way to 
have 100% efficiency in matter to energy conversion. A very promising explanation to 
explain this asymmetry is the similar asymmetry exhibited by X-ray binaries with 
strong emission, so called hard “low mass x-ray binaries” (LMXBs), as displayed in 
Figure 24 (Weidenspointner et al. 2008). Importantly, the authors notice that “High- 
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Figure 23 The 1/4-power law for replication time as a function of replicator mass, for biological 
replicators (circles= biological replicators, triangles = manmade replicators). From (Freitas Jr and 
Merkle 2004, 175).
mass X-ray binaries do not, by contrast, show any significant imbalance”, which is 
consistent with the starivore hypothesis, since contrary to low mass x-ray binaries 
(LMXBs) most high mass x-ray binaries (HMXRBs) do not display accretion control, 
and therefore are not good ETI candidates. 
Could it be that supermassive black holes are a huge energetic source needed 
to secure universe making? This brings us  back to the highly speculative idea of 
Cosmological  Sexual  Selection  (CSS) mentioned in Chapter  8.  We might  imagine 
competition in Cosmological Artificial Selection, in the sense that starivores compete 
for energetic resources to produce universes. The analog of sexual selection would be 
if starivores would engage in something like male combat, to pass on their (universal) 
genome  through  the  “female”  supermassive  black  hole.  The  properties  of  the 
supermassive  black  hole  could  be  interpreted  as  an  entity  of  the  opposite  sex 
constraining universe reproduction. If you find this too misogynist, you might prefer 
the  female  choice of  sexual  selection,  where  the  supermassive  black  hole  is  the 
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Figure 24 A sky map in the 511-keV electron–positron annihilation line (a), and the sky distribution of 
hard LMXBs (b). From (Weidenspointner et al. 2008) 
feminine matrix which chooses the male who will have the chance to reproduce his 
universal genome. But this interpretation leads to a difficulty, namely that it further 
requires that supermassive black holes have some mechanisms to select.
Sexual selection is a strong mechanism to improve biological offspring and 
analogously, CSS would also improve cosmological offspring. John M. Smart (2009) 
was the first  to speculate about this rivalry in using supermassive black holes.  A 
following prediction is that reproductively mature civilizations migrate towards the 
supermassive black hole. So, we could expect LMXBs to migrate towards the galactic 
center  in  ways that  are  different  from a “natural”  scenario,  like the migration by 
dynamical  friction  (see  e.g.  Miralda Escude  and  Gould  2000)- .  Note  that  a 
competition  is  not  strictly  necessary,  and  we  could  imagine  as  well  ETIs 
collaborations, for example in merging or comparing their universe simulations before 
replication. Again, even if these LMXBs are worth keeping an eye on, for now CSS is 
fitter for science-fiction than science. 
It  is  possible  to  critique  this  living  systems analysis  because  the  different 
subsystems we mentioned mostly concern different binary systems. And displaying 
only a few critical living subsystems does not confirm at all that the system as a whole 
is living.  This is a valid objection. However,  we have a problem of observational 
time-scale. Hypothetical starivores are probably very long-lived compared to a human 
life.  So taking apart one system and trying to guess its evolution is nearly impossible, 
for  high  energy  astrophysicists  as  well  as  for  high  energy  astrobiologists.   But 
observing  different  systems  can  give  us  some  clue  to  reconstruct  evolutionary 
trajectories. 
Imagine you are a butterfly and your life lasts only one day. Your mission is to 
study the human species. If you decide to follow one person during this day, you will 
learn some details about his life. But if in this one day, you fly over a city, observe 
hundreds of people of all ages, from birth to death, you will get a clearer picture of the 
human species.  Humans are like butterflies compared to putative starivores. If we 
want to understand them, our best strategy is to observe many of them and try to 
construct a global picture.
Now even if  we would find a  binary system displaying all  the  10 matter-
energy subsystems, would it constitute a proof that it is a living ETI? It would still be 
debatable.  This brings us to an other  objection,  namely that  we did not  take into 
account the 9 remaining informational critical subsystems. The reason is that they are 
all unknown, and maybe unknowable without actually establishing contact. We could 
speculate that the  input transducer  would be implemented via gravitational lensing 
with the dense object, but this is nearly impossible to check. 
Now, what about the output transducer, which is the focus of orthodox SETI? 
Could we search for information transmission from hypothetical starivores? Certainly, 
and this brings us to  pulsars, and X-Ray pulsars in particular. Let us have a closer 
look at them.  
9.4.6  Are Pulsars Artificial Output Transducers?
All  our  arguments  so  far  do  converge  towards  pulsars  as  the  best  ETI 
candidates. Let us see why. First, many pulsars are found in binary systems, so all our 
arguments so far apply to them. Amongst binary pulsars are the most puzzling ones, 
millisecond pulsars and X-Ray pulsars (see e.g. Ghosh 2007). They are thought to be 
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very  dense  neutron  stars,  so  they  comply  with  the  Barrow  scale  civilizational 
developmental trend towards small scales and high density. Note that many pulsars 
are  not  in  binaries,  so  the  artificiality  of  isolated pulsars  is  less  in  line with our 
argumentation.
Second,  we  proposed  living  systems  arguments  regarding  matter-energy 
processes in binaries.  However even if  we grant the arguments,  they may still  be 
insufficient to prove the existence of ETI. Information processing is key to all life and 
complexity, and if we can't find any proof of it, it will remain debatable if we have 
found  ETI.  In  that  sense,  we  are  back  to  orthodox  SETI,  which  focuses  on 
information.  More  specifically,  we  conjecture  that  some  pulsars  may  fulfill  one 
critical living subsystem function, the output transducer which transmits information 
in the environment. 
Since their discovery, pulsars have often flirted with the possibility of being 
artificial  (see  McNamara  2008  for  a  popular  science  book  about  the  history  of 
pulsars). It is well known that Jocelyn Bell Burnell and Antony Hewish observed the 
first  pulsar on November 28, 1967. They were astonished to observe such regular 
pulses and suspected it might be of artificial origin. They were so puzzled that they 
nicknamed the source LGM for “Little Green Man” (Burnell 2004). 
Despite the strangeness of the phenomenon, astrophysicists' job is to produce 
natural models, not artificial ones. So they quickly settled on a natural model called 
the  Lighthouse model (Gold 1968). The model shows that the pulsating source is a 
neutron star. It further proposes that pulses come from the two poles of the rotating 
neutron star, which beam magnetodipole radiation. These beams sweep across the sky 
generating one observed pulse per rotation period.
However,  the  pulsar  emission  mechanism  remains  largely  unsettled.  As 
Shapiro (1983, 289) writes:
The actual mechanism by which pulsars convert the rotational energy of the 
neutron  star  into  the  observed  pulses is  poorly  understood.  Many  theoretical 
models  have  been  proposed,  but  no  single  one  is  compelling  [footnote:  See 
Manchester and Taylor (1977), Ruderman (1980), Sieber and Wielebinski (1981), 
or Michel (1982) for a review and critique of some of them.] This is so despite the 
seemingly universal characteristics of the radio emission from different pulsars; a 
single  basic  model  probably  applies  to  all  pulsars.
On the other  hand,  the energy observed in  pulses is  only a  small  fraction 
[footnote: The fraction is ≤ 10-9 for the Crab, and ≤ 10-2 for some old pulsars] of 
the  total  rotational  energy  dissipated,  so  that  ignorance  of  the  actual  pulsed 
emission process may be decoupled from the gross energetics of radiating neutron 
stars.
Accordingly, Shapiro wrote this in 1983, but recent accounts still leave many open 
problems in the study of pulsars. For example, Beskin (2010, 89) writes:
The general view of the radio pulsar activity seems to have been established over 
many years. On the other hand, some fundamental problems are still to be solved. 
It is, first of all, the problem of the physical nature of the coherent radio emission 
of pulsars. In particular, as in the 1970s, there is no common view of the problem 
of  the  coherent  radio  emission  mechanism  of  a  maser  or  an  antenna  type. 
Moreover, there is no common view of the pulsar magnetosphere structure. The 
point is that the initial hypothesis for the magnetodipole energy loss mechanism 
is,  undoubtedly,  unrealistic.  Therefore,  the  problem  of  the  slowing-down 
mechanism can be solved only if the magnetosphere structure of neutron stars is 
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established. However, a consistent theory of radio pulsar magnetospheres has not 
yet been developed. Thus, the structure of longitudinal currents circulating in the 
magnetosphere has not been specified and, hence, the problems of neutron star 
braking, particle acceleration, and energy transport beyond the light cylinder have 
not been solved either. The theory of the inner structure of neutron stars is also far 
from completion.
Leaders in SETI have also repeatedly attracted attention to the strangeness of 
pulsars and the worth to study them with an astrobiological stance. For example Carl 
Sagan (in Dyson et al. 1973, 228) wrote: 
The pulsar story clearly shows that phenomena which at first closely resemble 
expected manifestation of ETI may nevertheless turn out to be natural objects –
although of a very bizarre sort. But even here there are interesting unexamined 
possibilities.  Has  anyone  examined  systematically  the  sequencing  of  pulsar 
amplitude and polarization nulls? One would need only a  very small  movable 
shield above a pulsar surface to modulate emission to Earth. This seems much 
easier than generating an entire pulsar for communications. For signaling at night 
it is easier to wave a blanket in front of an existing fire than to start and douse a 
set of fires in a pattern which communicates a desired message. 
To my knowledge nobody has taken Sagan's invitation of a systematic examination... 
yet. Regarding the issue of how to power the broadcast of interstellar messages, Paul 
Davies (2010, 105) made a similar remark when he wrote: 
A more technologically  savvy civilization might  try using the pulsar  emission 
itself to convey the message, by modulating the natural pulses in some way. That 
would neatly  solve the power problem – pulsars  are  so powerful they can be 
detected across the entire galaxy with a modest radio telescope. The signal would 
then show up as a pattern in the frequency, intensity or polarization of the radio 
pulses.
It is outside our scope to treat the difficult question of what would constitute 
an artificial informational signal. We discussed principally matter-energy criteria, but 
informational criteria should also be further discussed and developed. However, in 
orthodox SETI something more than a  regular  pulse is  needed to suspect  an ETI 
presence. Let us mention two features. First, in their landmark article, Cocconi and 
Morrison  (1959) argued that the radio emission line around 1.420 Ghz is a unique 
objective standard of frequency. Indeed, in this part of the radio spectrum there is little 
noise from natural  celestial  sources,  so an artificial  transmission at  this frequency 
would easily be distinguished. Second, in their textbook Life in the Universe, Bennett 
and Shostak (2011, 412) write: 
Most natural radio emissions have fairly broad bandwidths, so a signal confined to 
one narrow spot on the radio dial would immediately offer a hint that it might be 
artificial (made by intelligent beings). If the signal was also flashing on and off or 
switching between two nearby frequencies, we would suspect that it was a coded 
message. We would undoubtedly record the pattern and try to analyze what was 
being “said.”
It is remarkable that some pulsars fit very well those last two features. For example, 
the highly magnetized object  (XTE J1810−197 or PSR J1809−1943, also called a 
magnetar) emits at 1.4 Ghz. Research on pulsars has also immensely progressed since 
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1967, and many pulsars are indeed flashing on and off for long periods (pulse nulling) 
or switch between frequencies (mode changing). They also display other properties 
such as polarization,  subpulse drifting,  giant pulses or pulse microstructure (see e.g. 
Manchester 2009 for a review). Our time resolution may still be largely insufficient to 
decode meaningfully a hypothetical message. Indeed, the minimum time resolution is 
Planck's time, which is 5.4 x 10-44 sec and modern pulsar survey reach 6.4 x 10-5 sec 
(Keith et al. 2010). Of course it is not an excuse to postpone the analysis of data we 
currently have. We can hypothesize that as our time resolution will increase, we will 
continue  to  discover  in  pulses  more  and  more  complexity,  microstructures  and 
subpulses.  Interestingly,  it  is  by  developing  more  sensitive  detectors,  and  thus 
technology  on  a  smaller  scale  that  we  will  be  able  to  approach  the  Planck  time 
resolution. So, the full breadth of a hypothetical message in pulsars may be accessible 
only to a civilization very developed on the Barrow scale.
Note that  these pulsar behaviors are  hard to explain within the Lighthouse 
model. For example, how can it explain pulse nulling? Does it mean that the neutron 
star suddenly stops rotating, and then starts again? Or “just” that its pole emissions 
stop from time to time. If so, why? how? 
LaViolette  (2006) did speculate about pulsars as message broadcasters. The 
book has some value in its critique of standard models of pulsars and indeed raises 
suspicion  about  their  artificiality.  LaViolette  speculates  that  pulsars  beam 
preferentially to the Earth to indicate the coming of (or a previous) galactic superwave 
resulting from the activity of the supermassive black hole at the center of the galaxy. 
However, in addition to anthropomorphism implied by preferential beaming towards 
the Earth, the model lacks scientific testability. In spite of a claimed message about a 
coming galactic superwave catastrophe, no prediction is made to inform us when this 
will happen. No possible refutation is proposed either, and the pulses themselves are 
also not analyzed for putative messages. Furthermore, it is a pity that analyses in the 
book may be quickly discredited by other extraordinary claims such as an incredible 
measurement  of 64 times faster than light  speed, with as evidence to  support  the 
claim... an ordinary personal communication (LaViolette 2006, 48)!
Anyhow, natural  or artificial,  pulsars are arguably very helpful for galactic 
navigation. Indeed, the Pioneer plaques placed on board of the 1972 Pioneer 10 and 
1973 Pioneer 11 spacecrafts were designed to be understandable if ever intercepted by 
extraterrestrial  life,  which  is  why Carl  and Linda  Sagan with  Drake  (1972) used 
pulsars and the center of the galaxy to localize the position of the Sun (see Figure 25).
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But pulsars can still  be  much more useful.  Emadzadeh and Speyer  (2011) 
recently  showed that  absolute  and relative  navigation  is  possible  thanks  to  X-ray 
pulsars.  It  is  indeed not  at  all  a  trivial  matter  when you navigate  at  a  significant 
portion of the speed of light to keep track of time, because of the time-dilation and 
contraction effects predicted by relativity theory. Why X-ray pulsars specifically? The 
authors elaborate (Emadzadeh and Speyer 2011, 10):  
The main advantage of spacecraft navigation using X-ray sources is that small 
sized  detectors  can  be  employed  (P.  S.  Ray,  Wood,  and  Phlips  2006).  This 
provides savings in power and mass for spacecraft operations. Another advantage 
of  using  X-ray  sources  is  that  they  are  widely  distributed.  The  geometric 
dispersion  of  pulsars  in  the  sky  is  important  to  enhance  accuracy  of  three-
dimensional  position  estimation  since  the  observability  of  the  source  is  an 
important issue. An important complication that must be addressed in utilizing an 
X-ray source in a navigation system is the timing glitches in its rotation rates. Of 
X-ray pulsars,  ones  that  are  bright  and have  extremely  stable  and predictable 
rotation rates are suitable candidates for the purpose of navigation. These sources 
are  usually  older  pulsars  that  have  rotation  periods  on  the  order  of  several 
milliseconds.
It is worth noting that small x-ray detectors are an important feature for civilizations 
climbing the Barrow scale. They would not want to send big spacecrafts and carry 
huge detectors but rather send small scale spacecrafts with small detectors.  
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Figure 25 - The Pioneer 10 plate. On the left, the position of the Sun is shown 
relative to 14 pulsars and the center of the galaxy.
In recent years, pulsars have attracted attention in SETI. For example, in an 
unpublished preprint, Gregory, James and Dominic Benford (2008) suggested that the 
strange radio emission from  GCRT J17445-3009 could be an artificial beacon  (see 
also  LaViolette  2006,  91–92).  Edmondson  and  Stevens  (2003) also  proposed  a 
research program to find habitable stars based on pulsar alignments.
To conclude, we are not sure how to file pulsars, as natural or artificial. The 
file of X-ray pulsars are better classified as X-files. We need to figure out with an 
astrobiological stance if the pulses contain information and structure. After all, could 
it be that Jocelyn Bell's feminine intuition that pulsars are artificial was correct?
I used to think that SETI was for failed science fiction authors. But watching 
Carl  Sagan in  the  TV series  Cosmos changed my mind.  I  was  impressed  by his 
passionate search coupled with scientific and philosophical rigor.
In 2010,  Martin  Dominik invited me to speak at  a  Royal  Society meeting 
entitled “Towards a scientific and societal agenda on extra-terrestrial life”, held 6-7 
October 201014. The meeting was quite exceptional, with a rare intelligence density 
combined with a marvelous surrounding. Although I believed, like most scientists, 
that it  is unlikely that we are alone in the universe, I had not yet given a serious 
thought on how to find extraterrestrial life. The organizers invited me to take part on a 
discussion panel regarding the question: “What are the implications of SETI for the 
future of humanity?”. I thought that to answer this question we not only needed to 
actually  find  extraterrestrials,  but  also  our  senior  in  the  grand  scheme of  cosmic 
evolution. Indeed, it is only in this case that we will have insights on our possible 
futures.  The  extraterrestrial  perspective  also  encourages  the  development  of  a 
cosmological ethics (see Chapter 10).
The scenario of CAS and discussions with John Smart lead me to seriously 
consider the importance of black holes for the future of intelligence. But, as John 
noticed, if ETIs live off black holes, we would not stand a chance to detect  them 
because we can't see any leakage from them. Still, in a scientific spirit I later went to 
look more closely at where the few confirmed stellar black holes were observed. I 
then discovered with fascination microquasars and gradually the variety of accreting 
binary  systems.  They  immediately  struck  me  as  displaying  all  features  of  non-
equilibrium systems. Non-equilibrium systems, whether simple dissipative structures, 
living systems or societies, share common properties. The energy flow, a maintenance 
of an internal organization and an exportation of entropy. All these features appeared 
to be present in some binary systems. Of course, proving the existence of an internal 
organization  in  a  white  dwarf,  neutron  star  or  black  hole  remains  a  core  open 
question.
14http://royalsociety.org/events/2010/extra-terrestrial-life-satellite/   
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Nevertheless, as I took my own ideas more and more seriously, I suffered from 
a "cosmic depression". Indeed, I faced the possibility that we, life on Earth, may be 
late, or even too late to make any meaningful contribution to the universe. What if 
humanity was born too late? What if life which has a future in the cosmos must be 
born around the habitability zone of a binary system (planets in binaries are possible, 
see e.g. Turnbull and Tarter 2003; Haghighipour 2010)? What if promising life should 
start in the primordial soup of a neutron star in a binary? Even worse, maybe that life 
mostly starts in binary systems, which allows high levels of development, thanks to 
the possibility of harnessing binary accretion.  What if  life  on Earth would be the 
exception rather than the rule? I mean, not the exception in its wonderfulness, but in 
its deformity? What if life on Earth was a galactic defect? Life on Earth would be like 
a  cosmic  trisomy,  and successful  life  would strive  in  binary systems.  I  hope  this 
questioning  was  a  temporary  crisis  towards  a  new  stage  of  psychological 
development, to hopefully take a new cosmic perspective, as analyzed by Kohlberg 
and Power (1981, 234).
In a more optimistic view, could being late be an advantage? Could we be 
“spoiled children of the cosmos”, just having to follow the path of our elderly cosmic 
cousins? Is it really terrific if a child realizes that adults are smarter and stronger than 
him, that they know more and do strange things which disgusts him –for now? No, we 
may act as children eager to learn from our cosmic cousins to see what is possible and 
desirable to do in the long-term future. 
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Figure 26 John Smart and Clément Vidal at the Royal Society at Chicheley Hall, home of the Kavli 
Royal Society International Centre, Buckinghamshire, October 2010.
All these are wild speculations, but plausible. All in all, I am now thinking that 
the best thing to do now is to try to know rather than to die stupid. That is why we 
should keep searching. The famous X-Files series and the 2008 subsequent movie 
have  a  subtitle:  “I  want  to  believe”.  This  expression  refers  to  the  difficulty  to 
conciliate faith with science. But I and astrobiologists don't want to believe anything. 
By contrast, the scientific astrobiological mindset is best summarized with “I want to 
know”. With this cosmic depression, I learned one thing; the question are we alone? 
has its psychological shadow: are we ready? 
Story 10: A cosmic depression
9.5  Objections
Hypotheses about extraterrestrial intelligence are hypotheses, not facts. A 
fine line separates the rational process of extrapolating our knowledge of 
life on Earth to life elsewhere and the irrational process of projecting 
fantasies, wishes, or fears onto unknown entities whose very existence is 
in doubt. We try to do the former without lapsing into the latter, but given 
our present state of knowledge, the question is not whether but how often 
we slip across the line.
(A. A. Harrison 1997, 313)
You certainly have some or many objections against the arguments above. As 
Harrison analyzes, it is likely that some, many or even all extrapolations I propose are 
wrong. But at least the existence of binaries is a fact, so the starivore hypothesis is 
scientifically  testable.  I  will  now formulate  and anticipate  objections,  and suggest 
replies. If you have more objections or suggestions, please let me know! 
9.5.1  Is it New?
No, it's not! Actually, forming a binary system is an obvious way to always 
have energy at hand. In his influential  science fiction novel  The Star Maker,  Olaf 
Stapledon (1953, 128) saw the formation of a binary as a solution for long interstellar 
travel. Let us quote him at large: 
Actual interstellar voyaging was first effected by detaching a planet from its 
natural orbit by a series of well-timed and well-placed rocket impulsions, and thus 
projecting it into outer space at a speed far greater than the normal planetary and 
stellar speeds.
Something more than this was necessary, since life on a sunless planet would 
have been impossible. For short interstellar voyages the difficulty was sometimes 
overcome  by  the  generation  of  sub-atomic  energy  from  the  planet's  own 
substance; but for longer voyages, lasting for many thousands of years, the only 
method was to form a small artificial sun, and project it into space as a blazing 
satellite of the living world.
For this purpose an uninhabited planet would be brought into proximity with 
the home planet to form a binary system. A mechanism would then be contrived 
for the controlled disintegration of the atoms of the lifeless planet, to provide a 
constant source of light and heat. The two bodies, revolving round one another, 
would be launched among the stars.
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If the starivore hypothesis is correct, we could say on the one hand that Stapledon had 
anticipated the form extraterrestrials would take, but on the other hand that he did not 
push the idea far enough in asserting that  known binaries may be extraterrestrials. It 
would be an interesting case where science fiction does not go far enough, where 
reality  is  stranger  than  fiction.  The  plausibility  of  using  a  star  as  an  engine  for 
interstellar travel has also been researched scientifically (see e.g. the pioneering work 
of Shkadov 1987).  Interestingly,  as  we mentioned earlier,  we do actually  observe 
binaries which move.
Martin Beech  (2008, 157) also hinted at the possibility that a Low Mass X-
Ray  Binary  (LMXRB)  could  be  formed  in  the  context  of  Sun  rejuvenation 
engineering, to avoid its red giant phase.
9.5.2  Dyson Spheres versus Starivores
In a  stimulating exchange about  putative starivores with astrophysicist  and 
science fiction author David Brin, he objected that accretion is not using the whole 
radiation of a star. Therefore, starivores would not be as advanced as a civilization 
using a Dyson sphere. I'll keep using “Dyson sphere”, although Dyson had in mind 
more a “swarm” than a sphere  (see Dyson 1996, 27). Starivores would be wasteful 
because they would still  allow an enormous amount  of  energy to  radiate  through 
space. 
My first reply is that a Dyson sphere is a passive technology. It is important to 
distinguish passive and active energy extraction. For example, in order to grow, plants 
passively  receive  the  energy  of  the  Sun.  They  are  passive  and  subject  to 
environmental  vagaries.  A fundamental  innovation  of  the  animal  kingdom is  that 
animals  are  able  to  seek  their  own energy  source.  They  actively  search,  hunt  or 
compete  for  food.  This  makes  them  much  more  adaptive.  Although  it  is  often 
overlooked,  evolutionary  progress  strongly  depends  on  innovations  in  energy 
extraction mechanisms; see for example the (2005) book by Peter A. Corning and the 
energy innovations which occurred through cosmic evolution, in table 6, p133.
My point here is that a Dyson sphere is like a plant or a solar panel. There is 
no new energy extraction mechanism involved. Whereas starivores hypothetically use 
an extremely efficient way to extract energy from a star: accretion. This is a radically 
new way to  use  energy,  indeed comparable  to  the  difference  between plants  and 
animals.
Now,  does  a  Dyson  sphere  really  harnesses  more  energy  than  accretion? 
Although it remains to be checked with calculations, the amount of energy extracted 
through actively accreting mass-energy from a star could represent even more energy 
than what is radiated from the whole star. Furthermore, starivores might be able to 
harvest not only the outer layer of a star, but its inner fusion core, which contains 
about  70% of  a  star's  mass-energy.  If  such  a  thing  is  possible,  it  might  be  that 
accretion brings much more energy than a Dyson sphere. Yet it is an open question 
whether  accretion can happen on deeper  layers  of  a  star.  Since these  quantitative 
questions remain open, for the sake of the argument, let us grant that a Dyson sphere 
still harnesses more energy than an accretion-powered starivore. 
The  race  to  more  energy  is  not  the  whole  story.  In  general  it  is  most 
parsimonious to harvest just the energy you need for your goals. Again, to take a 
human example, if you eat too much or too little you die. Another example. I guess 
galactic-wide civilizations are unlikely because the finiteness of the speed of light 
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would  make  such  a  civilization  communicate,  improve,  evolve,  cooperate  and 
progress at a very slow pace. The same applies to Dyson sphere versus accretion. The 
objection of a starivore using less energy than a Dyson sphere takes into account only 
the Kardashev scale, not the Barrow scale. A Dyson sphere of 1 AU radius is totally 
anti-Barrow scale because it is a huge structure. The energy needs to be stored and 
transferred  on  very  large  distances  before  performing  useful  work.  A starivore 
civilization would accrete energy very near its boundary, ready to be used, processed 
or stored.
Additionally,  starivores  may  be  able  to  control  the  accretion  rate,  thereby 
controlling the energy use depending on what their needs. The accretion disk or the 
rotation of the dense body (WD, NS, BH) could be used as a buffer to store additional 
energy.  No  additional  resources  are  needed  in  transferring  energy  through  a 
megastructure, the energy is directly available. Although not inconceivable, it is not 
clear whether or how a Dyson sphere could control the energy intake efficiently.
Furthermore,  there  is  the  issue  of  entropy  production  and  the  extruder 
function.  Dyson  indeed  hypothesized  that  infrared  radiation  would  leak  out  of  a 
Dyson sphere and that this would be an observable feature. But this is not an efficient 
way to get rid of waste products, at least not as efficient as the putative waste products 
of novae or jets regularly being expelled by some binaries, sometimes at velocities 
near the speed of light. 
Finally, there is a closing objection. Dyson spheres are purely hypothetical 
constructs,  with no observational counterpart found, despite some searches (see e.g. 
Jugaku, Noguchi, and Nishimura 1995; Carrigan 2009). By contrast, astrophysicists 
and amateur astronomers observe binaries daily. 
9.5.3  Are all Binaries Extraterrestrial Life? 
Certainly  not.  The binary configuration obviously  occurs  naturally.  Only  a 
small subset of binaries are 'candidates'. You may want to take a second partial visit to 
the binary zoo (section 9.4.2 A Partial Visit to the Binary Zoo, p233). 
9.5.4  “Postbiology?”, Are You Serious? 
Many people find it  hard to  believe that  completely postbiological  entities 
could really exist. In other words, they think life must be based on carbon and water. 
Functional and systems theoretic perspectives on the world make us see the material 
support as one parameter like an other in a system. Most of us have no idea of the 
material support and organization underlying computers we use. We only want that 
they perform the functions we want (see also section 9.1.3 The Case for Postbiology, 
p215 above). What matters is the organization, structure and function of a system. 
Matter doesn't matter as much. 
9.5.5  Is High Temperature Livable? 
Would not anything burn at stellar temperatures? Can we seriously hold that 
starivores would operate at hundreds of millions of degrees?
We tend to think that life has strict boundaries, and that high temperature or 
high magnetic field would destroy any kind of living organization. But these are only 
prejudices.  The  discovery  of  extremophiles  living  with  no  light  or  under  high 
temperatures  greatly  surprised  us.  We  tend  to  dismiss  quickly  as  impossible  or 
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dangerous an area we do not know. The first map drawers drew dragons behind what 
they  had  explored.  We  have  not  explored  the  possibility  of  life  or  complex 
organization  at  very  high  temperatures  or  under  very  strong  magnetic  fields.  Yet 
regarding the latter we saw that under strong magnetic fields, a new stable chemical 
bond emerges beyond the only two chemical bonds known (Lange et al. 2012). 
For the sake of the argument, let us grant that life under high temperature is 
indeed impossible. We could still see the binary as a power station, and suppose that 
intelligent  beings  would  stay  at  cold  on  a  planet  orbiting  the  accreting  binary. 
However,  I  think  it  is  unlikely,  because  of  additional  complications  and  costs  of 
energy transfer associated with such a configuration.
9.5.6  Will We Become Starivores?
Probably. One plausible speculative scenario is the following. We continue to 
climb  the  Kardashev  scale  and  use  more  and  more  energy.  In  parallel,  our 
technologies function on smaller and smaller scales, and we climb the Barrow scale. 
Those small and dense technologies demand more and more energy. Once we cover 
the Earth with solar panels –having understood that all other energy sources are not 
sustainable on the long term– we still need more energy. We then follow Stapledon's 
scenario of carefully changing Earth's orbit to bring it closer to the Sun. Then our 
solar panels receive much more energy. At this stage, our descendants have evolved to 
a  postbiological  substrate  and are  able  to  live  under  high  temperatures.  Still,  the 
passive energy received (e.g. by stellar wind) is not enough to meet our ever growing 
energetic need driven by computational or technological progress. Stellar engineers 
set up the first active accretion from the Sun. We have become starivores. 
The Sun's energy is used and transformed for building ever smaller and denser 
organizations. This goes through hundreds, thousands or millions of years. Eventually, 
the Sun runs out of energy. Only then it  makes sense to migrate to the nearest  –
preferably single– star,  and to  continue.  The density  of the evolved Earth is  now 
comparable to the one of a white dwarf –which indeed are Earth-sized– , and the new 
binary we form resembles a cataclysmic variable.
9.5.7  Starivores' Missing Mass
There is a lot of mass involved in a binary. Where does this mass come from? 
The scenario above provides a possible answer. Remember that the maximum age of 
extraterrestrials is 2 billions or more years older than us. They might thus have had 
plenty of time for complete depletion of stellar energy of one or several stars (if we 
include migration). Accordingly, more precise estimates need to be calculated, taking 
into account accretion rates to assess if this scenario is plausible. 
However, our closest relative would be very low mass binaries. So we could 
focus on searching the less advanced starivores. Not surprisingly, thanks to the variety 
of binaries we can indeed find very low mass ones, such as LB 3459 (AA Dor) or DN 
WZ Sge. Warner  (1995, 452) writes about the latter: 
Another  possible  origin  of  CV  [cataclysmic  variables]  precursors  is  through 
engulfment of a planet or very low mass star by expansion of a red giant. It is 
possible to find circumstances in which the planet will accrete sufficient gas to 
produce a low mass dwarf in a short period orbit, perhaps resembling the DN WZ 
Sge (Livio 1982; Soker, Livio, and Harpaz 1984).
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Migration, and some rare events of a single dense body traveling to a new star 
should be observable. However, we should keep in mind that those events would be 
relatively rare.
These  speculations  lead  to  predictions  that  we  can  test  with  our  current 
telescopes. We can test new scenarios for binary formation and binary dislocation. 
Putative starivores would migrate when the companion star runs out of fuel, and the 
dense body would not be ejected in a random direction, but would most likely go 
towards the nearest star. So we should monitor binaries whose companion has almost 
no energy, to see what comes next. We can also monitor single dense bodies with high 
velocities, to see if they get attached delicately to another star and start accreting gas.
An other reply is that starivores are instances of life which has started on a 
planet orbiting a binary system, and then gradually started to harness the energy of 
naturally occurring accretion. 
9.5.8  The Explosive Objection
I already introduced Eric Chaisson's universal complexity metric (section 7.2 
Increase of Computing Resources, p158). Could we apply it to binaries, to see how 
well they score? It is a research program well worth pursuing on its own. It would be 
helpful to classify the putative starivore family. However, we can already ask what is 
the  theoretical  maximum  energy  rate  density  that  a  binary  could  achieve.  In 
astrophysics,  we  can  make  such  a  crude  estimate  using  the  Eddington  limit for 
luminosity (Frank, King, and Raine 2002, 3) :
~ 1.3 × 1038(M/M⊙) erg. s−1 
We reach a theoretical maximum of free energy rate density (noted ΦM):
ΦM ~ 6.54 x 104 erg.s-1.g-1
Now, how do actual white dwarfs, neutron stars and black holes score? Surprisingly, 
their luminosity can break this limit! They are amongst the few systems which display 
super-Eddington luminosity. The question of how a binary can break the Eddington 
limit is difficult and technical. 
Nevertheless,  those  values  of  energy  rate  densities  are  extremely  high  for 
astrophysical systems. Other astrophysical systems such as the Sun has a value ~2 and 
planets have ~102. Higher values are otherwise known only for complex system such 
as a human body (ΦM ~ 2 x 104 erg.s-1.g-1; (Chaisson 2001, 138)).
Intrigued about these high values of  ΦM, I wrote to Eric Chaisson because I 
very much value this energetic metric.  I claimed that  we may be dealing with an 
anomaly in cosmic evolution. Although he admitted the high ΦM values of binaries, he 
was rather skeptical about the ETI interpretation. His counterargument is that such 
systems display unstable states, indicative of explosiveness, destructiveness and not 
constructive  complexity.  Indeed,  supernovae,  which  are  definitely  destructive 
processes also do display high ΦM values (>>106; (Chaisson 2001, 157)). 
However, classical or recurrent novae, or jets emitted by neutron stars or black 
holes  are  not  supernovae,  and  the  binaries  systems  are  not  at  all  destroyed  and 
generally  not  even  disturbed  by  such  events.  The  case  of  recurrent  novae  is 
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particularly clear: even though the system undergoes impressive cataclysms, it does so 
recurrently, on a regular basis. 
In sum, we should remember that what we observe are gross systemic features, 
and novae or jets are the products of a hypothesized extruder subsystem functioning. 
We admittedly do not observe the hypothesized constructive information processing 
happening  at  very  small  scales.  Maybe  we  could  compare  the  explosiveness  we 
observe  from binaries  to  the  sudden release  of  water  from a  hydroelectric  power 
station. If you are a fish watching this, you would certainly think that is a cataclysmic 
event.  But  if  you are  a  human,  you know that  it  contributes  to  power  the  subtle 
electron  exchanges  which  make  our  computers  process,  store  and  communicate 
information on a global scale.
9.5.9  The Candle Objection
An other objection is that  displaying a kind of metabolism is certainly not 
enough to say that a system is living or intelligent. For example, a candle has a kind 
of metabolism, ingesting wax and extruding smoke. In the process, chemical energy is 
converted to heat. This is a valid objection, and this is why thermodynamical criteria 
and considerations are insufficient. If we take into account living systems criteria, fire 
as found in nature has no boundary, so it lacks a fundamental sub-system of Miller's 
living systems. 
What is more, fire can't control its energy flow. It has no way to seek energy if 
it  runs  out  of  fuel.  Maybe  I  am  unlucky,  but  I've  never  seen  candles  switching 
themselves on and off at regular intervals; neither unlighted candles trying to scratch 
a match. In sum, it is true that we can attribute basic metabolism to a fire or a candle, 
but putative starivores display also non-trivial energy flow control and living systems 
features. 
9.5.10  The Fridge Objection
A fridge is  a very simple system, which can be argued to have some life-
qualities. As Freitas (1979, chap. 6.2.3) writes:
The refrigerator in my house technically should be considered a “live” system in 
the very broadest sense, as it is a well-defined intermediate system which uses an 
energy flow to decrease entropy within (the icebox gets colder, and well-ordered 
ice crystals collect on the freezer walls) at the expense of increasing the entropy in 
the  external  environment  (the  kitchen  air  gets  warmer).  Yet  its  organizational 
structure is minimal.
Is a binary in accretion like a fridge, with no organizational structure inside? Or is the 
dense body's organization increasing? If there is no organization, binaries might be 
like a cosmic fridge, exporting entropy and using energy, but doing no interesting 
work in between. So it remains a crucial open question whether there is information 
processing or not. This is of course related to the informational subsystems in Miller's 
living system. We saw that the way to answer this issue is to study whether or not 
there is information in binary pulsars' signals (see section 9.4.6 Are Pulsars Artificial
Output Transducers?, p248).
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9.6  Conclusion
It would be a tragedy of literally cosmic proportions if we succeeded in 
annihilating the one truly intelligent species in the entire universe.
(Davies 2010, 206)
In a 1972 NASA symposium on “Life beyond Earth and the Mind of Man”, 
Philip Morrison argued that the discovery of extraterrestrials will be a slow discovery 
like agriculture, not like America  (see Dick 1996, 506). History of science supports 
this view. For example, Percival Lowell elaborated a theory that canals on Mars were 
artificial.  In  1895,  the issue of  natural  or  artificial  canals  was clearly formulated. 
However, as Dick (1996, 78) reports:
Thrust into the open, an issue full of public interest, a golden opportunity now 
presented itself for science either to confirm an earthshaking theory or to crush it 
quickly under the glare of objective argument. To the dismay of the public and the 
embarrassment of astronomers, science was unable to do either for almost two 
(some would say seven) decades. 
Let us hope that we will do better and take less time to assess the starivore 
hypothesis. In the meantime, from an ethical perspective it is not bad to assume that 
we are alone. Indeed, as Davies ponders, it invites us to take the greatest care of an 
incredible cosmic phenomenon: life on Earth. But of course we should also prepare 
ourselves that recognizing our cosmic cousins will change our science, philosophy 
and religions forever. 
Concluding his Critique of Practical Reason, Kant (2009) famously wrote that 
two “things  fill  the  mind  with  ever  new and  increasing  admiration  and awe,  the 
oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the 
moral  law  within.”  When  I  look  at  the  starry  heavens  above,  I  see  plenty  of 
possibilities through available energy. We still need to learn how to use it, and, more 
importantly,  know  what  to  do  with  it.  Can  we  combine  Kant's  two  objects  of 
reverence, and develop a starry moral law within? Let us try in our next Chapter 10, 
with some reflections about a cosmological ethics. 
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Open Questions – A High Energy Astrobiology Agenda: 
The Starivore Hypothesis
Current  research  in  astrobiology  focuses  on  searching  less  advanced 
extraterrestrial life, such as bacteria or traces of a biosphere in an exoplanet. It makes 
sense, because these are features of life on Earth that we know and that we know how 
to recognize. A naive symmetrical argument would require to divide resources in two, 
one  half  for  searching  less  advanced  extraterrestrials,  the  other  half  for  more 
advanced. But even that is not enough since we saw that putative extraterrestrials are 
on average two billion years older than us. So it would actually make sense to spend 
much more resources in the search for advanced extraterrestrials. 
The works of  Dyson  (1960) and Kardashev  (1964) advanced the idea that 
advanced extraterrestrials use much more energy than us. This is the assumption of 
high energy astrobiology.  The starivore hypothesis invites us to look back at  high 
energy astrophysics with a fresh astrobiological perspective. We already encountered 
many open questions to test the hypothesis. Let us now summarize and specify them 
to propose a high energy astrobiological agenda. 
Many ideas in this chapter are  necessarily highly speculative, for how else 
could we aim at searching putative ETIs arguably billion years more advanced? Yet, 
the hypothesis that some binary systems in accretion are ETIs is testable. We have 
plenty of data about binaries, and we can gather more. This is to be contrasted with 
other proposals such as Dyson spheres or Bracewell  probes which have so far no 
observational counterpart.
What is the ideal profile of the high energy astrobiologist? She is not subject 
to  artificiality-  or  naturality-of-the-gaps.  Instead,  she  takes  the  more  careful 
astrobiological stance. She understands high energy astrophysics models and theories. 
However, she spends as much time with artificial and natural models to tackle yet 
poorly  understood  high-energy  phenomena  in  the  cosmos.  Furthermore,  she  has 
knowledge  and  interest  in  systems  theory,  living  systems  theory  and  complexity 
sciences. Other research interest can include biology and ecology, especially general 
biological laws, and the field of  energetics. Experts in energetics would indeed be 
able to take a fresh look at energetic exchanges in binaries, from a more biologically-
inspired perspective. 
General Agenda
Let us summarize the specific predictions regarding putative starivores:
• the finding of a black hole less than 3 solar masses. Indeed, in astrophysics, 
stellar black holes are the result of gravitational collapse of a massive star. If 
the  remnant  exceed  the  Tolman–Oppenheimer–Volkoff  limit  (3-4  solar 
masses), it will implode in a black hole. Finding a black hole less than 3 solar 
masses  would thus mean that  the  black hole  formation took another  road, 
possibly an artificial one.
• low-rate planetary accretion.
• an instance of migration, where the direction of dense bodies (WD/NS/BH). 
navigating in the galaxy is not random, but targeted to the nearest star.
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An ongoing project is to continue to develop criteria for artificiality. Our list 
has  no  exhaustive  pretension,  and  much  more  work  is  required  to  answer  this 
question. We saw that informational criteria are demanded if we want to test whether 
or not there is a message in pulsars. Even with an excellent criteria list, this will not 
be enough to convincingly prove the existence of extraterrestrials. What we need are 
alternative models leading to different predictions.  But what motivation would we 
have to build alternative models other than the natural models we already have? 
The strongest motivation comes from showing the limitations, contradictions, 
unsolved  problems  or  shortcomings  of  astrophysical  models  of  binaries.  Then  to 
propose alternative high energy astrobiological models, which not only solve those 
problems,  but  which  also  lead  to  new  different  predictions.  Astrophysical  or 
astrobiological models leading to the most successful predictions will progressively 
be favored. Although I am not expert in binary astrophysics, let me mention a few 
more examples of open issues in the field, and then propose more precise research 
proposals to test the starivore hypothesis with an astrobiological stance. 
 We saw that nova ejecta display heavy elements abundances. It  remains a 
difficult scientific challenge to explain the enrichment mechanism (see Prialnik 2001).
In  binaries  with  accretion  discs,  the  origin  of  disc  viscosity  remains  very 
uncertain. As Hellier (2001, 59) writes: 
Although viscosity is essential to the operation of an accretion disc, the physical 
origin of the viscosity has been uncertain,  defying theoretical investigation for 
many years.  We know that  molecules  are  sticky,  attempting to  form chemical 
bonds with their neighbours (this accounts for the viscosity of everyday materials 
such as  treacle);  however,  discs  are  so diffuse  that  molecular  viscosity  is  too 
feeble by a factor of a billion to explain their behaviour.
Recurrent  novae  usually  happen  after  a  brightening  due  to  an  excess  in 
accretion, and their luminosity fades after the outburst. But as in the biological world, 
the binary world is full of exceptions. In his impressive review of recurrent novae, 
Schaeffer (2010) attracted attention to a fading which happened before the outburst:  
Why did T CrB suffer a distinct, significant, and unique fading in the year before 
its 1946 eruption? And why would this fading behavior be different in the B and 
V bands? The fading is by around one magnitude below the usual level of the 
system, with this going to two magnitudes below the usual level in the B-band at a 
time 29 days before the eruption. My first thought is that the accretion turned off 
(for unknown reason) hence making the system lose the light from the accretion 
disk, but maybe the depth of the drop will require the red giant companion to be 
dimmed somehow. And what is the physical connection between this fading and 
the  subsequent  nova  eruption?  That  is,  how  can  the  turning  off  of  accretion 
anticipate or  trigger the nova event?
Let  us  go  back  to  the  possibility  of  extragalactic  SETI.  If  there  is  a 
developmental pattern in civilizations then we should see less and less binary systems 
in accretion as we look at stars in younger and younger galaxies, deeper into space.  Is 
it the case? This is an application of the inverse distance-development principle.
For  example,  what  about  extragalactic  pulsars?  The  starivore  hypothesis 
predicts that they should be very rare. Note that they are detectable, because many 
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pulsars display giant pulses  (see McLaughlin and Cordes 2003). Is it the case? The 
search for extragalactic pulsars is still in its infancy, yet out of 1500 radio pulsars 
known, only about 25 are extragalactic, all located in the nearby dwarf galaxies of the 
Magellanic Clouds (McLaughlin and Cordes 2003, 983). 
If density is an indicator of development, a prediction is that the proportion of 
accreting WD/NS/BH decreases as we look in more distant galaxies. Is it the case?
Are  we  ready  to  contact  starivores?  If  we  take  the  starivore  hypothesis 
seriously, Communication with Extraterrestrial Intelligence (CETI) has more chances 
to succeed by targeting binary systems. Of course,  huge ethical  issues need to be 
discussed before sending a signal to putatively so advanced civilizations. Humanity 
should  assess  the  risk  benefit  tradeoff.  The  maximum  risk  is  they  coming  and 
destroying the Earth or the Sun. The maximum benefit is they fully collaborating with 
us,  e.g.  learning  us  about  cosmic  mysteries,  and  boosting  our  evolutionary 
development incredibly thanks to their technology, knowledge and wisdom.
Research Proposals
Let us now turn to more concrete research proposals. Some of my readers may 
think that it is easy and fun to speculate, but that we did more science fiction than 
science. They are partly right, and this is why it is essential to conduct new research 
with actual data on binaries to assess their naturality or artificiality.
Below are seeds of four scientific research proposals which, if successful, will 
corroborate the existence of starivores. Only the last one however promises to give 
indisputable proof of extraterrestrial intelligence. 
Gamma-ray bursts and binaries
Are starivores protected from gamma-ray bursts? Such events are of a rare 
violence and a galactic gamma-ray burst could wipe out eukaryotes in a range of 14 
kpc from the explosion (see Scalo and Wheeler 2002; and also Ćirković, Vukotić, and 
Dragićević  2009). Long-lived civilizations would certainly anticipate such rare but 
probable catastrophes. We should be able to show either that binaries get  strongly 
disturbed, dislocated or destroyed by gamma ray bursts (which would tend to falsify 
the starivore hypothesis), or that they are very robust to such disturbances (which 
would tend to corroborate the starivore hypothesis). 
Keiber's laws and semi-detached binaries
When we analyzed binaries with living system theory, or when we applied a 
scaling law of reproduction time to black holes, we applied biological concepts and 
theories  to  astrophysical  systems.  This  is  indeed  part  of  a  general  biological  (or 
evolutionary developmental) view of the universe. It remains a challenge for future 
generations to assess if this view is correct. As Dick (1996, 1–2) writes, 
The  whole  thrust  of  physical  science  since  the  seventeenth-century  scientific 
revolution has been to demonstrate the role of physical law in the universe,  a 
mission admirably carried out by Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and their successors. 
The question at stake in the extraterrestrial-life debate is whether an analogous 
“biological law” reigns throughout the universe
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What other robust biological laws could be applied to binaries? Kleiber's law (Kleiber 
1932) is the observation that in living organisms the metabolic rate scales to the ¾ 
power of its mass. It is remarkable, because it holds over 16 orders of magnitude –
although the scaling exponent changes slightly (see DeLong et al. 2010 for a recent 
review).  This  validity  across  so  many scales  suggests  that  it  could  hold  even for 
macroscopic living systems, such as cities (Isalgue, Coch, and Serra 2007) or putative 
starivores. Figure 27 below illustrates this law.
Now, does this law apply to transient accreting binaries? The hypothesis is 
that, if binaries are starivores, they should fit with this law. If not, it is less likely. How 
can we test this? It is easy. We need to gather the relevant data for binaries. We can 
simply interpret the accretion rate as a metabolic rate (both are energy flow metrics); 
and keep on the x-axis the mass of the primary. Kepler's law famously applies to 
planets, but does Kleiber's law apply to binaries? 
Note  that  this  research  program  could  also  be  coupled  with  a  systematic 
calculation of the free energy rate density complexity metric proposed by Chaisson. 
The only additional parameter to add is the age of the system in consideration.
Scale Relativity and Binaries
Scale relativity  (see e.g. L. Nottale 2011) generates probability distributions 
for  the  formation  of  gravitational  structures.  It  gives  probabilities  to  have  single, 
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Figure 27 - “Relationship between whole organism metabolic rate and body mass for heterotrophic 
prokaryotes, protists, and metazoans plotted on logarithmic axes.” (DeLong et al. 2010, 12942)
double, triple or n-body systems. Preliminary results explain why pairs of galaxies are 
so common (L. Nottale 2011, 654–658).
This project  consists in applying scale relativity to the formation of binary 
systems. If binaries are starivores, the prediction of scale relativity should fail. Indeed, 
we  should  find  more  binary  systems  than  what  would  be  formed  by  natural 
gravitational formation. Or there should be proportionally less pairs of galaxies than 
binary systems. Note that the picture could be more complicated if putative starivores 
migrate and leave single depleted stars. 
Furthermore, applying the inverse distance-development principle, further and 
further away galaxies should fit more and more the predictions of scale relativity. Of 
course, this project represents a lot of work, but it is a global approach which, even if 
it  ends  up  dismissing  the  starivore  hypothesis,  would  teach  us  a  lot  about  star 
formation. 
If  it  succeeds,  we  would  have  an  estimate  of  the  number  of  intelligent 
civilizations in the galaxy, simply by subtracting the observed number of binaries with 
the predicted number.
Pulsars decoding
Finally  and  most  importantly,  a  convincing  proof  of  ETI  should  include 
information processing. This is why I insisted that the assessment of whether there are 
messages  in  pulsars  should  be  a  priority  (see  section  9.4.6  Are  Pulsars  Artificial
Output Transducers?, p248).
The High Energy Astrobiology Prize
After  examination  by  a  scientific  jury,  the  Evo  Devo  Universe  (EDU) 
community will be happy to deliver a 500€ “High Energy Astrobiology Prize” for the 
first peer-reviewed paper on either of these projects (Gamma-ray bursts and binaries; 
Kleiber's law; scale relativity and binaries; assessing or decoding the informational 
complexity of pulsars' pulses). Of course the prize will be delivered for both a positive 
or  a  negative  result.  New research  proposals  to  test  all  the  ways  there  could  be 
intelligence  in  interacting  binaries  are  also  most  welcome.  If  you  would  like  to 
contribute but do not have the scientific expertise to do so, we welcome donations to 
make the high energy astrobiology prize even more attractive. 
I invite you to http://www.highenergyastrobiology.com/theprize.htm for more 
details.
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CHAPTER 10 -  Cosmological Ethics and Immortality
Abstract: Most ethical principles, religious or not, are based on wisdom acquired 
through  a  few  millennia.  This  may  seem  a  long  time  but  once  we  take  a 
cosmological  perspective,  even  millennia  are  insignificant.  The  field  of 
evolutionary  ethics  makes  a  big  leap  by  embracing  evolutionary  time  scales 
(millions of years). Can we continue to extend our ethical reflections, principles 
and theories up to the 13.7 billion years of cosmic evolution? What is the ultimate 
good in  the  universe?  Evolutionary ethics  concludes that  survival  is  the  most 
important value. But survival of what? and for how long? How can we aim for 
infinite  survival,  that  is,  for  immortality?  We  first  outline  thermodynamical 
values,  which are  truly universal because  they depend only on the concept  of 
energy. Then we criticize the naturalistic fallacy and, inspired by Aristotle's theory 
of moral virtues, we outline evolutionary trade-offs (egoism-altruism,  stability-
adaptability,  specialist-generalist,  exploration-exploitation,  competition-
cooperation and  r-K  selection)  sketching  a  theory  of  evolutionary  virtues. 
However, evolutionary values are insufficient for ethical purposes, since they give 
insights in how to adapt to any circumstance, for any purpose. To remedy this 
limitation, we outline developmental values for individuals (e.g.  cognitive and 
moral development); developmental values for societies (e.g. rationality increase, 
violence  decrease).  Thermodynamical,  evolutionary  and  developmental  values 
promise to be robust ethical principles, because proven through the wisdom of 
billion years of cosmic evolution. As an application, we examine the age-old will 
to  immortality  and propose a  voyage to  five kinds of  immortalities:  spiritual, 
individual,  creative,  evolutionary and  cosmological.  We  conclude  that  the 
ultimate good is the infinite continuation of the evolutionary process. 
To romance of the far future, then, is to attempt to see the human race in 
its cosmic setting, and to mould our hearts to entertain new values.
Preface of Olaf Stapledon's (1931) Last and First Men.
Until now our intellectual journey has been mainly  descriptive and  critical, 
exploring hypotheses for tackling issues such as the beginning of the universe and 
scenarios  for  its  long-term  future.  In  order  to  aim  as  much  as  possible  for  a 
comprehensive worldview, we need to address the issue of values, or the  normative 
dimension of philosophy I identified in Chapter 1. This is what we will explore now. 
As usual,  our  scope in space-time is maximal,  that  is,  cosmological.  We are  thus 
interested about values general enough to hold for cosmological scales. Philosopher 
Archie J. Bahm (1980, 4) dubbed the science inquiring into the ultimate values of life 
as a whole “religiology”. It concerns the ultimate value of life, how to find it, preserve 
it  and enjoy it.  The  neologism makes sense  because  answering  such questions is 
traditionally a religious endeavor. But it needs not to be.  
Values and ethics can be built without relying on God or revelations (see e.g. 
Nielsen 1973; Jantsch 1980, 264). Actually, human ethical principles, religious or not, 
are based on the historical wisdom of a few millennia, which is totally insignificant 
from a  cosmological  perspective.  We need  to  increase  the  scope  of  our  thinking 
towards the cosmological scale (see table 16). 
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Scale Duration
Human 100 years
Historical 10 000 years
Anthropological (Evolutionary) 10 million years
Geological 5 billion years
Cosmological 13.7 billion years
Table 16 Time Scales in Human Thought. Adapted from (Dick 2009a, 464). 
Since it is difficult for humans to appreciate orders of magnitude greater than historical, see also the 
remarkable “Chronozoom” project for a dynamical view on time scales: 
http://www.chronozoomproject.org/ 
Evolutionary  ethics  (see  e.g.  Matt  Ridley  1997;  E.  O.  Wilson  1998) 
encompasses  millions  of  years,  a  remarkable  thousandfold  advance  compared  to 
history-based ethics. A major insight of evolutionary ethics is that our existing beliefs, 
motivations and values have no special or universal validity. They have been selected 
from past evolutionary needs (Stewart 2000, 16).
Yet, evolutionary ethics is insufficient if we are concerned about cosmological 
timescales. It means that the origin of human nature is not our central concern here, as 
it is in evolutionary ethics (see e.g. the excellent books of Wright 1994; Waal 1996; 
Matt Ridley 1997). From a cosmological perspective, human nature is just but one 
step  in  cosmic  evolution.  I  am  interested  in  an  ethical  system  which  can  also 
withstand evolution before and beyond humanity. I thus focus in this chapter on the 
next thousandfold advance from evolutionary to cosmological ethics. As Stapledon 
wrote  above  when  prefacing  his  science  fiction  novel,  such  thinking  opens  the 
possibility to decipher new values. Romance is an approach, but not the only one. 
Here I will stay with the rational tradition of science and philosophy. 
As I already wrote earlier (Story 7: Global warming and universal cooling.
This story is fictional., p154), when I tell friends or colleagues that I am busy with 
cosmological issues, they often do not understand why or how I could seriously care 
about  such a  far  future.  My best  reply  is  to  draw an  analogy.  We are  definitely 
growing in our global awareness and are becoming aware and worried about global 
economical, ecological or climatological problems concerning the Earth as a whole. 
We also do care for phenomena beyond planet Earth. As you read these lines, 
scientists are monitoring the nearest star, our Sun. Indeed, tracking solar weather is 
critical to take care of our electrical and communication networks. The famous solar 
storm of 1859 was so powerful that it created aurorae all around the world, so bright 
they even woke up gold miners during the night. The consequences of such a solar 
storm today would be billions of dollars of damage to satellites, power grids and radio 
communications (see e.g. Odenwald and Green 2008). So increasing our cosmological 
awareness is not just an intellectual curiosity and a solar storm is just one example of 
global catastrophic risks  (see contributions in Nick Bostrom and Ćirković 2008 for 
more examples). 
The  more  we  progress  with  our  understanding  of  the  Universe,  the  more 
global  our  awareness develops.  Peter  Russell  (1982,  83) remarked that  life  forms 
build more and more extended models of their environment. He wrote, an “important 
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characteristic attributed to conscious beings is the ability to form internal models of 
the  world  they  experience;  the  greater  the  consciousness  the  more  complex  the 
models.” Actually this activity of model building is necessary to regulate efficiently 
the  environment  (Conant  and Ashby 1970).  Why would  modelling  stop  at  planet 
Earth? From a cosmological perspective, it is a tiny slice of space. What is then the 
limit of the process of model building? We saw (Chapter 6.3; Chapter 7) that it is the 
modelling of our and other possible universes.  
In  this  cosmological  context,  what  are  the  ultimate values  of  intelligence? 
What  is  the ultimate good for  intelligent  life  in the universe? Evolutionary ethics 
concludes that it is  survival. But this almost trivial statement raises two questions. 
First,  survival  of  what? Myself?  My  family?  My culture?  My planet?  The  solar 
system?  Our  galaxy?  The  universe?  Second,  survival  for  how long? For  human, 
historical, evolutionary, geological or cosmological time scales? Ethical theories aim 
at producing good results  (Bahm 1953, 310). But good for whom? For oneself, for 
others, for God, for the best people, for most people, for higher principles such as 
justice or the process of evolution? Could we and should we integrate goodness for 
these different options?
I argue in this chapter that the ultimate good is the infinite continuation of the 
evolutionary  process.  Note  that  the  “ultimate  good”  is  an  essential  component  of 
ethical  theories  and is  also  called  summum bonum,  supreme  good,  supreme goal, 
supreme value,  highest  good  (Adler 1985, 478a).  My thesis implies that  I  answer 
“survival of what?” with “the evolutionary process”; and “survival for how long?” 
with no less than “infinitely”. This is in line with the Principia Cybernetica Project, 
when Heylighen, Joslyn and Turchin (1993) wrote:  
Thus we can from there derive the ultimate good as the continuation of the process of 
evolution itself, in the negative sense of avoiding evolutionary “dead ends” and general 
extinction,  in  the  positive  sense  of  constantly  increasing  our  fitness,  and  thus  our 
intelligence, degree of organization and general mastery over the universe.
It  is  important  to  distinguish two different  kinds of  ethics,  descriptive and 
normative.  Descriptive  ethics  is  a  second-order  knowledge  inquiry  consisting  in 
recording empirically what people do seek; while normative (or prescriptive) ethics is 
a first-order knowledge defining what people should seek. 
Generally, evolutionary ethics focuses on  descriptive ethics, explaining why 
we hold such or such values, or how such or such moral behavior could have evolved. 
Can evolution also justify normative ethics? That is, can evolutionary insights tell us 
that such or such value should be followed? Such an endeavor of normative ethics is 
of course much more delicate and controversial than descriptive ethics. The spectrum 
of eugenism  and its  horrible political  associations looms.  Eugenism is indeed an 
evolutionary normative ethics, because it attempts to justify its value system based on 
genetics. Yet, avoiding normative ethics is no option, because it is the only practically 
helpful kind of ethics, translatable into action. Descriptive ethics, however insightful 
intellectually doesn't help much to give values and act in the world.
My aim in  this  Chapter  is  to  take inspirations from some major  scientific 
theories to propose values or guidelines. I am not pretending to deduce absolute moral 
theorems based on scientific models. Since scientific models evolve and progress and 
the price to pay is that there is no certainty in morality, as there are no certainties that 
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our scientific models are "true". Yet, it is possible to be relativist without falling into 
relativism (see 2.1.4 Relativity, not Relativism, p33).
The organization of this chapter  is  simple.  First,  we seek universal  ethical 
principles in universal laws of thermodynamics. We thus discuss fundamental insights 
of  thermodynamical  values,  or  thermoethics.  Then  we  inquire  about  evolutionary 
theory to extract evolutionary values. We debunk the fallacious naturalistic fallacy, 
discuss fitness as an evolutionary value and show what evolutionary trade-offs such as 
egoism-altruism,  stability-adaptability,  specialist-generalist,  exploration-exploitation, 
competition-cooperation or r-K selection tell  us about ethics.  Because of the large 
generality and practical applicability of evolutionary values, we conclude that they are 
more providing means rather than ends, goals or values. We need further insight about 
a general evolutionary development, progress and direction. Although the direction of 
evolution is a controversial topic, the case for it is strong. And this leads to the much 
more useful  developmental values, which we discuss for humans, societies and the 
universe.
As an illustration of  the thermodynamical,  evolutionary and developmental 
ethical framework, I apply it to a central longing of humanity: the will to immortality. 
I invite  you to a  voyage  to  five  kinds of  immortalities  from spiritual,  individual, 
creative, evolutionary up to cosmological immortality.
Although our analyses toward cosmological ethics and immortality are only 
precursory, I hope they will lay the ground to further work and eventually offer a 
meaning of life in harmony with cosmic evolution.
10.1  Thermodynamical Values
Prigogine “wanted the entropy ethics 
to be taught to children all over the planet”
(Hammond 2005, v, preface to the Eulogy Edition)
As  Dick  E.  Hammond  argues  in  his  (2005) book,  entropy  ethics  brings 
important insights to children all over the planet, but also all over the universe. 
Is  there  a  way  to  think  about  universal  values  from an  energetic  perspective?  If 
organisms develop new ways to extract energy, they will have resources to increase 
their  complexity and thus  become fitter.  The engineering of  new ways to  extract 
energy  constitutes  a  fundamental  step  in  major  evolutionary  transitions  (see  e.g. 
Aunger 2007a). In the modern evolutionary picture, Peter Corning (2005) also insists 
on the importance of  thermoeconomics in the darwinian synthesis. But what does it 
means for ethics? How should we best extract, use, store and distribute energy? To 
answer these questions, we need an ethics based on energetic exchanges, i.e. based on 
thermodynamics. 
What is the underlying principle of entropy ethics? It is “the need to learn to 
utilize energy efficiently to bring about order in the environment” (Hammond 2005, 
67).  Importantly,  we  need  to  distinguish  two  entropies,  informational  and 
thermodynamical.  Informational entropy has to do with statistics and order in any 
system. Thermodynamical entropy has to do with heat and energy. The expression 
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“entropy  ethics”  can  thus  be  confusing  because  entropy  can  be  informational  or 
thermodynamical.  The  two corresponding ethics  are  infoethics (Floridi  2008) and 
thermoethics (Freitas Jr 1979, chap. 25.1.3). Let us outline their core principles. 
10.1.1  Informational Ethics
Floridi  (2008, 58–59) did articulate foundations of infoethics, by proposing 
four principles:
0. entropy ought not to be caused in the infosphere (null law);
1. entropy ought to be prevented in the infosphere;
2. entropy ought to be removed from the infosphere;  
3. the flourishing of informational entities as well as of the whole infosphere 
ought to be promoted by preserving, cultivating and enriching their properties.
We can illustrate the (0)-principle with email  spam, because it  creates disorder or 
entropy in our email boxes. Antivirus softwares are faithful to principle (1) because 
they prevent information destruction on our hard drives from malicious softwares. 
Examples of applying principle (2) include removing and correcting false statements 
in Wikipedia; or cleaning, merging databases, which are good actions bringing more 
order, less redundancy and more integration in the infosphere. Principle (3) is less 
objective, but can be related to valuing creativity at large.
We will not further elaborate on infoethics, because the concept of information 
is far from being clear, its definition is highly debated, and information is largely 
dependent  on our goals.  There is  no such thing as objective information.  From a 
cybernetic perspective, information is information only if it reduces uncertainty and 
helps thereby to achieve goals. An information about a semi-detached binary system 
might be very exciting to me, while it would have absolutely no interest to you –
unless you are also intrigued about ideas exposed in Chapter 9.
10.1.2  Thermodynamical Ethics
Although Freitas coined the term “thermoethics”, its origin can be traced back 
to  Wilhelm  Ostwald,  nobel  prize  winner  in  chemistry  in  1909.  Ostwald  (1912; 
translated by Bayliss 1915, 28) advanced the thermodynamic imperative:
Waste not free energy; treasure it and make the best use of it.
We can derive a lot of value from this seemingly trivial principle. On the negative 
side, it means that we should avoid randomizing, actions which lead to confusion, 
conflict or chaos. For example, killing is clearly bad because it is the destruction of a 
trillion-cells  organization.  Burning libraries is  also a very destructive and bad act, 
because it  destroys knowledge accumulated by a  civilization.  The thermodynamic 
imperative is implicitly in application in most businesses. If a firm can do the same 
amount  of  work  with  less  energy,  it  will  outcompete  others.  The  same  holds  in 
biological evolution. The capacity to extract efficiently energy from the environment 
is absolutely crucial to stay fit. 
Hammond also contrasts making random noise with the orderly coordination 
of an orchestra. The one produces stressful activation patterns on human brains, while 
the  other  can  provoke  aesthetic  experiences  and  highly  coherent  brainwaves.  Of 
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course, this does not prevent modern artists to change and challenge the rules and will 
create pseudo-random works in order to trigger negative emotions and feelings.
Why  is  thermoethics  so  fundamental?  Because  it  does  not  make  any 
assumption about the substrate of living systems to which it applies. It it thus valid for 
humans and animals, but also for posthumans, postbiological or even extraterrestrials. 
Freitas (1979, chap. 25.1.3) proposed a similar principal thermoethic: 
all living beings should always act so as to minimize the total entropy of the universe, 
or so as to maximize the total negentropy.
Freitas explains that in other words, “living beings should always act to further the 
mission of life in the cosmos, which is to reduce the universe to order by building the 
maximum  complexity  into  the  mass-energy  available.”  He  summarizes  three 
thermoethical duties, to  avoid harming, to  preserve and to  create, which indeed are 
very similar to the infoethics principles of Floridi. A corollary of the thermoethical 
principal is what Freitas calls the Corollary of Negentropic Equality:
All  entities  of  equal  negentropy  have  equal  rights  and  responsibilities;  the  more 
negentropic an entity, the greater are its rights and the deeper are its responsibilities. 
(See Cocca 1962; Fasan 1968; 1970; Haley 1963; 1956; Nicolson 1978; Rhyne 1958.)
Let us take an example of humanity's failing to be thermoethical, which was 
pointed out very clearly by David Criswell (1985, 63–64):
   The industrially advanced nations are accused and self-accused of wasting the 20 
KW (or 0.00002 GW)/person they consume to support their materially extravagant life-
styles. However, we also live in an era of enormous waste of solar energy. Not only are 
we failing to use the 81,000,000 GW/person (averaged over everyone on Earth)  of 
power the sun is currently sending irretrievably to cold deep space but we are also 
vigorously wasting the extremely inefficiently obtained power that has fallen on Earth 
over geologic time to produce our fossil fuels and power our inefficient biosphere.  
   We currently burn several billion tons of coal, oil and wood (fossil solar energy) a 
year worldwide (equivalent to 1.78 tons of fusion mass burning) to meet our meager 
energy  needs,  while  we  permit  the  sun  to  completely  fusion  burn  nearly 
136,500,000,000,000 tons of matter each year. We do have present-day limits to our 
technology, our will, and our immediate needs to tackle this stellar task. However, we 
can frame the  basic  challenges and begin imagining the general  approaches to  the 
conservation and upgrading of our stellar resources in the Solar System. 
What Criswell lays down is a  12 orders of magnitude difference between personal 
energy consumption (2 x 10-5 GW/person) and the wasted solar energy (8.1 x 107 
GW/person)! Humanity (and beyond) has a long way to go to cover this gap. Along 
these lines, it is thermoethical to go to the stars and use their energy to do intelligent 
work, instead of letting them dissipate their energy in space. But first things first, we 
need to make the most of Sun, the nearest star. 
Could extraterrestrials be more thermoethical than us? Seeing how much we 
waste solar energy, putative starivores would not be proud of us. But different putative 
starivores  would  also  be  more  or  less  thermoethical.  For  example,  we  saw  that 
putative starivores with an accreting black holes are very thermoethical because they 
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deplete the whole material of the accretion disc, while similar systems with white 
dwarfs accrete only 10% of the disc (see section  9.4.5  Living Systems Arguments, 
p239). 
One could object that, albeit its universality, the thermoethics picture may be 
too simple. Indeed, moments of chaos, crises, conflict and destruction can lead to new 
developments. For example, in developmental psychology, states of disorder are often 
the  way  towards  higher  stages  (see  e.g.  Scharmer  2007).  In  human  societies,  a 
revolution  creates  a  lot  of  disorder,  but  can  make  a  bloodbath  ultimately  useful, 
establishing  a  new  fairer  societal  organization.  Natural  catastrophes  also  shake 
ecosystems and can give the way to new evolutionary branches to flourish –such as 
mammals some 65 millions years ago. 
Even in such examples, one could reply that thermoethics still holds because 
those crises in the the long term bring a better organization or energy budgeting. This 
may be true,  but  it  remains difficult  while  in  a crisis to  know whether one goes 
towards destruction or construction of something better. Will the new system really 
become more thermoethical than the one currently being destroyed? The prospect of 
regression  is  not  excluded.  Thermoethics  is  universal  and  therefore  sometimes 
difficult to translate into more precise and concrete ethical  principles. Let us now 
explore insights from evolutionary theory and developmental  trends to  enrich our 
cosmological ethics.
 
10.2  Evolutionary Values
If, even in the long run, ethical behavior were self-defeating,
eventually we would not call it ethical, but foolish. 
(Sagan 1997, 218)
10.2.1  The Fallacious Naturalistic Fallacy
It  is  hard  to  enter  evolutionary  ethics  without  tackling  the  critique  of  the 
naturalistic fallacy. It states that we cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. In other 
words, that normative and descriptive dimensions of philosophizing are unbridgeable 
(see also the is-ought test, section 2.3.2 Testing the Dimensions, p46). Although the 
spotting of the fallacy is often attributed to Moore (1903), he actually did not claim 
that  we  can  not  derive  an  “ought”  from  an  “is”.   He  was  concerned  by  the 
distinctiveness of the content of ethical judgments  (see the introduction of Thomas 
Baldwin in Moore 1993, xviii). So it is better to trace it back to the source, Hume's 
(1739, bk. III, Part I.1) classical work, A Treatise of Human Nature. Although Hume's 
position is indeed that we can not derive moral judgments from reason alone, he is 
chiefly  criticizing  that  moral  philosophers  slip  from  “is”  to  “ought”  without  
justification. 
Let  us  give two examples of deriving moral  judgments from natural  facts. 
First, Herbert Spencer  (1851, 324) who, inspired by the functioning of the natural 
world, harshly criticized social thinkers who advocate a protective law for the poors:  
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Blind to the fact, that under the natural order of things society is constantly excreting 
its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating, faithless members, these unthinking, though 
well-meaning,  men  advocate  an  interference  which  not  only  stops  the  purifying 
process, but even increases the vitiation—absolutely encourages the multiplication of 
the reckless and incompetent by offering them an unfailing provision, and discourages 
the  multiplication  of  the  competent  and  provident  by  heightening  the  prospective 
difficulty of maintaining a family. And thus, in their eagerness to prevent the really 
salutary sufferings that surround us, these sigh-wise and groan-foolish people bequeath 
to posterity a continually increasing curse.
This is an example of drifting from what the process of natural selection “is”, to its 
application in society and how it “ought” to be. To say the least, this “bad naturalistic 
fallacy” would seem politically incorrect even to the most radical ideologies. Maybe 
not all, since Adolf Hitler (cited in G. L. Weinberg 2003, 21) would agree:
The abandonment of sick, frail, deformed children—in other words, their destruction—
demonstrated greater human dignity and was in reality a thousand times more humane 
than the  pathetic  insanity of  our  time,  which attempts  to  preserve the  lives  of  the 
sickest subjects—at any price—while taking the lives of a hundred thousand healthy 
children  through  a  decrease  in  the  birth  rate  or  through  abortifacient  agents, 
subsequently breeding a race of degenerates burdened with illness.
Let us now turn to a second example, which is a “good naturalistic fallacy”. It 
starts  from the  “is”  proposition  that  “humans  need  biodiversity”  and  derives  the 
“ought” that “we should promote biodiversity”. Who would challenge this reasoning?
My point with these two examples is only formal. Why accept one fallacy and 
not the other?  When should we imitate nature, and when should we not?  The real 
issue is  how to commit the naturalistic fallacy, not whether we can avoid it. We are 
going to commit it anyway. This was the point of the is-ought test I proposed in Part I. 
For sure it  is difficult,  if not impossible, to deduce with scientific methods 
moral  theorems.  But  we can  and must  use  insights  from science  to  build  ethical 
theories.  For,  what  are  the  alternative  sources  of  inspiration?  Common  sense? 
Introspection?  Art?  Existing  laws?  Supernatural  revelation?  Axiologies  based  on 
these other options are of course possible, but here we hold tight to objective criteria 
as much as we can. Subjective, intersubjective (social) or supernatural insights are 
thus  not  our  focus  because  they  hold  no  promise  for  a  naturalistic  cosmological 
extension.
Let  us  think  for  a  moment  how we  can  extract  the  virtues  and  vices  of 
evolutionary  processes.  Aristotle  has  developed  a  classical  theory  of  ethics  in 
Nichomachean Ethics, which is a theory of moral virtues. Virtues fall between two 
extremes vices of deficiency and excess. These trade-offs lead to a virtuous mean, 
which can be summarized with table 17 below:
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Vice of Deficiency Virtuous Mean Vice of Excess
Cowardice Courage Rashness
Insensibility Temperance Intemperance
Illiberality Liberality Prodigality
Pettiness Munificence Vulgarity
Humble-mindedness High-mindedness Vaingloriness
Want of Ambition Right Ambition Over-ambition
Spiritlessness Good Temper Irascibility
Surliness Friendly Civility Obsequiousness
Ironical Depreciation Sincerity Boastfulness
Boorishness Wittiness Buffoonery
Shamelessness Modesty Bashfulness
Callousness Just Resentment Spitefulness
Table 17 - According to Aristotle, moral virtues fall at the mean between two accompanying vices.
 Aristotle did focus on human virtues, but could we apply a similar reasoning 
to the virtues of different evolutionary mechanisms? We will  attempt to reason in 
these lines and study the importance of six fundamental evolutionary trade-offs. But 
first a word about fitness.
 Fitness is tautologically a good value, because it implies survival. As Sagan 
writes above, a self-defeating behavior can only be foolish, never ethical. The fitness 
of a system is most generally its probability of continuity, i.e. the number of agents in 
the future divided by the number of agents in the present. However it is important to 
make explicit the level of selection on which fitness applies. Do we try to promote 
fitness  of  cells,  organs,  individuals,  groups?  Generally,  there  are  many ways  and 
strategies to be fit  which involve evolutionary trade-offs that  we will  now outline 
from an ethical perspective. 
10.2.2  Egoism – Altruism Trade-off
That organisms strive to survive is a truism. But some organisms help others 
to survive and this is a puzzle for evolutionary biologists. Indeed, the competition 
induced by natural selection selects the fittest individuals, regardless of what happens 
to others. But some behaviors increase the fitness of others and decreases the fitness 
of  the  actor.  It  is  a  challenge  for  evolutionary  theorists  to  put  forth  mechanisms 
explaining how such a behavior can evolve (see e.g. Sober and Wilson 1998). 
We are not going to tackle this question surrounded by controversies. We can 
mention that multiple levels selection theory is a promising way to resolve it (see e.g. 
D. S. Wilson and Sober 1994). The main idea is to look at  the actions of natural 
selection  not  only  at  the  genetical  level,  but  at  other  smaller  or  bigger  units  of  
selection such as molecules, cells, individuals, groups or species.  
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Let us simply point out here the trade-off between egoism and altruism. If an 
individual is too egoistic, she will have few chances to be integrated into a larger 
group. If he is too altruistic while giving and getting nothing in return, his own benefit 
and survival might suffer. It seems therefore that a mean has to be found. There are 
many possible middle grounds. The first is  kin selection where altruistic behavior is 
only displayed towards one's group, and not other groups. For example, ants do help 
each others, but won't help worms.
If we aim at a universal ethics, extrapolating our increasing awareness and 
compassion, we should arrive at a point where we consider elementary particles and 
star dust as part of our cosmological group. So it is an interesting case where we aim 
at enlarging our circle of compassion to become altruistic at higher levels. But the 
hope that such a disinterested moral sentiment would emerge spontaneously is naive. 
A more pragmatic form of altruism is reciprocal altruism, or the more general tit-for-
tat rule. Its essence is to avoid blind altruism. An individual will first be altruistic 
(cooperate), then subsequently replicate an opponent's previous action. It is intuitively 
fair  and indeed an excellent  evolutionary strategy.  We will  come back to  it  when 
discussing the competition – cooperation trade-off. 
10.2.3  Stability – Adaptability Trade-off
Evolution keeps stable what works and adapts what doesn't. Let us say a  few 
words about values associated with stability and adaptability. 
A system's stability amounts to its internal or intrinsic fitness. For example, 
an organism has an intrinsic  stability  and capacity for  (re)production.  The related 
human values are equilibrium, robustness, strength, durability, autonomy or health. 
Such an increase in internal fitness requires the system to increase bonds and linkages 
between its different parts. As Heylighen (1997b; 1999) argues, this is accompanied 
by the increase of structural complexity. 
However,  building  and  reinforcing  what  is  already  here  is  a  conservative 
strategy. If others are progressing and getting better at extracting resources in new 
creative ways, too much of stability will prove unfit. 
Adaptability values relate to the capacity to cope with specific environmental 
perturbations  or  make  use  of  changing  external  resources.  In  humans,  wealth is 
typically  an  access  to  external  resources.  But  adaptability  values  or  the  general 
adaptation  to  the  environment  also  include  variation,  innovation,  exploration, 
experimentation, diversity, growth and (re)production. A question naturally arises: for 
how long are we trying to adapt? Again, when our self and awareness grow, we are 
more  and  more  inclined  to  increase  the  adaptability  of  larger  systems  (family, 
company, nation, humanity, the ecosystem, the Earth or the Universe). 
This emerges not only out of altruistic motives, but also out of a concern for 
longer term adaptability, since when our awareness of interconnectedness increases, 
our care  for  external  fitness  increases  accordingly.  We strive  to  fit  with a  greater 
whole and to make it fitter.
As a  system becomes more and more  adaptive,  it  increases  the  variety  of 
environmental perturbations that it can deal with, and this irreversibly increases its 
functional complexity. Heylighen (1999) elaborates:
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All  other  things  being  equal,  a  system that  can  survive  situations  A,  B and C,  is 
absolutely fitter than a system that can only survive A and B. Such an increase in 
absolute fitness is necessarily accompanied by an increase in functional complexity. 
Thus, evolution will tend to irreversibly produce increases of functional complexity.
How do we balance stability and adaptability? In evolution, the combination 
of variation and selection brings such a balance. It is also very similar to the trial and 
error method in learning, which is the most basic learning mechanism. Let us now see 
two kinds of well adapted organisms: the specialist and the generalist. 
10.2.4  Specialist – Generalist Trade-off
There are two ways to adapt and become fit. Either an organism becomes a 
specialist and is uniquely adapted to its niche or environment. For example, morgan's 
sphinx moth uses his long tongue specifically adapted to pollinate and feed at comet 
orchid  found  only  in  Madagascar  (see  Figure  28 below).  Darwin  and  Wallace 
predicted the existence of such an insect with a long tongue, when they discovered the 
peculiar orchid. The moth was later discovered. The moth is fit because it is the only 
organism adapted to this flower.
The generalist by contrast is fit because it can adapt to very different niches. 
For example in human societies, doctors, engineers or scientists can be generalists or 
specialists. Both generalists and specialists make their evolutionary way differently. 
10.2.5  Exploration – Exploitation Trade-off
A very important trade-off in evolutionary theory is between exploration and 
exploitation. Exploration consists in seeking affordances or opportunities. Explorators 
are proactive and do not imitate what others do. By contrast, exploiters  use what is 
already  here,  what  has  already  occurred  or  been  learnt.  The  attitude  behind 
exploitation is  to  use known affordances such as resources,  in  order to maximize 
utility. 
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Figure 28 Morgan's Sphinx moth is highly specialized to 
feed at Comet orchid. Photo © Mitsuhiko Imamori 
The  key  question  underlying  this  trade-off  is,  how  to  divide  the  energy 
expenditure  between  exploration  and  exploitation?  This  can  be  illustrated  in 
management (see e.g. March 1991) but also in social insects.  For example in ants, the 
evaporation rate of pheromones is a critical parameter which determines the fitness of 
the ant colony. If the evaporation rate is high, exploration is favored because they will 
not follow existing pheromones tracks for a long time and will be forced to explore 
new paths. If the evaporation rate is low, exploitation is favored because ants will tend 
to follow the same tracks. 
10.2.6  Competition – Cooperation Trade-off
Competition is  a,  if  not  the fundamental  driving force in  evolution.  Plants 
often compete to grow higher to receive more sunlight; biologists even suspect that 
plants can also poison the roots of their neighbors  (see e.g. Keddy 2001, 6). Living 
organisms constantly compete for territory, resources or mates. Higher animals also 
compete for prestige, recognition, awards, or social status. Competition has both pros 
and cons.  The  pros  are  that  only  the  most  adapted,  efficient  or  clever  organisms 
survive. They are fitter than the outcompeted ones.  If resources are limited, those 
organisms able to make the most of available resources will survive and thus be able 
to reproduce more successfully and become fitter than others.  
The disadvantage of competition is that the more energy invested to survive 
the competition, the less remains for growth, reproduction or higher purposes. The 
mentality behind competition is a primitive one that game theorists call “win-lose”. In 
competition, I win, you lose; or if you prefer, you win, I lose.
In organizations,  the trade-off between competition and cooperation is  also 
well  studied.  Khanna,  Gulati  and  Nohria  (1998) have  argued  that  as  a  company 
focuses on egoisitic (private) benefits at the expense of altruistic (common) benefits, 
it tends to be more competitive. The interesting part is of course to find a balance 
between the two. And we thus see that this trade-off is also related to the egoism-
altruism trade-off. 
In the outdated evolutionary picture, evolution is a merciless process where all 
what matters is this competition for survival. But this view is very limited because 
those who win the competition in the long term are those who cooperate  (see e.g. 
Axelrod 1984; Wright 2000; Stewart 2000). 
Cooperation is more commonly referred to as mutuality in biology. Ecologist 
Robert Ulanowicz (2009, 75) turned competition and mutuality upside down, arguing 
that mutuality is essential and competition is derivative of it. Indeed, mutuality is “the 
platform from which competition can launch: without mutuality at some lower level, 
competition  at  higher  levels  simply  cannot  occur.”  For  example,  the  “reason one 
rodent  is  able  to  strive  against  its  competitors  is  that  any individual  animal  is  a 
walking 'orgy of mutual benefaction' (May 1981, 95) within itself.” 
So, what are the advantages of cooperation? First, it allows greater cooperative 
systems to emerge. Second, the underlying value system is “win-win” where both 
parties – or more – profit. The win-win game can be between two individuals (e.g. we 
both win) or between two levels (e.g. my individual benefit and our societal benefit). 
Such  mutuality  or  cooperation  is  more  and  more  possible  and  suitable  in  our 
information society, because the informational resources are non-rival. If I forward a 
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paper to a colleague, I don't lose the paper. The costs in matter-energy are negligible 
compared to an economy based on matter-energy, where if we want to share a piece of 
bread,  we can't  multiply it  –without help.  Matter-energy exchanges are thus  rival. 
Still,  information exchanges do have an energetic  cost,  becoming more and more 
apparent as we exponentially increase our information processing. 
What are the cons of cooperation? There are at least two. First, the danger of 
cooperation is that it can freeze competition, and thus novelty and adaptability. For 
example,  phone companies cooperate when they agree to keep high prizes on the 
market.  The  cooperation  is  between companies,  not  between companies  and end-
users.  This  limited  cooperation  at  one  hierarchical  level  is  detrimental  to  another 
level, the end-user. This is why societies have competition laws (or antitrust law) to 
make  sure  that  market  competition  endures.  So  it  is  not  enough  to  promote 
cooperation, but also to specify who cooperation should concern, or to balance it with 
competition.
Second, what if the other party wants to take profit of my cooperative attitude? 
What should I do? Carl Sagan (1997, chap. 16) did a great job also in ethics when he 
clearly  summarized  popular  rules  to  live  by,  valued  world-wide  (see  table  18 
summarizing  what  follows).  Let  us  summarize  these  rules,  in  order  to  better 
understand the need for cooperative ones.
Rule Description
The Golden rule Do unto others as you would have them do unto you
The Silver rule Do not do unto others what you would not have them do unto  
you
The Platinum rule Do unto others as they would like done unto them
The Brazen rule Do unto others as they do unto you
The Zinc rule Do unto others as they would like done unto them to reward 
them; or as they would not like done unto them to punish them
The Iron rule Do unto others as you like, before they do it unto you
The Tin rule Do the Golden rule to superiors, do as you like to others (Iron  
rule)
The Kin rule Do the Golden rule to close relatives, do as you like to others  
(Iron rule)
The Reciprocal rule Do the Golden rule to others, then do unto them as they do  
unto  you (Brazen rule),  but  stop  cooperation  if  they  do  not 
reciprocate
The Tit-for-tat rule Do the Golden rule to others, then do unto them as they do  
unto you (Brazen rule) and try again cooperation (forgive)
Table 18 - Rules to live by. 
Inspired by and adapted from (Sagan 1997, 228). Note that we could group similar rules: Golden, 
Silver and Platinum; Brazen and Zinc; Tin and Kin; Reciprocal and Tit-for-tat. 
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The famous Golden rule of behavior is attributed to Jesus and in the Bible it 
says:  Do unto others  as  you would have them do unto you  (Matthew 7:12).  The 
problem is that it does not take into account human differences. For example, should 
the masochist inflict pain to his neighbor? Doing so, he would faithfully apply the 
Golden rule.
The negative formulation of the rule is called the Silver rule and is a restrictive 
rule,  because  it  tells  you what not  to  do,  but  not  what  to  do.  Its  formulation  by 
Conficius (Analects 15:23) says: Do not do unto others what you would not have them 
do unto you. This version is also known worldwide, from the writings of Hillel the 
Elder,  to  Gandhi  and  Martin  Luther  King  Jr.  But  the  same  critique  of  human 
differences applies. By inflicting pleasure to a masochist, I do her no good. Those two 
rules would thus benefit to take into account the needs of the neighbor before their 
practical application. Otherwise they lack empathy. 
We thus need to Do unto others as they would like done unto them (Alessandra 
1996). In other words, to treat others in the way they like to be treated, and not just to 
apply  our  values  blindly  unto  others.  Now,  thanks  to  this  Platinum  rule,  the 
masochists can be happy. 
Enough  for  lofty  and  indulgent  rules.  What  do  we  do  when  someone  is 
repeatedly violent? What if what she really wants is to hurt us? Should we just be 
empathic and self-sacrifice? Conficius replies that we should “repay evil with justice, 
and kindness with kindness” (Analects 14:36). Sagan calls it the Brazen rule: Do unto  
others as they do unto you. In the Bible, it is the lex talionis “an eye for an eye, and a 
tooth for a tooth” combined with the proverb “one good turn deserves another”. The 
Brazen rule contrasts with the Golden, Silver and Platinum rules because it is also 
retaliating.  When the interactions are positive,  such as lovers offering each others 
nicer and nicer presents, very well! But the Brazen rule also fuels the negative fire of 
endless vengeance. The Brazen rule crudely lacks forgiveness.
The  Brazen  rule  can  be  made  more  generous  or  tougher.  It  just  needs  to 
include empathy or the insight of the Platinum rule. It then becomes what I call the 
Zinc rule:  Do unto others as they would like done unto them to reward them; or as  
they would not like done unto them to punish them. 
Sagan also describes three other widely applied rules of behavior. The first is 
the Iron rule which is at the opposite philosophy of the Golden rule. It says: Do unto 
others as you like, before they do it unto you. It is a rule of the powerful, also known 
as “he who has the gold makes the rules”. 
The other rule widely found in nature illustrates a submission and dominance 
game. It says Do the Golden rule to superiors, the Iron rule to inferiors. Sagan calls 
this bullying rule the Tin rule, because it is an alloy between the Golden and the Iron 
rule.
In nature we also find the Kin rule, which says:  Do the Golden rule to close 
relatives, do as you like to others. It is a Golden rule selectively applied for one's kin, 
and the Iron rule for the rest. It is thus a nepotism rule. 
Now, let us summarize the pros and cons of the different rules. The Golden, 
Silver  and  Platinum  rules  are  too  complacent,  unable  to  punish  cruelty  and 
exploitation. The Brazen and Zinc rules are too unforgiving, while the Iron rule is 
clearly not applicable by everyone and will fail when encountering a superior other. 
The  Tin  rule  is  smarter  in  this  respect,  but  runs the  risks  of  retaliation  from the 
inferiors, if for whatever reason they become superiors. The kin rule promotes the 
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survival  and  benefit  of  the  group,  but  is  by  definition  not  scalable.  So,  can  we 
combine the different rules to still better ones? 
There are three types of games we can play,  win-lose,  lose-lose or  win-win. 
Sagan  notes  that  most  competitive  games  we  play,  such  as  Monopoly,  boxing, 
football, hockey, basketball, baseball, tennis, chess or partisan politics are win-lose, 
because only one party can win while the other loses. In such games, there is room 
only for the Iron and the Tin rules. Lose-lose games such as nuclear war or economic 
depression are even worse because all parties lose. The Iron and Tin rules focus only 
on playing such win-lose or lose-lose games. But we should emphasize that the most 
important and fruitful games of life are win-win, essential to make love, friendship, 
business, parenthood, music, art and science flourish.
Games theory studies these three kinds of games. It is not only a formal and 
theoretical  science  helping  strategic  decision  making,  it  also  has  an  experimental 
aspect.  Indeed,  sociologist  Robert  Axelrod  (1984) did  organize  a  computer 
tournament to find out which rules where winning in a repeated prisoner dilemma 
game (if you are not familiar with this game, see e.g. the summary of Sagan 1997, 
225–229). It is clear that players using the Golden rule will tend to be exploited by the 
Iron rule players. Such players are both playing win-lose games, and thus will have a 
tendency to self-annihilate. The remaining ones are the win-win players.
A promising  rule  to  play  the  win-win  game is  widely  found  in  nature  as 
reciprocal altruism. We can formulate the rule as the Reciprocal rule: Do the Golden 
rule  to  others,  then  do  unto  them  as  they  do  unto  you  (Brazen  rule),  but  stop  
cooperation if they do not reciprocate.  It is a very smart rule because you don't let 
people take advantage of you, yet you seek cooperation with everyone and not only 
with your kin. However, the cooperation will tend to be restricted to agents which 
reciprocate in the first place. What if the other player is not inclined to reciprocate 
right from the start? A broader more forgiving rule is needed. 
This leads us to the Tit-for-tat rule, which states: Do the Golden rule to others,  
then  do unto  them as they  do  unto you (Brazen rule)  and try  again cooperation  
(forgive). This rule has proven very robust and won the game-theoretical tournament. 
As Axelrod (1984, 54) summarizes it:
What  accounts  for  Tit-for-tat's  robust  success  is  its  combination  of  being  nice, 
retaliatory,  forgiving and clear.  Its  niceness  prevents  it  of  getting  into  unnecessary 
trouble. Its retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever defection is 
tried.  Its  forgiveness  helps  restore  mutual  cooperation.  And  its  clarity  makes  it 
intelligible to the other player, thereby eliciting long-term cooperation. 
It  is  important  to  emphasize  that  this  conclusion  was  reached from cold-blooded 
rational, strategic and opportunistic players: competing game theorists. There were no 
ethical presuppositions or inclinations to think that Tit-for-tat would be winning. Tit-
for-tat wins because it works, not because its similarity with almost religious values.
There are some variations on Tit-for-tat, and finer analysis shows that it can be 
improved. One idea is first to exploit full cooperators (a selective Iron rule), and then 
switch to tit-for-tat  (see Matt Ridley 1997 for a popular account of these variants). 
However,  in  the  real  world  if  you display  a  behavior  of  profiteer,  you will  raise 
suspicion regarding your ability to cooperate. In a more sophisticated and realistic 
game theory tournament, a variation on tit-for-tat also won. It is the Generous-tit-for-
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tat,  which,  one  third  of  the  time,  overlooks  a  defection  (see  Nowak,  May,  and 
Sigmund 1995).
The  robustness  of  the  tit-for-tat  rule  is  a  successful  example  of  what 
evolutionary ethics can teach us. Of course, unlike religions, scientists are careful not 
to make this conclusion an ethical dogma. Indeed, we should be reminded that they 
have proven the worth of tit-for-tat in simplified contexts. Yet, it certainly contains 
much more wisdom than the more naïve Golden or Silver rules.
To sum up, we have learned that blind cooperation or blind competition do not 
make their evolutionary way, but will self-annihilate sooner or later. A more careful 
trade-off  between cooperation  and competition is  needed,  of  which tit-for-tat  is  a 
prime example.
10.2.7  r – K Selection Trade-off
At bottom, fitness is about survival and reproduction. Since no organism is 
immortal, albeit all its efforts to stay alive and develop, if it wants to continue it needs 
to reproduce. So it needs to invest resources into reproduction. A fundamental trade-
off  emerges  as  organisms  need  to  split  their  resources  between  survival  (or 
development)  and  reproduction.  In  practice,  should  organisms  aim  for  more 
quantitative or  qualitative survival and reproduction?  The r-K selection theory  (see 
e.g. Pianka 1970) concerns this trade off. The “r” and “K” stand for the parameters of 
the ecological model, where “r” refers to the maximum growth rate of the population, 
and  “K”  to  the  carrying  capacity  of  the  environment.  Organisms  in  unstable 
environments will tend to be r-selected and invest in quick reproduction and produce 
many offspring, while in stable environments, surviving organisms will be K-selected 
and will rather invest in prolonged development, long life and produce few offspring.
Typical examples of r-selected organisms are bacteria, insects, frogs or mice. 
They reproduce quickly because it is crucial to survive in their unstable environment. 
Examples of K-selected organisms are trees, elephants or humans.
Since the last few decades, the r-K selection theory is less in fashion. Indeed 
not all organisms can be classified in the r-K spectrum. For example, trees display 
long  life  and  compete  for  light,  making  them  K-strategists,  while  they  spread 
thousands  of  seeds,  a  characteristic  of  r-strategists.  Also,  r-K selection  is  not  the 
whole of the story and other factors such as environmental variability and predation 
should be taken into account. But similar trade-offs such as between maintenance and 
reproduction are fundamental for modeling dynamics in evolutionary biology (see e.g. 
the disposable soma theory of Kirkwood 1977; 1999).
What does r-K selection implies for ethics? It is difficult to tell because it is a 
biological theory, and our human world is now dominated by culture. However, some 
authors  have  attempted  to  model  cultural r-k  selection  (see  e.g.  Heylighen  and 
Bernheim 2004; Fog 1997; 1999). As Fog argues, cultural r-selection happens when a 
group is dominated by external conflicts and wars; while cultural k-selection happens 
when a group is peaceful and spends more resources on satisfying the individuals than 
on strengthening the group. Fog further develops applications to religion,  politics, 
music, art, architecture, clothing fashion, sexual behavior, sport and play.
10.2.8  Discussion
If evolution is a trial-and-error process capable of solving problems of survival 
and adaptation, then the values behind the different trade-offs are foremost practical. 
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Being aware of such important trade-offs can allow us to play with their spectrum in 
order to solve any kind of problem. Evolutionary values thus give insights in how to 
adapt to  any circumstances, for  any purpose. So it is easy to use and abuse those 
values to reach any objective. As with any powerful tool, there are “good” or “bad” 
applications  of  evolutionary  principles.  Furthermore,  even  balancing  properly  a 
particular trade-off is not enough. We need to make explicit the level of selection we 
want to promote. Am I trying to increase the fitness of my body or my society? We 
certainly need to trade-off also the different levels of selection. For example, I agree 
to pay taxes if the government pays to build roads.    
By contrast with Aristotle's theory of virtue, the attitude of finding a mean 
between each trade-off is not necessarily the smartest  one. Indeed, there are some 
environments or situations where it may be better or necessary to be totally altruistic, 
maximally explorative, etc. We could thus propose a rule of metadaptation, adapting 
each evolutionary trade-off depending on the environmental situation. This remains of 
course very pragmatic.
One critique of evolutionary ethics is that it may provide necessary knowledge 
to build an ethics, but this is insufficient (Gewirth 1993). We are evolved beings who 
can make free choices, often constrained by our evolutionary past, but not always. 
What we choose is not always in line with basic evolutionary principles. We have the 
power and freedom to choose to go against  evolution.  For example,  in developed 
countries,  under  certain  conditions,  one  can  choose  euthanasia,  abortion  or  to  be 
homosexual.
Interestingly, these three choices are morally wrong in conservative societies. 
Indeed,  they  go  most  clearly  against  the  most  primitive  evolutionary  values  of 
survival and reproduction.
Only in a more global, societal or cultural context can they make sense. What 
is the meaning of struggling to keep alive a 95-year old man in the coma, costing 
several thousands euros per day of palliative care? What sense does it make to have a 
child resulting from a rape when one is a 14 years girl still going to school? What is 
the big deal of being homosexual and having no children, knowing that we are more 
than 7 billion humans on Earth? Shouldn't on the contrary societies further develop 
the rights to euthanasia, abortion or homosexuality? 
The reasoning is  tempting,  but  the problem is of course to set  boundaries. 
Euthanasia  or  abortion are  not  decisions to  be  taken lightly and indeed countries 
which permit  it  still  strongly regulate  those practices.  They may be  argued to be 
ethical  if  they  contribute  to  evolution  on  a  greater  scale,  contributing  to  social 
progress. But what do we mean with the notion of progress? 
In fact, as Nitecki (1993, 15) argues, we can't answer ethical questions without 
a notion of progress: 
We believe in correctness of ethical prescriptions only when we see that there will be, 
or  is,  progress  in  human behavior.  Thus evolutionary ethics  has  an unspoken,  and 
hidden, claim to a meaning or a direction to biological process. Since, according to 
evolutionary ethicists, natural selection is responsible for morality, the more moral will 
be selected, and hence there is progress in morality. If  evolutionary biology rejects 
progress then it must also reject evolutionary ethics. Just as to remain alive requires 
regeneration, or repair, so evolutionary ethics requires progress. Progress is a process 
that produces improvement.  It  is  a  process that  must  continue and cannot end. By 
definition,  the  process  that  ends,  dies.  Thus  progress  reflects  the  drama  of  the 
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evolutionary intellectual, who must either accept evolutionary ethics  and progress or 
must reject both –to many of us a difficult choice.
Evolutionary  values  are  thus  more  the  basis  of  a  praxeology,  a  theory  of 
action, rather than an axiology, a theory of values. We need clearer goals, values, 
purposes, directions or an idea of progress if we aim for a normative ethics. Indeed 
where do we want to go with these evolutionary strategies and management of trade-
offs? Or maybe evolution already shows some general trends, that we could benefit 
from following? The tit-for-tat rule showed that cooperation pays in the long term, 
which is a remarkable and promising result.
To go further, we need broader insights into evolutionary theory, namely into 
the  direction  of  evolution.  Evolution  and  development  go  hand  in  hand,  but 
developmental  values  are  more  promising  than  evolutionary  ones  because 
development implies a direction. Let us have a short examination of developmental 
values in humans, societies and a possible extrapolation to the universe.
10.3  Developmental Values
Cooperators will inherit the earth, and eventually the universe.
(Stewart 2000, 9)
10.3.1  Cybernetic Values
As organisms grow in complexity, they more and more become goal-directed 
and therefore can be modelled as cybernetic systems. They are able to choose which 
goal to pursue, to compare alternative courses of actions, to remember patterns which 
do or do not work, that is, to learn. So we can legitimately extend evolutionary values 
to cybernetic values. Such values are essential for a goal-directed system to survive. 
For example, homeostatic animals are able to control and maintain their temperature. 
But such control mechanisms are more effective if the system has reserves or buffers, 
such as a fair amount of fat … or provision in the refrigerator. 
An  effective  cybernetic  system  also  values  power  of  observation (input  
sensitivity  of  its  receptors)  in  order  to  better  anticipate  the  environment.  A blind 
animal  in  the  wild  will  have  poor  chances  to  survive.  Once  it  makes  accurate 
observations,  it  should also be able  to  store  past  experiences and process  present 
inputs  through  an  intelligent  mechanism (e.g.  neural  network)  thereby  displaying 
knowledge and intelligence. 
The  system should  also  be  able  to  act  with  power,  and  sufficient  energy 
through its effectors. An animal seeing a predator coming, but mute and memberless 
cripple (cruelly lacking effectors) will be useless and hopeless because unable to raise 
the alarm, fight or flight. 
As intelligence and knowledge rise, the amount of possible actions and goals 
growths. It becomes more and more difficult to choose what to do. In our information 
overloaded society the problem is stringent and we need to have insight into our own 
goals or preferences to make our way. Two core cybernetic principles are needed to 
steer a complex system. First, feedforward which consists in a proactive anticipation 
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of  a  future  course  of  action.  Unfortunately  in  a  complex  environment,  such 
anticipation is not always possible, and systems are easier to regulate using feedback 
mechanisms. 
Positive feedback helps to choose goals by avoiding a locked-in situation. For 
example, in the classical Buridan's ass dilemma, an ass is equally hungry and thirsty, 
has water and hay at his disposal, but is unable to choose which to drink or eat first, 
and tragically dies from hunger and thirst. Philosophers like to discuss this thought 
experiment but from a cognitive point of view, it is unlikely to happen. Indeed, the 
brain  functions  with  positive  feedback  mechanisms,  and  if  the  ass  looks  one 
millisecond more at the water, it will trigger neural activation which will make the ass 
decide to drink first, and momentarily inhibit his hunger.  
Cybernetic values provide a great addition to evolutionary values because they 
promote values which improve not only survival and reproduction but also control, 
observation,  knowledge,  intelligence  and  effective  action.  The  richness  and 
effectiveness of cybernetic values are impressive. A cybernetic philosophy of time 
could be: 
Learn from the past,
Be in the present,
Predict the future. 
It means to acknowledge lessons from the past (feedback); to deal with the present in 
the present (effective action); and to anticipate to our best the future (feedforward and 
model making). 
But let us keep a macroscopic perspective. Is there a general direction or a 
developmental pattern in evolution that could help to build a normative ethics? This is 
what we now examine.
10.3.2  Progress in Evolutionary Progress
The notion of evolutionary progress was probably an essential component of the Nazi 
policy. As Weikart (2009, 2) writes: 
Evolutionary ethics underlay or influenced almost every major feature of Nazi policy: 
eugenics  (i.e.,  measures  to  improve  human  heredity,  including  compulsory 
sterilization), euthanasia, racism, population expansion, offensive warfare, and racial 
extermination.  The  drive  to  foster  evolutionary  progress—and  to  avoid  biological 
degeneration— was fundamental to Hitler’s ideology and policies.
Weikart  (2009, 16) adds that Hitler “thought that by killing certain people he could 
improve  the  moral  stature  of  humanity.  Thus  he  committed  some  of  the  worst 
atrocities  in  world  history  in  the  name  of  morality.”  Weikart  argues  that  Hitler's 
political program was actually based on a consistent and stable evolutionary ethics 
throughout  his  career.  However,  Weikart's  work  is  highly  controversial  since  he 
explicitly avoided political, social, psychological, and economic factors that may have 
played key roles in the post-Darwinian development of Nazi eugenics and racism (see 
e.g.  Gooday,  Kenneth G. Wilson,  and  Barsky  2008;  Richards  2012;  2013  for 
critiques). What  is  more,  Weikart's  study  is  academically  not  neutral,  as  he  is 
associated  with  the  “Discovery  Institute”,  which  promotes  intelligent  design  and 
creationism. Furthermore,  Hitler  as a consistent  evolutionary ethicist  is a doubtful 
claim, since Hitler positions himself explicitly as a creationist, when he writes (Hitler 
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1939, 310) : “it was by the Will of God that men were made of a certain bodily shape, 
were given their natures and their faculties.” 
Nevertheless, the notion of progress may have played a role in the nazi policy, 
and remains essential to define, debate and criticize in any evolutionary ethics.
Of course, Hitler and his contemporaries had a limited and wrong picture of 
evolution. Hitler's evolutionary picture is outdated. Today, all biologists would see it 
naive  to  strive  towards  the  biological  uniformity  of  the  Aryan  “race”  instead  of 
valuing diversity at the human species level; naïve to believe that moral characters are 
biologically inherited or naïve to think that the best way to improve humanity is by 
changing its genetic population. On the last point, evolutionary theorists agree that 
genetic change is slow compared to cultural change. Therefore, it makes much more 
sense to attempt to change culture by fostering creativity, innovation and education 
rather than changing genomes. 
But there is another assumption in Hitler's view, which is that competition is 
the driving force of evolution, and that it will help to give it a hand. Since nature is 
cruel and involves a merciless struggle for survival, should not a political program 
based on evolutionary ethics also promote such values and mechanisms? Of course 
we saw that this view is quite limited and the modern evolutionary picture is different. 
So, what is progress? The idea of evolutionary progress is very controversial. 
We find both ardent proponents that evolution is a random process with no preferred 
direction (see e.g. Williams 1966; Hull 1988; Gould 1996); as well as arguments that 
there is evolutionary progress (see e.g. Dawkins 2006; 2003, chap. 5.4; Stewart 1997; 
2000; Wright 2000; Corning 2003; McShea and Brandon 2010).
There is a very intuitive argument about evolutionary progress through time. A 
single cell is less complex than a multicellular fish, itself less complex than a human 
being composed of trillions of cells, capable to adapt to any climate and to surf the 
web he is weaving with millions of social partners. This is a straightforward argument 
that more and more complex organisms did evolve through time. 
Depending on the definition of progress,  we might conclude that  the same 
empirical  evidence  involves  progress  or  not.  As  Steven  Pinker  (1995,  332–333) 
illustrates, a wise elephant would reason that progress defined as nose elongation is 
rare in the animal kingdom. According to this definition, elephants are arguably the 
most advanced species on Earth. 
We shall rather use a broad yet non trivial definition of progress proposed by 
Richard Dawkins (2003, 208): 
a tendency for lineages to improve cumulatively their adaptive fit to their particular 
way of life, by increasing the numbers of features which combine together in adaptive 
complexes.
This  definition  is  not  anthropocentric  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  focus  on  any 
particularly human train such as brain size. Following this definition, there is a basic 
evolutionary progress thanks to a  ratchet effect, where natural selection keeps small 
gains. Let us mention a few other progressive directions of evolution.
In  the  modern  evolutionary  picture,  evolution  is  based  not  only  on 
competition, but also on cooperation. Cooperation is to be understood as competition 
through cooperation, in the spirit of tit-for-tat, not a kind of gullible golden rule. The 
point is that what cooperates eventually outcompetes others, so evolution can't go in 
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any direction.  It  will  go in the direction of greater cooperation...  or stop  (Stewart 
2000)!
A cybernetic analysis of evolution let us see clearly that it involves higher and 
higher  hierarchical  control  levels,  or  metasystem  transitions  (Turchin  1977). 
Evolutionary progress leads to an increase in complexity of higher and higher control 
systems working together. 
We also mentioned the irreversible functional increase of complexity (section 
10.2.3 Stability – Adaptability Trade-off, p276). It means that evolving systems will 
be fitter if they are able to perform more useful functions. There is a cybernetic reason 
why this provides an evolutionary advantage, which can be explained by Ashby's law 
of  requisite  variety  (Ashby 1956). Indeed,  possessing a  wide  variety of  functions 
allows to deal with more external perturbations,  and thus makes the system fitter. 
Importantly, there is no anthropocentric agenda behind such arguments. As Heylighen 
(1999) explains, 
This preferred direction must not be mistaken for a preordained course that evolution 
has  to  follow.  Though  systems  can  be  absolutely  ordered  by  their  functional 
complexity, the resulting relation is not a linear order but a partial order: in general, it 
is  not  possible  to  determine  which  of  two  arbitrarily  chosen  systems  is  most 
functionally complex. For example, there is no absolute way in which one can decide 
whether a system that can survive situations A, B and C is more or less complex or fit 
than a system that can survive C, D and E. Yet, one can state that both systems are 
absolutely less fit than a system that can survive all A, B, C, D and E. Mathematically, 
such a partial order can be defined by the inclusion relation operating on the set of all 
sets of situations or perturbations that the system can survive. This also implies that 
there  are  many,  mutually  incomparable  ways  in  which  a  system  can  increase  its 
absolute fitness. For example, the first mentioned system might add either D or E to the 
set of situations it can cope with. The number of possibilities is infinite. This leaves 
evolution wholly unpredictable and open-ended. 
Another general evolutionary trend can be studied through thermodynamics. Stanley 
Salthe  (1993),  Schneider  and  Dorian  Sagan  (2005),  all  argued  for  a  preferred 
thermodynamical direction to the universe. Eric Chaisson (2001) showed empirically 
that physical, biological and technological systems increase their capacity to sustain 
higher and higher flows of energy per mass. Importantly,  Schneider  and  Kay  (1994) 
reviewed  arguments  that  more  developed  ecosystems  degrade  more  energy.  They 
suggest this can be extended to evolution at large, where species and ecosystems with 
the highest global dissipation rate are selected. 
Granting  those  arguments,  is  there  a  preferential  direction  through  which 
evolution goes? Let us now examine the sister concept of evolution, development. We 
will explore its application for ethics, starting with humans, society and speculating to 
a possible extension at a universal scale.
10.3.3  Developmental Values for Humans
Let us now turn to humans. Is there a developmental path for humans, as there 
is  for the embryo? The embryo indeed develops from a single  fertilized cell  to  a 
trillion-cells organized human being. But its development doesn't stop at birth. Our 
children go to school, and adults value continuous education. Does our development 
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really stops after school or university? Our world is changing at an accelerating pace, 
and in more and more jobs it is necessary to always learn new knowledge and know-
how. What are the ultimate moral and cognitive developments that intelligent beings 
could achieve in this universe? What are the highest stages of knowledge, intelligence 
and morality?
To approach these ambitious questions we need to extrapolate some insights of 
developmental psychology. Robert Kegan (1982) did synthesize the common ground 
of several developmental theories, by noticing how the notions of subject and object 
evolve at each developmental stage (see table 19, p290 below). His core insight was 
to notice that  the subject  of  one stage becomes the object  in the next  stage.  This 
process happens recursively. For example in stage 0, the subject in a baby between 6 
months and 2 years  is his reflexes –such as sensing or moving. Later at stage 1, he 
has reflexes as an object of control, and his subject is something new, impulses and 
perceptions. At stage 2, impulses and perceptions become the object of the individual 
in stage 3, and so on. Such a recursive growth is not without resemblance with the 
general  evolutionary  cybernetic  view  of  Valentin  Turchin  (1977),  and  it  is  an 
promising research program to study developmental psychology with the thread of 
“self metasystem transitions”. 
The recursive aspect of this theory makes its extrapolation to unknown future 
stages of development possible. I have attempted such extrapolations to stages 7, 8 
and 9 which I call evolutionary, cosmological and infinite. Obviously those stages are 
not in any way supported by empirical psychological research, like the others are. But 
they open the door for humanity and its successor to develop. 
Cognitively and logically, the evolutionary stage 7 involves awareness of the 
importance and power of evolutionary mechanisms. The highest logic is not just a 
static classical logic, with the scientific hypothetico-deductive attitude  (as it was in 
Piaget 1954). The logic includes this attitude, but adds more dynamical reasonings, 
using principles from complexity theory and evolution. Otto Laske (2006; 2008) did 
argue that adults can be helped to develop such higher levels of cognitive capabilities. 
In particular he summarized 28 thought forms regarding process, context, relationship 
and transformation of systems. Morally, Kohlberg's (1981) classical work focuses on 
moral principles to make a good society, but the evolutionary stage goes further. This 
stage further involves a detachment from the human species, which is indeed but one 
species in the living world. There is an awareness that species have a limited duration. 
This does not exclude that humans could participate in higher cooperative wholes in 
the future, like bacteria cooperated with cells to form mitochondria or with our guts to 
help us digest, but there is no reason why humans would stay the most advanced. 
Psychologically, in this stage, the individual is ready to change, to transcend its self in 
order to also embrace larger evolutionary systems. 
What  could  possibly  come  after  the  evolutionary  stage?  I  propose  the 
cosmological stage 8, where the subject becomes something greater than dynamical 
evolutionary systems on Earth. He identifies with the universe, that  is,  the greater 
context in which the evolutionary dynamics takes place. If the subject is the universe, 
the object on which he acts are evolving and developing systems of all kinds. Morally, 
truly universal issues are of central concern,  such as the red giant phase of the Sun, 
the sustainability of new star generation in the galaxy and ultimately a lurking cosmic 
doom. It is hard to imagine a stage beyond the cosmological, but there is one, that I 
propose to call the infinite stage.
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 At stage 9, individuals are concerned with infinity. Maybe the mental attitude 
at  this stage can be approached by James Carse's  (1987) unique book  Finite  and 
Infinite  Games:  A Vision  of  Life  as  Play  and Possibility.  But  we should  add the 
lessons of the previous stage, and integrate insights from a cosmic culture. So the 
individual realizes that our universe is something temporary, subject to death. To go 
beyond, one must identify with something greater than the universe. Let us illustrate 
the psychology of  this stage with the metaphysics  behind Cosmological  Artificial 
Selection  (CAS,  see  Chapter  8).  At  this  stage,  the  ultimate  good  is  the  infinite 
continuation of the evolutionary process. It is the thesis of this chapter, and now we 
understand that what matters most are  processes  which sustain life at large and our 
universe, rather that the universe conceptualized as a  static object.  At stage 8, the 
subject was the universe but in stage 9, he has the universe. The subject is aware and 
worried about the importance of the infinite continuation of cosmic reproduction. The 
universe becomes the object of the subject. He is no more attached to our particular 
universe.  In  CAS,  what  matters  is  the  recursively  fertile  infinite  production  of 
intelligent universes. In other words, to make sure that universes continue to evolve 
and  reproduce  with  intelligence,  even  beyond  our  own  universe.  Thus  artificial 
cosmogenesis becomes a primary way to cognize, not only to decipher to what extent 
our universe is robust or fine-tuned, but to produce an artificial blueprint of a fertile 
offspring universe. 
This stage maybe the penultimate one, because the next one would simply 
close the developmental logic, the subject and the object becoming the same. Why 
should universe reproduction be infinite? The issue here is to achieve a cosmological 
immortality  of  the  universal  reproduction  process  (see  also  section  10.4.5  
Cosmological Immortality, p304). So reproduction is not just  about producing  one 
new universe  but  to  generalize  to  a  fertile reproduction  mechanism,  that  is,  to  n 
generations as  n tends towards infinity. This particular universe reproduction is just 
one step in the infinite cycle of evolving universes, like having one child is one small 
step in  the chain of humanity.  A central  motto of infinite  psychological  beings is 
“L'infini et l'autre continue”15. 
Again, it is totally impossible to worry or to seriously consider stages 7, 8 and 
9 without a strong evolutionary and cosmic culture. It was also totally impossible to 
worry  about  climate change or  global  economy a  few thousand years  ago.  So,  it 
means that those stages can only develop if our awareness extends beyond human 
societies to include the whole of evolution on Earth (stage 7), to cosmic evolution 
(stage 8) and to the infinite continuation of cosmic evolutionary processes (stage 9). 
15 Again, an untranslatable french word game that I attempt to translate. “L'infini” means “the 
infinite”, but sounds like “L'un fini”, which literally means “The one finishes”; while “et l'autre 
continue” means “and the other continues”. So, we could translate (loosing the word game with 
infinity): “While one finishes, the other continues”.
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STAGES -> 0  –  Incorporative  
(0,5 – 2 years)
1 – Impulsive 
(5 - 7 years)
2 – Imperial 
(12 – 16 years)
3 – Interpersonal
(no age) 
4  –  Institutional  
(no age) 
CULTURE Mothering Parenting Role-recognizing Mutuality Self-authorship
SUBJECT Reflexes (sensing, moving) Impulses, perceptions Needs, interests, wishes The interpersonal mutuality Authorship, identity, psychic 
administration, ideology
OBJECT None Reflexes (sensing, moving) Impulses, perceptions Needs, interests, wishes The interpersonal mutuality
PIAGET (logic) None Preoperational Concrete operational Early formal operations Formal operations 
(dichotomizing)
KOHLBERG 
(moral)
None Punishment – Reward Instrumental hedonism 
(reciprocal fairness)
Interpersonal expectations 
and concordance
Societal perspective, 
reflective relativism or class-
biased universalism
STAGES 5 – 6 Interindividual
(no age) 
7 – Evolutionary (?)
(no age) 
8 – Cosmological (?)
(no age) 
9 – Infinite (?)
(no age) 
CULTURE Intimacy Evolutionary Cosmic Infinite
SUBJECT Interindividuality, interpenetrability of 
self systems
Interpenetrability of all 
systems, evolutionary 
developmental dynamics
The universe Recursively fertile infinite 
production of intelligent 
universes
OBJECT Authorship, identity, psychic 
administration, ideology
Interindividuality, 
interpenetrability of self 
systems
Interpenetrability of all 
systems,  evolutionary 
developmental dynamics
The universe
PIAGET (logic) Formal operation (5- dialectical; 6- 
Synthetic)
Evolutionary Developmental 
logic and dynamic 
Evolutionary 
Developmental logic and 
dynamic applied to the 
universe 
Infinite and recursive
KOHLBERG 
(moral)
5- Prior to society, principled higher law 
(universal and critical); 6- Loyalty to 
being
Loyalty to evolution and 
cooperation
Care for the universe and 
worry about cosmic 
doom 
Loyalty to infinity 
Table 19 Stages of cognitive and moral development. Inspired and adapted from (Kegan 1982, 86–87). Kegan stops at stage 5-6, while Kohlberg wrote just one 
paper about the possibility of a 7th stage, which he calls “cosmic” but that we call here evolutionary (Kohlberg and Power 1981). The content of stages 7, 8 and 9 are 
my proposed speculative extrapolations.
290
10.3.4  Developmental Values for Societies
Jean Gebser's (1986) remarkable book The Ever-Present Origin analyzed and 
documented  developmental  path  for  human  societies.  He  analyzes  five  kinds  of 
societal structures, from archaic, magic, mythical, mental to integral. Each time, the 
conceptions  of  space-time,  the  notions  of  signs,  essence,  properties,  potentiality, 
emphasis,  consciousness,  forms of  manifestation,  the  agency of  energy,  the  organ 
emphasis,  the  forms  of  realization  and  thought,  of  expression,  assertion  or 
articulation, the relationships, the localization of the soul, the forms of bond or the 
general motto change. 
But  there  are  also  much  more  empirical  arguments  that  societies  follow 
developmental trends. The large scale study of the world values survey shows that 
secular-rational values instead of traditional values, as well as self-expression values 
instead of survival values increase through time (R. Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The 
study shows that countries tend to develop towards to upper right region of the space, 
where a snapshot in the period 1999-2004 is represented in Figure 29 below. 
Steven Pinker in his recent and extensive  (2011) book argued at length that 
there is a decrease in violence in societies, a developmental trend valid on time scales 
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Figure 29 The World Value Survey Cultural Map 1999-2004. From (R. Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005, 63)
Figure 30: 
from millennia  to  years.  Paul  Hawken  (2008) also  showed  the  rise  and  growing 
impact  of  nonprofit  groups  defending  ecological  sustainability  and  social  justice. 
Another factor which increases is the quality of life –or happiness (see e.g. Heylighen 
and Bernheim 2000; Ronald Inglehart et al. 2008).
So, where is the development of our technological society headed? We already 
mentioned that  a  case can be made for  the metaphor of  a  global  brain as a  next 
evolutionary transition, fostering cooperation at a planetary scale (see e.g. P. Russell 
1982; Mayer-Kress and Barczys 1995; Heylighen 2005). This would also eventually 
make a new level of intelligence emerge from humans and computers interacting on 
the internet.
What are the next evolutionary transitions after the global brain? The starivore 
hypothesis (Chapter 9) provides a long-term vision, from switching all our energy 
source to solar, to migrating the Earth nearer to the Sun to get more of its energy, up 
to black hole accretion and universe making.
10.3.5  Universal  Thermodynamical  Evolutionary  Developmental 
Values? 
Can we extrapolate psychological and societal development up to universal 
development? John Smart (2009) already saw the emergence of chemical elements as 
a progressive differentiation or development through cosmic evolution. We already 
mentioned the open question of whether there is what Teilhard de Chardin's  (1959, 
78) called a “cosmic embryogenesis” (see the Open Questions of Chapter 7, p163). Is 
there a development at play in the universe, like the development of an embryo? We 
might accept a developmental path for chemical elements, for the child going towards 
adulthood,  but  are  we  ready  to  accept  it  for  our  psychology,  societies  or  our 
technologies? The debate is likely to remain lively. These are open question I invite 
you to explore within the “Evo Devo Universe” research community I co-founded 
with John Smart. 
To sum up, evolutionary values are extremely valuable because pragmatically 
useful. However, we saw that they are rather short term, contextual, adaptive and all 
purpose. For these reasons they are more practical values, and good basis to explain 
the source of our behavior, or descriptive ethics. 
Developmental  values  on  the  contrary  focus  on  long  term  growth.  They 
provide direction for humans to develop towards higher stages of cognitive, social, 
and emotional functioning; direction for societies to develop towards less violence, 
greater  cooperation  and  integration,  towards  a  peaceful  global  society.  Such 
developmental values are thus more promising to develop a normative ethics. Without 
direction, it is hard if not impossible to propose a normative ethics.
To  sum  up,  ethical  principles  go  toward  the  survival  of  more  and  more 
cooperative,  hierarchically complex systems, which use more and more efficiently 
free energy. But for how long? Isn't the energy of the universe ultimately limited and 
bond to dissipate towards a heat death? Can we still hope in this cosmological context 
for a kind of immortality? This is what we explore now. 
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10.4  Voyage to Five Immortalities
The mortality of man defines by contrast the immortality which 
some men hope for, some men fear, some men scoff at, 
but no man ever fails sooner or later to consider. 
(Adler 1990, 606)
All living things seek to perpetuate themselves into the future, but humans 
seek to perpetuate themselves forever. This seeking –this will to 
immortality–  is the foundation of human achievement; it is the wellspring 
of religion, the muse of philosophy, the architect of our cities and the 
impulse behind the arts. It is embedded in our very nature, and its result is 
what we know as civilization.
(Cave 2012, 2)
Why do we die? Do we have to die? Does everything has to die? Should we 
accept death as a blunt fact? This would still leave open the question of how or why 
we  should  learn  to  accept  death.  Stephen  Cave  (2012) articulated  the  mortality 
paradox which goes as follows. Objectively, we see death everywhere and know for 
sure that we will die; but subjectively, we cannot conceive death because it is beyond 
any experience we have. So we tend to accept the former and reject the latter, which is 
an inconsistency in our worldview, where the  it-I test (see section  2.3.3  Testing the
Big Three, p49) fails. In other words, the subjective world is in contradiction with the 
objective world. 
As usual in our approach, we like to apply concepts to themselves. The death 
of death leads to the fascinating idea of immortality. However the situation is logically 
peculiar here,  because the death of death also annihilates the very concept  it  was 
applied  to.  Immortality  means  that  there  is  no  death  anymore,  whereas  doing 
philosophy of philosophy or history of history does not destroy philosophy or history. 
The  desire  for  immortality  contrasts  with  the  fear  of  death.  Implicitly  or 
explicitly this ultimate fear of death triggers a conscious or unconscious desire for 
immortality.  However,  outside religions,  topics of death and immortality are often 
taboo. Immortality is seldom found separate from belief in a supernatural order. Can 
we develop an idea of immortality without supernatural order? This is the axis we 
focus on now. 
Awareness of mortality is not obvious. As Jorge Luis Borges put it in his 1949 
novel The Immortal, “with the exception of mankind, all creatures are immortal, for 
they know nothing of death” (Borges 2004, 13). Only few animals seem to understand 
death, and even children lack the idea of death. Their discovery of mortality leads to 
great anxiety (see e.g. Yalom 1980). This means that the idea of immortality requires 
awareness of mortality! This is not so trivial as it seems and suggests that at different 
cognitive and moral stages of human development, we have different ideas of death 
and immortality.
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For  example,  what  about  you?  Which  death  do  you  care  about?  Human, 
creative,  evolutionary  or  cosmological  death?  To  clarify  what  I  mean  by  these 
different deaths, let me tell you a fictional story. Imagine that you are sitting in a bus, 
and the person next to you starts to have difficulty breathing, makes an epilepsy crisis, 
and is imminently going to die. To your astonishment, nobody in the bus cares about 
that person. Nobody tries to do something, ask if there is a doctor in the bus, call an 
ambulance, try to stop the bus or to do any other emergency procedure. This horrible 
situation is barely imaginable, because humans are social creatures able of empathy. 
We care about human death and won't let a fellow human die. 
Now imagine that you watch the news, and you learn that the government of 
your country has decided to abolish human rights. What would you do? Would you 
protest, mobilize, sign petitions, go demonstrate in the street? It would make sense 
because human rights are values inherited through a lot of social fight. Many people 
would do it, but you'll certainly find less people reacting than in the first example. 
Indeed, letting an idea die has not the same psychological impact as letting a human 
being die. Probably even less people will be sensitive to the destruction of a work of 
art through an act of vandalism. This is because the empathy we have with fellow 
humans is an instinct, while if you leave in a small village in China you might never 
have heard about human rights or strange western forms of art. Empathy for ideas 
requires education and culture.
Let  us  continue.  Do  you  care  about  a  form  of  evolutionary  death,  where 
biological  diversity  dramatically  drops,  in  the  end  disturbing  or  destroying  the 
planetary ecosystem? Maybe if you have seen the destruction of the amazonian forest, 
seen  some  worrying  television  documentary  or  read  some  book  about  such 
phenomena. But my guess is that even less people do care, or at least used to care a 
few decades ago. The good news is that today, our awareness more and more rapidly 
reaches these kind of global issues.
Now, who cares about cosmological death? How often do you worry about the 
predictable death of our Sun which will already make oceans boil in one billion years? 
And why stay solar-system-centric? What about other stars? And the health of the 
galaxy? And the ultimate death of our Universe? Almost nobody cares anymore, only 
a tiny percentage of researchers which I can count on my fingers. 
Of course, to be motivated to fight against each kind of death requires each 
time  a  different  idea  of  immortality.  We  will  use  and  extrapolate  developmental 
psychology  and  suggest  that  there  are  stages  of  immortality.  This  idea  would  be 
interesting to test empirically, but here we stick to setting the theoretical framework. 
We hypothesize that the definition of the self is critical in how we apprehend death 
and immortality. Do I identify with the boundary delineated by my skin, my family, 
my community, my nation, mankind, the Earth, the solar system, the galaxy or even 
the universe? 
The idea of  the self  rarely extends beyond a  nation.  Yet  we are  living an 
exceptional age in which the self of humanity is emerging. But the way to a cosmic 
culture where the self is identified with the universe is still in its infancy. Yet it is the 
logical development of our psychology, and sooner or later, it will emerge.  
Let us now start our voyage to five kinds of immortalities, in two parts. The 
first has to do with personal immortalities where the person longs for an afterlife or 
hopes to live forever. I call them respectively  spiritual and  individual immortality. 
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The second part deals with transpersonal immortalities, where the person longs for an 
immortality beyond the self. We will see three such immortalities that I call creative, 
evolutionary and cosmological. Through this voyage we hope to convey cosmological 
immortality as an ultimate value to interpret human's ultimate fear, death.
10.4.1  Spiritual Immortality
Spiritual immortality is the belief in a magical or supernatural realm where the 
soul goes after death. The idea of an afterlife is present in the major world religions 
like Christianity, Islam or Hinduism. Of course, the definition above assumes old-
fashioned religious interpretations such as the separability of body and soul. We can 
distinguish a literal belief in the existence of an afterlife from a need to symbolize 
immortality as an answer to death (Lifton and Olson 2004). Spiritual immortality thus 
assumes the immortality of the soul.
This belief is quite widespread since, as Dawkins (2008, 356) reports, 95 per 
cent of the population of the United States believe they will survive their own death. 
This is not so surprising because the idea of immortality is a point-cognitive attractor 
for the future.  It  is appealing for our mind. In his recent book about immortality, 
Stephen Cave  (2012) argued that there are only four narratives around immortality 
that culture have been transmitting.  He calls this first  belief  the  Soul narrative of 
immortality. 
Of course, we find also the cyclic cognitive attractor, where death is part of a 
reincarnation cycle. For example, in the Buddhist tradition, this involves the belief 
that you have already lived, that you will die but be reborn, over and over again. This 
happens  according  to  the  quality  of  a  person's  actions.  Cave  calls  this  cyclic 
perspective on death the Resurrection narrative.  
Now, what  does the rational materialistic mind think about these ideas? In 
1925, Bertrand Russell (2004, 7) famously wrote: “I believe that when I die I shall rot, 
and nothing of my ego will survive”. The critique of spiritual immortality argues that 
after  the body dies,  there  is  nothing.  Being dead will  be no different  from being 
unborn and anyway, there is no proof of an afterlife. We need to find and define new 
kinds of immortalities. Can we use and extrapolate our knowledge of science and 
technology to achieve a materialistic and naturalistic immortality? 
10.4.2  Individual Immortality
I don't want to achieve immortality through my work, 
I want to achieve it through not dying. 
Woody Allen.
Woody Allen made his will for individual immortality crystal clear. Individual 
(or personal) immortality is the continuation of life in a biological or digital substrate. 
Cave calls this third option the immortality narrative of staying alive. He argues that 
“almost all cultures contain legends of sages, golden-age heroes or remote peasants 
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who  discovered  the  secret  to  defeating  aging  and  death”  (Cave  2012,  4).  Our 
civilization is no exception. As Cave (2012, 283) puts it:
The difference between those who swallow 250 dietary supplements per day and the 
rest of us is not that they will live forever and we will not. No: we will all die, even the 
transhumanists.  The  difference  is  that  they tell  themselves a  story  about  achieving 
“longevity escape velocity,” which helps them to alleviate their existential angst. They 
are  therefore  following  a  long  tradition  of  elixir  seekers,  resurrectionists, 
reincarnationists and others who have attempted to deny the fact of death.
What is the motivation of individual immortality? It is simply the refusal of 
one's personal death. Death is absurd. Indeed, as John E. Stewart (2000, 316) writes, 
from “the point of view of an isolated individual, the inevitability of death makes 
anything  he  does  during  his  life  irrelevant  and  meaningless”.  An  evolutionary 
informed  argument  even  goes  as  follows.  Biological  death  was  acceptable  when 
evolution was primarily genetic, so that information could be preserved in the genes 
of offspring.  But in our culture-driven society,  most of the information we gather 
during our lifetime is cultural and gets lost at  the time of death. And this is pure 
waste.
There are two ways to solve this problem. Either to drastically extend our life 
span (individual biological immortality) or to transfer our “self” in a digital substrate 
(individual cybernetic immortality). 
Committed  researchers  in  life  extension  are  aware  that  true  immortality 
(infinite  lifespan)  is  not  realistic.  This  is  why  they  often  use  the  more  careful 
expression of “indefinite lifespan”. The objective here is to stop all aging processes 
and thereby live for extremely long timespans (see e.g. Kyriazis 2005). One strategy 
De Grey (2007, 43) proposes is to develop rejuvenation therapies acting on the seven 
major classes of cellular and molecular damage, in order to stop them.
Other  approaches  include  cryonics  or  plastination  (see  e.g.  Olson  1988), 
whose philosophy is to conserve now, and pray that future science will be able to 
resurrect later. 
We can make an even stronger theoretical case against death. Indeed, if we 
remember the very general definition of life as a thermodynamically open system, 
there is no necessity for a living system to die, as long as it can process an energy 
flow and extrude waste products. There are even examples of plants or animals that 
some  scientists  speculate  to  be  immortal.  For  example,  the  bristlecone  pine 
“Methuselah” had his 4723rd birthday already in 1957  (Stern, Bidlack,  and Jansky 
2010, 87). We could indeed speculate that such a tree, already living for millennia, 
could  continue  indefinitely.  The  speculation  of  an  immortal  animal  is  no  less 
fascinating. The jellyfish turritopsis nutricula can reverse its life cycle and may have 
an indefinite lifespan. These medusae can perform an ontogeny reversal where they 
“rearrange their tissues and go back to the polyp stage if subjected to sub-lethal stress 
and also at the end of their lifespan, after spawning” (Grzimek 2004, 1:139) . 
To sum up, as long as we can find free energy in the universe, we can hope to 
live forever.  A cosmological  perspective brings two critiques however.  First,  even 
assuming this tree and jellyfish will live forever in the future, they did not live forever 
in the past, since their atoms were cooked up during the big bang era and in stars. The 
second critique is that there are limits of available free energy if we aim to live truly 
forever. Modern physical eschatology teaches us that (see Part III). 
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Another approach to individually live forever is to bet on the digital substrate. 
This  is  called  cybernetic  immortality  (Turchin  1990),  mind  uploading,  digital 
immortality, virtual immortality or immortality in silico. Imagine you can upload all 
the information which constitutes your self in a computer. You could then continue to 
live in a digital world, for as long as your computer hardware can run without failure. 
But mixed approaches are also conceivable. For example, if future biotechnologies 
can grow a clone of yourself, then you could re-upload the content of your brain or 
what ever constitute your “self” in this new you. So it seems storing your self in a 
digital substrate is a more versatile strategy than just focusing on maintaining your 
biological  substrate.  The  ethical  side  of  such  practices  remains  of  course  to  be 
debated. 
There  are  many  critiques  to  these  modern  yearnings  for  individual 
immortality. Let us mention a few. First, the body is embodied (see e.g. Clark 1998). 
Cybernetic immortality assumes that preserving brain patterns is the only challenge. 
Yet,  it  is  not  clear  if  memories,  thoughts,  emotions  or  consciousness  can  be 
reconstructed  without  a  body  embedded  in  an  environment.  Additionally,  if  you 
resurrect a neural pattern in 200 years, all the context will be lost, and the resurrected 
brain has great chances to be totally maladapted.  A possible way out is to run your 
preserved self in a simulation of your time. But this means you need to also preserve 
your environment, and not only your brain. And what's the point of being resurrected 
in a fake world?
A second critique is that the body cognizes. For example, we know that the 
heart is actually full of neurons, which influence intuitive decision making (see e.g. 
McCraty,  Atkinson,  and  Bradley  2004). So  to  be  on  the  safe  side,  individual 
immortalists would be better off to preserve the whole body and not only the brain.  A 
computational analogy teaches us that to resurrect a 20 years old microprocessor or 
harddrive (rough analogs of the brain), you need a compatible motherboard, cables, 
other chips and software. Otherwise, it's useless. 
A third critique of immortality is its futility. In a private communication, my 
colleague Carlos Gershenson explained that the old alchemic dream of getting gold 
from lead is now possible thanks to particle accelerators, but actually more expensive 
than mining gold. The situation with personal immortality will most likely be similar. 
Once we will be able to achieve it, it will cost so much that we will finally realize its 
futility.
Does  death  contribute  to  the  meaning  of  life?  A common critique  is  that 
immortality undermines motivation. Why do things now if you have eternity in front 
of you? There would be no urgency. 
Is individual immortality a societal cancer? The analog of an immortal entity 
in biology is a cancer cell which has gone wild because it will not die anymore. The 
daily 50 to 70 billions cells dying in our body (Karam and Hsieh 2009, 27) is essential 
for our bodies to function. If we see society as a superorganism, we should definitely 
stop individuals wanting to become immortal! Are scientists and futurists passionate 
about  individual  immortality  working  hard  towards  growing  a  societal  cancer? 
Maybe.
But  there  is  a  brighter  option.  Imagine  you  have  achieved  individual 
immortality. Your ethics broadens radically, because the time scope of your life has 
changed radically. It then really makes sense for you to care about far future issues, 
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such as climate change, the red giant  phase of our Sun or the heath death of the 
universe. You know that sooner or later, those issues will affect you.
So,  individual  immortality  may  actually  be  a  necessary  step  for  ethics  to 
extend on very long time scales. People wouldn't be able to say anymore “climate 
change?  I  don't  care  because  I  know it  will  not  affect  me”.  The  same  holds  for 
cosmological  issues.  But  could we care  for  greater  things than  one's  self  without 
living forever? Of course we can, and this is the basis of wisdom and heroism, higher 
ethical functioning where the individual is able to self-sacrifice for a greater whole 
(see  e.g.  Murphy  and  Ellis  1996).  This  sacrifice  is  in  fact  natural  if  you  have 
transcended yourself,  if  you identify with something greater than the boundary of 
your skin. And this leads us to transpersonal immortalities. But win-win cooperation 
can also be explored, and sacrifice seen as the last option.
Transpersonal immortalities focus on the future of life beyond the self. They 
can be summarized with the motto: “Life after death exists. It is the one of others.” 
Life continues to exist not only through the existence of other human beings, but also 
other systems or cultural items like a nation, a work of art or a scientific achievement. 
Stephen Cave (2012) calls this fourth way of dealing with death the legacy narratives. 
Like other immortality narratives, they are present in human societies at least since 
Antiquity. Those worried about transpersonal immortality see beyond their selves, and 
this  arguably  corresponds  to  higher  stages  of  development  and  needs.  Indeed,  in 
Maslow's (1954) hierarchy of needs, self-actualization is in fact not the latest need. In 
his later work, Maslow identified a new need beyond self-actualization, namely, self-
transcendence (see Koltko-Rivera 2006 for a detailed account of Maslow’s conception 
of self-transcendence). It means that the self, having climbed the hierarchy of needs 
through  satisfying  physiological,  safety,  love,  esteem  needs,  will  not  stay  self-
actualizing and satisfying his individual needs. The self will strive to extend its own 
boundaries,  to  identify  with  greater  things.  Koltko-Rivera  summarizes  that  the 
individual  now  seeks  “to  further  a  cause  beyond  the  self  and  to  experience  a 
communion beyond the boundaries of the self  through peak experience”.  A cause 
beyond the self “may involve service to others, devotion to an ideal (e.g., truth, art) or 
a  cause  (e.g.,  social  justice,  environmentalism,  the  pursuit  of  science,  a  religious 
faith), and/or a desire to be united with what is perceived as transcendent or divine”, 
while the communion beyond the self may “involve mystical experiences and certain 
experiences  with  nature,  aesthetic  experiences,  sexual  experiences,  and/or  other 
transpersonal experiences, in which the person experiences a sense of identity that 
transcends or extends beyond the personal self.”
Philosopher Bertrand Russell did actually not stop at the materialistic critique 
of spiritual immortality quoted above. In his essay How to Grow Old (1956, 52–53), 
he embraced the idea of a transpersonal immortality:
[T]he fear of death is somewhat abject and ignoble. The best way to overcome it –so at 
least it seems to me–  is to make your interests gradually wider and more impersonal, 
until bit by bit the walls of the ego recede, and your life becomes increasingly merged 
in the universal life. An individual human existence should be like a river –small at 
first, narrowly contained within its banks, and rushing passionately past boulders and 
over waterfalls. Gradually the river grows wider, the banks recede, the waters flow 
more quietly, and in the end, without any visible break, they become merged in the sea, 
and painlessly lose their individual being. The man who, in old age, can see his life in 
this way,  will  not  suffer  from the fear  of  death,  since  the  things he  cares  for  will 
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continue. And if, with the decay of vitality, weariness increases, the thought of rest will 
be not unwelcome. 
Psychologist Roy Baumeister, specialized in the notion of the self, wrote that 
the “most effective solution to this threat [of death] is to place one’s life in some 
context that will outlast the self. If one’s efforts are devoted to goals and values that 
project  many  generations  into  the  future,  then  death  does  not  undermine  them” 
(Baumeister 1991, 292). 
Notwithstanding  Woody  Allen's  wish,  in  50  years  from  now,  I  am  more 
interested in watching again and again his great movies rather than shaking his shaky 
hand. Despite his personal preference for individual immortality, his creative work 
has an enormous value and is a stunning creative achievement. Can we shift from an 
idea  of  immortality  reacting  to  the  fear  of  individual  death  to  an  immortality 
expressing the love of life as a whole? This is what we will explore now through three 
kinds of transpersonal immortalities: creative, evolutionary and cosmological. 
10.4.3  Creative Immortality
unless there is an accepted structure into which each new finding can be 
fitted, the “immortality” of scientists' ideas will vanish.
(J. G. Miller 1978, 5)
Remarkably, one of the deep motivations of James Grier Miller to develop 
living systems theory is to provide a conceptual framework to unify and maintain the 
legacy of scientific ideas. Miller is thus concerned with the noble mission of securing 
the creative legacy of the scientific enterprise. 
Stephen Cave calls this creative immortality the path of  cultural legacy. Of 
course,  a  cultural  legacy  can  also  be  a  work  of  art,  a  graffiti,  an  invention  or  a 
contribution to societal progress. Aristotle's, Shakespeare's or Darwin's achievements 
are  all  known  despite  their  individual  bodies  not  existing  anymore.  They  are 
remembered because through their work they have offered a legacy for humanity, a 
creative  immortality.  As  Baumeister  (1991,  292) argued,  to  feel  secure  in  facing 
death, “one must draw the value of one's actions from a religious, political, artistic, 
scientific, or other cause that transcends decades and even centuries”. The motto of 
creative immortalists can be summarized by: “the more you give, the more you stay” 
(René Berger, cited in de Rosnay 2012, 221).
Another legacy is the sociological one. One may be motivated to pass on a 
family name;  a  material  legacy to  one's  family.  However,  such a  legacy is  rather 
limited, similarly to kin selection in biology. The benefits of the legacy is restricted to 
a small group, not the whole of humanity or the whole of the tree of life.
However, the timescales of creative immortality are uncertain. Even Aristotle, 
Shakespeare or Darwin did make their legacy through “only” centuries or millennia. 
What about millions or billions of years? They might well be totally forgotten. Can 
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we hope and aim for a kind of immortality which endures through thousands, millions 
or even billions of years? 
10.4.4  Evolutionary Immortality
Evolutionary  immortality  is  the  striving  to  continue  or  maintain  life  by 
replication, or any other process in harmony with evolutionary principles. In the case 
of our particular biology, Stephen Cave calls it the biological legacy narrative, to be 
contrasted with the cultural legacy narrative (creative immortality).
There is immediately an objection here, namely that animals and adults at all 
stages of development do have children. So there is nothing particularly advanced or 
wise about evolutionary immortality.  The most primitive sexual  drive that  we –or 
some?–   share with animals leads us to achieve immortality through offspring. Even 
in some human tribes, the connection between sexuality and offspring is unknown. 
The situation is similar to the golden rule in developmental  psychology. Kohlberg 
(1981) found consistently that it was held at all stages of moral development. What 
changes is thus the justification of the golden rule. 
Similarly, what matters is the justification and motivation behind procreation. 
There  is  a  continuum between  unconscious  procreation  up  to  the  most  carefully 
planned in vitro fecundation for  a  homosexual  couple.  Is  the motivation only the 
result of an instinctual drive? Of a social pressure? Of the fruit of love? Of a will to 
contribute to the tree of life? Here we consider only this last option, in line with a 
supposed evolutionary stage 7 of psychological development that we outlined earlier 
(section 10.3.3 Developmental Values for Humans, p287). 
The  evolutionary  thinker  will  critique  individual  immortality.  Arguments 
could  go  as  follows.  Most  importantly,  individual  immortality  freezes  variation. 
Indeed, as we saw with evolutionary values (section  10.2.3  Stability – Adaptability
Trade-off,  p276),  the  stability-adaptability  trade-off  is  essential  for  systems  to 
dynamically adapt. Individual immortality means to get rid of adaptability, which can 
only lead to long-term extinction of the human species. Indeed, changes, exploration, 
variations are required to provide adaptation and innovation. Individual immortality is 
thus unfit biologically. Kirkwood (1999) did a thought experiment about a supposed 
immortal species and showed that it quickly becomes biologically unfit. Individual 
immortality is against evolutionary thinking. As John E. Stewart (2000, 320) writes,  
Individuals with restricted adaptability and evolvability would stall evolution if they 
live forever. For this reason, organisms who are not self-evolving but whose overriding 
objective  is  to  contribute  to  the  successful  evolution  of  life  would  not  attempt  to 
achieve immortality.
Some studies even show that aging may have been selected for its own sake 
because  genetic  systems  which  limit  their  lifespan  have  been  conserved  over 
evolutionary time-scales  (Mitteldorf 2004). Which means that organism death (e.g. 
with telomeric aging) might be as important as cellular death (apoptosis), but at the 
species level. Not without irony, it is in fact good news for those seeking individual 
immortality, since the possibility of a programmatic mechanism triggering death rises 
hopes to simply shut it down (see e.g. Bredesen 2004).  
For someone seeking individual immortality, evolutionary immortality is not 
immortality anymore. Indeed, it involves the death of individuals, so how could this 
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be immortality? The answer of evolutionary immortalists is twofolds. First, they have 
transcended  their  individual  self,  so  they  can  accept  to  individually  die.  Second, 
evolution needs genetic and cultural change, that is death of old systems, in order to 
leave room for fitter new systems.
Evolutionarily, there is another major critique of individual immortality. Even 
if  we  assume  that  an  immortal  human  being  can  evolve,  learn  new things,  it  is 
generally not conceived that she could go through major evolutionary transitions like 
the  transition  from non-living  molecules  to  first  cells,  from cells  to  multicellular 
organisms or from plants to animals. An immortal human is similar to a plant which 
would  have  decided  to  hamper  the  emergence  of  animals  and  therefore  to  stall 
evolution.  So,  individual  immortalists  may  be  in  a  process  of  hampering  the 
development  of  higher  levels  of  evolution,  and thus  going  against  developmental 
values we outlined (section 10.3 Developmental Values, p284).
If  we  see  life  in  a  broader  picture  as  the  tree  of  life,  the  mechanism  of 
reproduction ensures that life always continues to explore novel solutions. So death is 
beneficial relative to an individual (e.g. with apoptosis) or a species (with individual 
deaths).  Maybe  death  could  be  beneficial  on  a  yet  larger  scale  of  a  whole 
(post)biosphere?  For  example on  a  cosmological  scale,  might  a  putative  starivore 
civilization sacrifice itself to leave room for another more advanced civilization? That 
would probably mean billion of years of evolutionary trial-and-error wasted. But this 
would be no big news that nature can be wasteful.
Evolutionary immortalists are skeptic not only about individual immortality, 
but also about the immortality of the human species. Mark Lupisella  (2009) coined 
the  term  “speciesism”,  which  he  defined  as  “a  kind  of  blind,  unethical  delusion 
engendered by biologically  driven affinities  for  one’s own likeness”.  Evolutionary 
immortalists  know too  well  that  99.9  % of  species  which  have  existed  are  now 
disappeared (see e.g. Prothero 2003, 83). There is no reason why humans should be an 
exception. Put an other way, there is 0.1% chance that humanity as a species will 
continue in the far future. In mammals, species average 1 million years of duration 
(May 1994, 15) and homo sapiens appeared only about 200 000 years ago. So, if 
paleobiology is of any help, we might still have a few hundred thousands years to live 
as a species. Which is very few from geological or cosmological perspectives. Note 
also that  a  species endures longer if  the environment does not change, and might 
endure  for  shorter  periods of  time if  the  environment  changes  a  lot.  Currently,  it 
would be hard to argue that life on Earth is not changing!  
These  arguments  do  not  necessarily  suggest  that  everything  we  do  is 
meaningless  and useless.  It  is  not  a  reason to  make the  end of  humanity  a  self-
fulfilling prophecy and to accelerate our self-annihilation. It simply means again that 
we  are  not  the  center  of  cosmic  evolution.  Evolutionary  processes  often  build 
scaffolding, which are useful for next generations to build on. To illustrate this, let us 
introduce an analogy which describes the evolutionary process, that ecologist Robert 
Ulanowicz  (2009, 100–101) describes as his only “Eureka” experience in his life. 
Here we apply it  to the particular branch of humanity. Consider a grapevine as in 
Figure 31 below. Suppose humanity is the central stem and is producing branches. 
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Those branches could be seen as our cultural  and technological extensions, as the 
additional branches and roots of Figure 32.
Finally,  at  a  third  stage  illustrated  in  Figure  33,  the  initial  root  –humanity– 
disappears.  However,  the  grapevine  has  considerably  grown since  Figure  31,  and 
could not have grown without the initial root. 
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Figure 31 Young muscadine grapevine with central stem and branche. (From 
Ulanowicz 2009)
Figure 32 Grapevine several years later, having developed adventitious 
roots to the sides of the main trunk. (From Ulanowicz 2009)
Figure 33 Same grapevine two decades later. Original trunk has rotted 
away, but vines are sustained by adventitious root system. (From 
Ulanowicz 2009) 
To sum up this critique, those aware and endorsing evolutionary immortality 
will find the striving of individual immortality selfish, meaningless and potentially 
harmful to the future of evolution. It is our evolutionary responsibility to be ready and 
willing to  individually die. “The secrets of evolution are death and time” famously 
wrote and said Carl Sagan (1985, 20). He further explained: “the deaths of enormous 
numbers of lifeforms that were imperfectly adapted to the environment; and time for a 
long succession of small mutations that were by accident adaptive; time for the slow 
accumulation  of  patterns  of  favorable  mutations.”  If  my  “I”,  my  self  identity  is 
transcended towards becoming greater than the biological self, it is no problem to die. 
Indeed, it is only a small part of me which dies, namely, its biological body part. But 
others continue to live; the influence I have had on Earth or my cultural or biological 
legacy will continue. And the Sun will continue to shine... if only for a few remaining 
billion years. Alan Segal (2004, 78) showed that traditionally, “wisdom and mortality 
are unconditionally wed.” This also holds for evolutionary immortalists. 
There are two broader evolutionary legacies, the legacy of genes and of the 
legacy of the global brain. Richard Dawkins (2006, 34) identified the genes as being 
the closest entity we could call immortal:
The genes are the immortals, or rather, they are defined as genetic entities that come 
close to deserving the title. We, the individual survival machines in the world,  can 
expect to live a few more decades. But the genes in the world have an expectation of 
life that must be measured not in decades but in thousands and millions of years.
The life expectancy at  the level of genes is indeed impressive, but could we find 
something close to immortal at a macroevolutionary scale? 
Very importantly, Stephen Cave showed that immortality narratives  are not  
mutually incompatible. He illustrates this with the Egyptian civilization, which used 
all four immortality narratives (soul, resurrection, staying alive and legacy). So we 
could see a version of the global brain legacy as a combination of individual, creative 
and evolutionary immortality. As Francis Heylighen elaborated (cited from the Global 
Brain Mailing list, 6/7/2006):
personal knowledge and experience would ultimately be integrated into a collective 
consciousness, or what I usually call a “global brain”, which is itself immortal (or at 
least  does not have an a priori  limited life span). This combines the advantages of 
continuity (none of the good ideas are lost) and innovation (personal experiences may 
be combined with other personal experiences in order to produce something that is 
more than the sum of the parts).
So, a wise evolutionary thinker will embrace the whole tree of life. But is it 
enough, even considering a promising global brain legacy? No, it is not. 
The scalability issue arises. Why not extend the tree of life to its deepest roots 
in cosmic evolution? Even the grandeur of a global brain legacy is not enough. It will 
at some point run out of energy because the Sun has a limited fuel reserve. We can not 
ignore the cosmological context. So we must expand our will to immortality from the 
planetary level to the cosmological. Can we aim for an even more enduring form of 
immortality,  taking  into  account  the  predictable  end  of  the  Sun  and  other 
cosmological constraints? 
Why stop our identification with the 4.5 billion years of evolution on Earth 
since we know that  the cosmological  context  to give birth to humanity took 13.7 
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billion years? We can be proud to be 13.7 billions years old if we identify with the 
atoms which compose us. And who knows what those atoms will become in the far 
future? There are good chances that  they will  be recycled by our descendants for 
purposes we can barely imagine.
10.4.5  Cosmological Immortality
A human being is part of a whole, called by us the “Universe” 
a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and 
feelings, as something separated from the rest—a kind of optical delusion 
of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us 
to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest us. 
Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our 
circles of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of 
nature in its beauty.
Albert Einstein (quoted in 1972 by the New York Times)
Ultimately everything depends on the fate of the cosmos. As Einstein writes 
above, we can aim to widen our circles of compassion to embrace the whole universe. 
This cosmic connection with everything in the universe is an awe inspiring feeling 
that deep reflection about death brings. As Sogyal Rinpoche (1994, 191) writes in The 
Tibetan Book of Living and Dying, 
when we finally know we are dying, and all other sentient beings are dying with us, we 
start to have a burning, almost heartbreaking sense of the fragility and preciousness of 
each  moment  and  each  being,  and  from  this  can  grow  a  deep,  clear,  limitless 
compassion for all beings.
This feeling is indeed very similar to what Einstein eludes to in the above quote. Such 
connections of  our  subjective experience with the universe  are  very inspiring and 
fundamental for cosmological immortalists.  In particular, cosmological issues are the 
most important ones to focus on if one wishes literally to achieve immortality. But 
those almost religious feelings do not solve the objective problem of a lurking cosmic 
doom.
Once we extend our  awareness  to  the universe,  thermoethical  issues arise, 
namely the limited amount of free energy available in the Sun, stars, galaxies and 
ultimately in the universe. Additionally, feeling compassion with the universe implies 
knowledge of threatening consequences of cosmological models, such as big crunch, 
big rip or heat death. To make the cosmos hospitable for life forever is no trivial 
matter at all. 
However, a critique may go as follows. Cosmic doom scenarios may reveal a 
failure of our imagination, because of the intrinsic limitation of deterministic models 
to end in stable attractors of disorder or equilibrium. We just fail to model innovation 
and creativity. This may be valid, but then it is up to us to imagine more creative 
scenarios and models for the future of life in the universe.
Let us see a few options to continue the evolutionary process infinitely. First, 
let us muse philosophically about an argument we call metaphysical immortality. The 
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reasoning goes as follows. Let us remember the metaphysical challenge for ultimate 
explanations (section 4.1.2 Metaphysical, p76). When we ask “why not nothing?” we 
implicitly  admit  that  “there  is  something”.  The  postulate  “nothing  comes  from 
nothing” is hard to challenge, at least if we define “nothing” in a philosophical way 
and not  as a  quantum vacuum full  of potential.  It  means that  “everything always 
endures, in one form or another”. For immortality, it means that something, some of 
our material-energetic “us” may have had an infinite history, and may have an infinite 
future! So we may all be truly immortal in this metaphysical sense, both in the past 
and  in  the  future.  But  if  you  are  murdered  tomorrow,  even  though  the  atoms 
composing your body will be recycled, I am not sure if this metaphysical immortality 
will really comfort you. So, this metaphysical immortality does not dispense more 
psychological and philosophical considerations. 
We  can  now  turn  to  the  central  issue  of  cosmological  immortality.  More 
accurately, the question is, how to perpetuate life in the universe infinitely? 
A straightforward answer is to actively promote space colonization. To export 
life or humanity to outer space is a way to achieve immortality (see e.g. Baird 1989, 
48).  As  with  any  future  prospect  for  humanity,  we  can  speculate  that  advanced 
extraterrestrials would have had similar ideas, and do actually colonize the galaxy 
with life (Crick and Orgel 1973). Intriguingly, this idea of directed panspermia leads 
to  the  proposition  that  bacteria  or  viruses  on  Earth  might  actually  have  an 
extraterrestrial origin (Fred Hoyle and Wickramasinghe 1990). However, even space 
colonization  doesn't  work  in  the  very  long  term  since  it  does  not  deal  with  the 
thermodynamical constraints. 
So,  how,  if  only  possible,  is  the  universe  going  to  survive  as  a  whole? 
Globally, there are two ways to perpetuate life, either by survival, or by reproduction. 
Let us apply those two options to the universe. 
We use again the biological theory of r-K selection and see how it could apply 
to the universe. An r-reproduction strategy would involve fast reproduction and short 
survival. It doesn't seem to apply well to our universe, which is globally quite stable 
and slowly changing. As far as we know, there are not billions of baby universes 
which are produced every second. The K-strategy involves a slow reproduction and a 
long survival. It seems more appropriate to apply it to our universe. The extreme case 
is  to  have no reproduction at  all.  This  is  the  essence  of  Freeman Dyson's  (1979) 
proposal to make life –defined as information processing– survive forever. 
The steady-state theory also provided a never aging cosmos. Indeed, even if 
galaxies get born, age and die, new galaxies do appear. In the steady-state universe, 
there is no beginning, no end and the universe as a whole never gets old. Of course, 
there is a catch, which is the issue of how new galaxies do appear. Paul Davies (1994, 
152) remarks that  such a process would require to add 1050 tons of matter to the 
universe every few billion years!
The  reversible  computation  scenario  also  offers  –in  principle–  a  way  to 
compute  forever,  because  no  new energy  would  be  needed  thanks  to  the  use  of 
reversible computational gates. But as we saw (section 9.4.1 Two Scales Argument, 
p232), a civilization choosing this path would not be allowed to forget (erase states) 
because this operation has an energetic cost.
Tipler's  (1997) omega point scenario, although it only works with a closed 
universe, which is not supported by current cosmology, points towards a very slow 
reproduction mechanism, where the contracting energy towards the big crunch is re-
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used for  producing a  next  generation universe.  Interestingly,  Tipler's  omega point 
theory is actually a mix of individual and cosmological immortality. Indeed, near the 
omega point,  intelligence is  so powerful  that  it  has the computational  capacity to 
resurrect  all  of  us  –cybernetically.  A  very  unlikely  outcome  for  sure,  since  a 
civilization developing cognitively and morally  up to  a  cosmological  stage would 
certainly not care resurrecting all the possible life histories of a particular species, and 
even less of a particular human being which has lived some billion years ago. 
Another  reproductive  scenario  is  cosmological  artificial  selection,  a 
speculative philosophical scenario integrating the origin and future of the universe 
with  a  role  for  intelligent  life  (see  Chapter  8).  Cosmological  immortality  via 
cosmological  artificial  selection  is  analogous  to  biological  immortality  through  a 
chain of reproducing universes instead of a chain of living entities. 
Interestingly,  Stephen  Cave  (2012,  249) speculated  about  cosmological 
artificial selection as a way to realize a cosmic legacy narrative. He apparently had the 
insight independently of the literature we reviewed (section 8.3.1 History, p176):
Perhaps one day we—or some far more evolved successor—will be able to seed new 
universes that are fit for life. Indeed, perhaps we are already in one, seeded by some 
earlier civilization.
Besides the r-K trade-off, let us now be inspired by an evolutionary theory of 
aging in biology, the  disposable soma theory (see Kirkwood 1977; 1999). It simply 
says that it is more efficient to invest energy in reproduction than in indefinite upkeep 
of  the  organism.  Indeed,  once  the  best  chances  for  reproduction  are  used,  thus 
ensuring  the  survival  of  the  almost  immortal  genes  (germline),  the  mortal  body 
(soma) can be disposed of. Futurist John M. Smart  (2009, 224–226) speculated that 
this theory may also apply to the universe. The soma is analogous to the constituents 
of  the  universe,  with  its  mortal  galaxies,  stars  and  planets  while  the  germline  is 
analogous to free parameters which determine immortal physical laws. 
If we take seriously this fundamental trade-off in energy expenditure between 
soma  and  germline,  the  ultimate  death  of  the  “universe's  soma”  may  indeed  be 
inevitable. But its germline, it's most delicate physical structure may be saved if they 
are replicable. If CAS holds, it means that intelligent civilizations will spend much 
energy  into  preparing  and  making  universes,  and  few energy  in  maintaining  our 
disposable universe. If –and this is a big if– the starivore hypothesis (see Chapter 9) is 
correct, there is already huge amount of energy invested in securing the germline of 
our universe. A famous maxim by La Rochefoucauld's (1868) says that “Neither the 
sun nor  death  can  be  looked  at  steadily.”  Cosmological  immortalists,  and  maybe 
starivores, are proud to defy it. They first look steadily at the death of our universe, 
and then  look as  steadily  at  our  Sun and other  stars  only  to  see them as energy 
bounties necessary to the task of universe making.
 Yet, cosmological immortalists would not be totally content with the making 
of  one new universe. They would worry: would the newly formed universe develop 
life,  intelligence,  up to  the  level  where universe making becomes again possible? 
Saving our particular universe by making another universe is not enough. It would 
just  shift  the  problem of  immortality  to  the  next  universe.  Making  a  sterile  new 
universe would be as depressing as having one only sterile child.  This realization 
motivates  the  next  cognitive  stage  9,  concerned  about  issues  regarding  infinite 
evolution.
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There is a difference between “indefinitely” and “infinitely”. While it seems 
more careful to say that the evolutionary process would continue indefinitely, a highly 
advanced intelligence would not be satisfied with the uncertainty implied by the word 
“indefinitely”. It would attempt to find a way to achieve true immortality, through a 
provably infinite process. Let us speculate on how a stage 9 being could approach this 
issue and accept to die in peace.
There  is  first  a  statistical  way.  Caring  universe  makers  will  do  extensive 
simulations to prove statistically that universes will recursively reproduce. Securing 
this property would be a major challenge of “hard artificial cosmogenesis” (see also 
8.3.9 Objection – Are Simulation and Realization Possible? , p190). 
The second way is the most rigorous way because it involves the mathematical 
logic technique of  model checking. Indeed, statistics based on computer simulations 
have always a small probability to fail. A good old solid logical proof is much more 
desirable.  Caring universe makers will  do model checking of the  n+1 universe to 
prove  that  it  will  recursively  reproduce.  However,  considering  the  difficulty  and 
computationally intensive process of model checking even for very simple systems, it 
seems quite unrealistic that it is achievable, even for extremely advanced civilizations. 
The  third way is  if  hypercomputation is  unlocked.  First  it  would allow to 
compute much more, and thus might provide the missing tool to validate the model 
checking approach. In all likelihood, the proposition “universe n+1 is fertile” will be 
Gödel-undecidable.  So  universe  makers  would  never  be  able  to  be  sure  that  the 
universe they make would have this desired property of fertility. Hypercomputation 
may solve this issue, because it could in principle decide issues which are not Turing-
computable. This would be a proof of cosmological immortality. The availability or 
not of these speculative options will depend on the level of universe making which is 
available (see section  8.3.3  Six Levels of Universe Making, p183).  Of course the 
thermodynamical issue should not be underestimated: where does the energy come 
from  to  make  universe  n+1 from  universe  n (see  8.3.7  Objection  –  The
Thermodynamical Issue, p189)?
In the conclusion of his book, Stephen Cave argued that  a combination of 
virtues which lead to accept death and a hope for a legacy narrative constitute a wise 
way to deal with death. Cosmological immortalists would largely agree. A multi-scale 
wisdom  towards  mortality  can  even  be  summarized  with  the  following  insight. 
Microcosmically, we owe our life to the death of cells; macroscopically, we owe our 
life to the death of stars. Indeed, we saw that cellular death is essential for our body to 
regenerate itself and it is standard astrophysics that the carbon atoms which constitute 
our  bodies  where  cooked  up  in  second-generation  stars  which  exploded  in 
supernovae.
But how can we imagine to seriously care for such an issue as cosmological 
immortality? We can summarize five steps towards it. The first is to realize that your 
individual death is normal and inevitable in the long term. The second is to develop 
psychologically, and fulfill all your needs to grow the hierarchy of needs up to the 
need of self-transcendence. You then surpass your self to become compassionate and 
identify with the process of cosmic evolution. Even if you accept individual death, 
you still  refuse death as a whole, namely the idea that nothing would continue to 
evolve after  the predictable death of your  body, society,  species,  Sun, galaxy and 
universe. You then set the immortality of the evolutionary process as a goal. I let the 
final words of this section to Freeman Dyson (1988, 121) who wrote: 
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We know very little yet about the potentialities and the destiny of life in the universe. 
In speculating about these matters we follow a great tradition. We are in the same 
company  with  Bernal  and  Newton,  Tsiolkovsky  and  Thomas  Wright.  Letting  our 
imagination wander among the stars, we too may hear whispers of immortality.
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Open Questions
Let us mention a few lines of open questions.
• Developmental  psychology  could  be  enriched  applying  the  insights  of 
Turchin's metasystem transition to individuals, in order to construct a theory of 
“self metasystem transitions” (see Stewart 2001 for a starting point).
• The evolutionary ethics based on virtuous trade-offs can be further developed, 
detailed, compared to Aristotle's virtue ethics. The six trade-off dimensions 
might be reduced to few more fundamental ones.  
• Are there  stages of  immortality,  as  there  are  stages of  morality  (Kohlberg 
1981) or stages of faith (Fowler 1981)? There is already quite some work on 
the conceptions of death through the child's development. We hypothesize that 
different hopes and narratives of immortality will be hold at different stages of 
psychological development. Such a research is a difficult endeavor because 
scientists  must  also  be  clear  on  their  own  status  in  resolving  their  death 
anxiety. Otherwise, they risk to bias experiments and their interpretation. In 
any case, they will not be inclined to do the research, because researchers, like 
every human being, do not like to face death. As Charles Wahl (1958) wrote, 
the study of the fear of death is “conspicuous by its absence.” 
• Immense work remains to be done to build our cosmic culture. More work in 
this area is needed if we want to foster personal development to very high 
levels and develop sustainable societies on the very long term.
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Conclusion
Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature.
And that is because, in the last analysis,
we ourselves are part of nature and therefore 
part of the mystery that we are trying to solve.
Max Planck (1932)
It's time to take a big picture perspective on our intellectual adventure. 
In Part I, I built scaffolding for answering our childishly simple big questions. 
Adults usually fail  to answer such deeply philosophical  questions. And for a very 
good reason, answering the big philosophical questions demands both philosophical 
care and scientific expertise. 
The elucidation of the nature of philosophy and its method is a delicate and 
arduous endeavor because through its history philosophy has entertained more or less 
strong  ties  with  art,  religion  and  science.  As  a  result  of  this  mixing  with  other 
disciplines  and  because  the  scientific  enterprise  becomes  increasingly 
interdisciplinary, I focused on developing the concept of worldview, which holds the 
promise to meaningfully integrate human knowledge.
We saw in Chapter 1 that we all have and need a worldview, even if it  is 
implicit. To make it explicit requires introspection and philosophizing, but the gain in 
perspective is priceless. Doing so, we look at how we look at the world. I argued in 
favor of the tradition of philosophical  systems which strive to build  coherent and 
comprehensive worldviews. 
Philosophy is a rich domain constituted by six dimensions, each concerned 
with different kinds of questions. The descriptive, normative and practical dimensions 
try to answer what is, what is good and bad, and how to act in the world. The practice 
of the dialectical dimension consists in stating and reconstructing issues and a variety 
of positions towards them. It is also essential to avoid forming premature doctrines 
and sinking into dogmatism. The critical dimension of philosophy is valued both by 
continental  and analytical  philosophy. It  is an intellectual  acid that  can attack any 
proposition. Finally, the synthetical dimension is the climax of philosophizing, the one 
aiming  at  coherent  and  comprehensive  worldviews,  but  also  its  most  demanding 
dimension.  To be successfully handled, it requires mastering and juggling all of the 
other five dimensions. 
Furthermore, given that we all develop different worldviews depending on our 
culture,  education  or  psychology,  in  Chapter  2  I  tackled  the  question  of  how to 
compare  worldviews.  Recognizing  six  philosophical  dimensions  and  making  the 
worldview agenda explicit were the first steps. I then developed in detail nine criteria 
to  compare  worldviews,  classified  in  three  broad  categories:  objective  criteria 
(objective consistency, scientificity, scope), subjective criteria (subjective consistency, 
personal utility, emotionality), and intersubjective criteria (intersubjective consistency, 
collective utility,  narrativity). From the criteria and the agenda, I derived worldview 
assessment tests (the  is-ought,  ought-act, and  is-act first-order tests; the  critical and 
dialectical second-order tests; the mixed-questions and first-second-order third-order 
tests; and the we-I, we-it, and it-I tests). 
I see the six dimensions, the worldview agenda, the nine criteria and the seven 
tests  as  a  metaphilosophical  apparatus  to  understand,  improve,  compare,  and 
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constructively criticize different religious,  scientific or philosophical  worldviews. I 
outlined in Chapter 3 the major strengths and weaknesses of those three kinds of 
worldviews, and argued that the way to synthesis is through building comprehensive 
theological or philosophical worldviews.
As William James noted, an important outcome of philosophical activity is to 
give birth to new scientific disciplines. The almost Oedipal stage of a scientist saying 
that  philosophy  is  dead,  that  he  doesn't  need  it,  is  actually  a  sure  sign  that  the 
scientific field can sustain itself. Philosophy has done its job, and the umbilical cord 
can indeed be cut. The second stage of scientific maturity is the realization that killing 
philosophy, like killing one's parent, was finally not such a good idea. At least if we 
want to remain creative, to question the foundations of science and tackle the deepest 
mysteries of nature. 
With hindsight, I proposed giving birth to two new research fields. The first 
regards  the  exploration  of  possible  universes,  up  to  now  chiefly  a  metaphysical 
recreation. I defined the field of artificial cosmogenesis (Chapter 6.3 and 7) in order 
to scientifically study possible universes. The second regards the search for advanced 
extraterrestrials. Here too, the field is usually very speculative and actually most often 
explored not by philosophers or scientists, but by science fiction authors. With the 
starivore  hypothesis  (Chapter  9)  and  the  more  general  field  of  high  energy 
astrobiology,  I  showed  that  existing  knowledge  in  astrophysics  demands  a 
reassessment from an  astrobiological viewpoint. 
In  Part  II,  I  focused  on  the  origin  of  the  universe.  I  first  outlined  seven 
fundamental  challenges  underlying  the  quest  for  ultimate  explanations: 
epistemological, metaphysical, thermodynamical, causal, infinity, free parameters and 
fine-tuning. I only conducted a detailed study on the last two, the free parameters in 
Chapter 5 and the fine-tuning conjecture in Chapter 6. Of course, the awareness of the 
five other challenges was in the background and helpful in clarifying analyses and 
conclusions throughout this thesis. 
In Chapter 4, I applied the concept of the origin to itself, and asked what are 
the  origins  of  the  origin? In other  words,  what  do we cognitively expect  to  be a 
satisfying answer to the ultimate origin of the universe? I argued that our explanations 
fall  into  two  kinds  of  cognitive  attractors:  the  point-explanation  and  the  cycle-
explanation.  An analogy from dynamical  systems theory  clearly  shows that  these 
correspond to the simplest attractors: the fixed point (0-dimensional) and the limit 
cycle  (1-dimensional).  We  have  no  reason  to  exclude  n-dimensional  attractors  or 
strange attractors (noninteger-dimensional)  whose nature are fractal.  Admittedly,  it 
becomes challenging for our brains to think about the origin in such terms.
The major thesis of Chapter 5 was that  free parameters in particle physics 
models  will  be  reduced  to  free  parameters  in  a  cosmological  model.  It  is  a 
fundamental issue in physics and cosmology to reduce or explain those remaining free 
parameters.  I  analyzed  the  issue  with  physical,  mathematical,  computational  and 
biological backgrounds. But are those free parameters further fine-tuned for life or 
complexity? 
To answer this  much debated fine-tuning issue,  I  started with a  review of 
probabilistic, logical and physical fallacies which surround it. Then I distinguished the 
issue with seven other closely related issues:  free parameters,  parameter sensitivity, 
metaphysical issues,  anthropic principles,  observational selection effects,  teleology 
and God's existence.
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I introduced the  Cosmic Evolution Equation as a central conceptual tool to 
study how robust our universe is when it comes to the emergence of complexity and 
to what extent it is fine-tuned compared to other possible universes. The fine-tuning 
issue can then be formulated as: “are fecund universes rare or common in the space of 
possible universes?”. The straightforward way to answer such a difficult question is to 
explore  the  space  of  possible  universes,  through  artificial  cosmogenesis.  Albeit 
extremely  ambitious  and  computationally  intensive,  in  Chapter  7  I  gave  more 
arguments  to  show  why  artificial  cosmogenesis  is  a  natural  outcome  of  future 
scientific activity. Since comparing our universe to other possible ones has just gotten 
under  way,  I  concluded  that  the  fine-tuning  of  our  universe  can  at  most  be  a 
conjecture.
Studying the fine-tuning conjecture is  one thing,  explaining it  is  another.  I 
showed  the  shortcomings  of  eight  classical  explanations:  skepticism,  necessity, 
fecundity, god-of-the-gaps, chance-of-the-gaps, weak-anthropic-principle-of-the-gaps, 
multiverse and design. This left two additional explanations inspired by evolutionary 
theory: Cosmological Natural Selection (CNS) and Cosmological Artificial Selection 
(CAS) that I discussed and critically analyzed in detail in Chapter 8. 
I  started  by  reviewing  the  history  of  cosmological  natural  selection  and 
formulated objections to it.  To remedy these objections, I introduced cosmological 
artificial selection  and  reviewed  its  generally  unknown history.  This  evolutionary 
scenario is my core thesis,  a philosophical speculation aimed at explaining the fine-
tuning issue and the meaning of life and intelligence in the far future universe.
Of course such an ambitious thesis ignites many objections, and I formulated 
and addressed eight of them. I then summarized four different roads leading to CAS 
and further substantiated this scenario by showing that because it is so broad, it has 
limited alternatives. Furthermore, I showed that the nine other alternatives encounter 
problems and difficulties.
Once  the  development  of  intelligence  is  seen  as  a  central  feature  of  our 
universe, we can address the issue Max Planck evokes in the quote above. We need to 
take into consideration ourselves and intelligence in general if we want to solve the 
“ultimate mystery of nature”. However, according to CAS, the greatest outcome of the 
scientific enterprise is not an almost spiritual quest to find the key to the mysteries of 
nature, but actually a more practical activity: to make universes in order to avoid a 
cosmic doom.
CAS finally invites us to focus more on the future of the universe rather than 
on its past. Indeed, we will probably never know what happened at the big bang or 
“before” it. But thinking about the far future leads to increasing understanding of the 
beginning. This led us to the architect point of view: the more we are in a position to 
make a new universe, the more we will understand our own universe. 
We saw that assessing the robustness of the emergence of life and intelligence 
in the universe is a central issue. I showed how it can be tackled with extensive runs 
of  computer  simulations.  However  there  is  a  shortcut,  which  is  to  search  for 
extraterrestrials, or the natural “re-runs” of the tape of life.
In Chapter 9, I thus focused on the search for advanced extraterrestrials. Why 
advanced? Because it would be much more informative, insightful and disruptive to 
find extraterrestrials  two billion years  older,  rather  than finding an extraterrestrial 
bacterium.  On  the  historical  side,  I  clarified  the  fundamental  importance  of 
astrobiology, whose outcome will lead to major scientific worldview changes. On the 
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methodological side, I first debunked many implicit and limiting assumptions in past 
and current search and then summarized and compiled criteria for artificiality.
When  I  started  to  think  about  extraterrestrials,  it  was  as  an  intellectual 
challenge,  trying  to  explore  how CAS could  help.  This  started  without  scientific 
pretension but to my own surprise, such extreme speculations quickly turned into a 
scientific  hypothesis,  the  possible  existence  of  starivores,  civilizations  feeding 
actively on stars. The hypothesis is now ready for rigorous empirical and scientific 
assessment. You certainly remember the open questions section at the end of Chapter 
9,  the  concrete  scientific  research  proposals  I  proposed  and  the  associated  High 
Energy Astrobiology prize. I am looking forward to congratulating the winner of the 
prize. 
Even proving that the hypothesis is wrong, which of course is also entitling to 
the prize, speculating about advanced extraterrestrials gives a unique cosmological 
perspective on humanity and its role in the universe. In the meantime, what about us 
and our values?
In the  last  Chapter  10,  I  outlined  foundations for  a  cosmological  ethics.  I 
focused on very general ethical principles, as much as possible applicable to all living 
things.  I  thus  critically  outlined  thermodynamical,  evolutionary,  cybernetic  and 
developmental  values.  As an application of the cosmological  ethical  framework, I 
discussed in details five conceptions of immortality, from the personal  spiritual and 
individual immortalities, to the transpersonal creative, evolutionary and cosmological 
immortalities.  I  argued  that  the  ultimate  good  is  the  infinite  continuation  of  the 
evolutionary process.
Our  time is  unique.  Humans  are  connecting  via  and  with  more  and  more 
networked and pervasive computers, creating a new level of planetary intelligence 
best  conceptualized as a global brain. We are also on the brink of confirming the 
existence of extraterrestrial life, via astrobiology or high energy astrobiology, which 
would refute biocentrism or intellicentrism. 
This event will change our worldviews forever, and thanks to the cosmological 
perspective developed in Part  III,  we are  ready. But  the scenario of  cosmological 
artificial  selection  also  prepares  us  to  be  ready  for  the  eventual  refutation  of 
universecentrism, the belief that our universe is somehow central and unique. This 
would defeat the very last bastion of anthropocentrism.
Is it  a  tragedy that we will probably die before witnessing such major and 
magnificent evolutionary or worldview transitions? No, because if we become wise 
enough to endorse a cosmological ethics and grow towards a will to cosmological 
immortality, we are also ready to –individually–  die. 
All in all, what is the meaning of your life in a cosmological perspective? Of 
course, it was not the purpose of this thesis to tell you what the direction of your 
personal life should take. Becoming a doctor, a dancer or a high energy astrobiologist 
must be your own choice. Yet, you might want to better harmonize your life with the 
whole of cosmic evolution. This practical shift remains to be worked out, but at least 
we  have  set  some  theoretical  foundations.  So,  what  is  the  meaning  of  life  in  a 
cosmological perspective? It is to replicate at the grandest scale, through an intimate 
connection of intelligence with the universe. 
Instead of seeing the cosmos as hostile to life and intelligence, I would like to 
end with a short poem, Cosmosis, conveying a vision of cosmic evolution as a love 
story; a love story between the cosmos and its precious intelligence:
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To begin, love is ego.
Then opening to alter ego,
now growing to Earth.
Yet, only from the osmosis
between wisdom and the cosmos
ends love in an infinite cosmosis.
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Appendix I – A Cosmic Evolutionary Worldview:
 Short Answers to the Big Questions
Introduction16
Across centuries,  humanity has been wondering about its  existence and its 
place  in  the  universe.  Humans  employed  insights  from  myths,  religions,  art, 
philosophy and science to make sense of the world around them.
However,  in  the  current  era  of  accelerating  scientific,  cultural  and  social 
developments,  all  the  old  certainties  are  put  into  question.  The  confusion  and 
fragmentation associated with this often lead to pessimism and uncertainty, and the 
need for psychological guidance in the form of a clear and reliable system of thought.
This  is  why  it  is  important  to  search  for  a  coherent and comprehensive 
worldview,  by  answering  today the  big questions  of  this  quest  for  understanding. 
Answering them explicitly is an enterprise which is traditionally philosophy's task. 
This took the form of comprehensive and coherent systematic philosophical treatises. 
The great philosophical systems are of this sort. Regrettably, this trend seems to have 
fallen out  of fashion,  since most  of  today's  philosophy is  busy with second-order 
problems (Adler 1965).
In contrast to most of contemporary philosophy's practices, below are tentative 
and provisional responses to first-order philosophical questions. The answers to these 
questions together determine a worldview, i.e. a comprehensive philosophical system, 
a coherent vision of the whole. A worldview gives meaning to our life, and helps us to 
understand the world around us.
Each worldview question would need at least a book to be properly answered. 
More  than  that,  the  most  appropriate  way  to  answer  them  is  with  a  systematic 
philosophical system (e.g. Bunge 1974; Rescher 1992). I do not have that objective 
here. Instead, I provide below very short responses as positions, not arguments. I give 
some main references to the works which influenced me, where the curious reader 
will  be  able  to  find  many  detailed  arguments.  It  is  worth  reminding  the  many 
advantages of explicitly stating one's philosophical position.
First,  these short  responses will  obviously let  the reader  quickly grasp my 
position. The position is stated transparently, straightforwardly, with a few technical 
concepts involved. 
Secondly, the task of answering those questions is a daring effort. I balance 
this great ambition with great caution in answers I provide. They are non-dogmatic, 
provisional,  revisable  and sometimes  falsifiable.  The  responses  proposed here  are 
mixed  philosophical  and  scientific  conjectures  to  make  sense  of  the  world. 
Accordingly, some of them are speculative. They are of course not definitive. In such 
a short format, I also do not make justice of the pros and cons of alternative positions 
(the dialectical dimension of philosophy). It doesn't mean that I'm not aware of them. 
Still, if you think I've missed something important, or a position clearly better than the 
ones presented here, please contact me. As every good philosopher and scientist, I 
very much value and warmly welcome criticism and further reflection you might have 
reading this text.
16 Eventual updates to this “philosophical identity card” can be found at: 
http://www.evodevouniverse.com/wiki/A_Cosmic_Evolutionary_Worldview:_Short_Responses_to
_the_Big_Questions 
315
Thirdly,  this  transparency in responding to  basic  questions allows  efficient 
debate  and  communication.  Many  debates  and  disagreements  get  lost  in  details, 
without touching the heart of issues at stake. This practice of answering first-order 
questions  can  save  an  enormous  amount  of  time  of  confusing  debates,  because 
enduring  disagreements  always  end  up  in  disagreements  about  such  fundamental 
questions.  I  invite  you to do the  same exercise  before reading what  follows,  and 
simply answer the worldview questions for yourself. Feel free to use the following 
space to outline your main worldview answers. Good luck!
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Make Your Worldview Explicit!
(g) Where to start from? 
(a) What is? Ontology (model of being);
(b) Where does it all come from? Explanation (model of the past);
(c) Where are we going? Prediction (model of the future);
(d) What is good and what is evil? Axiology (theory of values);
(e) How should we act? Praxeology (theory of actions).
(f) What is true and what is false? Epistemology (theory of knowledge)
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My Worldview Made Explicit
(g) Where to start from?
Before proposing responses to those big worldview questions, here are some 
preliminary  considerations,  laying  bare  how  I  start  this  enterprise.  The 
(meta)philosophical framework and method are mainly inspired by the works of Adler 
(1965; 1993), Rescher (1985; 2001; 2006) and Bahm (1979).
If I had to choose a philosophical stream, I would say I am mostly influenced 
by systems philosophy (esp. Laszlo 1972b; Heylighen 2000b; and 2010b on which this 
text is based). To summarize it in one sentence, its “data come from the empirical 
sciences; its problems from the history of philosophy; and its concepts from modern 
systems  research”  (Laszlo  1972a,  12).  We  may  add  to  systems  theory an 
interdisciplinary  problem solving approach and  evolutionary-developmental  theory, 
applied on many scales (Vidal 2008a).
(i) The worldview agenda
I start with the philosophical agenda described in Chapter 1. 
(ii) The metaphilosophical criteria
Once the questions are  asked, we obviously need to answer them and use 
evaluation standards to assess their strengths and weaknesses. I developed in Chapter 
2,  nine criteria and a battery of tests to compare and assess different worldviews. 
Which criteria do I value most?
The  aim  in  Chapter  2  was  descriptive.  Now,  how  do  I  use  the  criteria 
prescriptively to answer the agenda of the worldview questions? Here, I use in priority 
objective  criteria (objective  consistency,  scientificity and  scope)  to  construct  a 
coherent  and comprehensive  cosmological  worldview.  In  this  cosmic  evolutionary 
worldview the scope in level depth is maximally wide in time and space, concerning 
the whole universe. As objective criteria are maximally satisfied, I turn to subjective 
and  intersubjective criteria  to  make  the  worldview  successfully  applicable  in  the 
conduct of a good life and in the organization of a good society. The pursuit of a good 
life and a good society is then harmonized with cosmic evolution.
(a) What is?
As  a  preliminary  remark,  I  am  generally  skeptic  with  reductionistic 
ontological statements. Reality is complex, evolving and multi-layered, and different 
ontologies  are  more  or  less  appropriate  to  analyze  and  solve  different  problems. 
Dooyeweerd's  (1953) fifteen  aspects,  although  static  and  not  dynamic,  offer  an 
example of a non-reductionistic ontology.
My ontological commitment goes towards systems theory, which aims to offer 
a universal language for sciences  (e.g. von Bertalanffy 1968; Boulding 1956). It is 
also very fruitful  for philosophizing  (e.g.  Laszlo 1972a).  It  is  best  combined with 
evolutionary  reasonings,  which  gives  rise  to  an  evolutionary-systemic  approach 
(Heylighen 2000b).
I  choose  an  ontology of  actions  and agents,  i.e.  elementary  processes  and 
relations, not independent, static pieces of matter (in the spirit of Whitehead (1930), 
Lazslo (1972a), Jantzch (1980), etc). Out of their interactions, organization emerges. 
Through evolutionary processes, these systems become more complex and adaptive, 
they  start  to  exhibit  cognition  or  intelligence,  i.e.  the  ability  to  make  informed 
choices.
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(b) Where does it all come from?
Modern  science  explains  –at  least  in  parts–   the  harmony  within  nature, 
connecting physical, chemical, biological and technological evolution (e.g. Chaisson 
2001;  De  Duve  1995).  Regarding  the  origin  of  the  universe,  although  Big  Bang 
models are a success of modern cosmology, the initial conditions remain mysteriously 
fine-tuned (e.g. Leslie 1989; Leslie 1998; Rees 1999; Davies 2008). In Chapter 6, I 
concluded  that  fine-tuning  is  hard  to  prove,  and  that  at  most  it  is  a  conjecture. 
Whatever possible explanation we favor, we need to cope with difficult metaphysical 
choices  (Vidal  2012a).  The  scenario  of  Cosmological  Artificial  Selection  (CAS) 
developed in Chapter 8 connects the origin and future of the universe with a role for 
intelligent life (Vidal 2008b; 2010a; 2012a).
(c) Where are we going?
Modern  science  has  shown  that  there  are  two  trends  at  play  in  cosmic 
evolution. First, a tendency to produce more order, with the emergence of more and 
more  complex  systems,  from  galaxies,  stars,  planets,  to  plants,  humans  and  our 
technological society (Chaisson 2001; Kurzweil 2006; Morowitz 2002; Livio 2000). 
Secondly,  the  second law of  thermodynamics  applied  to  the  universe  as  a  whole 
implies  that  in  the  far-future  the  universe  will  irreversibly  go  toward  a  state  of 
maximum disorder, or heat death (e.g. F. C. Adams and Laughlin 1997). The outcome 
of those two opposite trends remains unsettled.
The  discovery  of  the  heat  death  generated  a  widely  spread  pessimistic 
worldview which sees the existence of humanity as purposeless and accidental in the 
universe (B. Russell 1923; S. Weinberg 1993b). With Darwin (1887b, 70), I estimate 
that  “it  is  an  intolerable  thought  that  he  [man]  and  all  other  sentient  beings  are 
doomed to complete annihilation after such long-continued slow progress”.
Hopefully, the first trend will prove to be more promising. The process of on-
going complexification and adaptation can reasonably be extrapolated towards the 
future. This allows us to predict that in middle course, conflict and friction within 
human  society  will  diminish,  cooperation  will  expand  to  the  planetary  level, 
individual and collective intelligence will spectacularly augment.
Generally,  more  advanced  biological  organisms  build  more  and  more 
sophisticated representations of their  surroundings  (P.  Russell  1995). The  research 
field  of  artificial  cosmogenesis pushes  this  trend  to  its  limit,  to  the  point  where 
intelligent life constructs a model of the whole universe. This modeling capacity can 
be used to understand not only our own universe, but also other possible universes 
(see  section  6.3  The  Cosmic  Evolution  Equation,  p122).  The  radical  proposal  of 
Cosmological Artificial Selection (CAS) developed in Chapter 8 is that in order to 
avoid  the  effect  of  the  second law of  thermodynamics,  those  toy-universes  could 
become a blueprint for a new universe (Vidal 2008b; Vidal 2010a; Vaas 2012; Vidal 
2012a). 
This  scenario  is  a  mixed  scientific  and  philosophical  speculation.  It  is 
philosophical because it involves a role for intelligent life and so the success of CAS 
depends on our conscious choices for the future of cosmic evolution. It thus requires 
an axiological dimension, proper to philosophy and that we explored in Chapter 10. 
CAS has  also  scientific  aspects  since  its  general  perspective  leads  to  far-
reaching  consequences  and  reasonings  to  search  and  maybe  find  advanced 
extraterrestrials. In order to confirm or infirm the existence starivores I introduced in 
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Chapter  9,  we  must  scientifically  approach  the  question  within  the  field  of  high 
energy astrobiology. 
(d) What is good and what is evil?
The inner drive or implicit  value governing all  life  is fitness,  i.e.  survival, 
growth, development and reproduction. From a human perspective, this fundamental 
value includes a  sustainable  quality-of-life,  well-being or  happiness.  Evolutionary, 
developmental, thermodynamical, psychological, and cybernetic theories allow us to 
derive  a  number  of  more  concrete  objectives  from  this  overarching  value,  i.e. 
properties  that  are  necessary  for  long-term  well-being.  These  include  openness, 
diversity, intelligence, knowledge, cooperation, freedom, personal control, health, and 
a coherent and comprehensive worldview.
In the longer term, fitness implies increasing adaptiveness and evolvability 
beyond human society as we know it. Actions that promote these values with the less 
friction as possible are intrinsically good, actions that suppress them are bad.
As our psychology grows in higher stages of development, we make sure our 
values do not conflict with higher evolutionary systems. Not only do I try to improve 
my happiness,  but  my happiness  becomes more and more  tightly linked with my 
family, my country, society, humanity, the planet, and the cosmos. Ultimately I should 
act being aware and compassionate with such a hierarchy, combining the values of my 
own life with the sustainability of larger and larger evolutionary systems.
At heart, humans have a will to immortality  (e.g. Turchin 1990; Lifton and 
Olson  2004). In  my  worldview,  it  takes  the  form  of  an  endless,  infinite  cosmic 
evolution. Indeed, the metaphysical and speculative part of Cosmological Artificial 
Selection  translates  this  will  for  immortality  in  an  infinite  process  of  evolution 
sustained by intelligence making offspring universes (Vidal 2008b; 2010a; 2012; esp. 
Vidal 2012a).
(e) How should we act?
To maximally achieve these values in real life, we will need to overcome a 
variety  of  problems  and  obstacles.  Cognitive  sciences,  cybernetics,  and  complex 
systems science suggest various tools and strategies to tackle complex problems, and 
to  stimulate  self-organization  so  as  to  be  as  efficient  as  possible.  These  methods 
include feedback control, anticipation, hierarchical decomposition, heuristic search, 
stigmergic coordination, extended mind and memetic engineering.
At  the  level  of  society,  these  methods  define  a  strategy  for  effective 
governance, for the maximization of collective intelligence, and the minimization of 
friction and conflicts.
There is a trend in cosmic evolution to do ever more with less energy, space 
and time (Smart 2009). Using less energy and resources to achieve more is also at the 
heart of productivity principles. On a personal productivity side, The Getting Things 
Done method combines high productivity with low-stress (Allen 2001; Heylighen and 
Vidal 2008).
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(f) What is true and what is false? 
Let us note that this is a second-order question which concerns knowledge 
about knowledge. Also, the domains of epistemology and ontology are closely related. 
We can divide this question in the following two questions (Heylighen 2000b, 15):
• What is knowledge? This question defines the domain of epistemology.
Science can be seen as a natural outcome of the more general evolutionary pressure to 
get  more and more accurate knowledge  (D. T. Campbell  1974). Knowledge is the 
existence in a system of a model, which allows that system to make predictions, that 
is, to anticipate processes in its environment. Thus, the system gets control over its 
environment. Such a model is a construction, not an objective reflection of outside 
reality (Turchin 1993; Heylighen 1997a).
• What is truth?
There are no absolute truths. The truth of a theory is merely its power to produce 
predictions  that  are  confirmed  by  observations  (Turchin  1993).  The  scientific 
enterprise is one of conjectures and refutations  (Popper 1962) and there is a natural 
selection of ideas, theories, which give more power, i.e. prediction and control (D. T. 
Campbell 1974).
Ultimately,  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  phenomenon  of  science  in  this 
pragmatic,  constructive  and evolutionary  epistemology?  It  is  not  to  seek  an  ideal 
“truth”, but a pragmatic goal of acquiring knowledge. In the scenario of CAS, it is to 
build a  model  of  our  and other  possible  universes  that  could become,  with some 
variation,  a  blueprint  for  a  future  universe,  thereby escaping a  predicable  cosmic 
doom.
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Appendix II – Argumentative Maps
This appendix presents the logical structure of the main arguments presented 
in this thesis. The core problems of our concern are mapped in the first map and the 
proposed solution in the second map. To facilitate readability, I present two versions 
of each map, a collapsed and a expanded version.
This approach provides an externalization of reasoning so that arguments can 
be clearly visualized. This brings many benefits, such as: 
• Allowing  the  reader  to  quickly  and  clearly  grasp  the  logic  of  the 
argumentation.
• Presenting an alternative structure of the content of the thesis. The table of 
content and the abstract tend to present a rhetorical and less logical structure.
• Allowing  the  possibility  of  a  constructive  discussion  of  assumptions  and 
deductions. For example, a critique can say “the core problem is not P but Q”; 
or “I disagree that hypothesis X leads to Y, you need implicit hypothesis Z, ...” 
or “hypothesis W is wrong because”;  or “there is  another solution to your 
problem, which is...” etc.
It should be clear however that reading those maps can not replace the reading 
of the thesis. Only the core reasoning is mapped, often in a simplified way. It also 
represents what I consider the core issues and proposed solutions, and has no ambition 
of comprehensiveness. Many more arguments are developed and discussed in the text. 
You as a reader can distill many other insights from the text. I am not claiming that 
these trees should be considered as my dogmatic position. I am in principle open to 
other interpretation and emphasizes. Those having worked with argumentative maps 
know too well that drawing them is first of all a basis for continuous improvement. 
To draw those maps I used some of the insights of Eliyahu Goldratt's Theory 
of  Constraints  (TOC)  and  its  “Thinking  Process”  (see  Goldratt  and  Cox  1984; 
Goldratt Institute 2001; Scheinkopf 1999). The TOC is a well proven management 
technique  widely  used  in  finance,  distribution,  project  management,  people 
management, strategy, sales and marketing. I see it  and use it as part of a generic 
problem solving toolbox, where causes and effects are mapped in a transparent way. 
In  this  TOC  framework,  three  fundamental  questions  are  employed  to  tackle  a 
problem:
(1) What to change? 
A core problem is identified, leading to undesirable effects, and mapped in a “Current 
Reality Tree” (CRT).
(2) To what to change?
A solution is proposed and mapped in a “Future Reality Tree” (FRT), which leads to 
desirable effects.
(3) How to cause the change?
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A plan is developed to change from CRT to FRT. This third step involves drawing a 
transition  tree.  Such  trees  are  important  for  practical  problems,  but  in  the  more 
theoretical context of this thesis, I did not map it. 
To tackle the problem in practice, six important questions should be addressed, 
constituting the “six layers of resistance to change”. These questions can be used to 
trigger discussions (Goldratt Institute 2001, 6): 
(1) Has the right problem been identified? 
(2) Is this solution leading us in the right direction?
(3) Will the solution really solve the problems?
(4) What could go wrong with the solution? Are there any negative side-
effects?
(5) Is this solution implementable?
(6) Are we all really up to this?
The following pages map the core problems (CRT) and my core arguments and thesis 
(FRT). Note that in the collapsed CRT, I put chronological links between the different 
worldview questions so that the diagram follows the linear order of this work. You 
can also consult the maps in their original expandable-collapsable-zoomable format 
thanks to the free Flying Logic reader software and the maps17.
17 http://flyinglogic.com/download/   for the software as well as 
http://student.vub.ac.be/~clvidal/writings/Vidal-CRT-PhD.logic and 
http://student.vub.ac.be/~clvidal/writings/Vidal-FRT-PhD.logic for the CRT and FRT maps.
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Appendix III – Revision History
This section will track the main changes of this document, as is practiced in 
software development. I will be glad to acknowledge you here if you help to correct 
or improve this essay in one way or an other. 
Revision Date Description
1.0 12/2012 First public version.
1.0.1 05/01/2013 Abstract improved; thanks to Martin Monperrus! ArXiv v1
1.0.2 10/01/2013 The distinction in section 6.1 between multiverse fine-tuning 
argument and theological  fine-tuning argument  was made, 
thanks to Jonathan Colvin.
1.0.3 16/01/2013 Typos fixed. 
1.1 04/02/2013 Abstracts  at  the  beginning  of  each  chapter  added,  more 
typos fixed, definition of starivores made more accurate with 
the word “actively”. Reference to (R. L. Kuhn 2007) added 
to  the  metaphysical  challenge.  Link  to  original 
argumentative maps added. 
1.1.1 06/02/2013 A short  paragraph  on  directed  panspermia  as  a  way  to 
achieve  cosmological  immortality  was  added.  Figure 
numbering problem of version 1.1 fixed. 
1.1.2 12/04/2013 Typos  corrected.  The  gamma  ray  resiliency  research 
proposal was corrected (at the end of Chapter 9). Gamma 
rays  are  actually  unaffected  by  magnetic  fields,  so  other 
resiliency mechanisms have yet to be found, different from a 
strong magnetic field. Thanks to Bernard Goossens!
2.0 06/06/2013 Version after official PhD defense at the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel.  New  cover.  Reflections  on  different  kinds  of 
speculations  were  developed  in  the  preface.  An  open 
question  about  the  way  to  philosophical  worldviews  was 
added.  My  conclusion  on  the  fine-tuning  conjecture  was 
expanded to  contrast  it  with  the  positions  of  Stenger  and 
Barnes.  The  non-absolutist  aspect  of  cosmological  ethics 
was emphasized more in Chapter 10. Criticisms to Weikart 
were added. More typos were fixed, and other improvements 
were made. ArXiv v2.
Table 20 - Revision history
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